Characteristics of Successful Models for Multi-stakeholder Partnerships to Improve Land Governance in Developing Countries

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I. Executive Summary

The Global Donor Working Group on Land (GDWGL) commissioned this study to identify successful land governance partnership models between developed and developing countries. Three MSPs were selected for the study: the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (New Alliance); the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT); and the MCC Mozambique Land Tenure Services Project.

Multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) increasingly are being used in initiatives to promote sustainable development in a wide variety of sectors. Not surprisingly, this has led to a number of efforts over the past 15 years or more to define the characteristics of effective partnerships, often in the context of assessing the success or failure of individual MSPs. Based on a review of some of the major partnership and desk research and key informant interviews on the three selected land governance MSPs, this study identifies several characteristics of effective successful MSPs:

1. The partnership has specific, well defined objectives with clear and measurable outputs and deliverables, and a defined time-line with benchmarks.
2. The objectives and activities take into account and are aligned with the activities of other donors, in part to avoid duplication of efforts and also to reduce the burden on host-country governments.
3. There is a clear governance structure and strategy or management plan that is likely to lead to transparent decision-making and efficient and effective use of resources.
4. The partnership structure and processes allow sufficient flexibility to react to changed circumstances.
5. The partnership is a truly inclusive multi-stakeholder initiative that equally values the contributions of all stakeholders and enables all of them to be actively engaged.
6. Processes for effective monitoring and evaluation and a transparent reporting are in place.
7. There are adequate resources to achieve the objectives. This includes sufficient core funding for the human resources required to manage and operate the MSP as well as money to pay for programming.
8. The achievements of the partnership are sustainable, especially in terms of host-country buy-in, ownership, capacity-building and institution-building.

Each of the selected MSPs was analyzed in light of these 8 characteristics. Each MSP received a score for each of the 8 characteristics. LIFT and MCC Mozambique scored better than the New Alliance.

The study led to the following observations:

- Although a sample size of three studies is too small to permit one to draw many concrete conclusions, both LIFT and MCC Mozambique better embody the eight identified characteristics of effective MSPs than the New Alliance. And those projects appear to have made better progress towards achieving their objectives, at least suggesting a relationship between certain partnership structures and project outcomes.

- Even a very well-structured partnership—one with all eight characteristics—is not guaranteed to succeed. The best structure will not be able to overcome an unsupportive political environment or ineffective implementation on the ground. That said, it does appear that some of the MSP models studied are more likely than others to feature the characteristics of effective partnerships.
The characteristics of effective MSPs would appear to apply to all development sectors. However, the political, institutional and economic complexities surrounding land tenure may mean that two of the characteristics—effective multi-stakeholder engagement and country buy-in (included under sustainability)—are more important and difficult to achieve than with other sectors. Thus, land governance programs may wish to particularly rely on partnership models with strong stakeholder input and government support.

Many of the most important aspects of potentially successful land governance projects that prospective donors should always look for—such as whether appropriate social and environmental safeguards are in place—are not directly related to any particular MSP model.

The limitations of the study are many. These include the inclusion of only 3 projects and the fact that only one of the three was focused solely on land governance. Therefore, further research would be beneficial.

II. Background and Objective of the Study

Formed in 2013 within the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, the Global Donor Working Group on Land (GDWGL) aims “to improve land governance transparency and enhance the coordination of efforts undertaken by its bilateral and multilateral donor members with each other and with key external government, non-governmental and private sector stakeholders at the global, regional, and national level” (TOR at 1). The 2015 work plan prepared by the GDWGL includes a study to identify successful land governance partnership models between developed and developing countries. This is that study.

More specifically:

The assignment’s specific task is to review the existing evidence on the success of national-level partnership approaches in supporting international land-related instruments and initiatives or adopting international agreements and standards to improve national and local land governance … and to make broad recommendations for responsible donor interventions in supporting the development of partnerships to drive maximum improvement of land governance at all levels.¹

Findings of the study are to inform a “strategy for future GDWGL engagement on land around an informed and targeted partnership approach” (TOR at 3).

III. Methodology and Organization

The content of this paper is derived from desk research and key informant interviews. The desk research included background research on multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) generally and on those that have sought to improve food security, agricultural productivity and land governance in developing countries. The research included a review of documents and reports describing the structure, objectives, activities and results of a number of MSPs that were considered for inclusion in the study. Three MSPs were selected.²

¹ TOR at 3.
² While more than 3 would have been desirable the TOR limited the total number of key informant interviews to 15. The consultant and the GDWGL liaison for this study agreed that 3 MSPs with differing structures should be studied in order to permit a reasonably broad range of stakeholder interviews for each.
A number of factors were considered in selecting the partnerships for this study: (1) the MSP governance structure; (2) number of donors; (3) number of countries involved; (4) whether the scope was national, regional or international; (5) when the project took place (the more recent the better); (6) the desire for geographic diversity; (7) the extent of private sector involvement; and (8) the likely availability of a range of knowledgeable people for interviews. Thus, the study is not limited only to very broad MSPs that cross sectors or include multiple geographies, such as the “multi-stakeholder initiatives” analyzed in a recent paper by the Global Development Incubator (GDI 2015).

Subject to the overall limitation of 15 interviews, an attempt was made to speak to a range of people representing different sectors: donor government, host government, civil society, technical consultants and the private sector. The interviews were conducted by telephone or internet-based telecommunication. In one case the interaction was conducted entirely by email at the request of the interviewee. In some cases, the oral interview was supplemented by email follow-ups. Many informants requested that they not be quoted. Therefore, while all informants are identified in Annex 1, none of the findings in this paper are attributed to a particular person.3

As the ultimate objective of this study is to inform the development of a partnerships strategy for the GDWGL, the body of the paper begins in Section IV with the characteristics of successful MSPs. Section V provides a brief overview of the objectives, structures and results of the three MSPs selected for this study: the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition; the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund; and the MCC Mozambique Land Tenure Services Project. In Section VI, the paper discusses the extent to which each MSP embodies the eight identified characteristics of effective partnerships. The last section offers some closing observations, sets forth some of the limitations of the study and makes suggestions for additional research.

**IV. Characteristics of Successful Multi-Stakeholder Sustainable Development Partnerships**

MSPs increasingly are being used in initiatives to promote sustainable development. This is the case in a wide range of sectors, including health care, renewable energy development, sustainable development of particular agricultural products, the preservation of forests and, of course, land governance.

Strategic alliances between business, government and civil society are a growing feature of both developed and emerging economies. Such multi-stakeholder partnerships are necessary because it is increasingly clear that no one sector in society can deliver the complexities of sustainable development alone.4

No doubt reflecting the increasing prevalence of MSPs, there have been a number of efforts to identify the components of effective sustainable development partnerships since at least the start of this century. For example, a set of principles for MSPs was produced in Bali in 2002 in preparation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development. These principles were updated in 2003 during the 11th Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development (ODI 2003; Dodds 2015).

These and other principles and guidelines on MSPs have spawned a number of studies assessing the successes and failures of MSPs to date. The results are decidedly mixed. One review in 2014 found that 38% of 330 partnerships studied were either inactive or had no measurable outputs.

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3 The author has kept and will maintain notes of all interviews.
4 Overseas Development at 7.
Twenty-six percent of the partnerships had undertaken activities not directly related to their stated objectives. This was attributed in part to the fact that many MSPs have vague goals combined with poor monitoring and reporting mechanisms, factors that have undermined the effectiveness of many MSPs (Dodds 2015).

Not surprisingly, researchers and analysts have also sought to determine the characteristics of effective MSPs that seek to promote sustainable development.\(^5\) The time available for this study did not permit a comprehensive review and analysis of more than a few of such studies. However, based on the partnership literature, the desk research on the three selected land governance MSPs and the key informant interviews, one can fairly confidently list several characteristics of successful MSPs. Those characteristics are:

1. The partnership has specific, well defined objectives with clear and measurable outputs and deliverables and a defined time-line with benchmarks.
2. The objectives and activities take into account and are aligned with the activities of other donors, in part to avoid duplication of efforts and also to reduce the burden on host-country governments.
3. There is a clear governance structure and strategy or management plan that is likely to lead to transparent decision-making and efficient and effective use of resources.
4. The partnership structure and processes allow sufficient flexibility to react to changed circumstances.
5. The partnership is a truly inclusive multi-stakeholder initiative that equally values the contributions of all stakeholders and enables all of them to be actively engaged.
6. Processes for effective monitoring and evaluation and a transparent reporting are in place.
7. There are adequate resources to achieve the objectives. This includes sufficient core funding for the human resources required to manage and operate the MSP as well as money to pay for programming (ODI 2003; GDI 2015).
8. The achievements of the partnership are sustainable, especially in terms of host-country buy-in, ownership, capacity-building and institution-building.

The extent to which the selected MSPs reflect these qualities is discussed in section V after the selected MSPs are introduced in the next section.

V. Description of the Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships Selected for this Study

A. The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition

Background and Objectives. Launched in 2012, the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition is a joint initiative of ten African governments,\(^6\) the G8 (now the G7) and other donors, and the private sector. The New Alliance seeks to encourage and facilitate responsible private investment in African agriculture that benefits smallholder farmers and reduces hunger and poverty. Its specific objectives are to:

- Reaffirm continued donor commitment to reducing poverty and hunger.
- Accelerate implementation of key components of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).
- Leverage the potential of responsible private investment to support development goals.
- Help lift 50 million people out of poverty in Africa by 2022.

\(^5\) See, e.g., Dodds 2015 and Martens 2007.
\(^6\) Initially there were 3 African countries in the New Alliance. This has since increased to 10 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Senegal).
Achieve sustained inclusive, agriculture-led growth in Africa.7

In the New Alliance partnership model, African governments commit to specific policy reforms and investments, donor governments promise specific amounts of aid funding and private companies make investment commitments. The commitments are memorialized in Cooperation Framework Agreements (CFAs) that reflect the overriding goal of implementing African national food security strategies in the context of the CAADP, and through non-binding Letters of Intent (LOIs) from private companies.

Some of the policy commitments made by African governments specifically involve efforts to improve land governance. For example, Tanzania set out to provide documentation of land rights for smallholders and others in designated regions of the country (New Alliance 2012a). Burkina Faso made a similar commitment (New Alliance 2012). Others, such as Nigeria’s CFA, are silent on improving land governance (New Alliance 2012b).

Structure and Governance. The New Alliance is a loosely structured MSP without a formal governing body or secretariat. It is guided informally by a Leadership Council which consists of high-level representatives from African governments, development partners, the African and multinational private sectors, civil society,8 and farmers’ organizations. The Leadership Council is led each year by three co-conveners, most recently the African Union Commission, the World Economic Forum and the United States Government (New Alliance 2014).9

The activities of the partners are governed primarily by the terms of the Cooperation Framework Agreements (CFAs) and by the LOIs signed by private sector partners. The CFAs and LOIs set forth commitments to specific policy reforms and investments, by the African governments, donors and companies alike. Parties agree to hold themselves accountable through annual progress reports.

It is entirely up to each stakeholder to determine its New Alliance undertakings and how to implement them. Thus, each African government decides how it will carry out its policy commitments and donor governments determine when and whether to carry out their funding commitments, most of which are expressly conditioned on the availability of funds. Similarly, private sector partners sign non-binding LOIs detailing their intended investments.

The New Alliance works closely with the Grow Africa partnership. Grow Africa was established in 2011 by the African Union Commission, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and the World Economic Forum to galvanize greater private investment in and financing for African agriculture in support of the CAADP. (One key informant described the New Alliance and Grow Africa as “Siamese twins.”) The New Alliance seeks to leverage the Grow Africa platform as a vehicle for engaging with the private sector in Africa. Grow Africa worked with the African governments and companies to facilitate the development of some of the LOIs. It is also collecting information on the extent to which the private investments are moving beyond the LOI stage to actual implementation.

The New Alliance coordination function is transitioning to the African Union Commission. Three staff members have recently been placed in a New Alliance support unit in the commission for that purpose with funding from USAID (New Alliance 2015).

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7 New Alliance website (https://new-alliance.org/about)
8 Oxfam initially served on the Council but it has yet to be replaced by another international NGO.
9 The Leadership Council began as an informal gathering of leaders but in 2014 the New Alliance formalized it somewhat by developing terms of reference for the Council.
Results to Date. Measured against the original goals of the New Alliance it is largely too early to draw any conclusions about its success, especially with respect to its goal of lifting 50 million people in Africa out of poverty by 2022. In its 2014 annual report the New Alliance characterized its achievements as follows:

The New Alliance is accelerating action and achieving results. In just two years, the partnership has grown from three to 10 African countries, and 180 African and international companies have signed Letters of Intent (LOIs) to invest $8 billion in African agriculture, $1.1 billion of which was realized in 2013. Private investments have created nearly 37,000 jobs and, including investments facilitated by the Grow Africa partnership in Kenya and Rwanda, have reached 3 million smallholders. African governments have advanced or completed 95 percent of policy commitments scheduled for completion by mid-2014 and development partners have disbursed $2.1 billion, or 72 percent of expected funding to date, building on their L’Aquila commitments.\(^\text{10}\)

Through mid-2015, the partners continued to make overall, if widely inconsistent, progress. In general, African governments are behind on fulfilling their various policy commitments, although there have been some very real successes. Donors disbursed $3.2 billion in 2014, although here, too, some donors provided less than the amount to which they have committed while others actually exceeded their targets. Just over half of the companies reported on progress in implementing their LOIs with 80% being either on plan or facing minor implementation challenges (New Alliance 2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Land Policy Commitments</th>
<th>Progress Towards Achieving Commitments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 on track; 1 behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4 of 5 behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 of 6 behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 on track; 1 behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 apparently behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Good progress but both behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Both behind schedule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the African partner countries have struggled to fulfill their land and resource rights commitments on time: for example, only 27% of such commitments due to be fulfilled by June 2015 were completed (New Alliance 2015). Country-specific results show that some of the

\(^{10}\) New Alliance 2014 at 4.
countries have made progress in carrying out their land governance commitments, but all are behind schedule on at least some policy actions, as detailed in Table 1.

In addition, the GDWGL commissioned the development of a tool for the private sector to use in carrying out due diligence and managing risks arising from land-based investments in agriculture (New Alliance 2015). Grow Africa is charged with distributing it to companies and facilitating its use and is attempting to do so.

B. Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund

Background and Objectives. The Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) is a multi-donor trust fund operating in Myanmar. It is jointly funded by Australia, Denmark, the European Union, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, United States and, most recently, Mitsubishi Corporation. Thus far, donors have provided a total of $210 million. Originally established as a five-year fund, LIFT has been extended twice, most recently through 2018 (LIFT 2014).

LIFT’s self-described vision “is to be a collective and influential voice for innovation and learning, and to provide a platform for enhanced policy engagement on sustainable agriculture, food security and rural development.” It seeks “to contribute to sustainably reduce the number of people in Myanmar living in poverty and hunger.” It does so by “focusing on interventions that increase income, food availability, utilization and stability of access to food.”

At the outset in 2009, LIFT appears not to have established specific benchmarks to use for measuring progress in reaching these outcomes. In its first annual report, it stated that it hoped its work would “lead to increased food availability, income generation opportunities and food use for 1 – 1.5 million target beneficiaries” without specifying a target date (LIFT 2009). By 2010 the fund had established a list of outputs and specific annual targets for each output in support of the overall goal of increasing the food availability and incomes of 1-1.5 million people (LIFT 2010). When the new strategy was adopted in 2014 LIFT embraced a new goal of reducing by half the number of people in Myanmar living in poverty. (No target date was established.) The revised goal was accomplished by a new set of outcomes, outputs and numerical targets linked to specific dates (LIFT 2014b; LIFT 2015).

Accordingly, LIFT currently seeks to achieve 4 outcomes:

- Increased incomes of rural households.
- Increased resilience of poor rural households and communities to shocks, stresses and adverse trends.
- Improved nutrition of women, men and children.
- Improved policies and effective public expenditure for pro-poor rural development.

LIFT’s primary function is to provide funding to implementing partners - who are local and international NGOs, research and academic bodies, United Nations agencies and private sector organizations – in order to achieve the four outcomes listed above. Its recent support for efforts to improve land governance includes funding another multi-stakeholder group known as the Land Core Group, a UN Habitat program that supports improved land administration and a research project by GRET on rural land issues. Otherwise, LIFT has not been directly involved in the development of land policies. It is, however, developing internal technical expertise on land (among other subjects) as it increasingly provides technical assistance to development partners in addition to funding (LIFT 2014).

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11 LIFT 2014a.
12 LIFT 2015.
Structure and Governance. LIFT is governed by a Donor Consortium and a Fund Board. Each donor is represented in the Donor Consortium which provides donors with a forum that enables them to conduct a joint annual review of LIFT and otherwise generally oversee LIFT’s activities. LIFT is managed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) which serves as the Fund Manager. Each donor enters into a contribution agreement with the Fund Manager (LIFT 2014; LIFT 2014a).

The Fund Board is a decision-making executive committee consisting of 5-8 members appointed by the Donor Consortium. It meets three times each year. The Fund Board provides strategic leadership for and oversight of LIFT’s activities based on authority delegated by the Donor Consortium. With advice from the Fund Manager the Fund Board determines how LIFT’s funds will be allocated with (LIFT 2014a).

As the Fund Manager, UNOPS is responsible for managing the Fund on behalf of the Fund Board. It is guided by the decisions of the Fund Board and responsible for carrying out the strategy approved by the Board (LIFT 2014a).

Finally, a Senior Consultation Group has recently been formed. It is comprised of senior representatives of the Government of Myanmar, implementing partners, civil society and the private sector. Its charge is to advise the Fund Board on strategic priorities and to review LIFT’s implementation and performance (LIFT 2015a).

Results to Date. According to LIFT:

More than 1.1 million people have better food security, and 133,000 poor farming families have increased their agricultural productivity. 216,000 people have accessed affordable credit from LIFT-funded microfinance providers, which helps to explain the increase in agricultural productivity.\(^{13}\)

With respect to land governance, the Land Core Group (with primary funding from LIFT) has come to have a significant and respected voice in the development of land policies in Myanmar. It has organized stakeholder workshops attended by a wide variety of interested parties, including representatives of the government. LCG funds research on a range of issues related to land tenure. And it has also contributed to the ongoing development of a new National Land Use Policy that appears to be nearing completion. The UN Habitat land administration project (known as “LAMP”) has made progress in improving government land administration capacity and implementation.

C. MCC Mozambique Land Tenure Services Project

Background and Objectives. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is an independent agency created by the U.S. Congress. Its broad goal is to fight global poverty, primarily through increased economic growth.

In Mozambique, the MCC Land Tenure Services Project:

Was designed to address the issue of land insecurity and access, by improving the policy and regulatory framework and helping specific beneficiaries better understand the processes and requirements for registered land rights. The project comprised three mutually reinforcing activity areas:

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\(^{13}\) LIFT 2014 at 2.
1. Supporting an improved policy environment, including addressing implementation problems for the existing land law, and engaging in regulatory review to improve upon it;
2. Building the institutional capacity to implement policies and provide quality public land-related services; and
3. Facilitating access to land use by helping people and business with
   a. Clear information on land rights and access;
   b. Resolution of conflict with more predictable and speedy resolution of land and commercial disputes, which in turn will create better conditions for investment and business development; and
   c. Registering their grants of land use, whether in the form of land titles to long-term or perpetual-use rights.  

To some extent, the project picked up where a predecessor project, ITC Mozambique, had left off with respect to community and individual land titling. MCC largely adopted the ITC approach and model. This 5-year project ended in 2013.

Structure and Governance. MCC has developed a well-defined model and structure for the projects it funds. MCC’s Board examines a country’s performance on several policy indicators to determine which are eligible for funding. Broadly speaking, to qualify countries must demonstrate their commitment to good governance, economic freedom and investing in their citizens.

Funding is mostly in the form of 5-year grants known as compacts. The five-year period is fixed and usually cannot be extended. That five-year term obviously affects what MCC will fund and what it will not as some objectives do not fit well within a five-year timeline.

MCC administers its funding through a “Millennium Challenge Account” (MCA). A country that is awarded a compact is required to establish a local MCA-accountable entity to manage and oversee all aspects of implementation. MCC requires rigorous and transparent monitoring of the funds and imposes strict fiscal and procedural requirements and reporting obligations. Funds do not flow directly to the government or the MCA entity. Rather, MCC pays bills submitted to it by the MCA entity.

The MCA entity is responsible for direct contractor oversight and overall project performance. It is overseen by a board consisting of government ministers and sometimes private sector representatives, depending on the project. The board sets the strategic direction of a project, limited by the provisions of the compact. The MCC country director is a nonvoting member of the board. The country director’s level of involvement varies from country to country and with the nature and sensitivity of particular issues.

MCC imposes social and environmental standards through these compacts. They rely on their own internal guidelines as well as the IFC performance standards.

Some may ask why this project was included in the study, given that it involves only one donor. While it may not qualify as a “multi-stakeholder initiative” if that term is interpreted to mean a very broad cross-sector or cross-border program, it is still a MSP for purposes of this study, as it is essentially a partnership between MCC, the Mozambique government (at all levels), local communities and civil society. MCC Mozambique provides a useful contrast to the other case studies and led to some useful insights on MSPs.

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14 MCC 2015a.
Results to Date. The project is generally seen to have been partly successful. Most of the specific objectives related to land tenure regularization and administration were achieved. According to MCC:

Through the project, nearly 8.8 million rural hectares were mapped, nearly 150,000 urban titles were formalized and distributed and a consultative forum was established to engage stakeholders for transparent and systemized policy discussions relevant to the sector.\textsuperscript{15}

However, the broader policy goals related to building capacity and institutions and improving the land tenure policy environment, were largely not achieved as discussed more fully in the next section (HTSPE 2013).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Characteristic & New Alliance & LIFT & MCC Mozambique \\
\hline
Objectives and benchmarks & 4 & 2 & 1 \\
Donor alignment & 4 & 1 & 2 \\
Governance structure & 4 & 1 & 2 \\
Flexibility & 1 & 3 & 4 \\
Broad inclusivity & 3 & 2 & 2 \\
Monitoring & reporting & 3 & 1 & 1 \\
Adequate resources & 3 & 2 & 1 \\
Sustainability & 4 & 2 & 3 \\
Total score & 26 & 14 & 16 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{TABLE 2}
\end{table}

VI. Analysis of Selected MSPs with Respect to Characteristics of Successful Partnerships

To what extent do the three MSP models represented by the partnerships included in this study incorporate the eight characteristics of successful partnerships? That is the subject of this section. The results of the analysis are reflected in Table 2, using a scale of 1-5 with a “1” indicating that the model appears to incorporate the characteristic especially well. Scores are also indicated at appropriate points in the text; the lower the score, the better the partnership has fared.

A. Are there well-defined objectives with clear and measurable outputs and deliverables and a defined time-line with benchmarks?

New Alliance. More than one key informant observed that the New Alliance’s objectives and the pathway to achieving the objectives were not clearly agreed upon and articulated from the beginning. Some felt that the large number of partners lacked a common understanding of the objectives beyond the broad goals described above. For example, there was no real agreement on how they would know if they were improving food security and nutrition due to a lack of clear outputs and benchmarks.

\textsuperscript{15} MCC 2015b.
This could be attributed to a number of factors. First, the New Alliance was assembled in great haste so that it could be introduced at the G8 summit in 2012. There may have been insufficient time to create the necessary objectives, outputs and deliverables.

Second, the New Alliance partners are very diverse and, as one informant put it, do not all speak the same language when it comes to attracting responsible investment as a way of improving food security and reducing poverty. Here, again, more time to plan and engage in dialogue may have helped.

Third, the New Alliance has no central secretariat or structure that can track progress towards achieving objectives, although Grow Africa has tried to do this to some extent with respect to the private sector. However, the African Union Commission is now taking on a coordinating function for the New Alliance activities, having just hired a small staff for its New Alliance support unit. (New Alliance 2015)

SCORE: 4.

LIFT. LIFT has been guided by two strategies, one adopted in 2012 and a revised version in 2014. When the MSP was formed in 2009 it had a very broad objective that was not initially linked to specific outcomes or benchmarks. This was largely due to the need to focus on responding as much as possible on Cyclone Nargis and due to the very difficult political environment at that time. It took some time for that objective to translate into outcomes, outputs and benchmarks as set forth in the 2012 strategy. Since then, LIFT has focused on a set of intended outputs, each of which is measured by a number of specific indicators (LIFT 2012; LIFT 2014b). Implementing partners are responsible for defining and achieving specific outputs set forth at the beginning of each project.

Overall, LIFT appears to represent an example of an MSP that operates pursuant to clear objectives, outputs and benchmarks, although these were lacking them when the MSP was first established. It may have been preferable to adopt clear, time-bound goals at the outset, difficult as that may have been. Based on research and comments from interviewees, the relative success of the LIFT model on this characteristic since then may be a function of three factors. First, the need for written donor contribution agreements has helped the partners to develop and follow a clear strategy and timeline. Second, it is probably easier to have clear objectives, outputs and deliverables when the partnership involves only one country (as opposed to the ten African countries in the New Alliance). Third, the existence of a secretariat with staff and funding promotes the development and tracking of objectives and performance in ways that a much looser structure may find it difficult to manage.

SCORE: 2.

MCC Mozambique. The MCC compacts tend to set forth quite clear objectives, deliverables and benchmarks. These are defined in the compact agreements and generally not subject to change. The fixed, 5-year time period with virtually no possibility of extension makes this model very results-oriented. One interviewee said this encourages a mindset, motivational factors and a culture that leads to achieving results.

In addition, the MCA entity that is established by the host government tends to be very project focused. Its sole function is to drive the work over a five-year period and achieve the designated outputs. The contractors it hires have a direct financial incentive to ensure that the targets are achieved. This makes both the MCA entity and the contractor dedicated to success, accountable and focused.

During the MCC diagnostic phase (when MCC determines whether a country qualifies for funding) the national government has an opportunity to say what it would like to do if selected.
During the early phase of the project (after the compact has been signed) there is also a needs assessment which helps to inform the specific work plans. However, one informant stated that MCC and the Mozambican government did not share a clear, common understanding of the broad land policy objective from the outset. This led to some disagreements later and, to some extent, undermined efforts to achieve that objective.

SCORE: 1

Analysis. Based on these cases, two points stand out. First, it is important to allow sufficient time and resources for the partners to agree on objectives, deliverables and a timeline that are clearly understood by all. The New Alliance did not do this well. In Mozambique, MCC did this well with respect to the land administration objective but not the land policy and capacity building goals. LIFT appears to be doing this well since about its second year.

Second, it is very difficult to develop and track outputs and deliverables in the absence of a designated entity or secretariat to which this task is assigned. Here, again, the New Alliance falls short while MCC and LIFT perform better.

B. Do the objectives and activities take into account of and are aligned with the activities of other donors?

New Alliance. There have been concerns about coordination and alignment between the activities undertaken under the umbrella of the New Alliance and other donor activities in the New Alliance countries. In its 2014 annual report the New Alliance itself observed that partner funding “could be better coordinated and aligned with country priorities,” a point echoed in the 2015 report (New Alliance 2015). Moreover, some of the African countries have made similar complaints about lack of donor coordination. For example, the Tanzania report for 2015 notes “[s]hortfalls in the alignment between certain donor initiatives and the New Alliance objective” and some civil society organizations voice similar concerns in the same report. According to key informants, there is no direct linkage between the G7 country land partnerships and the land-related activities of the New Alliance countries.

Here, again, it seems that donor coordination could be better if there was a central secretariat at the New Alliance that could assume this function.

SCORE: 4

LIFT. Perhaps the single most positive feature of the LIFT MSP model is how well it coordinates and aligns with the various donors. There is an inherent coordination of the strategies and activities of the 13 donors who contribute to LIFT because LIFT allows them to operate through a single strategy. LIFT has funded 95 projects thus far and probably achieved synergies that could not have been achieved if those projects had all been funded bilaterally.

Importantly, by operating through a single entity, the donors relieve some of the burden on the Myanmar government which only has to deal with one donor rather than as many as 13. This reduces the number of reports and meetings that government officials have to prepare and attend and, in theory, should make it easier to align LIFT’s activities with government priorities.

SCORE: 1

MCC Mozambique. MCC policy requires that its funding be coordinated with other donors. The recipient country has the primary responsibility for doing so:

16 New Alliance 2014 at 5.
Countries should pick their priorities and design their programs taking into account other donor and government efforts. Countries should include donors in the consultative process during the Compact proposal development stage ... and keep donors informed by briefing the donor community on their proposals and their development on a regular basis. Countries should include an assessment of related donor and government efforts in their MCA proposals. Countries are responsible for maintaining active donor coordination throughout implementation of the MCA Compact.  

MCC also takes steps to ensure donor coordination.

The desk research and interviews revealed very little information about donor alignment in Mozambique. There was certainly some alignment as the MCC project took over and expanded on the prior ITC project that was funded by other donors. One would assume that the initial needs assessment looked carefully at what other donors were doing on land in Mozambique in order to avoid duplicating efforts. But this should be confirmed. Certainly, there is nothing inherent in this model that would preclude or discourage donor alignment.

SCORE: 2

**Analysis.** Here, too, it seems that the loose and decentralized New Alliance structure presents challenges. It appears that no one is responsible for the donor alignment function within the New Alliance. A central secretariat could do so and it may be that this is something that the new support unit within the African Union Commission will do. This is not to say that such alignment is not happening at the African country level, of course. One can only observe that the multi-country New Alliance model does not appear to offer a mechanism for coordinating donor activities across the range of donors, implementing countries and companies.

The LIFT model does this extremely well. MCC requires donor coordination but it is unclear whether that happened effectively in Mozambique.

If there is a lesson to be drawn here it is that donor coordination may be best achieved where the MSP structure includes a central secretariat or coordinating body that is expressly charged with ensuring coordination. By pooling their funds and transferring to the LIFT Fund Board and Fund Manager the responsibility for determining which projects to fund, the LIFT donors explicitly recognize the benefits of this approach.

C. Is there a clear governance structure and strategy or management plan?

New Alliance. As a loose alliance of many countries and companies, it is difficult to say that the New Alliance has a governance structure at all. While it has assembled a Leadership Council, as described above, and relies on Grow Africa to help engage with the private sector, the nature of the New Alliance is one that essentially precludes a governance structure and management plan. In a sense, the Cooperation Framework Agreements take the place of a management plan with leading New Alliance partners, especially the United States, playing more of an advocacy role at the multi-country level.

Given the political realities this may be appropriate for the New Alliance. But perhaps not for any other structure.

SCORE: 4

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18 MCC 2007.
**LIFT.** LIFT has a clear governance structure and detailed operational guidelines (LIFT 2014a). But this does not mean that getting the governance structure right has not been challenging. Informants indicated that decision-making has sometimes been cumbersome because there are 13 donors. It took some time for LIFT to develop a workable structure.

Devising an acceptable and effective governance structure was especially difficult because not all donors are equally involved. Two (DFID and the EU) provide about 75% of LIFT’s funding. As a practical matter, this means that those donors are very much involved in everything that LIFT is doing while others are less engaged. So the governance structure must somehow reflect this varying amount of involvement and commitment. They met this requirement by adopting the two-tiered structure described above in which the Fund Board acts as a kind of executive board on behalf of the larger Donor Consortium. This gives the more involved donors a greater role by serving on the Fund Board.

LIFT has developed two detailed strategies thus far. It also follows a detailed set of Operational Guidelines with which the Fund Manager and implementing partners must comply (LIFT 2014a).

**SCORE: 1**

**MCC Mozambique.** The MCA accountable entity is created by the host government and is supposed to work with existing government institutions on implementation. On paper, this structure is clear and appears to have well-defined responsibilities and, therefore accountability.

But it takes time to set up the new MCA entity and then familiarize it with MCC processes. And the MCA entity may not see eye to eye with the implementing agency within the government. This was the case in Mozambique where the National Directorate of Land Forestry (known by the Portuguese acronym “DNTF”) was the primary government implementing body. The MCA entity and DNTF originally had a somewhat antagonistic relationship as attitudes and thinking towards the project differed. This caused the work to move very slowly at first. These delays and differences led the MCA entity increasingly to take over some of DNTF’s activities as the five-year deadline approached due to concerns that targets would not be met. (See the discussion below of the implications of this parallel entity for sustainability.)

MCC provides detailed guidance on which plans the MCA entity is required to prepare. Such guidance includes, for example, how to prepare and implement a procurement plan (MCC 2010). Management planning appears to be something MCC projects do well.

**SCORE: 2**

**Analysis.** The lack of a governance structure in the New Alliance model may be inevitable because so many governments may be unwilling and unable to agree on one. Governance of New Alliance activities is primarily done at the national level and that may be sufficient for purely national level activities.

From the LIFT experience, one can conclude that devising a governance structure for a multi-donor model that reflects the varying investments and levels of interest of many donors may be challenging. LIFT appears to have responded well to this challenge. This is something that should be addressed at the outset of the project.

Based on the Mozambique experience, it is clear that it is important under the MCC model to ensure that the temporary entity and the government implementing institution have a clear understanding of the objectives, responsibilities and work plan.
D. Do the partnership structure and processes allow sufficient flexibility to react to changed circumstances?

New Alliance. The New Alliance itself does not preclude any of the partners from changing its commitments and activities in response to changed circumstances. As the commitments are non-binding, partners can alter their plans as they see fit, subject primarily to stakeholder pressure to persist. Thus, there is nothing about this particular structure that would undermine the need for flexibility. It may create challenges for sustainability, as discussed below.

SCORE: 1

LIFT. Flexibility may not be a strong suit of this model. Generally speaking, LIFT has been unable to work any faster than the pace at which its slowest donor wishes to go. It seems that LIFT could be more agile if it had fewer masters. This may be reflected by the relatively slow process of adopting the revised strategy in 2014. Moreover, some have complained that LIFT responds too slowly to proposals from implementing partners.

However, it appears that LIFT allows funding recipients to be flexible in their activities in the face of changing conditions. Projects must stay reasonably close to their budgets but in at least some cases implementing partners can easily get approval to make necessary changes.

SCORE: 3

MCC Mozambique. One of the primary criticisms of the MCC model is its lack of flexibility. The fixed 5-year compact term usually cannot be extended. On the one hand, the fixed term asserts helpful pressure on the MCA entity to meet its targets and timelines. In the land governance context, this may be appropriate when the objective is more technocratic in nature, such as registering a certain number of parcels. A significant portion of the MCC Mozambique project involves this kind of target and it was achieved.

On the other hand, broader land governance policy objectives may not be so well-suited to a rigid term. This was the case in Mozambique where the land-related government institutions raised many more political and institutional complexities in relation to the broader land policy objective. Thus, it was easier for the MCA entity to work on systematic land regularization as opposed to more policy-related issues.

The HTSPE final report described another important effect of the fixed term:

Another more generalized lesson learned is the need to balance the tension between building capacity on the one hand, and being held accountable to meet fixed targets on the other hand. In an ideal world, the two goals should not be at odds. But in the reality of non-extendable fixed length contracts, where performance is often judged by quantifiable results, the service provider may be forced to do whatever it takes to get the work done, even if that means using more project staff as opposed to relying on government counterparts. The risk is that the targets are achieved, but when the project closes and project staff depart, the government counterpart is left with less capacity than might otherwise have been the case. In the MCA project, HTSPE tried to balance this tension by engaging counterpart staff in our implementation field work, often with the added incentive of paying per diems via the MCA reimbursables mechanism. This in turn creates the added complication that post-Compact, given the fact that such per diems presumably will not be available, counterpart technicians may not be equally motivated to do the same work with what will amount to less pay. There is no easy solution to this tension, and therefore the conclusion is that the
trade-off should be evaluated carefully and periodically with a view toward adjusting program priorities, if possible and appropriate.¹⁹

This tension is discussed more below with regard to sustainability.

SCORE: 4

**Analysis.** The New Alliance permits nearly unlimited flexibility because of the non-binding nature of the commitments made by its partners. Again, this may be appropriate in this particular case. But it would be problematic in a purely land governance context where too much flexibility translates into a lack of agreed upon objectives, deliverables and benchmarks.

The LIFT experience suggests the need to confront the tendency of a multi-donor model to be slow and perhaps less flexible than it needs to be. This could be addressed by ensuring that the managing entity (in this case, the Fund Manager) has sufficient discretion to react reasonably quickly to changing conditions.

Another lesson here seems to be that projects that seek to achieve land policy reform and capacity building require more flexibility than those that focus on more technocratic land administration targets. The Mozambique case shows that it is much more difficult to apply a fixed term to efforts to build government capacity and achieve systemic policy change that requires widespread political support.

**E. Is the multi-stakeholder initiative inclusive and does it equitably engage all stakeholders?**

**New Alliance.** The New Alliance has been widely criticized for failing to engage adequately with civil society. CSOs had little or no involvement in development of the CFAs. CSO input and participation in implementation at the country level has been inconsistent, varying from country to country. Civil society appears to be increasingly involved in Ethiopia, for example, but CSOs in Tanzania complained that they are receiving too little information about New Alliance activities in their country (New Alliance 2014a). Some key informants suggested that engagement with civil society may have been better had the New Alliance partners agreed from the outset that such engagement was expected and, indeed, required. There are continued calls to improve inclusivity and transparency (New Alliance 2015).

Oxfam served a term on the Leadership Council but thus far no other international NGO has been willing to take that seat. In fairness, this (and much of the broader criticism from segments of civil society) appears to reflect a philosophical or political unwillingness by many organizations to be associated in any way with international private investment in agriculture in Africa whether or not such investment is associated with the New Alliance.

SCORE: 3

**LIFT.** Overall, it seems LIFT has done well in engaging with civil society and the donor community. A range of stakeholders were invited to provide input to the development of the two strategies. Through public orientation sessions, meetings for interested organizations and its website, LIFT has effectively communicated information related to funding opportunities, how to apply and otherwise engage with LIFT.

The greatest challenge in engaging stakeholders has been attracting the participation of the government. When LIFT was first formed (before the political opening in 2011), it had virtually no interaction with the Myanmar government. This began to change in 2012 and has slowly improved. For example, LIFT now works well with the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and

¹⁹ HTSPE 2013 at xxxiii (emphasis added).
Rural Development. The Senior Consultation Group is chaired by one of the government ministers and has representatives from a total of six ministries. There are also representatives from civil society, NGOs, UN agencies and the private sector (LIFT 2015a). The effectiveness of the Senior Consultation Group is yet to be determined as it is so new.

SCORE: 2

MCC Mozambique. Public consultation is built into all MCC compacts. MCC requires the government to engage in and document its stakeholder consultation during the life of the compact. MCC expects the government to drive the development of its national strategies in consultation with key local stakeholders. This consultation is supposed to be an ongoing, iterative process and is part of MCC’s broader attempt to promote country ownership of these projects (Rose 2015).

This requirement works better in some countries than in others. Stakeholder engagement practices commonly used in some countries do not meet MCC standards. In Mozambique there was some level of NGO engagement, more during the implementation phase and less during project design and planning. This was primarily through a stakeholder engagement committee—the Land Consultative Group (LCF)—which was established to provide input to the government. Some think the LCF had some influence on the government and the MCA entity. Others disagree, noting that there were only two annual meetings between the government, MCA and the LCF. One informant believes that the government really did not listen to civil society organizations and used the LCF as a “show” of giving CSOs some input.

In its final report, HTSPE observed:

Moreover, broader consensus-building activities might have been contemplated as part of the program design, to engage civil society groups, MINAG officials from departments other than the DNTF, members of the Assembleia da República, and other government officials in events independent of the more formal Land Consultative Forum, which meets bi-annually and deals with a wide range of topics. Regional workshops, as well as as national round tables, might have been organized to debate and discuss the issues, as part of a broader advocacy strategy. A true advocacy component was not part of the program design, but might be considered for other policy reform efforts in the future. Although the LCF might have been originally envisioned as more dynamic, one observes that it became rather formal and ceremonial at times. Smaller, more frequent, and more focused events, both regional and national, might have better helped pave the way for reform.20

Here, once again, whether stakeholder engagement is stronger in one MCC project than in another appears primarily to be a function of individual country conditions and MCC’s ability to enforce this requirement in a given context. It does not otherwise appear to be related to this particular MSP model.

SCORE: 2

Analysis. One lesson that can be drawn from the New Alliance experience is the importance of requiring, from the very beginning, inclusive stakeholder engagement as a core element of the MSP. Both LIFT and MCC do this, although in each case implementation could be improved.

The LIFT and MCC cases also demonstrate how hard it can be to actually consult effectively with a wide range of stakeholders. As a practical matter, this difficulty is probably not a function of

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20 HTSPE 2013 at xxxii.
any particular MSP model. It does point out the need to create well-considered stakeholder engagement plans early in these projects.

F. Is there an effective monitoring and evaluation process with appropriate reporting requirements?

New Alliance. The New Alliance does not have a monitoring and evaluation mechanism, although one is said to be under development. More than one interviewee noted that a robust monitoring provision should have been in place from the beginning.

The New Alliance, Grow Africa and individual African governments have produced annual reports on their New Alliance activities since 2013. These reports provide one means of tracking progress by many of the partners, especially the government partners. And, in 2014, multi-stakeholder validation workshops were held in 7 of the 10 countries to validate the information provided for the annual reports (New Alliance 2015). But the lack of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism means that the accuracy of the primarily self-reported information has not been independently confirmed.

This has proven to be especially problematic with respect to private sector activities. Grow Africa has collected and published in its own annual reports information on the progress of many of the private sector commitments but the LOIs were not made available to the public. It seems that the New Alliance partners did not agree that detailed information on private investments should be made public.

In some countries, companies have been reluctant to disclose the extent to which they have translated their commitments into action. In Ethiopia, for example, “while representatives of private sector companies were willing to meet with the review team and discuss progress against plans at a general level, some were unable or unwilling to share details of actual disbursements against commitments.”

However, it is important to note that the information published by the New Alliance and Grow Africa has made the investments and activities more transparent than they would otherwise have been. Previously, much of this information was not publicly available in a central location to any meaningful extent so this has increased transparency. The reporting could be more complete but it is better than what was available before.

More progress is being made. The country validation workshops held in 7 of the 10 countries in 2015 are a positive development. In addition to the New Alliance M&E mechanism that will be unveiled soon, countries reportedly are working towards aligning their New Alliance commitments and monitoring thereof with the CAADP Joint Sector Monitoring process. This could improve monitoring, not to mention coordination of efforts between the two programs. In Ethiopia there is a recommendation that a monitoring mechanism be adopted to track donor disbursements and private sector investments (New Alliance 2014b).

SCORE: 3

LIFT. LIFT has a robust monitoring and evaluation mechanism and detailed reporting requirements applicable to itself and its implementing partners to ensure that funds are used effectively (LIFT 2014a). One positive feature of this model is that it facilitates the use of only one reporting, monitoring and evaluation process rather than multiple processes that would be required if the donors operated individually. LIFT prepares reports to donors every six months in addition to the many other reports described below. LIFT can report in the aggregate on these wide-ranging activities in ways that donors could not do individually because the activities they

21 New Alliance 2014b at 7.
fund would almost certainly be narrower and smaller in size. For example, LIFT operates across agricultural value chains where individual donors would be more likely to focus on just one.

LIFT also prepares publicly available annual reports that describe its progress, activities and challenges. Several other reports are published each year that describe and assess the results of particular projects and activities in pursuit of particular goals. For example, in 2015 LIFT reports describe improving water management in the Dry Zone of Myanmar, assess microfinance programs and also evaluate how well LIFT has supported civil society organizations.22

SCORE: 1

**MCC Mozambique.** MCC has developed a detailed, 29-page policy on monitoring and evaluation policy (MCC 2012). The policy tracks performance on processes and outputs at the beginning of a Compact’s life and then continues to track high-level outcomes and impacts at the end to assess how its activities have affected poverty and economic growth. The organization monitors performance by individual compact and also with regard to MCC’s overall performance. MCC’s M&E process and requirements are generally seen to be effective and have improved over time (Sturdy, et al, 2014). Consist with its extensive M&E requirements, the MCA entities are required to produce periodic reports on their activities under particular compacts.

SCORE: 1

**Analysis.** There is nothing inherent in the structure of these three models that would preclude them from having M&E mechanisms and robust reporting. The sheer number of countries and companies involved in the New Alliance may make accurate monitoring and reporting more difficult and expensive and make resistance to it more likely. A central secretariat or other formal governing structure would probably be necessary.

G. Are there adequate resources to achieve the objectives?

For purposes of this analysis, “resources” refer to both human and financial resources. That is, we are concerned about whether the MSP has sufficient resources for its operations (staff, overhead, etc.) as well as for its programmatic objectives.

**New Alliance.** It is difficult to assess the adequacy of resources made available by the New Alliance for a number of reasons. First, donor funds are generally said to be subject to available funding. So, there is no way of knowing whether donor commitments will continue to translate into actual disbursements in the coming years. We do know that the extent to which donors have fulfilled their funding commitments thus far varies widely from country to country (New Alliance 2015).

Second, it is not clear whether donor funds represent “new money” in all cases. Many have asked whether New Alliance donor funds were simply shifted from other previously established programs.

Third, the New Alliance has been driven primarily by the current administration in the United States. There is no way of knowing at this time whether President Obama’s successor will share his commitment to the objectives of the New Alliance. If not, U.S. funding and efforts to persuade others to continue their funding may disappear as discussed below in the context of sustainability.

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22 These reports and more can be found here: [http://www.lift-fund.org/publications/828/2015](http://www.lift-fund.org/publications/828/2015).
Fourth, we do not know for sure to what extent private sector investment that is being attributed to the New Alliance would have flowed anyway. More than one informant opined that most of this private activity would have taken place without the New Alliance, albeit perhaps not as quickly, although there was disagreement from others on this point.

The New Alliance did not make funds available for a secretariat or other coordinating body, although the US has made staff from the USAID Bureau of Food Security available to work on New Alliance matters. Thus, human resources have been less than adequate.

SCORE: 3

**LIFT.** The breadth and lengthy time horizon (at least through 2018) of LIFT’s goals makes it very difficult to know whether the resources available to it are adequate. Moreover, donor commitments cannot be assured as they are usually subject to national budgetary constraints. Primary reliance on two donors can be dangerous.

However, the fact that these commitments are set forth in the donor contribution agreements suggests the funds are more secure than they might otherwise be. In addition, the multiplicity of donors may reduce risk as a reduction in funding from one donor may not be overly problematic (unless it is one of the two primary donors).

The cost of having UNOPS serve as the Fund Manager is approximately 2% of total LIFT spending. LIFT maintains that this is far less than the aggregate costs each government would incur if they all acted independently. This appears to be a reasonable assertion. It seems more likely that there will be adequate resources in circumstances where administrative costs are low.

SCORE: 2

**MCC Mozambique.** None of those interviewed suggested that this project suffered from inadequate resources. This indicates that budgeting was done reasonably well as the project met most of its targets. (But see the discussion below with respect to salary disparities and sustainability.)

SCORE: 1

**Analysis.** Whether resources are adequate does not appear to be directly related to the structure of the MSP except to the extent that the funding commitments are more or less secure in one model than in others. If budget projections are accurate and funding commitments are secure resources are likely to be sufficient. These conditions could occur under any of these models.

H. Are the achievements of the partnership sustainable?

**New Alliance.** Interviewees expressed significant concerns about the sustainability of the New Alliance. This is due in part to the political uncertainties in the U.S. discussed above. Other donor countries have different levels of commitment both in terms of funding and involvement. Some have been more interested than others.23 This, too, may change.

In addition, the partners apparently did not create any sort of long-term plan for the alliance. There appears to have been a general intention to transition the New Alliance to African ownership and control. The African Union is supposed to take on a leadership role but it has been hampered by lack of capacity and other challenges so little progress has been made. But,

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23 Perhaps this is reflected by this finding in the 2014 Ethiopia country report: “Second, not all current G-8 representatives in Ethiopia appear to be familiar with the Cooperation Framework in Ethiopia and certainly some found it difficult to provide details on New Alliance-related disbursements made in 2013/2014.” New Alliance 2014b.
overall, seeking to create greater African continental and country ownership is positive in terms of sustainability.

More optimistically, the high level involvement by G7 and African governments has raised awareness of food security challenges and helped to ease the path for private investors. This political support has led to at least some level of increased donor funding and attracted private sector investment faster than otherwise would have occurred. Having been embraced by the New Alliance, Grow Africa has created a space for companies to meet and collaborate. It is reasonable to predict that the business community’s increased focus on Africa will be sustainable at some level. The New Alliance can take some credit for that.

SCORE: 4

LIFT. From a funding perspective, LIFT appears to be reasonably sustainable through 2018 except possibly for its heavy reliance on two of the thirteen donors. Its biggest sustainability challenge appears to be the difficulty it has had in obtaining government buy-in. Initially, in 2009-10, it was nearly impossible to engage with the government at all. As discussed above, this has been improving but there is much yet to be done. The government has not participated in development of LIFT’s strategies, despite being expressly invited to do so for the 2014 revision. LIFT does not provide direct funding to the government; it is possible that the government would be more involved if they did. The results of the Myanmar election appear to be a reason to hope that the government will further embrace LIFT’s objectives and activities.

Similarly, LIFT has had limited success in building capacity within the government. LIFT has provided some support to the government’s National Strategic Framework for Rural Development and the implementing ministry. Last year, LIFT placed two advisers in the Department of Rural Development to assist with developing an operational plan. LIFT has also provided funds to FAO so that it can help the government with its planning process for a National Action Plan for Agriculture (LIFT 2014). Otherwise, capacity-building and institution-building support has been minimal.

Overall, the difficulty in working with the Myanmar government towards the eventual goal of transitioning ownership of LIFT’s work is probably not a function of this particular MSP structure. Indeed, in some respects the multi-donor trust fund structure has made it somewhat easier for donors to provide technical assistance and support for sustainable development activities without resistance from the government. This is because, unlike individual donors, LIFT generally is not perceived as an entity that seeks to advance a political agenda through the assistance it provides. It seems that the trust fund approach effectively dilutes or mutes the agendas of individual donors to the point that it becomes easier to work with the government. In the fast-changing political climate of Myanmar, the fact that LIFT is seen as being relatively “unpolitical”, may enhance the likelihood that the achievements of its implementing partners may be lasting. Thus, one could make the case that government buy-in may have been even slower if each country dealt directly with the government.

SCORE: 2

MCC Mozambique. The use of temporary MCA entities raises some concerns about sustainability. In Mozambique, having the MCA entity in charge of project implementation may have undermined the extent to which the existing government institutions (at all levels) would take ownership of the project. Similarly, government capacity building was not strong because, as the 5-year clock ticked, the MCA entity contractor became increasingly concerned that it would not meet its targets. This caused the contractor to tend to do the work with internal staff rather than training people at the existing government institutions, such as DNTF. In effect, as time passed capacity building was replaced by direct execution.
It should be noted that there was reasonably good coordination between the government, the donor and the contractor. They had offices in the same building which permitted them to have regular coordination meetings. The same thing happened at the regional and local level. The MCA contractor went to great lengths to integrate the local and central government staff in the project teams. This was important in their efforts to build sustainable capacity within the government.

MCC might have tried to do more to move MCA entity staff into the permanent government institutions while the project was in progress. This may have led to a more sustainable result in terms of building human capacity and institutions. It also seems that the Mozambique government may not have been committed to continuing to provide financial support for individuals who would transfer from MCA at the end of the project. The project did not allocate funds for this.

But an overriding problem is that government salaries in Mozambique, as in so many other developing countries, are very low. This means that many government workers are poorly motivated to do their work. MCA staff were paid well and this led to good performance. At the end of the project, however, most of the MCA staff left government altogether so the government did not reap the benefit of their training and expertise. Only broad-based economic growth can ultimately solve this problem but the impact of low government salaries is a factor that must be considered in deciding whether a project is sustainable enough to justify funding it.

SCORE: 3

Analysis. Whether a development project’s achievements are sustainable may be the single most important consideration in determining which projects to fund. For purposes of this study, the question is whether the MSP structures discussed here are more or less likely to lead to sustainable outcomes. In that regard, one can make three observations.

First, the New Alliance model is of questionable sustainability because it depends so heavily on political and financial support of one government (and in fact one governing party), for a broad program that is to extend far beyond the end of that party’s term in office. This worry is especially acute when that model does not incorporate a long-term plan that can be administered by a central body of some sort.

Second, the problems LIFT has had in engaging with the government are not a function of that particular MSP model. They have been caused by the political environment, one which may change soon.

Third, the fact that the MCC model requires creation of a temporary government entity (the MCA-accountable entity), combined with the pressures of a 5-year fixed term, creates challenges for sustainability, especially in terms of building government institutions and capacity.

VII. Closing Observations and Study Limitations

A. Closing Observations

The ultimate purpose of this study is to inform creation of a strategy for the GDWGL that enables GDWGL members to implement MSP structures that are more likely to lead to improved land governance. That leads to the following observations:

- Although a sample size of three studies is too small to permit one to draw many concrete conclusions, it is interesting to observe that the projects that received the best aggregate “scores” in this analysis appear to have had the best overall results to date. Both LIFT and MCC Mozambique better embody the eight identified characteristics of effective
MSPs than the New Alliance. And those projects appear to have made better progress towards achieving their objectives.

- Of course, a very well-structured partnership—one with all eight characteristics—is not guaranteed to succeed. Even the best structure will not be able to overcome an unsupportive political environment or ineffective implementation on the ground.

- However, as discussed in the “Analysis” sections, these cases suggest that some MSP models may be more likely than others to feature the characteristics of effective partnerships.

- The characteristics of effective MSPs appear to apply to all sectors; for the most part, land governance projects are not so different that one should look for a different set of partnership qualities. However, the political, institutional and economic complexities surrounding land tenure may mean that effective multi-stakeholder engagement and country buy-in are more important and difficult to achieve than with other sectors, such as health care. Thus, it may be more important to emphasize models with strong stakeholder input and government support when it comes to a land governance project than in, say, a health care project.

- While all 8 characteristics appear to be important, the case studies suggest that some—clear objectives, clear governance structure and plan, inclusiveness and a monitoring and reporting process—may be more important than others. Those four characteristics relate more to the organization and operation of the MSP itself while the others may be said to apply more broadly to all development projects.

- There are many important aspects of potentially successful land governance projects that prospective donors should always look for but which are not directly related to any particular MSP model. A partial list includes:
  - Whether the objectives and methods of the MSP are consistent with internationally agreed goals and best practices related to land governance and respect for human rights. (All three MSPs analyzed for this project largely meet this foundational test.)
  - Are appropriate social and environmental safeguards in place?
  - Are the land governance objectives addressed via a holistic approach that takes into account the realities and perspectives of related sectors, such as the environment, agricultural, foreign investment, etc.?
  - Is the political and economic climate in the country conducive to successful land governance reform?

- The foregoing observation leads one to ask whether the GDWGL should have a separate strategy for “more informed use of the partnership tool” and another for evaluating the more substantive aspects of a proposed land governance project. It may make more sense to consider these elements together in one strategy as questions of MSP structure and program content always appear to be intertwined.

- The New Alliance model has been criticized in this paper in relation to several of the desired MSP characteristics. However, the New Alliance has had a positive impact in

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24 TOR at 3.
Africa. The conclusion that the New Alliance MSP model is probably not well-suited to targeted efforts to improve land governance should not detract from its very real achievements.

B. Limitations and Need for Further Research

Finally, it is important to note some of the limitations of this study along with some suggestions for additional research:

- As noted, there was only time for three case studies. It would be useful to analyze other models, such as bilateral projects funded by individual countries and others supported by a multilateral institution such as the World Bank or FAO.

- Only one of the three case studies (MCC Mozambique) involved a project that aimed primarily at improving land governance. The other two have land governance objectives as part of broader goals of improving food security and agricultural productivity and reducing poverty. These three were chosen because they represent three quite different MSP structures. But it is likely that other useful insights could be gleaned from studying more projects that focus solely on land governance even if they do not involve alternative MSP models.

- It could be informative to study another MSP that has significant private sector involvement. The private sector is or was only minimally involved in LIFT and MCC Mozambique, although that is changing in the case of LIFT.

- Additional desk research, longer interviews and more key informants could provide important additional insights. Greater access to host country government officials would be especially helpful. Moreover, the information provided by some informants may be incorrect.
REFERENCES


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ANNEX 1-LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

New Alliance

- Mathieu Boche, Land Policy Advisor in the Democratic Governance Department, Transparency and Rights Unit, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development
- Jessica Cagley, USAID Bureau of Food Security
- Jennifer Chow, USAID Bureau of Food Security
- Eric Munoz, Oxfam Senior Policy Advisor
- Ian Randall, Grow Africa.

LIFT

- Catriona Clunas, DFID Myanmar (interview requested)
- Karin Eberhardt, SDC Myanmar (interview requested)
- Andrew Kirkwood, LIFT Fund Director
- Dr. Zarni Minn, Department of Rural Development within Myanmar Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development (interview agreed to but not yet scheduled)
- Jo Raisin, DFID Myanmar (interview requested)
- U Shwe Thein, Chair, Land Core Group

MCC Mozambique

- Joao Carrilho, MCA land project coordinator
- Steve Dobrilovic, MCC Mozambique Country Director
- Rick Gaynor, MCC Director of Property Rights and Land Policy
- Carlos Mugoma, Director for MCA of the Land Tenure Services Project
- Jill Pike, MCC Mozambique Country Director (following Steve Dobrilovic)
- Ian Rose, HTSPE Chief of Party
- Alda Salomao, Executive Director, Centro Terra Viva (NGO)

Other

- Frits Van der Wal; Senior Policy Advisor – Cluster Food & Nutrition Security; Focal Point Land Governance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands

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25 The 3 MCC representatives participated together in one interview.
ANNEX 2—QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANTS

The following list of key questions was approved by Yuliya Neyman on behalf of the GDWGL as per the terms of the Terms of Reference for this study. It is attached here as it is Output 1 under the TOR. Not all questions were used with all informants and, as the interviews progressed, additional questions were used.

1. Discuss the involvement you and your organization had/have with the partnership.
2. What were the original objectives of the partnership? What problem was it formed to solve?
3. How, if at all, have these objectives evolved or changed and why?
4. What impact have these changes had on the partnership? (Structure, operations, personnel, training needs, communications strategies, etc.)
5. Who are the partners?
6. How is the partnership structured?
7. How is the partnership governed?
8. How is it managed at an operational level?
9. Did the structure, governance or management change over time?
   a. If so, why?
   b. Change related to modified objectives (if any)?
10. Was this structure the right one for the scope of the problem?
11. Which interested groups or individuals within government (donor or host) have had the most influence on the partnership? Which have had the least?
12. Which interested groups or individuals outside government (donor or host) have had the most influence on the partnership? Which have had the least?
13. How have you/they managed to take into account the views of the various interested stakeholders?
   a. Which stakeholders?
   b. How did you/they do this?
   c. Were your efforts successful?
   d. What would you do differently if you could do it again?
14. Does the partnership include a multi-stakeholder platform?
   a. Who participates?
   b. What does it do?
   c. Who participates?
   d. How has it worked?
   e. What has worked well?
   f. What has not work well?
15. From which stakeholder groups have you received the most support? Opposition?
   a. What did you do to elicit support?
   b. What did you to counter opposition?
16. Relationship or consideration of issues related to land governance but outside the scope of the partnership (foreign investment, rule of law, climate change, etc.)
   a. Communication with stakeholders working on such issues?
   b. Project awareness building among such stakeholders?
   c. Consideration of impact of such other issues/projects on achievement of partnership objective?
17. What have been the main challenges you have faced?
   a. Which challenges have you been able to address successfully?
   b. Which challenges have you not been able to solve?
   c. What challenges have arisen due to cultural differences between the partners?
   d. Did you adopt any processes or strategies to address these challenges?
18. What difficulties have you faced in working with the donor(s) who have funded the partnership?
   a. How did you deal with those difficulties?
   b. Were there communications challenges?
   c. How would you characterize (too little, about right or too much):
      i. The amount of direct donor involvement.
      ii. The amount reporting donors required of you
   d. What has worked well in your dealings with donors?
19. How do (or did) partners work together in response to disagreements or challenges to try to find common ground?
20. What aspects of the partnership have been ineffective and why?
21. How is learning fed back into the partnership and beyond?
22. To what extent has the partnership achieved its objectives?
23. How do you monitor your progress towards achieving the objectives?
24. If you were starting all over, what would you do differently?
25. How would things be different if this partnership had not been formed?
26. What advice would you give to others seeking to form similar partnerships?
27. What advice would you give to donors on how to promote more effective partnerships?
28. If necessary, ask for suggestions of others to interview.
29. Any other opinions or information that might be helpful to the GDWGL?