



2024 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES

JOINT ANALYSIS FOR BETTER DECISIONS

Required citation

FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. 2024.
GRFC 2024. Rome.

When citing this report online please use this link
<https://www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024>

All rights reserved. Reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product for educational or other non-commercial uses are authorized without any prior written permission from the copyright holders provided the source is fully acknowledged.

Reproduction of material in this information product for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission. Applications for such permission should be addressed to the Food Security Information Network Secretariat, email: fsin-secretariat@wfp.org

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), its constituent parties and its partners concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

©FSIN 2024.

Acknowledgements

This eighth edition of the *Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC)* continues the collaboration established in 2016 between the Food Security Information Network and the 16 GRFC partner agencies. While the drafting and review process are facilitated by the FSIN Secretariat, the robust and comprehensive content relies on the contribution of data, technical expertise and content from our partners. Special thanks in particular are extended to the FSIN team who once again worked tirelessly to produce the document, listen to reviewers and enrich the product based on their feedback; to the GRFC Senior Committee who provided guidance and support through complex decisions; to the GRFC Technical Working Groups who brought their knowledge and expertise to deepen the analysis; and to our partners' communications teams who ensured that the findings of the GRFC 2024 are widely disseminated and known. Thanks are also extended to all the individuals based in regions and countries who brought their expertise to the product. The names listed below are by no means exhaustive for a product of this nature:

FSIN Secretariat

Federica Carfagna, Evan Carr, Lynn Clark, Carlos Manuel Estevez Reyes, Giulio Fabris, Maria Paola Guerra, Sara Mchattie, Emily Olsson, Claudio Ribotta, Ziad Rizkallah and Katy Williams.

GRFC partners

Hassan Ali Ahmed, Jonathan David Andrews, Lavinia Antonaci, Vicente Anzellini, Lilian Barajas, Simona Bortolotti, Helene Berton, Eric Branckaert, Giulia Caivano, Alice Clough, Gemma Connell, Sophie Chotard, Cristina Coslet, Alessandro Costantino, Anne-Celine Delinger, Eve Suzy Clara Le Dem, Nana Dlamini, Anteneh Dobamo, Stefano Fedele, Abdi Fidar, Gwenaelle Garnier, Valerie Gatchell, Rodrigo Gil-Quintana, Shannon Hayes, Nikki Alexandra Herwanger, Lena Hohfeld, Arif Husain, Kahin Ismail, Baoua Issoufou, Sally James, Douglas Jayasekaran, Damien Joud, Justin Kabuyaya, Janet Kimani, Marie-Helene Kyprianou, Naouar Labidi, Brenda Lazarus, José Lopez, Oliver Maes, Hamadoun Mahamadou, Abdul Majid, Williams Massaoud, Aurélien Mellin, Quraishia Merzouk, Nicholas Minot, Naser Mohmand, Siphokazi Moloinyane, Cinzia Monetta, Susana Moreno Romero, Moctar Moussa, Giampiero Muci, Charity Mumbua, Anuradha Narayan, Mary Njenga, Terry Njeri-Theuri, Marta Ortiz, Cinzia Papavero, Hyunju Park, Elise Polak, Benedetta Pompili, Jonathan Pound, Samia Rahman, Hasina Rakotomanana, Felix Rembold, Brendan Rice, José Ruiz Espí, Mohamed Salem, Duncan Samikwa, Charity Sammy, Britta Schumacher, Edgar Scrase, Almudena Serrano, JungEun Sohn, Ahmed Sulaiman, Felicia Takavarasha, Gaolathe Thobokwe, Philippe Thomas, Laura Tosi, Monika Tothova, Jose Manuel Veiga Lopez-Pena, Roosmarijn Verstraeten, Joseluis Vivero, Rob Vos, Anne Wagner, Massaoud Wiliams, Fleur Wouterse, Lisamarie Zammit and Mario Zappacosta, Hein Zeelie.

In memoriam: Ricardo Sibrián and Djimé Adoum.

This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the European Union. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations



FOOD SECURITY
CLUSTER



Global
NUTRITION
CLUSTER



SICA
Sistema de la Integración
Centroamericana



unicef
for every child



Contents

Foreword	vii	South Sudan	60	LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	109
Key findings	ix	Sudan	61	Colombia.....	116
Acronyms	x	Uganda.....	62	Dominican Republic	117
Glossary.....	xi	Additional countries of concern	63	El Salvador	118
Introduction	1	WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL	65	Guatemala	119
CHAPTER 1		Benin.....	73	Haiti.....	120
GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES	5	Burkina Faso	74	Honduras	121
Spotlight Displacement.....	18	Cameroon.....	75	Nicaragua	121
CHAPTER 2		Chad	76	Migrant and refugee populations.....	122
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA	25	Côte d'Ivoire.....	77	Additional countries of concern	123
Angola	33	Guinea	78	MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	125
Central African Republic	34	Liberia.....	79	Focus Palestine (Gaza Strip)	133
Congo	35	Mali	80	Lebanon.....	136
Democratic Republic of the Congo	36	Mauritania	81	Palestine	137
Eswatini	37	Niger	82	Gaza Strip	137
Lesotho	37	Nigeria	83	West Bank.....	137
Madagascar (specific areas)	38	Senegal	84	Syrian Arab Republic	138
Malawi	39	Sierra Leone.....	85	Yemen.....	139
Mozambique (specific areas)	40	Togo.....	86	Refugee populations.....	140
Namibia	41	Additional country of concern	87	Additional countries of concern	141
United Republic of Tanzania (specific areas).....	42	ASIA	89	APPENDICES	143
Zambia (specific areas)	43	Afghanistan	97	1 Trend graphs showing numbers of people by phase of acute food insecurity	144
Zimbabwe	44	Bangladesh (specific areas).....	98	2 Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024.....	154
EAST AFRICA	45	Myanmar	99	3 Table of forcibly displaced populations	158
Focus Conflict in the Sudan	53	Pakistan (specific areas).....	100	4 Indicators.....	161
Burundi	55	Sri Lanka	101	TECHNICAL NOTES	165
Djibouti	56	Additional countries of concern	102	BIBLIOGRAPHY	176
Ethiopia	57	EUROPE	103		
Kenya (specific areas)	58	Focus The far-reaching impact of the war in Ukraine	104		
Somalia	59	Ukraine.....	107		
		Additional country of concern	108		

Foreword

This *Global Report on Food Crises* is a roll call of human failings.

In a world of plenty, children are starving to death. War, climate chaos and a cost-of-living crisis – combined with inadequate action – mean that almost 300 million people faced acute food crisis in 2023. The number of people on the brink of famine rose to over 700 000 – almost double the number of 2022.

The conflicts erupting over the past 12 months compound a dire global situation. The Gaza Strip has the highest number of people facing catastrophic hunger ever recorded by the *Global Report on Food Crises*, even as blocked aid trucks line up at the border. Conflict in the Sudan has created the world's largest internal displacement crisis, with atrocious impacts on hunger and nutrition, particularly for women and children.

This crisis demands an urgent response. Using the data in this report to transform food systems and address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition will be vital. So will finance. Funding is not keeping pace with need. Governments must boost the resources available for sustainable development – by putting our proposals for an SDG Stimulus in support of developing countries into action, and fully funding humanitarian operations.

Humanity can and must do better. Together, with commitment and concerted action, we can create a world where hunger has no home.

António Guterres
Secretary-General of the United Nations



Key findings

In 2023, **281.6 million people** or **21.5 percent** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 food-crisis countries/territories.



The overall share of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity was **marginally lower** than in 2022, but still higher than pre-COVID-19.



Nearly **24M more people** faced high levels of acute food insecurity than in 2022 – explained by expanded analysis coverage as well as deteriorating acute food insecurity in some countries/territories outweighing improvements in others.



Acute food insecurity deteriorated in **12 countries** with comparable data between 2022 and 2023, where **13.5M more people** needed urgent assistance, mostly in the **Sudan**.



Food security improved in **17 countries** with comparable data between 2022 and 2023, resulting in **7.2M fewer people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity.



Over **36M people** in 39 countries/territories faced Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), with more than a third of them in the Sudan and Afghanistan.



Around **165.5M people** in 41 countries/territories faced Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3).



Around **292M people** in 40 countries faced Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2).



Food crises escalated alarmingly in conflict hotspots in 2023 – notably **Palestine (Gaza Strip)** and the **Sudan**. The Gaza Strip became the most severe food crisis in IPC and GRFC history.



The number of forcibly displaced people reached **90M** in the 59 countries/territories – the highest in eight years of GRFC reporting – showing the high correlation between displacement and acute food insecurity. The **Sudan** became the world's biggest internal displacement crisis. By the end of 2023, almost 80% of the population of the **Gaza Strip** was internally displaced.



Acute malnutrition among children and women continued to deteriorate, especially in conflict-affected areas. In 2023, over **36M children** under 5 years old were acutely malnourished in 32 food-crisis countries with data, of whom nearly 10M had severe acute malnutrition. Some 60% of these children were in the ten largest food crises.



Data gaps remain a concern. While food security analyses expanded coverage to an additional 177.6M people, particularly in vulnerable areas, data gaps remain a challenge with populations in **14 food-crisis countries** not accounted for due to lack of data or data not meeting GRFC technical requirements.

Populations projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)



About **0.7M people** – 0.6M of them in **Palestine (Gaza Strip)** – were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in five countries/territories in 2023.

More than a quarter of the population of the Gaza Strip were projected to be in this phase from December 2023 to March 2024, with the risk of Famine increasing each day that the intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted. By March–July 2024, over half the population of the Gaza Strip (1.1M people) were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), rising to 70% in northern governorates where **Famine was imminent**.

Burkina Faso, Somalia, South Sudan and Mali also had populations facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity in 2023.

Drivers of acute food insecurity

Drivers are interlinked and superimposed on structural vulnerabilities that make it more difficult to respond and recover from a shock.



Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in 20 countries/territories with **135M people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity. It was the main driver in most of the ten largest food crises (by number or share).



Weather extremes were the main driver for 18 countries with over **72M people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Many countries were grappling with prolonged recovery from drought or flooding. The El Niño event and climate change-related weather phenomena made 2023 the hottest year on record.



Economic shocks were the main driver in 21 countries with over **75M people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Decreasing global food prices did not transmit to low-income, import-dependent countries. Continued high public debt limited government options to mitigate the effects of high prices.

Bleak outlook for 2024

Conflict/insecurity – especially in **Palestine (Gaza Strip)**, the **Sudan** and **Haiti** – will continue to be the main drivers of acute food insecurity throughout 2024.

While **El Niño** peaked in early 2024, its full impact on food security – including flooding and poor rains in parts of East Africa, and drought in Southern Africa, especially **Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe** – are likely to manifest throughout the year. Some of the impacts of El Niño may be positive, including better harvests in parts of East Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Net food-importing, low-income countries, especially those with weakening currencies, are still grappling with **high domestic food prices** and weak household purchasing power.

Decreasing humanitarian funding and increasing costs of delivery pose a further threat, already resulting in reduced beneficiary numbers and food assistance rations among many food-insecure populations.

Acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan	FSIN	Food Security Information Network	NFSS	Nutrition and Food Security Surveillance
ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project	FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit	NGCA	Non-Government-Controlled Area (Ukraine)
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project	FSNMS	Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System	NNS	National Nutrition Survey
ALG	Liptako–Gourma Authority (Autorité de Développement Intégré de la Région du Liptako Gourma)	FSNWG	Food Security and Nutrition Working Group	NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
AMN	Acute malnutrition	GAM	Global acute malnutrition	OAS	Organization of American States
AML	African migratory locusts	GDP	Gross domestic product	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ARI	Acute respiratory infection	GFA	General food assistance	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ASAL	Arid and semi-arid lands	gFSC	Global Food Security Cluster	OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
ASAP	Anomaly Hotspots of Agricultural Production	GHO	Global Humanitarian Overview	OIP	Other people in need of international protection
AWD	Acute watery diarrhoea	GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises	PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
BAY	Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states (Nigeria)	GNC	Global Nutrition Cluster	PDM	Post-distribution monitoring
CADC	Central America Dry Corridor	GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises	PIN	People in Need
CARI	Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security	HDI	Humanitarian Development Index	PBW	Pregnant and breastfeeding women
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	HIV/AIDS	Human immunodeficiency virus infection/acquired immune deficiency syndrome	R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
CEPAL	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	HLPE	High Level Panel of Experts	REVA	Refugee influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment
CFS	Committee on World Food Security	HNAP	Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme	RMRP	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
CH	Cadre Harmonisé	HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview	RPCA	Food Crisis Prevention Network (Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires)
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control	HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism (Yemen)
CONASUR	Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation (National Emergency Response and Rehabilitation Council), Burkina Faso	IASC	Inter-agency Standing Committee	SADC	Southern African Development Community
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
CPI	Consumer Price Index	IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre	SBA	Sana'a-based Authority (Yemen)
DEVCO	International Cooperation and Development of the European Commission	IDP	Internally displaced persons	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
DGPC	Direction Générale de la Protection Civile (Haiti)	IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	SEFSEC	Socio-Economic & Food Security Survey (Palestine)
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey	IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute	SENS	Standardised Expanded Nutrition Survey
DRC	Danish Refugee Council	IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross	SFSA	Seasonal Food Security Assessment
DRPIA	Direction Régionale de la Protection Industrielle et Animale	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in Eastern Africa)	SICA	Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix	ILO	International Labour Organization	SISAAP	Système d'Information sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et d'Alerte Précoce
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations of the European Commission	IMF	International Monetary Fund	SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
EC-JRC	European Commission – Joint Research Centre	INFORM	Index for Risk Management	SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
ECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	INGD	National Institute for Disaster Management (Mozambique)	SNNP	Ethiopian Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States (Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO))	IOM	International Organization for Migration	SOFI	The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment	IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification	TWG	Technical Working Group
ENCOVI	Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida	IPC FRC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee	UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit	IRG	Internationally recognised government	UEMOA	Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine
ENA	Essential Needs Assessment	ISCG	Inter Sector Coordination Group (Bangladesh)	UN	United Nations
E-VAC	Emergency Vulnerability Assessment Committee	IYCF	Infant and young child feeding	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	JME	Joint Malnutrition Estimates	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
FAO-GIEWS	FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture	JMP	Joint Monitoring Programme	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
FCS	Food Consumption Score	JRP	Joint Response Plan	UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
FCT	Federal Capital Territory	LGA	Local government area	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	MAD	Minimum Acceptable Diet	USD	United States dollar
FSC	Food Security Cluster	MAM	Moderate acute malnutrition	VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
FIES	Food Insecurity Experience Scale	MCNA	Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment	VASyR	Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
		MDD	Minimum Dietary Diversity	WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
		MENA	Middle East and North Africa	WB	World Bank
		MFB	Minimum Food Basket	WFP	World Food Programme
		MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey	WHO	World Health Organization
		MoH	Ministry of Health	WoAA	Whole of Afghanistan Assessment
		MPI	Multidimensional poverty index	ZimVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
		MUAC	Mid-upper arm circumference		

Glossary

Acutely food-insecure people

The number of people in Stressed or worse (IPC/CH Phase 2 or above) are considered “acutely” food insecure. Those in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) require urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect and save lives and livelihoods. This might not necessarily reflect the full population in need as some households may only be classified in IPC/CH Phase 1 or 2 because they receive assistance and need continued action. In many countries, the number in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) refers to populations in need of action further to that already taken.

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food insecurity at a specific point in time that is of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration.

These acute states are highly susceptible to change and can manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact the determinants of food insecurity and malnutrition (IPC, 2019). Transitory food insecurity is a short-term or temporary inability to meet food consumption requirements related to sporadic crises, indicating a capacity to recover.

Asylum-seekers

Asylum-seeker is a general term for any person who is seeking international protection. In some countries, it is used as a legal term referring to a person who has applied for refugee status or a complementary international protection status and has not yet received a final decision on their claim. It can also refer to a person who has not yet submitted an application but may intend to do so, or may be in need of international protection. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.

Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food insecurity refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. The definition includes seasonal food insecurity that occurs during periods with non-exceptional conditions. Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food

consumption for an active and healthy life (FAO et al., 2021). FAO defines this as “undernourishment” and it is the basis for SDG indicator 2.1.1 published in the SOFI report.

Moderate chronic food insecurity refers to the level of severity of food insecurity, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), in which people face uncertainties about their ability to obtain food and have been forced to reduce, at times during the year, the quality and/or quantity of food they consume due to lack of money or other resources. It thus refers to a lack of consistent access to food, which diminishes dietary quality, disrupts normal eating patterns, and can have negative consequences for nutrition, health and wellbeing.

Severe food insecurity refers to the level of severity of food insecurity in which people have likely run out of food, experienced hunger and, at the most extreme, gone for days without eating, putting their health and well-being at grave risk, based on the FIES (FAO et al., 2021). According to the SOFI report, between 691 and 783 million people in the world faced hunger in 2022 – or 122 million more people than in 2019, before the global pandemic. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity at the global level (SDG Indicator 2.1.2) remained unchanged for the second year in a row after increasing sharply from 2019 to 2020. About 29.6 percent of the global population – 2.4 billion people – were moderately or severely food insecure in 2022, of which about 900 million (11.3 percent of people in the world) were severely food insecure.

Coping strategies

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

Export prohibitions and restrictions

Measures that have a limiting effect on the quantity or amount of a product being exported. They can take the form of a tax or a quantitative restriction. The latter is generally prohibited with some exceptions, notably those applied to prevent or relieve critical shortage of foodstuffs.

Famine

An IPC/CH area classification and is the highest phase of the IPC acute food insecurity scale. It suggests that starvation, death, destitution and Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. A Famine classification is attributed when at least 20 percent of households in a given area face an extreme lack of food, at least 30 percent of children are suffering from acute malnutrition, and two people or four children for every 10 000 are dying each day due to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease (IPC, March 2024).

Food access

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Food availability

The availability of enough food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Food crisis

The GRFC defines a food crisis as a situation where acute food insecurity requires urgent action to protect and save lives and livelihoods at local or national levels and exceeds the local resources and capacities to respond. Food crises are more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition, and in areas where structural factors increase their vulnerability to shocks. They can occur anywhere and can have global ramifications. For instance, the war in Ukraine also has food security impacts outside its own borders since the country is a major food exporter. Furthermore, the capacity of governments to respond can influence the magnitude and severity of food crises.

Food inflation

Monthly food inflation, as measured by a price index, reflects the year-on-year percentage change in the cost of purchasing a basket of commonly consumed food items (WFP).

Food security

This exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (HLPE, 2020). For people to be food secure, food must be both consistently available and accessible in sufficient quantities and

diversity, and households must be able to utilize (store, cook, prepare and share) the food in a way that has a positive nutritional impact.

Forced displacement

Forced displacement is the movement of people who have been obliged to leave their homes, particularly to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters. Displacement is often a side-effect of conflict, food insecurity and weather shocks.

High levels of acute food insecurity

This refers to populations in Crisis or worse (Phase 3 or above) according to the IPC/CH classification or moderate and severe acute food insecurity categories in CARI, and HNO/HRP food security People in Need (PiN) number as an approximation of IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. These are the populations who face high levels of acute food insecurity and are in need of urgent assistance.

Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) Nexus

Refers to the interlinking of efforts by humanitarian, development and peace actors. This approach advocates for improved coordination between actors and alignment around common goals to address crises, food security and overcome conflict.

INFORM

The INFORM Risk Index is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters. It can support decisions about prevention, preparedness and response.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

IDPs are those forced to flee their homes as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border.

International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS)

Internationally agreed framework for countries and international organizations to improve production, coordination and dissemination of high-quality official statistics on IDPs that are consistent over time and comparable between regions and countries.

Lean season

The period of the year when food access is most difficult and food prices are typically at their highest. It typically corresponds with a time of reduced food stores prior to harvest after the previous

harvest has been exhausted. It occurs at different times of the year in different locations, depending on local climate conditions and agricultural practices.

Livelihoods

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

Magnitude

Magnitude refers to the total number of people experiencing acute food insecurity in a reference population.

Major food crisis

A food crisis is defined as “major” if more than 1 million people or more than 20 percent of the total country population is estimated to be facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent, or if at least one area is classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above, or if the country is included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response level 3.

Malnutrition

An umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. See <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malnutrition>.

In food-crisis countries/territories, this term usually refers to undernutrition. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition (wasting, thinness and/or bilateral pitting oedema), stunting, underweight (a composite of stunting and wasting) and micronutrient deficiencies (e.g. deficiencies in vitamin A, iron) are all forms of undernutrition.

Malnutrition has immediate and long-reaching consequences, including stunting children's growth, increasing susceptibility to disease and infections, and contributing to 45 percent of deaths among children under 5 years old (WHO). The determinants of malnutrition also include inadequate access to healthcare, poor water and sanitation services, and inappropriate child-feeding and care practices, as described in the UNICEF framework.

Migrants

According to IOM, “migrant” is an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a

person who moves away from their place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.

A migrant with the intention to settle is someone who has reached a final destination country, where they wish to remain permanently.

An in-transit migrant is someone who is temporarily staying in one or more countries with the objective of reaching a further and final destination country.

A pendular migrant is someone who regularly commutes or travels between their country of residence and another country, typically for work or economic reasons. These migrants often maintain a pattern of back-and-forth movement, crossing international borders frequently but without necessarily establishing permanent residence in the destination country.

Nutritional status

The physiological state of an individual that results from the relationship between nutrient intake and requirements and the body's ability to digest, absorb and use these nutrients.

Nutritious foods

Safe foods that contribute essential nutrients, including carbohydrates, lipids, vitamins, proteins (macronutrients) and minerals (micronutrients), fibre and other components to healthy diets that are beneficial for growth, and health and development, guarding against malnutrition.

Other people in need of international protection (OIPs)

Other people in need of international protection refers to people who are outside their country or territory of origin, typically because they have been forcibly displaced across international borders, who have not been reported under other categories (asylum-seekers, refugees, people in refugee-like situations) but who likely need international protection, including protection against forced return, as well as access to basic services on a temporary or longer-term basis. The terminology was first introduced in mid-2022 reporting by UNHCR.

Pastoralists

Pastoralists are people whose primary means of livelihood involves raising livestock, such as cattle, sheep, goats, camels or yaks. These communities typically rely on animal husbandry as their main source of sustenance and often lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, moving their herds seasonally in search of water and pasture.

Peak period/number

The GRFC reports on the period with the highest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the year in question as reported by endorsed sources. It does not necessarily reflect the latest analysis available, and it often, but not always, coincides with the lean season.

People in Need (PiN)

People in Need, used in HNOs, is based on analysis that estimates who needs assistance, regardless of whether or not assistance is already provided. There are multisectoral and sectoral PiN. The GRFC only contains the sectoral PiN specific to people who are estimated to be highly acutely food insecure.

Prevalence

Prevalence refers to the proportion or percentage of a population that exhibits a particular characteristic or condition at a specific point in time or over a specified period. In the context of food insecurity and/or malnutrition, prevalence indicates the extent of the food insecurity or wasting condition within a given country or population group. It is calculated by dividing the number of individuals with the characteristic or condition of interest by the total reference population, expressed as a percentage or a rate.

Primary driver

Although acknowledging that drivers are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, the GRFC identifies the primary driver as the most prominent trigger of acute food insecurity for each country/territory in terms of number of people affected. This term is used interchangeably with “most significant driver” in the GRFC.

Protracted food crisis

A food crisis is defined as “protracted” if included as such in all eight editions of the GRFC. If the food crisis met the criteria to be defined as a “major” food crisis in all editions then it is defined as a “protracted major” food crisis.

Refugees

Refugees are persons outside their countries of origin who are in need of international protection because of feared persecution, or

a serious threat to their life, physical integrity or freedom in their country of origin as a result of persecution, armed conflict, violence or serious public disorder. The International Recommendation on Refugee Statistics provides a statistical definition of refugees.

Remittances

The term refers to the transfer of money or resources by migrants to their families or communities in their countries of origin. These transfers are typically sent by migrants who have moved to another country for employment or other reasons, and they serve as an essential source of financial support for their families back home.

Resilience

The capacity to absorb, prepare for, and prevent humanitarian disasters, crises and long-term stresses. It also contributes to the adaptation and transformation of livelihoods and food systems, progressing along a pathway out of the protracted crisis situation.

Stateless persons

Someone who does not have a nationality. Some people are born stateless, but others become stateless due to a variety of reasons, including sovereign, legal, technical or administrative decisions or oversights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights underlines that “Everyone has the right to a nationality” (UNGA, 1948, article 15).

Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB)

While the MEB is defined as the minimum amount of money that a household requires to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, at its average cost, the SMEB is the absolute minimum amount required to cover life-saving needs, which could involve the deprivation of certain rights as health or education. <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000074198/download/>




Transhumance

Transhumance refers to the seasonal movement of people along with their livestock between fixed summer and winter pastures. This traditional practice is common in pastoral communities and is often driven by the need to find suitable grazing areas and water sources for livestock, which may vary with changing seasons.

Vulnerability

Refers to the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes that increase the susceptibility of an individual, community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards. Vulnerability to food insecurity is the range of conditions that increases the susceptibility of a household to the impact on food security in case of a shock or hazard.

Key to icons

	Acutely food-insecure people		Major food crisis
	Conflict/insecurity		Nutrition
	Weather extremes/drought		Acute malnutrition
	Weather extremes/flooding		Pregnant and breastfeeding women
	Economic shocks		Infectious diseases
	Agricultural pests		Inadequate health and nutrition services
	Livestock		Food insecurity/ lack of food
	Displacement – IDPs		Inadequate maternal and child-feeding practices
	Displacement – refugees		
	Displacement – returnees		

Map disclaimer

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on all the maps in this document do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. A dispute exists between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Introduction

About the report

The Global Report on Food Crises 2024 provides analysis and evidence on acute food insecurity and malnutrition in countries/territories identified as being in food crisis in 2023. It is a document of reference that consolidates data from various sources using rigorous methodologies and a transparent and consultative multi-agency process.

The purpose of the GRFC is to:

- provide consensus-based analysis of countries/territories with food crises for humanitarian and development stakeholders and policymakers;
- present underlying and immediate drivers of acute food insecurity and malnutrition and analyse the evolution of food crises for countries/territories included in past editions;
- contribute to maintaining food security and nutrition as priority sectors for policymakers and donors;
- advocate for timely responses to food crises,
- offer insights into immediate and medium-term risks to food security and nutrition status of populations.

The foundation of the GRFC: an evidence-based public good



A strong partnership



A highly consultative process



A compilation of multiple consensus-based food security and nutrition analyses



A technical document of reference on food crises

What constitutes a food crisis?

The GRFC defines a food crisis as a situation where acute food insecurity requires urgent action to protect and save lives and livelihoods at local or national levels and exceeds the local resources and capacities to respond.

Food security (is) a situation that exists "when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (HLPE, 2020).

Food insecurity arises when one, some or all of these dimensions – availability, access, utilisation and stability – is disrupted, whether by shocks or other factors. It can be chronic, which is when food insecurity persists over time, largely due to structural causes, or acute, which means that it occurs at a specific point in time and of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. Chronic and acute food insecurity are overlapping concepts (*see box, right*).

Food crises are more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition, and in areas where structural factors increase their vulnerability to shocks. They can occur anywhere and have global ramifications, such as the crisis in Ukraine – a major food exporter – that has had ripple effects globally. The capacity of governments to respond can influence the magnitude and severity of food crises in a country/territory.

Addressing the interconnected root causes of food crises demands comprehensive strategies that promote economic stability, climate resilience and conflict prevention, aligning activities with the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus.

Persistent and seasonal acute food insecurity as a form of chronic food insecurity

Acute food insecurity refers to a situation in which populations face food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration. Action becomes a matter of life or death when the situation is particularly severe, such as in IPC/CH Phase 4 or 5.

Chronic food insecurity is defined as the persistent or cyclical inability to consume adequate diets for a healthy and active life and it is mainly due to structural causes (e.g. poverty, marginalization, lack of access to basic services).

The concepts are therefore interlinked and not mutually exclusive. Understanding their overlaps and linkages is important to develop more integrated and better coordinated response planning. Food gaps and unsustainable coping strategies deserve equally urgent action whether they are transitory or persistent/seasonal.

Acute food insecurity analyses consider the indicators at a specific point in time, but as they are replicated at near-regular intervals it is possible to identify the protractedness or cyclical nature of acute food insecurity.

One of the most common chronic food insecurity forms found in the acute analyses are the cyclical recurring "hunger seasons". In areas where there is a high reliance on subsistence agriculture as the principal livelihood, food reserves from own production often do not last until the following harvest and households must rely on market purchases to cover food needs at a time when income-generating opportunities are limited, and food prices reach a seasonal peak due to increased demand and reduced local grain

supplies. Households that experience recurrent hunger face a double-edged sword: on the one hand they eat inadequate diets, which potentially impacts their lives and livelihoods, while on the other they are unable to build resilient livelihoods, which makes them more vulnerable to future food crises. Estimates state that around 310 million people are employed in agriculture, fishing and forestry across the 59 GRFC 2024 countries/territories with data meeting GRFC requirements. They are at risk of entering the vicious cycle of seasonal hunger (FAO, 2023).

In an acute food insecurity analysis, people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent during the lean season, even under non-exceptional circumstances, should not only be assisted with the short-term objectives of covering food gaps, but also with the medium to long-term objective of addressing the underlying factors and improving the quality and quantity of their food consumption. The United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS) categorizes possible structural factors underlying chronic food insecurity as: Governance, Economic and Production issues, Demographic and Social issues, and Climate/Environment.

The GRFC does not provide a detailed analysis of the structural issues that determine chronic food insecurity but it does identify which are the immediate drivers of the food crises and reports on the main structural vulnerability indicators available at country level in each of the regional chapters. Together these two pieces of information offer valuable insights for informing broader initiatives related to climate change adaptation, conflict prevention and resolution, economic development, and resilience.

The GRFC is based on partnership, consultation and consensus

The production of the GRFC is coordinated by the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) in support of the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC).

It is the product of a collaboration among 16 partners consisting of regional intergovernmental bodies, donors, technical bodies, clusters and United Nations agencies: Comité permanent inter-État de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS), the European Union (EU), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Food Security Cluster (FSC), Global Nutrition Cluster (GNC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Sistema de la Intergración Centroamericano (SICA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

The result is an independent reference document presenting a consensus-driven analysis validated and endorsed by global and regional experts in food security, nutrition and forced displacement.

All 16 partners participate in the following:

- Technical Working Groups (displacement, food security, nutrition) consisting of technical experts from partner agencies who contribute data and analysis, participate in the review of content and make recommendations to the Senior Committee for endorsement.
- The Senior Committee consisting of senior representatives from each partner agency who make the final decision on content and coordinate institutional clearance.

Country/territory selection and inclusion

The GRFC follows the process defined in the table below to identify food-crisis countries/territories through the application of multiple, agreed-upon criteria established by the GRFC's Technical Working Group and endorsed by its Senior Committee (*see table, below*).

Following a review of the available data and evidence, the GRFC Technical Working Groups validate acute food insecurity estimates, malnutrition indicators and displacement figures for food-crisis countries/territories. Endorsement of data is based on their relevance for the

timeframe of the report, their source and whether the methodology meets the GRFC partners' technical requirements, further described in the Technical Notes.

1 PRE-SELECTION OF QUALIFYING COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES

46 countries/territories that required external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS in 2023

4 additional countries that had a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in 2023

23 additional low- or middle-income countries/territories were not selected for analysis by FAO-GIEWS, but requested external assistance as a result of:

- hosting refugee populations who were assisted by UNHCR and WFP
- having over 1 million or at least 20 percent of its population forcibly displaced
- having populations affected by conflict and insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks

High-income countries were excluded as they were deemed able to cope with shocks without requesting external assistance

73 food-crisis countries/territories identified

2 SELECTION AND GROUPING OF COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES

14 of the 73 countries/territories identified had data gaps or did not meet GRFC partners' technical requirements to produce estimates of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent.

The remaining **59** food-crisis countries/territories have data available for Q4 2022 and 2023 using GRFC-accepted methodologies.

Countries/territories are grouped into 7 regions:

- Central and Southern Africa
- East Africa
- West Africa and the Sahel, and Cameroon
- Asia
- Europe (Ukraine)
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Middle East and North Africa

59 countries/territories identified

3 IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR/PROTRACTED FOOD CRISES

44 of the selected countries/territories were identified as **major food crises** in 2023 based on meeting one or more of the following criteria:

- at least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- at least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- any area in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above
- included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response level 3

36 of the selected countries/territories were identified as **protracted food crises** in 2023 as they required emergency assistance and had evidence of populations facing acute food insecurity in all eight editions of the GRFC.

19 of the selected countries/territories were identified as **protracted major food crises** in 2023.

Methodology at a glance

Data sources

Acute food insecurity data

The main data sources for acute food insecurity are the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and the Cadre Harmonisé (CH). These are multistakeholder, consensus-based processes that result in a classification of the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity based on a convergence of evidence and that are comparable across countries.

For countries where these analyses are not available, acute food insecurity estimates are derived from IPC-compatible Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) analyses, or categorization of WFP’s Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Insecurity (CARI), where populations that face "moderate acute food insecurity" and "severe acute food insecurity" as per this methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

The number of people in need (PiN) for the food security sector provided by OCHA assessments (HNO/HRP) can also be used as a proxy for high levels of acute food insecurity (see *Technical Notes*).

Projection data for 2024

IPC, CH and FEWS NET methodologies "project" the acute food insecurity situation based on the most likely scenario by developing assumptions on the evolution of food security drivers and their impacts on food security outcomes. All data presented in the GRFC 2024 are the latest available as of 7 January 2024, with the exception of the off-cycle analyses of Palestine (Gaza Strip) and Haiti.

Malnutrition data

Acute malnutrition burden estimates are collected from IPC acute malnutrition analyses, HNOs and estimates by UNICEF and WFP. Acute

malnutrition prevalence data are collected from Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys, Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), or national nutrition surveys.

Displacement data

Population statistics on forcibly displaced populations primarily come from the UNHCR through nowcasting figures for the end of the year 2023, and on internally displaced persons through the IOM, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and governments’ data, based on figures available as of February 2024.

Peak estimates

The GRFC 2024 reports the highest (or peak) estimates of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, malnutrition and displacement in 2023. In three cases (migrants in Colombia and Ecuador, and refugees in Congo), acute food insecurity data from the second half of 2022 are still deemed relevant for 2023 because more recent data are not available.

As acute food insecurity can be seasonal or the consequence of a shock, the peak figure may not reflect the situation throughout the year in that country and can be based on a projection. When the analysis spans two calendar years, the peak estimate may straddle late 2022 and early 2023, or late 2023 and early 2024.

Data gaps

Some food-crisis countries are not analysed in the GRFC 2024 because they face data gaps, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Eritrea, or do not have data that meet GRFC technical requirements or lack partner consensus. Data gaps can be driven by lack of processes to systematically collect information, lack of funding to conduct assessments, as well as lack of access due to insecurity. Countries that are not analysed are discussed at the end of each regional chapter.

IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

Phase	Phase description and priority response objectives
Phase 1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.
Phase 2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.
Phase 3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
Phase 4 Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.
Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or cannot meet other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)* URGENT ACTION required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC Phase 5 thresholds. Depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available, Famine can be classified as IPC Phase 5 (Famine) with solid evidence or as IPC Phase 5 (Famine) with reasonable evidence.


Acute food insecurity in upper-middle-income countries

Seven countries/territories in the GRFC 2024 were classified by the World Bank as upper-middle-income, but their populations can still experience chronic and/or acute food insecurity.

These countries/territories were mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru) but also included Namibia and, until recent events, Palestine. These countries/territories present very different contexts where levels of income are higher and living standards and livelihoods are different, including the strategies adopted by households to cope with food insecurity.

Colombia lacks an IPC analysis and concerns regarding the approximation of CARI levels 3 and 4 to IPC Phase 3 or above in these contexts resulted in the reporting of only the most severe category of CARI level 4 acute food insecurity for resident populations. Since 2016, insecurity has led to internal displacement which, when combined with an influx of migrants from neighbouring countries, has resulted in pockets of the population facing acute food insecurity.

MAP 0.1 Food-crisis countries/territories included in the GRFC 2024



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

- Countries/territories that required external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS in 2023.
- Countries that had a Humanitarian Appeal/ Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).
- Low or upper/lower-middle-income countries/territories not selected for analysis by FAO-GIEWS, but who either: requested external assistance in response to experiencing a shock or shocks to food security from conflict/insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks; had an influx of refugees; or had over 1 million or 20 percent of the country population forcibly displaced.
- Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

Source: GRFC Food Security TWG, 2024.

Global overview of food crises

Over 281.6 million people in the 59 countries/territories with data meeting GRFC technical requirements faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023.

.....

This fifth consecutive annual increase is mostly attributed to expanded analysis coverage. At 21.5 percent, the prevalence was marginally lower. Among countries with comparable data between 2022 and 2023, the situation worsened in 12, driven by conflict/insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks, but it improved in 17.

.....

Escalating conflicts in Palestine (Gaza Strip) and the Sudan drove extraordinarily high levels of acute food insecurity. The Gaza Strip became the most severe food crisis in IPC history.

.....

Thirty-six countries/territories are considered protracted food crises in the GRFC, having been included in all eight editions. Among them, 19 are protracted major food crises and accounted for up to 80 percent of the total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity across food-crisis countries/territories each year.

Acute food insecurity overview, 2023–2024

281.6M



people, or 21.5% of the analysed population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories with data meeting GRFC technical requirements in 2023.

The share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity was marginally lower than in 2022, when it was 22.7 percent. However, the number of people affected increased by 24 million since 2022, marking the fifth consecutive year of rising numbers. This year-on-year increase is mainly explained by increased analysis coverage, as well as deterioration in some countries/territories outweighing improvements in others.

The **Sudan** faced the biggest deterioration due to the devastating impacts of the conflict since April 2023, with an additional 8.6 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity bringing the total to 20.3 million. It had the highest number of people in the world facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.

The escalation of hostilities in Palestine (**Gaza Strip**) in late 2023 created the most severe food crisis in IPC and GRFC history with the entire population of 2.2 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, including 26 percent in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) from December 2023 to February 2024.

An IPC analysis published in March 2024 warned of a further devastating deterioration, with Famine imminent between March and May 2024 in the northern governorates of Gaza and North Gaza and a risk of Famine across the rest of the Gaza Strip. Half of the population (about 1.1 million people) were estimated to be experiencing catastrophic acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) (IPC Global Initiative, December 2023 and March 2024).

MAP 1.1 Why were an additional 23.8 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity between 2022 and 2023?

Increase due to greater analysis coverage and country inclusion

In 14 countries, there was a significant change in geographical coverage.

Five additional countries included in the GRFC 2024 were not in GRFC 2023. On the other hand, four that were in GRFC 2023 are not in GRFC 2024.

The population analysed increased from 1.1 billion in 2022 to 1.3 billion in 2023.


Overall, changing coverage explains a net increase of 17.5 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (see *Technical Notes for comparability issues*).

Increase due to deteriorations in 12 countries

In 12 of the 36 countries with comparable year-on-year data, there were notable deteriorations since 2022 due to conflict/insecurity, weather extremes or economic shocks, or a combination of these shocks. This resulted in an additional 13.5 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in these countries.

Improvements in 17 countries

In 17 of the 36 countries with comparable year-on-year data, there were notable improvements since 2022. This resulted in 7.2 million fewer people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in these countries.



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

Percentage change in number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity

■ < -15% ■ 1% to 14.99% ■ <1% change/same peak for 2022 and 2023
 ■ -1% to -14.99% ■ >15%

Non-comparable data due to

■ Increase in coverage/new countries ■ Data gap/data not meeting GRFC technical requirements
 ■ Decrease in coverage/change in methodology ■ Country not selected for analysis

○ Indicates migrants/refugee populations (colour coding as this key)

Source: GRFC Food Security TWG, 2024.

Early 2024 analyses and alerts raise concerns

Famine imminent in Palestine (Gaza Strip) in March–May 2024

An IPC analysis released on 18 March 2024 warned of further deterioration in the Gaza Strip's catastrophic food crisis, driven by relentless hostilities, besiegement, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure indispensable to survival, and severely restricted humanitarian access.

Since the IPC analysis of December 2023, the conditions necessary to prevent Famine – an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access to essential supplies and services for the population – have not been met. Famine was projected to occur anytime between mid-March and May 2024 in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza where the Famine threshold for acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and the steeply increasing trend in malnutrition data indicates that it is highly likely that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. The upward trend in non-trauma mortality is also expected to accelerate, resulting in all famine thresholds likely to be passed imminently.

Through July 2024, the entire population in the Gaza Strip (2.2 million) are facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Half of the population (about 1.1 million people) are expected to experience catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5), an increase of 530 000 since the December 2023–February 2024 period. For the northern governorates, the share of population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) increased from 30 percent to 70 percent.

While the governorates of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah were still classified in IPC Phase 4, in a worst-case scenario, these areas face a risk of Famine through July 2024 (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024).

In Haiti, nearly 5 million people or half the population face high levels of acute food insecurity from March to June 2024, a stark increase since the August 2023 projection. Some 1.6 million people face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), reflecting the surge in armed gang violence severely limiting movement of goods and people, causing internal displacement and driving up food prices. In the Artibonite valley – the country's breadbasket – armed groups have taken over farmland and stolen harvested crops. Also of concern are the West department, rural parts of Grand'Anse in the South, and poor parts of the capital, including Cité Soleil where pockets of the population faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in late 2022 (IPC, March 2024).

In the Sudan, the escalation of conflict and violence, especially in central, southern and western regions, is expected to exacerbate acute food insecurity and malnutrition, according to a March IPC alert. Khartoum, Gezira, Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan are at risk of catastrophic outcomes in the absence of a cessation of hostilities and significant humanitarian assistance. Immediate action is needed to prevent famine during the upcoming 2024 lean season (IPC, March 2024).


In West Africa and the Sahel, the late March CH analyses projected a worrying rise in high levels of acute food insecurity in Chad, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, driven by persistently high food prices and conflict disruptions to markets and livelihoods. About 2 500 people were projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Mali (CH, March 2024). The FSIN *CILSS Regional Report* to be published in June 2024 will include this data.

In Southern Africa, El Niño-driven drought conditions led Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe to declare national disasters in February/March 2024 due to the impact on crop production.

Severity of acute food insecurity, 2023

Out of 281.6 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 203 million were in 41 countries/territories with IPC/CH analyses and had data disaggregated by phase. Around 79 million were in 18 countries with FEWS NET, HNO or WFP CARI data with no phase disaggregation.

FIG. 1.1 Population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 (millions)



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2024.

Over 705 000 people in five countries were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2023 – the highest number in GRFC reporting and almost double that of 2022

In this phase of acute food insecurity, people are facing extreme lack of food and exhaustion of coping capacities leading to starvation, acute malnutrition and death. They require urgent action to avoid more widespread extreme outcomes.

Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) categorizes an area evidencing critical levels of acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition and mortality rates above a given threshold. While no area was classified in Famine in 2023, there was a tangible risk of Famine in Palestine (Gaza Strip) (IPC, December 2023).

FIG. 1.2 Countries/territories with populations projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2023

PALESTINE (GAZA STRIP)	576 600
SOUTH SUDAN	43 000
BURKINA FASO	42 700
SOMALIA	40 400
MALI	2 500

Source: IPC TWGs, 2023; IPC Global Initiative, 2023; CH, 2023.

Around 0.6 million people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Palestine (Gaza Strip)

A quarter (26 percent) of the population of the Gaza Strip, corresponding to 576 600 people, were estimated to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between early December 2023 and early February 2024 due to intense hostilities, sharply reduced access to food, basic services and life-saving assistance, and the extreme concentration or isolation of people in inadequate shelters or areas without basic services.

This is the highest share of population in this phase in any country/territory in IPC history. As of late December 2023, the risk of Famine was expected to increase for each day that intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened (IPC, December 2023).

Around 43 000 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in South Sudan

In Jonglei and Unity states, 43 000 people were estimated to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the April–July 2023 lean season (IPC, November 2022). For the same lean period of 2024, the number was projected to increase to 79 000, of whom 28 000 were South Sudanese returnees from the Sudan who faced economic destitution (IPC, November 2023).



Around 42 700 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Burkina Faso

In June–August 2023, around 42 700 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in the regions of Boucle du Mouhoun and, mostly, the Sahel due to the intensity of conflicts that impeded the proper functioning of markets and left populations under siege, severely constraining population movements, access to fields and the delivery of humanitarian assistance (CH, March 2023).



Over 40 300 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Somalia

Over 40 300 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in April–June 2023 among IDPs in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Burhakaba due to the lingering impacts of drought, breakdown of livelihoods, impact of high food prices and protracted conflict (IPC, April 2023).

However, this is a significant decrease from 214 000 people in 2022, attributable to the positive impact of the 2023 Gu rains and sustained humanitarian assistance (IPC, September 2022). In the last quarter of 2023, no populations were estimated in IPC Phase 5 despite large numbers remaining in IPC Phase 4 (IPC, February 2024).



Around 2 500 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Mali

An estimated 2 500 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) over the June–August period in Ménaka as conflict impeded agricultural and market activities while also hindering the movement of populations and the delivery of humanitarian aid. About 37 percent of the affected population were IDPs (CH, March 2023).

Update on countries with recent populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)

In **Afghanistan** and **Nigeria**, people previously found to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in

2022 were no longer facing these severe conditions in 2023.

In **Haiti**, the population projected in this phase in Cité Soleil in September 2022–February 2023 no longer faced these conditions for the remainder of 2023.

There was no IPC analysis for **Ethiopia**, but FEWS NET declared that, in the aftermath of the 2020–2023 drought and the 2020–2022 conflict, some households were facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in southern, southeastern and northern areas, especially before the start of the Meher harvest in September and Deyr rainy season in October (FEWS NET, August 2023).

There was increasing concern for localized areas of Tigray and Amhara where the Meher harvest failed and households had limited food stocks (FEWS NET, January 2024).

Disaggregated data were not available in 2023 for **Yemen** where 31 000 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the first months of 2022.




Over 36 million people in 39 countries/territories experienced Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 2023

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. Households face large food gaps, which are either reflected in high acute malnutrition levels and excess mortality or mitigated by use of emergency coping strategies, which may entail households selling their last breeding animal or their land or house.

Among the 39 countries/territories with populations in this phase, 28 are comparable between 2022 and 2023 (see *Technical Notes*, page 165).

The 4 percent increase in the total number of people facing IPC/CH Phase 4 between 2022 and 2023 is largely due to the increase in severity in the Sudan crisis in the midst of deteriorating conflict

FIG. 1.3 Countries/territories with over 1 million people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), 2023



Source: IPC TWGs, 2023; Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP; IPC Global Initiative 2023; CH 2023.

(with an additional 3.2 million people in this phase). More than a third of the 36.4 million people in IPC/CH Phase 4 were in two countries alone: **Afghanistan** and the **Sudan** (see figure 1.3).

Palestine (**Gaza Strip**) had by far the highest share of its population (53 percent) in IPC Phase 4, followed by South Sudan (23 percent) and Haiti (18 percent). More than 10 percent of the population of Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Somalia and the Sudan were in this phase.



Over 165 million people in 41 countries/territories experienced Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) in 2023

Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) either face food consumption shortfalls or make the choice to protect food consumption by engaging in coping strategies that will harm their ability to access food and sustain their livelihoods in the future.

In 2023, 165.5 million people faced Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3). At 18 percent, the share of the

analysed population in this phase was on a par with 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria each had more than 20 million people in this phase, while Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and the Sudan each had over 9 million. More than 30 percent of the population of Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Haiti, Lebanon, Madagascar and South Sudan were in IPC Phase 3.



Almost 292 million people in 40 countries experienced Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 2023¹

Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) have minimally adequate diets but resort to coping strategies to afford non-food needs. They are vulnerable to shocks and require support to reduce risks related to disasters and to protect their livelihoods.

Thirty-five out of the 40 countries had more than 20 percent of their analysed population in this phase. The prevalence reached 45 percent in **Democratic Republic of the Congo**.

In **Burundi**, **Liberia** and **Senegal**, the significant increase in the number of people in this phase coincided with a decrease in people in Minimal (IPC/CH Phase 1), suggesting a deterioration in food security.

In **Eswatini** and **Namibia**, the increase in the number of people in this phase mirrored a decrease in the number of people facing higher levels of acute food insecurity, suggesting an improvement in food security.

¹ The number of countries with data in this phase is 40 (not 41) because El Salvador is not included among the countries with populations in IPC Phase 2 since IPC Phases 1 and 2 are merged.

Major food crises in 2023

Of the 59 countries/territories meeting GRFC technical requirements, 44 were identified as major food crises.


Major food crises have more than 1 million people or 20 percent of their total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), an area classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above, or were included in the Inter Agency Standing Committee humanitarian system-wide emergency response Level 3.

The number of major food crises in the GRFC has almost doubled since the first GRFC edition in 2017. Nineteen countries are classified as protracted major food crises, having been classified as major food crises in all eight editions (refer to *Technical Notes for full list*). Of these 19, **Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen** have been among the ten largest food crises in terms of numbers of people facing high acute food insecurity in all editions of the GRFC.

Colombia (residents), Congo (residents), Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal became major food crises for the first time in the GRFC 2024 either because data became newly available (Congo and Colombia residents) or levels of acute food insecurity increased to the extent that they met the inclusion thresholds (Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal).

Mauritania and Guinea, which were major food crises in the GRFC 2023, were no longer so in the GRFC 2024 as their situations improved.


MAP 1.2 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 food-crisis countries/territories, 2023



Ten largest food crises by number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity

Around 176 million people or 62.5 percent of the total number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories were in ten food crises, each with more than 10 million acutely food-insecure people needing urgent humanitarian assistance (see figure 1.4). The list of the ten largest food crises has changed little since the GRFC 2023. **Bangladesh** is listed for the first time due to increased analysis coverage. **Ukraine** was among the ten largest food crises in 2022, but not in 2023.

FIG. 1.4 Countries/territories with the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023




Sources: IPC TWGs (Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan, Sudan); CH (Nigeria); FEWS NET (Ethiopia, Yemen); HNO (Afghanistan, Syrian Arab Republic); pre-analysis conducted under the HNRFP, as a basis for generating results for the 2024 projection used by the Myanmar HNRFP 2024 (Myanmar).

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

Legend: < 1 million, 1-2.9 million, 3-4.9 million, 5-9.9 million, 10-15 million, > 15 million, Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements, Data gap, Country not selected for analysis, Migrants/refugee populations (colour coding as this key)

Source: GRFC Food Security TWG, 2024.


MAP 1.3 Share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories, 2023



Ten largest food crises by share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity


At 100 percent of its population (2.2 million), the Gaza Strip had the largest prevalence of high acute food insecurity globally and in IPC history. South Sudan, Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic had more than half of their population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (see figure 1.5). More than half of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, migrants in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, refugees in Congo, and Syrian refugees in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon faced high levels of acute food insecurity (see figure 1.6).

FIG. 1.5 Countries/territories with the largest share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



Sources: IPC Global Initiative, 2023 (Gaza Strip); IPC TWGs (Central African Republic, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan); FEWS NET (Yemen); HNO (Afghanistan, Syrian Arab Republic).

FIG. 1.6 Refugee/migrant populations with more than half facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



This graphic only refers to countries that were selected for hosting migrant and refugee populations and therefore does not include Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh or Syrian refugees in Lebanon (see Spotlight on Displacement on page 18 for additional data).

Source: WFP CARL.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

< 10 percent | 10–24.99 percent | 25–49.99 percent | ≥50 percent | Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements | Data gap | Country not selected for analysis | ○ Indicates migrants/refugee populations (colour coding as this key)

Outlook for 2024

As of January 2024, projections were available for 41 out of the 59 countries/territories included in the GRFC 2024.

Outlooks are based on information available at the time of the analysis, and projection periods do not extend for all of 2024 nor do they necessarily cover lean seasons or peak periods. In these 41 countries/territories, around 208.3 million people are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024. This represents 19 percent of the analysed population, which suggests a possible improvement since 2023.

Around 1.2 million people are likely to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in two countries/territories. In **Palestine (Gaza Strip)**, Famine is imminent in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza and around 1.1 million people are projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between mid-March and mid-July (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024). In **South Sudan**, 79 000 people were projected to be in this phase during the April–July 2024 lean season. If security and humanitarian access deteriorate in **Burkina Faso**, food insecurity could rise to more severe levels.

Besides Palestine (Gaza Strip), acute food insecurity is expected to worsen in the Sudan due to the escalation of conflict and violence, with Khartoum, Gezira, Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan at critical risk of catastrophic outcomes in the absence of a cessation of hostilities and significant humanitarian assistance (IPC, March 2024). A March 2024 IPC analysis also pointed to increasing numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in Haiti, reaching more than half the population in March–June 2024, reflecting the surge in armed gang violence severely limiting movement of goods and people, causing internal displacement and driving up food prices (IPC, March 2024).

Deteriorations are also expected in Chad, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. For Angola, Nicaragua, Uganda and Yemen, projections

are provided as ranges, and their upper bound represents a scenario of deterioration.

Improvements are expected in 17 food-crisis countries. Eight of these countries had more than 1 million fewer people projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. The biggest improvement was projected for Kenya due to the impact of favourable weather on crops and livestock. Improvements in these countries may be seasonal or they may not materialize because of worsening or new/unforeseen drivers.

In net food-importing countries, a double burden is developing with high food prices coupled with a strong dollar contributing to currency depreciation that will continue to push up food prices and further erode households' purchasing power (UNCTAD, December 2022).

El Niño-driven drought conditions have led **Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe** to declare national disasters in February/March 2024 due to the impact on crop production. El Niño's sustained impact on global temperatures risks that 2024 could be hotter than 2023 (WMO, February 2024).

Humanitarian operations in a context of reduced resources and increasing costs

The GRFC records a growing number of people in need of humanitarian food assistance at the same time as the cost of delivery is increasing. Inflation, supply chain disruptions and disrupted transport routes increased WFP's food procurement costs by 39 percent between 2019 and 2022 (WFP, 2023). Decreasing resources leads to a reduction in beneficiaries, ration sizes or both. Available analyses on reductions in food assistance show that they lead to a deterioration in food consumption and/or an increase in negative coping strategies to cover food needs, thus impacting future access to food. Women and children are most affected (WFP, April 2024).

Acute food insecurity levels remain stubbornly high in the context of 2023 funding shortfalls following record humanitarian funding levels in 2022

The current trends in external financing fail to pave the way for sustainable improvements in food security, according to the 2023 Financing Flows and Food Crises report (GNAFC, 2023).

Between 2021 and 2022, humanitarian funding for food assistance, emergency agriculture and nutrition in 58 food-crisis countries/territories increased by over 50 percent, reaching a record USD 15.1 billion, the highest since 2016. However, the latest information from the OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS) shows that while needs remain high, the record 2022 levels of humanitarian funding were not sustained in 2023, and were similar to those of 2021. Based on the HRP funding requirements, this results in an increasing gap between needs and funding.

In 2022, the ten largest recipients of humanitarian funding for food assistance, emergency agriculture and nutrition were Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Lebanon and Democratic Republic of the Congo, ranging from USD 1.9 billion in Afghanistan to USD 0.5 billion in Democratic

Republic of the Congo. Overall, these ten countries received almost 71 percent of the total humanitarian assistance allocated to food sectors in countries with food crises.

According to preliminary data, development assistance to food sectors in food-crisis countries/territories increased by 16 percent from 2021 to 2022, reaching pre-COVID-19 levels (USD 7 billion). This increase can also be explained by the fact that more countries were categorized as food crises in the GRFC 2023. However, the overall trend of development assistance since 2016 has remained largely unchanged – at around USD 6–7 billion per year.

In 2022, the ten largest recipients of development assistance to food sectors were Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, the Niger, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Yemen, Uganda and the Sudan, ranging from USD 0.7 billion in Ethiopia to USD 0.2 billion in the Sudan. Overall, these ten countries received 46 percent of the total development assistance to food sectors in food-crisis contexts (GNAFC, 2023).

FIG. 1.7 Humanitarian and development assistance to highly acutely food-insecure populations in food-crisis countries/territories, 2016–2023



Source: GNAFC based on OCHA FTS and OECD CRS.

Drivers of food crises in 2023–2024

The drivers of food crises are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.

Acute food insecurity is rarely driven by a single shock or hazard, but rather by the interaction between shocks and underlying poverty, structural weaknesses and other vulnerability factors.

Conflict is the major driver and amplifier of high levels of acute food insecurity, directly affecting food access and availability and the ability to cope with other shocks. Conflict also tends to reverse economic and development gains, limiting communities' and countries' capacity to withstand and recover from weather and economic shocks.

In 2023, the global shocks of climate change, continued and residual economic effects of the war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic persisted, while the El Niño event and renewed intense conflicts, particularly in Palestine (Gaza Strip) and the Sudan, had national and regional impacts.


The GRFC 2024 aims to identify the driver that had the most significant impact on acute food insecurity for each country/territory. As it is difficult to disentangle other compounding factors, the total number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in that country/territory is used to calculate the aggregated statistics in figure 1.8. Secondary and tertiary drivers are also identified where relevant.



Conflict/insecurity – primary driver in 20 countries/territories with 135 million people facing high acute food insecurity

Among the 59 GRFC countries/territories with data meeting GRFC technical requirements, conflict/insecurity was the major driver in 20 of them where almost 135 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. In total, around 621 800 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in conflict-affected Palestine (Gaza Strip),

FIG. 1.8 Primary drivers of acute food insecurity in countries/territories with food crises, 2023



Food crises are the result of multiple drivers. The GRFC has based this infographic on the predominant driver in each country/territory.

Source: GRFC Food Security TWG, 2024.

Burkina Faso and Mali. Out of the 36 million people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) globally, half were in countries where conflict was the primary driver. Conflict/insecurity was considered the secondary driver in nine food-crisis countries and the tertiary driver in six.

Around 181.7 million people in 13 of the 20 conflict-affected countries were estimated to be in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2).

Seven of the 20 primarily conflict-driven food crises were in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and six were in West Africa. Conflict/insecurity was the major driver in most of the ten largest food crises (by number and/or by share): Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palestine (Gaza Strip), the Sudan and Yemen.

Intensifying impact of widespread and pervasive conflict in 2023

Globally there were 12 percent more conflict events in 2023 than in 2022, and 40 percent more than in 2020 (ACLED, February 2024). Eight of the ten

countries/territories classified as having “extreme” conflict by the January 2024 ACLED Conflict Index were major food crises in 2023, including, in order of conflict severity, Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic, Palestine, Nigeria, Colombia, Haiti, Yemen and the Sudan (ACLED, February 2024).

The index classified Palestine, Haiti and the Sudan as worsening conflicts and the rest as consistently concerning.

A further 14 countries included in the GRFC 2024 were among the 20 countries classified as having “high” levels of conflict (ACLED, February 2024).

Indeed the impact of conflict on acute food insecurity intensified since 2022 when 117 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 19 countries/territories where conflict/insecurity was the main driver.

Since 2021, the decrease in the number of countries with conflict as the primary driver can be attributed to a switch in primary driver from conflict/insecurity to economic shocks in

Afghanistan, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic though localized insecurity persisted in these countries, and years of conflict have left their economies in tatters and eroded people’s resilience and ability to recover from external shocks.

Conflict continued to lead to displacement within countries and across borders, affecting not only displaced people but also the communities hosting them.

The conflict in the Sudan made it the world’s largest internal displacement situation by the end of 2023, with the number of displaced people continuing to increase rapidly in early 2024. Limited humanitarian access to conflict hotspots in the country undermined the provision of assistance and support to affected populations.

Another 1.5 million people had fled from the Sudan to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, January 2024), including to parts of Central African Republic, Chad and South Sudan where high levels of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition were already widespread. The increased influx of refugees and returnees is intensifying competition for already scarce resources.

From October 2023, around 80 percent of the population of the Gaza Strip became internally displaced (UNRWA, February 2024) due to continued air, land and sea operations, destruction of shelter, military evacuation orders, and lack of access to food, basic services and humanitarian assistance. Many were displaced multiple times in search of safety. The high concentration of IDPs – especially in Rafah governorate – inadequate shelter and lack of access to basic services were major factors increasing the risk of Famine (OCHA, January 2024).

In the Syrian Arab Republic, an estimated 6.6 million are internally displaced by the conflict and a further 5.5 million Syrian refugees are in neighbouring Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye, where many face high levels of acute food insecurity amid worsening socioeconomic crises and humanitarian funding shortfalls.



Weather extremes – primary driver in 18 countries with 72 million people facing high acute food insecurity

In 2023, the world experienced its hottest year since records began in 1850 and approached the critical 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels Long Term Temperature Goal of the Paris Agreement. The rise in temperatures manifested in extreme heat, drought, wildfires, intense rainfall and flooding (WMO, 2024).

Climate-related shocks were the main drivers in 18 countries, where almost 72 million people faced high levels of food insecurity. This is an increase from 2022 (12 countries with 56.8 million acutely food-insecure people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance). Twelve of these countries are in Africa, with 47.8 million people requiring urgent assistance, and five in Latin America and the Caribbean, with 12.2 million. In Pakistan, 11.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity primarily due to weather extremes.

Weather extremes were considered the secondary driver in 12 food-crisis countries and the tertiary driver in 15 of them.

Weather extremes can also drive displacement and are known to impede voluntary returns for refugees and IDPs as livelihoods at the place of origin may be lost. Competition for resources can also limit livelihood opportunities at the site of displacement.

Around 51 million people were in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 11 of the 18 countries where weather extremes were the main driver of acute food insecurity, and are thus vulnerable to more severe levels of acute food insecurity if they face another shock.

The El Niño event drove many of the weather extremes seen in 2023, bringing hotter and drier-than-normal conditions across much of East Africa, Central and Southern Africa, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, reaching its peak intensity in late 2023 through mid-2024.

FIG. 1.9 Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent by primary driver, 2018–2023

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Conflict/ insecurity	73.9M 21 countries	77.1M 22 countries	99.1M 23 countries	139.1M 24 countries	117.1M 19 countries	134.5M 20 countries
Weather extremes	28.8M 26 countries	33.8M 25 countries	15.7M 15 countries	23.5M 8 countries	56.8M 12 countries	71.9M 18 countries
Economic shocks	10.2M 6 countries	24.0M 8 countries	40.5M 17 countries	30.2M 21 countries	83.9M 27 countries	75.2M 21 countries

Economic shocks include the indirect impact of COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021 and the effects of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Food crises are the result of multiple drivers. The GRFC has based this infographic on the predominant driver in each country/territory.

Source: FSIN, GRFC 2019–2023.

Until May 2023, the Horn of Africa experienced below-average rainfall for three consecutive years affecting both long rains and short rains, leading to the worst drought conditions in nearly 40 years, which affected rangeland, water resources and in turn crop and livestock production.

In Central and Southern Africa, 12 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity across seven countries primarily due to the impact of dry conditions on crop production and destruction caused by flooding from cyclone Freddy in March 2023. In February/March 2024 El Niño-driven drought conditions led Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe to declare national disasters due to the impact on crop production.

In Asia, cyclone Mocha caused widespread destruction of farmlands, impacting over 3 million people in Myanmar alone (ECHO, June 2023).



Economic shocks – primary driver in 21 countries with 75 million people facing high acute food insecurity

In 2023, economic shocks were considered the primary driver in 21 countries where 75.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of these, 12.1 million people faced Emergency (IPC/

CH Phase 4) in 15 countries and, in South Sudan, 43 000 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). This marks a decrease from 27 countries with 83.9 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2022, although still more than double the numbers in 2019 before COVID-19 instigated major rises in domestic food prices. Economic shocks were considered the secondary driver in 27 countries/territories and the tertiary driver in five.

Around 59 million people were estimated to be in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 16 countries with economic shocks as the primary driver and thus vulnerable to more severe acute food insecurity if they face a shock.

In 2023, global economic growth slowed to 3.1 percent from 3.5 percent in 2022, as higher central bank rates set to curb inflation slowed economic activities. Despite tighter monetary policies and lower commodity prices, which helped to rein in the cost-of-living crisis, inflation remained above pre-pandemic levels (IMF, October 2023; IMF, January 2024).

Not all food-crisis countries/territories benefited equally from lower international commodity prices. For some food-crisis countries that export primary

commodities, it has meant lower export revenues, while for most countries that are net-importers of food, higher borrowing costs coupled with further depreciation of domestic currencies increased their debt burdens and raised the domestic cost of imported food and agricultural inputs. This kept inflation high and added pressure to existing macroeconomic woes created by high exposure to the global shocks posed by COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. Out of the 73 countries/territories selected for inclusion as food crises in the GRFC, 48 are net food-importing countries (FAO, 2023).

As of February 2024, 58 percent of low-income countries were experiencing inflation higher than 5 percent (WB, February 2024).

Governments continue to have limited budgetary resources to put towards social protection programmes and/or investments in building vulnerable households' resilience due to already elevated levels of debt that require increased spending on interest rate payments (IMF, October 2023).

These pressures contribute to a significant depletion of foreign exchange reserves, making it more difficult to import food and non-food essential items (WFP & FAO, November 2023).

In many instances, the persistence of high prices of food in domestic markets also reflects high costs and scarcity of labour as well as limited food availability due to weather extremes and/or escalating conflicts.

Acute food insecurity, 2016–2023

The prevalence of high acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) doubled from 11 percent in 48 countries/territories in 2016, to 21.5 percent in 59 countries/territories in 2023.

The sharpest increase was between 2019 and 2020 when the share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 17 percent to 21 percent as protracted conflict, the economic fallout of COVID-19 and weather extremes exacerbated existing fragilities.

There was also a significant increase in prevalence between 2018 and 2019, reflecting worsening acute food insecurity in key conflict-driven crises, notably in the Central Sahel, Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, and the growing intensity


of weather extremes and economic shocks as drivers in countries such as Guatemala, Haiti, Pakistan and Zimbabwe (see figure 1.10).

Protracted crises

Thirty-six countries/territories are considered to be protracted food crises in the GRFC, having been included as food crises in all eight editions. Among them, 19 are defined as both protracted and major food crises (see *Technical Notes*). These 19 protracted major food crises encompassed 65–80 percent of the total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity across food-crisis countries/territories each year.

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in these 36 countries/territories increased from 93.4 million or 13 percent of the analysed population in 2016 to 203.3 million or 22 percent in 2022. It further increased to 225.2 million or 23 percent in 2023.

FIG. 1.10 Numbers of people and share of analysed population in GRFC countries/territories facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, using IPC, CH, FEWS NET, WFP, SADC and OCHA data from 2016–2023.


Populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023¹



Populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)

In 2023, the total population projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in five countries/territories was over four times higher than 2016 and the highest in eight years of GRFC reporting. More than 80 percent of the population in this phase in 2023 were in Palestine (Gaza Strip).

FIG. 1.11 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 5, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data.

Between 2016 and 2023, 11 countries/territories have had populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5): Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine (Gaza Strip), Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. Sometimes these estimates have been outside the peak period of acute food insecurity and are therefore not included in figure 1.12. South Sudan has had populations in this phase almost every year, ranging between 21 000 people in 2016 to 155 000 in 2018, and Yemen for five consecutive years from 2018 to 2022.

The high numbers in 2021 were driven by the conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia² and a convergence of


conflict, economic shocks and weather extremes in South Sudan and Yemen. The numbers were also high in 2022 with 57 percent of the 351 300 people in this phase in Somalia largely due to the prolonged drought. In localized parts of Somalia and Yemen, a risk of Famine was identified in 2022 according to worst-case scenarios, although it did not materialize in either country.



Populations in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4)

When considering the 19 countries with disaggregated Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) data across all editions of the GRFC, the share of analysed population in this phase increased from 1.7 percent in 2016 to 4.1 percent in 2023, peaking at 4.4 percent in 2021 due to the economic fallout of COVID-19 as well as conflict and weather extremes. Five conflict/insecurity-affected countries have had more than 1 million people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) each year since 2019 – Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, South Sudan and the Sudan. No disaggregated data were available for Yemen in 2023. Since 2020, four countries have had more than 10 percent of their analysed populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Haiti and South Sudan.

FIG. 1.12 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 4, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data.

¹ Discrepancies with past GRFC editions are due to a more accurate and consistent methodology for reporting aggregates by IPC phase.


² The IPC estimates for Ethiopia in May–June 2021 reflect the merger of the October 2020 and May 2021 IPC analysis results. The Government of Ethiopia has not endorsed the May 2021 IPC analysis.

Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3)

In the 19 countries with disaggregated data across all editions of the GRFC, the share of the analysed population facing Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) increased from 10 percent in 2016 to 18 percent in 2023. This corresponds to a more than threefold increase in the number of people in this phase since 2016, noting a 59 percent larger analysis coverage between 2016 and 2023. Democratic Republic of the Congo and Yemen have had more than 10 million people in this phase in five editions since 2016.

Central African Republic, Haiti and South Sudan consistently had more than 20 percent of their population analysed in IPC Phase 3 since 2017, and this trend continued through 2024.

FIG. 1.13 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3, 2016–2023




Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data.

Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)

In the same 18 countries with disaggregated IPC/CH Phase 1 and 2 data across all eight GRFC editions, the share of the population facing Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) has increased from 21 percent in 2016 to 29 percent in 2023. This is in parallel with a decrease in the share of the food-secure population (IPC/CH Phase 1) from 63 percent of the population analysed in 2016 to 52 percent in 2023, pointing to a deterioration in food security.

Across the 18 countries, the number of people in this phase more than doubled from 63 million in 2016 to almost 144 million in 2023, reflecting sustained drivers increasing food insecurity as well as increased analysis coverage.

FIG. 1.14 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 2, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data.

Nutrition overview


Acute malnutrition among children and women in food-crisis countries continued to worsen in 2023, particularly among displaced populations and those affected by conflicts.

This included a troubling increase in the number of children suffering from the most severe form of acute malnutrition,¹ who are up to 12 times more likely to die than their well-nourished counterparts. Out of 36.4 million children aged under 5 suffering from acute malnutrition in 2023, 9.8 million were severely acutely malnourished and in need of urgent treatment in 32 food-crisis countries.^{2 3}

Globally, nearly half of all deaths in children under 5 years old are attributable to malnutrition (UNICEF, March 2023). The ripple effects of malnutrition extend to diminished immune function, linear growth and cognitive development, with profound impacts for the economic potential of communities and countries. Malnourished women are at a higher risk of giving birth to low birth-weight babies, who are more prone to illness, malnutrition and mortality in infancy and early childhood, and may suffer from chronic diseases in later life (GRFC 2023, May 2023).

In the contexts of major conflicts, especially in the Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Palestine (Gaza Strip), leading to the uprooting of large populations, the nutrition situation of children, and of pregnant and breastfeeding women is of great concern. Such conflicts have caused a severe reduction in the access to and availability of nutritious, affordable and safe foods for children, essential health and nutrition services for children and women, and

FIG. 1.15 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 32 food crises, 2023



Source: GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024.

9.3M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 22 food-crisis countries with data in 2023

Source: GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024.

humanitarian assistance. Dire living conditions and lack of safe water are enabling the spread of infectious diseases. All these factors raise the risk of life-threatening acute malnutrition.

This edition of the GRFC aims to provide a holistic understanding of available acute malnutrition data in GRFC food-crisis countries/territories since 2021. To do so, the GRFC Nutrition Technical Working Group endorsed up to three levels of nutrition data for each country:

- Data on contributing factors to acute malnutrition, such as levels of anaemia, share of households with adequate access to health and WASH services, information on Minimum Acceptable Diet, etc.
- Data on the prevalence of acute malnutrition (outcome level) stemming from nutrition surveys, such as SMART and MICS surveys.
- Data on the burden of malnutrition, which refer to the number of children and women suffering from acute malnutrition during a particular period of analysis. Such estimates are provided by IPC acute malnutrition analyses, HNOs and estimates by UNICEF and WFP.

¹ Acute malnutrition, or wasting, refers to low weight in relation to height/length or the presence of bilateral oedema.

² The acute malnutrition burden calculation method is not the same across countries and therefore the numbers are not directly comparable.

³ The comparability of the number of children affected by acute malnutrition across countries is limited due to variations in the incident correction factors used for its estimation in each country. For further details, please refer to the *Technical Notes on page 162*.

The underlying determinants of malnutrition

Malnutrition is multidimensional. Children's nutritional status is largely determined by the adequacy of their diets and care, which in turn are driven by the availability of and access to nutritious and affordable foods, essential nutrition and social services, and age-appropriate feeding and care practices, according to the UNICEF Conceptual Framework on the Determinants of Maternal and Child Nutrition (see figure 1.18).

The Framework emphasizes the need for year-round access to nutritious foods, essential services and positive practices to create environments that nurture children and women. Without these foundational supports, the risk of acute malnutrition in children and women rises, initiating a cascade of nutrition deprivation and poor survival, growth and development outcomes with intra- and inter-generational consequences (UNICEF, November 2021).

The associations between malnutrition and acute food insecurity are not linear but, as the GRFC illustrates, areas with high levels of acute food insecurity often tend to have high levels of acute malnutrition, which, when combined, create a major threat to the survival and development of populations in the short, medium and long term.


Assessing the unseen: the need for holistic information systems

Out of 59 food-crisis countries/territories meeting GRFC 2024 technical requirements, 35 had estimates for the number of acutely malnourished children since 2021, and out of these 27 had data for all three data levels.

Twenty-four food-crisis countries/territories included in the GRFC 2024 did not have comprehensive burden or prevalence data between 2021 and 2023.

Some major food crises had target estimates rather than burden or prevalence data. These are instrumental in identifying and assisting children

FIG. 1.16 The ten food crises with highest numbers of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, 2023 (millions)



* These figures are not based on country-wide analyses.

Source: IPC TWGs; HRP/HNO (Ethiopia, Sudan).

most impacted by severe acute malnutrition, ensuring support where it is most needed.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, countries facing food crises such as Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras, and Ukraine in Europe, have historically shown low levels of acute malnutrition, as confirmed by screenings and admission data. This situation explains the absence of acute malnutrition burden and prevalence data at national levels. Investing in wider nutrition vulnerability analyses would better reflect the malnutrition situation and the potential intersectionality of malnutrition with food insecurity.

Data for pregnant and breastfeeding women in 2023 were available in only 22 out of 59 food-crisis countries/territories, indicating the difficulty of accessing data for these populations. In these countries, about 9.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished.

This concerning picture for maternal nutrition in food-crisis countries had Democratic Republic of the Congo at the forefront, with 2.2 million women affected. Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Nigeria, South Sudan and the Sudan each reported between half a million to nearly 1 million cases, reflecting poor maternal diets, high levels of acute food insecurity and protection issues that have a cascading effect on the wellbeing of mothers and their children.

Gathering nutrition data among forcibly displaced populations in food-crisis countries/territories is also an enormous challenge. Outcome-level and contributing factors data were available only for 18 of the 57 food-crisis countries with displaced populations. The data came from SENS surveys conducted by UNHCR in refugee camp settings. In addition, in Colombia, a WFP analysis provided key nutrition indicators for migrant populations.

Limited funding and monitoring capacity, coupled with heightened conflict and restricted access, have led to fragmented nutrition data. This was particularly the case for some conflict-driven food crises that lacked national coverage, notably Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria and Yemen.

Innovative data collection and analysis methods, exemplified by the recent nutrition vulnerability analysis for Palestine (Gaza Strip), offer expanded insights into nutrition situations. A concerted and intentional investment is essential to scale this approach for a holistic perspective on nutrition. This is especially important in hard-to-reach areas where large forcibly displaced populations, particularly IDPs, go largely unassessed.

Conflict-affected countries had the highest numbers of children with acute malnutrition in 2023

Among the countries with data for 2023, about 60 percent of the estimated children with acute malnutrition were in the ten food crises with the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. These countries experienced significant conflict, either through protracted situations or a notable intensification in 2023, compounded by climate shocks and extreme weather events and high prices of nutritious foods, exacerbating their food and nutrition crises.


Northeastern and northwestern Nigeria had the highest numbers of children with acute malnutrition, with over 5.9 million, of whom over 1.6 million were severely acutely malnourished, followed by Ethiopia, Afghanistan and the Sudan (according to estimates from before the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023).

For the Sudan, a revised analysis after the start of the conflict projected a 30 percent increase in the number of children suffering from wasting in hotspot areas, an increase of 15 percent in states hosting large IDP populations and 10 percent elsewhere in the country.

The analysis for Yemen was only carried out in internationally recognised government (IRG)-controlled areas. There were no recent nutrition data for Myanmar, but the Nutrition Cluster indicated a continued deterioration of the situation amid worsening contributing factors.

Ascertaining the nutrition status of children in Palestine (Gaza Strip) was very challenging, due to the ongoing conflict. The deteriorating nutrition situation of women and children raised concerns that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition had likely been exceeded and mortality could breach Famine thresholds in northern governorates anytime between mid-March and May 2024 (IPC, March 2024). The second round of the Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis for the Gaza Strip revealed significant worsening

FIG. 1.17 The ten food crises with the highest number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2023 (millions)



* These figures are not based on country-wide analysis coverage.

Source: HNO/HRP; IPC TWGs (Afghanistan, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and South Sudan).

in the nutrition of children aged 6–23 months from January–March 2024, particularly in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates, where limited aid access led to acute malnutrition rates doubling to 31 percent, with 4 percent of them suffering from severe acute malnutrition. While aid efforts in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah governorates helped to some extent, the overall malnutrition levels still increased to around 6 percent, up from 1 percent before the conflict (GNC, March 2024).

In Latin America and the Caribbean, data available for Haiti showed a concerning and worsening nutrition crisis, with GAM prevalence in several locations of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area above the 10 percent WHO High threshold (SMART, 2023). While acute malnutrition is not a major issue among resident populations across the region, there are growing concerns of a progressive deterioration in the nutritional status of populations on the move, particularly among migrants, refugees and people requiring international protection (GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024).

Extremely Critical and Critical levels of acute malnutrition in drought, flood and conflict-affected areas

According to the IPC acute malnutrition (AMN) analyses conducted in 18 countries/territories covering 2023, only Kenya had areas classified in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) (>30 percent) due to the multi-season drought.

In Yemen, where the coverage of the 2023 IPC AMN analysis was reduced due to conflict-related access constraints, areas classified in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) in 2022 were not analysed in 2023.

Fifteen of the 18 countries – Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, the Niger, northern Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen – all had areas classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) (15–30 percent of children with acute malnutrition).


In only three countries was Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) the most severe classification: Burkina Faso, where the analysis did not cover northern areas severely affected by conflict, Burundi, and southern and southeastern Madagascar.

According to other nutrition sources on outcome levels, the prevalence of acute malnutrition for children under 5 years old was concerning in several countries.

In Ethiopia, SMART surveys conducted in August 2023 in rural areas and IDP sites across the Tigray region indicated a Very High/Critical prevalence of acute malnutrition, with the highest prevalence among IDPs (26.5 percent). Some 61 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were suffering from acute malnutrition (MUAC < 23cm), indicating an Extremely Critical situation (SMART, August 2023).

In the Sudan, before the escalation of conflict in April 2023, 64 localities had a Very High acute malnutrition prevalence of 15 percent or more, including five localities with levels over 30 percent.

FIG. 1.18 UNICEF's conceptual framework



Source: UNICEF, 2021.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, it varied regionally, with the Northwest and parts of Damascus at 5 percent (considered Low/Medium), while some northeastern areas reached 12 percent, surpassing the WHO High threshold.

SMART surveys also indicated prevalence above the WHO Very High threshold of 15 percent in parts of Mauritania.

In Haiti, the Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) prevalence was estimated at 2.1 percent, reaching a highly concerning 3 percent in Port-au-Prince's metropolitan area.



© WFP/AFET/ABOODAL SAMD

Spotlight | Displacement

Available data on acute food insecurity and malnutrition on displaced populations paint a dire picture. The situation will likely continue to deteriorate in 2024 without concerted action among governments and the international community to meet funding requirements as conflict, and economic and climate shocks drive increased displacement.

.....

Failing to meet global burden-sharing commitments can increase protection risks for displaced people, drive engagement in harmful coping strategies, trigger further displacement and amplify acute food insecurity.

.....

While tools are evolving to support robust, disaggregated and systematic data collection and analysis on displaced populations, more work needs to be done to harmonize indicators and methods of analysis.

.....


The vulnerabilities faced by displaced populations – protection risks, limited access to employment, livelihoods, food and shelter, and reliance on dwindling humanitarian assistance – need to be captured in food security and nutrition analyses.

Spotlight | Displacement

New, escalating and protracted conflicts, extreme climatic events and economic shocks resulted in another year of increasing numbers of people forced to flee their homes in 2023. In 59 food-crisis countries/territories, the number of displaced people reached 90.2 million.¹


This *Spotlight* aims to highlight the link between acute food insecurity and displaced populations in food-crisis contexts globally and through four country-level case studies, two covering internally displaced populations (IDPs) and two refugee populations.

FIG. 1.19 Number of forcibly displaced people in 59 food-crisis countries/territories, 2023



Sources: IOM, 2023; UNHCR Nowcasted estimate December 2023; UNRWA, 2023.

FIG. 1.20 New refugee, migrant and asylum-seeker flows in 59 food-crisis countries, 2013–2022




The data in this figure refer to the 59 food crises with data meeting GRFC technical requirements for 2023.

Source: UNHCR.

¹ Globally there were 110 million forcibly displaced people by the end of 2022 (UNHCR Mid-Year Trends, October 2023).

FIG. 1.21 Number (millions) of displaced people in 59 food-crisis countries/territories, 2013–2023



The data in this figure refer to the 59 food crises with data meeting GRFC technical requirements for 2023.

Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimate, December 2023, IOM, UNRWA.

Most forcibly displaced people remain in their country of origin as IDPs

Most displaced people in the 59 food-crisis countries/territories with data meeting GRFC technical requirements were displaced internally, amounting to 64.3 million IDPs (IOM, 2023). The remaining 26 million fled across international borders, mainly to neighbouring countries, and reside as refugees, asylum-seekers or others in need of international protection (UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023; UNRWA, 2023).

Rapidly increasing numbers of displaced people in last decade

Conflict in many of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories – including Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Palestine, Nigeria, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen – has contributed to rapidly increasing numbers of displaced people over the last ten years.

Climate disasters in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan, and economic hardship including in countries of South America, have also been contributing factors.

Refugee flows into food-crisis countries over the last decade reached over 3 million in 2017 (when 0.8 million refugees entered Türkiye and 0.7 million Rohingya refugees entered Bangladesh) and in 2018 largely due to migrants entering Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Lower numbers were observed during 2020 and 2021 when COVID-19 movement restrictions were in place. Higher numbers in 2013 and 2014 were largely driven by the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, with refugees seeking safety in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Türkiye (see figure 1.21). The Sudan and Uganda have received continually high numbers of refugees, especially in 2016–2018.

A sharp increase in IDPs in 2023

Of the people newly internally displaced in 2023, the largest numbers were in the Sudan followed by Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine (Gaza Strip), Somalia and Myanmar (UNHCR Mid-Year Trends, October 2023; IDMC, 2024).

The Sudan became the largest internal displacement crisis in the world in 2023 with millions of people internally displaced between the onset of hostilities in April and the end of the year, bringing the total number of IDPs to over 9 million (IOM, January 2024).


In Palestine, the Gaza Strip saw 85 percent of its population – or 1.9 million people – displaced between early October and December 2023, some multiple times (UNRWA, January 2024).

Displacement and food crises are linked and mutually reinforcing

Disaggregated data reveal that high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition are particularly prevalent in displaced communities. This is linked to insecurity and protection risks, limited access to employment and livelihood opportunities, unreliable access to food and shelter, and reliance on dwindling humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs.

Failing to address these vulnerabilities can drive use of harmful coping strategies, leading to further displacement and amplifying acute food insecurity (see box on page 20).

Who do the numbers in this Spotlight refer to?

 The figures in this Spotlight refer to people who have been **forcibly displaced** by the end of 2023. Forced displacement is involuntary or coerced movement of people away from their home or home region as a result of or to avoid the effects of events or situations such as armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights abuses, or natural or human-made disasters (UNHCR).

The data include **refugees** (under UNHCR's and UNRWA's mandate); **asylum-seekers**; **internally displaced persons** (IDPs); and **"other people in need of international protection"** (OIPs), a category introduced by UNHCR in mid-2022 to refer to people forcibly displaced outside their country or territory of origin including for economic reasons.

This Spotlight uses the term **"displaced populations"** to cover all these population groups.

FIG. 1.22 Four-year trends in food-crisis countries with more than 5 million IDPs in 2023





FIG. 1.23 Four-year trends in food-crisis countries with 2–5 million IDPs in 2023



Colombia, with 6.9 million IDPs in 2023, is not included in this graphic because no data were available for 2020–2022.

Source: IOM; OCHA; UNHCR.

IDP populations are experiencing dire food insecurity and malnutrition levels

Although food security data specifically on IDP populations are fairly scant, the data in the GRFC 2024 reveal a strong link between internal displacement and high levels of acute food insecurity.

In Palestine (Gaza Strip), where 75–85 percent of the population are displaced (UNRWA, January

2024), the entire IDP population are facing high levels of acute food insecurity, with 25 percent estimated to be facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, December 2023). Some 60 percent of IDPs in Burkina Faso, 67 percent in Somalia, and 100 percent of IDPs living in camps in northwest Syrian Arab Republic faced high levels of acute food insecurity (GRFC 2024) (see table 1.1 on page 24). Figures 1.22 and 1.23 above show the change over the last four years in the number of

Displaced populations face particular vulnerabilities pertaining to the four pillars of food insecurity

Food availability Restrictive policies in some refugee-hosting countries might limit access to land for food production. Displaced populations are less likely to own livestock and farmland than residents, especially when they experience repeated displacements. Markets may be strained to respond to a sudden or sustained increased demand due to weak local food systems. Displaced people are therefore often heavily reliant on food assistance, yet severe underfunding has resulted in cuts – whether in quantity or a decreasing number of households receiving them – leading to a reduction in the quantity and quality of food received.

Food access While some countries have made significant progress in expanding legal access to work for refugees, the majority of refugees struggle to find decent employment or access livelihoods that allow them to generate a sustainable income, particularly those living in camp settings.

Restrictive policies prevent displaced populations from accessing livelihoods/generating income, including accessing credit and bank accounts and being permitted to open a business, which restricts entrepreneurship and engaging in business.

Displaced populations may face labour market competition in and with host communities. Employment tends to be unpredictable, high risk and low paid. Faced with low incomes, inflation, food price rises and volatility, they are often unable to meet their food and other basic needs without resorting to harmful coping strategies.

Food utilization Most displaced populations live in marginalized or high-risk areas, exposed to natural disasters or crowded into dense camps or poor urban centres with limited access to social or health services. Access to clean water, improved sanitation and cooking facilities can be limited, increasing the risk of disease and malnutrition, particularly among women and children. Displacement can break down social networks and disrupt – but sometimes strengthen – community support systems. The stressors associated with being displaced and finding oneself in unfamiliar places exposed to unfamiliar food sources can affect mental and physical health, and compromise infant and young child-feeding practices.

Food stability Lack of predictable and stable income, and poor access to livelihoods, shelter and basic services can make it difficult for displaced households to predictably or stably meet their food needs.

IDPs in the ten food-crisis countries that had at least 2 million IDPs in 2023. In most countries, rising levels of acute food insecurity go hand-in-hand with increasing IDPs. All ten countries/territories with more than 2 million IDPs in 2023 are among the ten worst food crises by number and/or share of people facing high acute food insecurity.

Assistance is often targeted to camp settings because vulnerable displaced populations

living outside camps are often difficult to locate and account for, but they also face significant challenges to economic and social integration with host communities, leading to higher levels of acute food insecurity compared with their host counterparts (IOM, 2023).

There is also a strong correlation between acute malnutrition and internal displacement. The highest number of children suffering from acute malnutrition were in countries with the largest

IDP populations – including northeastern and northwestern Nigeria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, the Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo. For the Sudan, a revised analysis after the April 2023 start of the conflict projected a 15 percent increase in the number of children suffering from wasting in states hosting large IDP populations. In Ethiopia, SMART surveys conducted in August 2023 in IDP sites across the Tigray region indicated a Critical prevalence of acute malnutrition among IDP children under 5 years old (26.5 percent) (SMART, August 2023).

More than 60 percent of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants face high levels of acute food insecurity in multiple countries

Out of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories with data in 2023, 44 host more than 5 000 refugees, asylum-seekers and migrant populations. These countries are themselves suffering structural vulnerabilities and repeated shocks.


In 2023, particularly high levels of acute food insecurity existed among refugee and migrant populations in Colombia, Congo, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan and South Sudan (GRFC 2024) (see table 1.2 on page 24).

Furthermore, High (10–15 percent) or Very High (above 15 percent) levels of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years old were found in refugee camps in Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Niger, South Sudan and Uganda, according to UNHCR SENS surveys carried out in these operations (GRFC 2024).

“Returning home” may not mean safety or stability

Many returnees face extreme hardship, continued displacement and acute food insecurity. They are not always able to return to their place of origin or they find that their communities have changed, including loss of access to their homes, lands and livelihoods, which can also directly impact food insecurity.

FIG. 1.24 Food-crisis countries hosting at least 1 million refugees, migrants or asylum-seekers, 2023



Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimates, December 2023.

There are several illustrative examples of this in the GRFC. In 2023, the Government of Pakistan announced plans to repatriate “illegal foreigners”. Following this, many Afghans made the decision to leave Pakistan, although some deportations were also recorded. From mid-September to the end of 2023, 0.5 million returned. People arriving at the border were exhausted, requiring urgent assistance and psychosocial support. Many Afghan returnees, including women and children, are vulnerable, especially in harsh winter conditions if left without adequate shelter (UNHCR, January 2024). Many are returning to a situation of internal displacement, joining the country’s 5.7 million existing IDPs (IOM, December 2023).

In Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, a reduction in conflict allowed around 0.6 million IDPs to return to safe areas in 2023, but largely without access to land or the means to restart their subsistence activities (IPC, November 2023).

The South Sudanese refugees in the Sudan provide another example: by February 2024, the conflict had forced nearly 0.5 million refugees to return to South Sudan. Their coping strategies

to meet their food and other basic needs have been exhausted by repeated displacements, low ownership of assets and little engagement with subsistence livelihoods, with around 28 000 of them projected to face catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) in April–November 2024 (IPC, November 2023).

Out of the 7.3 million Ukrainians facing moderate or severe acute food insecurity in 2023, about 1 million were returning refugees and nearly 1 million were internally displaced (HNRP, January 2024).

Funding shortfalls hit displaced populations hard

While the scale of both acute food insecurity and forced displacement continues to grow, resource constraints and other factors result in a reduction in the number of people assisted and/or the amount of assistance provided.

Over USD 57 billion in funds were required to meet the world’s humanitarian needs in 2023, but as of November 2023 about a third or USD 20 billion had been raised against this target (Global Humanitarian Overview 2024).

As a result of these shortfalls, exacerbated by rising commodity and logistics costs, as well as access and security challenges, life-saving food assistance to many of the world’s worst food crises is being reduced. This is contributing to increased adoption of negative coping strategies to ensure food consumption in the short term, and eventually, a deterioration in food consumption (WFP, forthcoming 2024).

Lack of investment in resilience, as well as limited employment and livelihood opportunities and high dependency on food assistance, have made displaced populations even more vulnerable to these reductions.

Data challenges

Food security data on displaced populations are often difficult to compare across populations or aggregate because of the use of different indicators or methods of analysis. Specific vulnerabilities limiting access to food (including access to land and productive resources, freedom of movement, financial inclusion, etc.) for displaced populations are not always adequately captured.

Accurate assessment is hampered by displaced populations being in hard-to-access areas or because the dynamic nature of displacement means that populations may not be present at the time of food security assessments, which can lead to exclusion from assistance. Most data collection and analysis take place in the early stages of crises, and end soon after the most acute phase is over. This approach serves short-term response, but does not measure or help to understand the chronic dimensions of food insecurity in long-term displacement situations (GRID 2023, IDMC, May 2023).

Nutrition, food security and socioeconomic data on displaced populations are most often collected through household surveys. Complementing these surveys with community-wide analyses can indicate the degree of integration with host communities and the vulnerabilities that are unique to displaced populations, while informing programme design that is relevant to the needs of both (IOM PROGRESS, 2023).

Filling this gap is complex, and requires stakeholders working on food security and displacement to agree on common methodologies and sampling to better articulate the relationship and subsequent response between the two phenomena. There may be significant financial, logistical and methodological obstacles, but ensuring the inclusion of millions of displaced people who may be suffering disproportionately from food insecurity and malnutrition should be considered a priority (GRID 2023, IDMC, May 2023).

Acute food insecurity and malnutrition in selected displacement settings

This section aims to provide evidence on acute food insecurity, and, where available, malnutrition, in displacement contexts through four case studies with acute food insecurity data available for displaced populations over the past three to four years.

Where data are available, the impact of funding shortfalls and funding prioritization on the food security of displaced populations is also analysed over the same time period. These countries present a range of security, legal and environmental challenges that impact the acute food insecurity of displaced populations. Two case studies focus on refugee populations (Bangladesh, and Lebanon), while two consider IDPs (Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic).

Case study 1


Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh

Bangladesh hosts the largest camp-based refugee population in the world. Over 750 000 Rohingya refugees fled from violence in Rakhine state in 2017 and joined a small existing population of Rohingya refugees in camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh (UNHCR, November 2023) with little prospect of safe return to Myanmar in the foreseeable future (UNHCR, August 2023).

As of 2023, more than 960 000 refugees lived in densely populated areas mainly in the Cox Bazar's region – home to the world's largest refugee camp (UNHCR, August 2023). The Government of Bangladesh does not issue formal work permits to Rohingya refugees. As a result, they are dependent on humanitarian assistance or finding informal work that can be exploitative (WFP REVA, June 2022).


Levels of acute food insecurity surged following the COVID-19 pandemic and remained at high levels due to a confluence of unemployment, high

FIG. 1.25 Share of Rohingya refugees facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2021–2023



Source: WFP Refugee Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA); WFP (assistance).

FIG. 1.26 Effects of 2023 rations cuts on Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar




Source: WFP, 2023.

inflation, heavy monsoon rainfall, humanitarian funding cuts and fires that destroyed refugee camp infrastructure (WFP REVA, June 2023).

A recent WFP study, based on WFP's preliminary results of REVA 7 in November 2023, showed that a 33 percent reduction in WFP's cash assistance in Cox's Bazar refugee camps in 2023 contributed to poorer food consumption, measured by the Food Consumption Score (FCS) (see figure 1.26).

Even more concerning, households were up to 70 percent more likely to resort to food-based

FIG. 1.27 Share of Syrian refugees in Lebanon facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2019–2023



Source: WFP-UNHCR-UNICEF VASyR 2019–2023; WFP (number of beneficiaries).

coping strategies, such as shifting diets, borrowing and reducing meals. The most vulnerable people had to increasingly resort to coping strategies such as selling assets, taking additional loans and begging, to maintain a substantially reduced consumption of food (WFP, forthcoming 2024). Ration cuts also contributed to high levels of acute malnutrition, which reached 12 percent among children under 5 years old in 2023 (UNICEF, August 2023).

Case study 2

Syrian refugees in Lebanon

Lebanon hosts the largest refugee population per capita in the world. It hosts around 0.8 million registered refugees from Syrian Arab Republic, as nowcasted by UNHCR in December 2023, though the number is as high as 1.5 million when including unregistered refugees (IPC, December 2023).

Conditions in the Syrian Arab Republic will not likely be conducive to large-scale voluntary returns in safety and dignity in the foreseeable future (IPC, December 2023).

However, living conditions in Lebanon are not easy as most Syrian refugees lack legal residency, face work restrictions, have extremely limited resources

to access food and other basic needs, and are almost entirely reliant on humanitarian assistance (VASyR 2023, February 2024). Moreover, soaring prices and decreased wages in Lebanon have made staple food and other basic goods unaffordable. By 2023, some 90 percent of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon was in debt, borrowing money from friends and neighbours to cover their basic needs (3RP, January 2024).

The share of Syrian refugees facing high levels of acute food insecurity fluctuated during the analysed period (2019–2023), peaking at more than half in 2022 (VASyR 2023, February 2024). During the period, the 2020 Beirut port explosion and COVID-19 pandemic worsened refugees' existing economic vulnerabilities (VASyR 2021, January 2022). The end of the data period showed a slight improvement, down to 42 percent of refugees experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Recent data suggest a concerning nutritional situation, with 80 percent of children aged 6–23 months receiving fewer than the recommended four food groups a day (VASyR 2023, February 2024).


Case study 3 IDPs in Somalia

In Somalia, conflict has been displacing rural populations to major urban centres since 1991, but extreme weather is an increasingly prominent driver of displacement as droughts and flooding intensify, leading to herd reductions and loss of livelihoods that undermine the potential of returning to rural livelihoods (UNHCR, May 2023).

As of 2023, around 1.2 million people were internally displaced. Around 67 percent faced high levels of acute food insecurity in November 2023 amid rising food and water prices. Of particular concern were displaced populations in settlements around Mogadishu and Baidoa (IPC, April 2023).

The severity of the acute food insecurity crisis, driven mostly by conflict, has been exacerbated by rising food and water prices. The percentage of IDPs facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 38 percent in 2021 to 67 percent in 2023 (IPC, April 2023).

FIG. 1.28 Share and number of IDPs in Somalia facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2021–2023



Source: Somalia IPC TWG; WFP (number of beneficiaries).



The earthquakes that hit northern Syrian Arab Republic in February 2023 caused mass displacement among families that had already been displaced by conflict.

Case study 4 IDPs in Syrian Arab Republic

More than 12 years of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic have resulted in widespread violence and displacement, with around 6.6 million Syrians internally displaced (HNAP, 2023). Around 2.8 million live in the Northwest region alone, in dire conditions. Access to essentials such as safe water, food, medicine, healthcare and livelihoods is limited (HNO 2024, December 2023).


IDPs are extremely likely to experience high levels of acute food insecurity, having experienced prolonged displacement, repeated movements as frontlines shift, and complete loss of livelihoods. A dire economic crisis has seen the cost of the food basket quadruple during the 2021–2023 period (HNO 2024, December 2023). The number of IDPs experiencing high levels of acute food

insecurity increased from 3.9 million in 2021 to 4.7 million in 2023. Conditions are relatively better for IDPs outside camps, but their situation also deteriorated between 2021 and 2023 (HNO 2024, December 2023).

The humanitarian situation was expected to deteriorate further in 2024. The nutrition situation showed signs of deterioration in 2023 with acute malnutrition levels increasing across Idleb, Ar-Raqqa and Quneitra governorates (HNO 2024, December 2023).

While IDP returns to areas of origin are occurring, returnees make up a very small fraction of the total IDPs in a conflict that has no foreseeable resolution (HNO 2024, December 2023).

FIG. 1.29 Share and number of IDPs in Syrian Arab Republic facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2021–2023




Source: HNO Syrian Arab Republic; WFP (number of beneficiaries).

TABLE 1.1 Estimates of high levels of acute food insecurity among IDPs

Countries/territories	Population group	Source	During peak period of acute food insecurity or not	Total population of reference (millions)	Population analysed	Analysis period	High levels of acute food insecurity (millions)	High levels of acute food insecurity (percentage)
Nigeria	IDPs	CH	N	1.5	100%	Oct–Dec 2023	0.4	28%
Syrian Arab Republic	IDPs in camps	HNO	Y	2.1	100%	Jan 2023	2.1	100%
Syrian Arab Republic	IDPs out of camps	HNO	Y	0.5	100%	Jan 2023	2.6	51%
Burkina Faso	IDPs	CH	Y	1.0	100%	Jun–Aug 2023	0.6	60%
Palestine (Gaza Strip)	IDPs	IPC	Y	1.7	100%	Dec 2023–Feb 2024	1.7	100%
Somalia	IDPs	IPC	Y	3.7	100%	Apr–Jun 2023	2.5	67%

TABLE 1.2 Estimates of high levels of acute food insecurity among refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants

Countries/territories	Population group	Source	During peak period of acute food insecurity or not	Total population of reference (millions)	Population analysed	Analysis period	High levels of acute food insecurity (millions)	High levels of acute food insecurity (percentage)
Colombia	Migrants	WFP (CARI)	Y	4.6	100%	Jun–Aug 2022	2.9	62%
Ecuador	Migrants	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.5	100%	Jul–Aug 2022	0.3	60%
Algeria	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.2	67%	Jun 2023	0.04	28%
Bangladesh	Refugees	IPC	Y	1.0	100%	May–Sep 2023	0.6	65%
Congo	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.06	94%	Aug–Sep 2022	0.04	65%
Djibouti	Refugees	IPC	Y	0.03	100%	Jul–Dec 2023	0.01	46%
Egypt	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.3	100%	Jan–Mar 2023	0.2	69%
Iraq	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.3	97%	Aug–Sep 2023	0.02	7%
Jordan	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.7	100%	Jan–Mar 2023	0.5	62%
Lebanon	Syrian refugees	IPC	Y	1.5	100%	Jan–Apr 2023	0.8	53%
Lebanon	Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees in Lebanon, Palestine refugees from Syria	IPC	N	1.7	100%	Apr–Sep 2024	0.6	33%
South Sudan	Refugees	JPDM (CARI)	N	0.3	100%	Jan 2023	0.2	66%
Türkiye	Refugees	WFP (CARI)	Y	0.05	100%	Sep–Dec 2023	0.004	8%
Uganda	Refugees	IPC	N	4.3	100%	Aug 2023–Jan 2024	0.9	19%



Central and Southern Africa

Although some countries in the region experienced marginal improvements, levels of acute food insecurity remained extremely worrying and similar to 2022.

.....

The impacts of conflict disrupted food security and livelihoods in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and northern Mozambique, while weather extremes and economic shocks contributed to driving food crises throughout the region in 2023.

.....

Large numbers of people were newly displaced by conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo, which continued to have more than half of the region's total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

.....

Tropical storms, cyclones and severe drought, exacerbated by the El Niño weather phenomenon, contributed to disease outbreaks, exacerbating acute malnutrition levels in areas with already limited health services.

.....

The outlook for 2024 is concerning because of the impacts of El Niño-related drought, especially in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique and Namibia.

Central and Southern Africa

Widespread economic shocks characterized by soaring inflation and low purchasing power, the lingering impacts of tropical cyclone Freddy, drier-than-average conditions linked to El Niño, and continued conflict in three of the 13 countries drove continued high levels of acute food insecurity across the region in 2023 and into 2024.

49.6M 

people or 21% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in 13 countries.

10.1M 

forcibly displaced people in 13 food-crisis countries in 2023 – consisting of 8.9 million IDPs and 1.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

3.9M 

acutely malnourished children in five food-crisis countries with 1.2 million of them suffering the most severe form of wasting.

Angola | Central African Republic | Congo (refugees and residents) | Democratic Republic of the Congo | Eswatini | Lesotho | Madagascar | Malawi | Mozambique | Namibia | United Republic of Tanzania | Zambia | Zimbabwe

MAP 2.1 Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 13 countries in 2023





FIG. 2.1 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



The total population was analysed in all countries, except: United Republic of Tanzania (17%), Madagascar (21%), Zambia (47%), Mozambique (49%), Lesotho (55%) and Democratic Republic of the Congo (94%). 94% of Congo's refugee population were analysed.

Legend:
■ Share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3+ above or equivalent
■ Population analysed
■ Population not analysed

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Legend for population size:
■ <1.0 million
■ 1-2.99 million
■ 3-4.99 million
■ 5-9.99 million
■ 10-14.99 million
■ ≥15 million
■ Not selected for analysis
■ Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed
■ Data gap
! Major food crisis
○ Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Zimbabwe and Angola); WFP CARI (Congo).

How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

The scale of the food crisis across the region remained similar to 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo remained the largest in terms of the number, and Central African Republic largest in terms of share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Some countries (Malawi and Zimbabwe) and localized areas of others (Mozambique and Zambia) experienced worsening acute food insecurity since 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia all saw slight improvements.

A regional-level year-on-year comparison in numbers is not possible due to a change in methodology for Angola, the inclusion of Congo for the first time and the fact that, for Central African Republic, Madagascar and United Republic of Tanzania, the peak period of acute food insecurity was the same as it straddled 2022 and 2023.

Considering the countries with data in both years, the share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity can be considered stable, passing from 22 to 21 percent. As in previous years, the highest prevalence of high acute food insecurity was in Central African Republic, at 44 percent.


Out of the 13 countries with analyses, all except Lesotho were considered major food crises with at least 1 million people or 20 percent of their total country population facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Severity of acute food insecurity

Out of 13 food crises in the region, ten had IPC analyses that provide data disaggregated by severity phase of acute food insecurity.

Seven of the ten are protracted major food crises – Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. No populations were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 2023.

FIG. 2.2 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Zimbabwe and Angola); WFP CARI (Congo).

4.9M people or 3% of the analysed population were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across nine countries in 2023

All ten countries with disaggregated data had populations in IPC Phase 4, except Lesotho. Conflict-affected countries continued to host most of the population in this phase – 3.4 million in Democratic Republic of the Congo, 0.6 million in Central African Republic and 0.2 million in Mozambique.

Severity was particularly high in Central African Republic where 11 percent of the population were in this phase. Compared with the previous year, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mozambique and Namibia all had fewer people in this phase.

37.9M people or 22% of the analysed population were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across ten countries in 2023

Across the region, the prevalence of people in IPC Phase 3 ranged from 10 percent in United Republic of Tanzania to 33 percent in Central African Republic. Overall, there is no significant change since last year in terms of number of people in this phase, with Malawi and Mozambique accounting for the slight regional increase.

72.4M people or 41% of the analysed population in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across ten countries in 2023

In each of the ten countries, at least 30 percent of analysed populations were in Stressed (IPC Phase 2), rising to 45 percent in Democratic Republic of the Congo and some areas of Madagascar, and 42 percent in parts of Zambia.

The additional 8 million people in this phase since 2022 is almost equivalent to the decrease in the number of people in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), indicating an overall deterioration of the situation. Without long-term support for disaster risk reduction and livelihood protection, these people risk slipping into IPC Phase 3, requiring urgent action, if they face an additional shock.

Acute food insecurity since 2016

The increase year after year in the estimated number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in Central and Southern Africa from 2018 to 2023 reflects multiple interconnected shocks as well as increases in the size of the population analysed in Angola, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Madagascar, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

The region's low level of economic development and reliance on agriculture – namely cereal crops and livestock – leave it highly susceptible to weather extremes. Disastrous weather events of the last eight years include the El Niño-related drought of 2016–2017, recurrent droughts in localized areas of several countries, including Angola, Madagascar, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and tropical cyclones Idai and Kenneth in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 2019, as well as cyclone Freddy in Mozambique, Malawi and Madagascar in early 2023.


Three countries in the region have experienced protracted conflicts and worsening insecurity: Democratic Republic of the Congo since at least the late 1990s, Central African Republic since 2013 and Mozambique since 2017.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in widespread income losses, currency depreciation in many countries was increasing the costs of servicing external debt, triggering an increase in prices of imported food and creating domestic inflationary pressures, especially in Zimbabwe.

Looking at the nine protracted food crises with data available throughout the eight GRFC editions Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe), the number of highly acutely food-insecure people more than doubled between 2016 and 2023.

Regarding prevalence, the sharpest increase was between 2018 (when 20 percent of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food

FIG. 2.3 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Zimbabwe and Angola); WFP CARI (Congo).

Legend: 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed (Yellow), Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse or equivalent (Orange), Total population (Grey)

insecurity) and 2019 (when it reached 27 percent). By 2020, the prevalence reached 29 percent before declining after 2021 to 22 percent in 2022.

Increased data availability played a major part in the rising numbers in these nine countries. The population analysed increased by 40 percent between 2016 and 2022. For instance, in Democratic Republic of the Congo, analysis coverage increased from 65–69 percent of the population in 2018–2020 to 91–96 percent since 2021.

All nine countries except Lesotho and Zambia have continuously faced major food crises over the past eight years. Projections available as of January 2024 point to a similar share (22 percent) of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity across the nine countries as in 2022, with decreases in Madagascar, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Outlook for 2024

Drier and hotter conditions associated with El Niño will significantly impact the April 2024 harvest in much of Southern Africa and lead to an earlier and deeper 2024/25 lean season from October 2024.

Projections for 2024 indicate that 44.6 million people or 20 percent of the analysed population will face high levels of acute food insecurity in 12 countries in the region.

For six of the countries – Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia – the projections are the same as the 2023 peak since they refer to the typical lean period (October 2023–March 2024). The prevalence of high acute food insecurity was projected to decrease slightly in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar. It was projected to rise in Angola and remain at similarly high levels in Zimbabwe.

Overall, the impacts of El Niño pose a downside risk to yields, limiting crop production and poor households' ability to access sufficient food to meet their needs, especially in rural areas.

The projections may not have fully reflected the impact of extreme drought and low crop production in Zambia, parts of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, about which there was little evidence at the time the projections were made.

Areas of high concern include deficit-producing areas of southern and western Zimbabwe, southern Malawi, southern and central Mozambique, and southern Madagascar, which are likely to be worst affected by rainfall deficits and expected below-average 2024 harvests. They are expected to exhaust household food stocks earlier than usual.

Seasonal improvements in food security outcomes associated with the harvest in April/May 2024 are expected to be short-lived across much of the region, as household and locally produced market stocks will decline atypically early (FEWS NET, November 2023).

The exceptions include Democratic Republic of the Congo, northern Madagascar, northern Mozambique, and central and northern Malawi, where average to above-average rainfall was anticipated to support normal crop production, livestock conditions and labour opportunities.

In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, conflict will likely continue to limit income-earning opportunities and agricultural production despite the forecast of favourable rainfall.

Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024



Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in three countries where 31.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Intensified conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, ongoing insecurity in northern and southeastern areas of Central African Republic, and deteriorating security in parts of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, continued to displace households, reduce participation in agricultural activities, and disrupt trade and market access. Living costs were especially high in conflict-affected areas where employment opportunities were limited.

In the first 11 months of 2023, almost 2 million people were newly displaced in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri in Democratic Republic of the Congo, bringing the total of IDPs to more than 5.5 million in the three provinces alone. Over 85 percent of these displacements were due to armed attacks and clashes (OCHA, November 2023).

In Central African Republic, despite ongoing volatility with clashes between armed forces and non-state armed groups, the humanitarian situation was relatively better in 2023 compared with the last five years, with a 20 percent decrease in IDPs between 2022 and 2023 (UNICEF, February 2024).




Weather extremes were considered the main driver in seven countries where a total of 12 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

In 2023, weather extremes continued to affect crop production and pastoralism, including excessive rainfall and waterlogging notably in Lesotho, northern Zimbabwe and Zambia, as well as erratic rainfall and dry spells (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023; FEWS NET, June 2023).

Dry conditions in localized areas of southern Angola and northern Namibia constrained food availability and reduced income-earning opportunities from crop sales. United Republic


FIG. 2.4 Persistently high food inflation in 2023 for most countries in the region



This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

FIG. 2.5 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

of Tanzania, southern Zimbabwe and Zambia experienced consecutive pest infestations (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023; FEWS NET, June 2023). In February and March 2023, cyclone Freddy caused extensive flooding and crop damage and losses in southern Malawi, as well as in Madagascar and Mozambique where localized flooding damaged crops (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

The various weather shocks during the 2022/23 agricultural season resulted in mixed harvests across the region, with a bumper harvest in the maize triangle of South Africa and poor harvests in parts of southern Zimbabwe, southern Mozambique and southern Malawi (FEWS NET, November 2023).

The prevailing El Niño climate event, which was forecast to reach peak intensity in late 2023 and dissipate by mid-2024, drove hotter and drier-than-normal conditions across much of Southern Africa during the October 2023–March 2024 cereal cropping cycle (FEWS NET, November 2023).

February 2024 has proved the driest February on record over parts of Zambia, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique (OCHA, February 2024). In February 2024, a national drought disaster and emergency was declared in Zambia where the dry spell from mid-January affected most of the central and southern half of the country, destroying almost half of the country's maize cultivation (UN, March 2024).

Production downturns in maize, the region's key food staple, particularly in surplus-producing South Africa and Zambia, could trigger supply-related price spikes across the subregion and curb import availabilities. Given the high susceptibility of maize to drought stress and the high prevalence of rainfed agricultural systems, a poor rainy season is highly likely to lead to a poor harvest, with worrying consequences for household food availability and food access due to income losses for rural households (FAO, November 2023).

Poor pasture and water conditions from early 2024 were already leading to an atypically high number of livestock deaths in southern Angola, Namibia, southern Zambia and western Zimbabwe, ahead of the July–September 2024 dry season (OCHA, February 2024).

In Democratic Republic of the Congo, the October–November 2023 rains were delayed at the start of the agricultural season in the east-central and southeast of the country, which is likely to impact crop production (FEWS NET, November 2023).



Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in three countries where a total of 5.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

In most countries, currency weakness with consequent increases in fuel and transport costs, pushed up food prices and limited the transmission of lower international cereal prices to domestic markets (FAO, November 2023). Despite

the recent easing of international fertilizer prices, farmers' access to agricultural inputs is being constrained by weak national currencies. This, in turn, is curbing yields and reducing the area under cultivation, contributing to lower agricultural work opportunities and wages, lower harvests and higher food prices (FAO, November 2023).

Most countries in the region experienced double-digit annual food inflation, with the highest rates in Zimbabwe and Malawi (WFP, December 2023).

In particular, maize prices, the main food staple in Southern Africa, climbed to new record highs in Malawi and Zambia (usually a maize exporter) in October 2023 due to currency weakness coupled with reduced domestic supply in Malawi and strong export demand for Zambian maize, while in Zimbabwe maize meal prices were more than four times higher in September compared with the year-earlier values (FAO, November 2023).

In the net-importing countries of Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia, retail prices of maize meal generally declined in the second and third quarter of 2023 – though still well above their year-earlier levels – mirroring earlier falling prices in South Africa, the main source of cereals for these countries. However, subsequent price increases in South Africa were expected to trigger upward movements later in the year (FAO, November 2023).

In Democratic Republic of the Congo, while currency stability kept commodity prices stable, fuel prices increased by 12 percent during October in the eastern area, which could cause food prices to rise (FEWS NET, November 2023).

The anticipated below-average cereal and cash crop harvests in 2024 will lead to an atypical increase in imported maize volumes from outside the region to meet consumer demand in 2024, exacerbating already-inflated maize prices. Staple food prices across the region are likely to be higher than both 2023 and the five-year average. The combination of high food prices and limited access to income are expected to keep household purchasing power low across the region (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises

Persistently high levels of acute food insecurity across the region reflect structural factors such as high levels of poverty, government debt, high population growth, high exposure to natural hazards, gender and income inequality, and low levels of education that decrease households' and communities' ability to withstand and recover from shocks.

Weak governance structures and high public debt burdens undermine governments' efforts to deliver social services, alleviate poverty and achieve zero hunger (WFP, 2023).







With debt levels already high and spending on interest payments rising, the fiscal space to borrow more to finance policy responses to a food shock is extremely limited. The latest IMF/WB debt sustainability analysis concluded that Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe are in debt distress (ADB, 2023).

Angola, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique and United Republic of Tanzania received Very High or High INFORM risk scores, which are a composite indicator of a country's ability to respond to disasters based on hazard exposure, socioeconomic vulnerability and institutional coping capacity. Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo rank eighth and tenth globally for weak institutional capacity according to the INFORM Risk Index (INFORM Risk, 2024).

All food-crisis countries in the region are in the lowest 50 of the 191 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI). Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Mozambique are in the lowest 20, a reflection of the compounding effects of poor health resources, limited education opportunities and low incomes in these countries.

The region is particularly susceptible to erratic weather patterns, including prolonged droughts

TABLE 2.1 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Annual population growth: UNDESA for population (%)	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)	Crop growing period affected by drought condition (%)	INFORM Risk Index (0–10)	HDI global ranking (1–192)
						
ANGOLA	2.0	42.9	58.7	11.29	5.2	148th
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.4	N/A	68.5	2.93	8.7	188th
CONGO	2.1	96.2	36.1	6.63	5	153rd
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	2.0	19.8	55.3	1.61	7.7	179th
ESWATINI	2.5	61.2	12.4	13.05	3.3	144th
LESOTHO	1.7	100	30	16.15	3.6	168th
MADAGASCAR	2.4	19.6	73.9	13.48	5.5	173rd
MALAWI	1.7	4.4	61.9	11.1	4.4	169th
MOZAMBIQUE	1.4	45.9	70.3	10.1	6.7	185th
NAMIBIA	1.2	65.2	22.1	19.23	3.8	139th
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	2.6	2.6	64.3	16.15	5.1	160th
ZAMBIA	2.8	-0.1	58.7	8.43	3.9	154th
ZIMBABWE	3.2	60.3	61.6	17.67	4.1	146th

Source: UNDESA (Annual population growth); FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).

and erratic rainfall, which disrupt traditional farming practices, diminish crop yields and contribute to food scarcity. Limited access to financial resources and reliance on rainfed agriculture in many parts of the region increase susceptibility to climate-related shocks.

Agriculture, forestry and fishing represented the main livelihoods for 78 million people across the region in 2021 – reaching more than half the total employment in most protracted food crises and around 70 percent in Central African Republic, Mozambique and Madagascar (FAO, 2023).

According to the ASAP system, Lesotho, Namibia, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe experience drought for more than 15 percent of the crop growing period on average.

Population growth places additional strain on existing resources. The rapid increase in population (the rates are above 2 percent in eight countries) outpaces improvements in agricultural productivity, leading to a growing gap between food supply and demand.

Many food-crisis countries in the region – particularly Congo, Lesotho, Namibia, Eswatini and Mozambique – have a high dependency on imports, exposing them to regional and/or global food price fluctuations.


DISPLACEMENT | Nearly 90 percent of the region's forcibly displaced people are internally displaced by conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, and political violence in Central African Republic

High vulnerability among IDPs

The increase in displacement since 2022 is largely driven by the escalating violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where the number of IDPs rose from 5.7 million in 2022 to a record 6.9 million in 2023. As the security situation, particularly in North Kivu and Ituri, deteriorated throughout 2023, humanitarian needs soared amid significant humanitarian funding constraints. From October to mid-December 2023, 0.7 million people were displaced by escalating violence across North Kivu alone (IOM, October 2023). Out of the country's 25.4 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the latter half of 2023, IDPs, returnees and host families were among the most affected (IPC, October 2023).


In Mozambique, around 0.7 million remained displaced by the conflict in Cabo Delgado. Although a reduction in violence in 2023 allowed about 0.6 million IDPs to return to their home

FIG. 2.6 Numbers of displaced people in 13 food-crisis countries in the region (in millions), 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

FIG. 2.7 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

areas, they lacked the means to restart subsistence farming activities and produce their own food (IPC, November 2023). A deterioration of the security situation in February 2024 triggered a new wave of displacement (almost 70 000 people), further impacting agricultural production after the main planting season (IOM DTM, February 2024).

In Central African Republic, improved security in certain areas also allowed for some voluntary repatriation to stabilized areas (UNHCR, January 2024). Still 0.5 million IDPs were among the most acutely food-insecure population groups in the country (OCHA, January 2024).

The regional situation is further complicated by the growing impact of weather extremes, which had internally displaced over 1 million people in Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique as of January 2024 (UNHCR, January 2024).

Refugees face increasing challenges

More than 1 million people live as refugees in camps, settlements and urban areas across 12 food-crisis countries in the region, having fled conflict in neighbouring countries.

The highest numbers are in Democratic Republic of the Congo (from Central African Republic and Rwanda), United Republic of Tanzania (mainly from Burundi and Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Malawi (mainly from Democratic Republic of the Congo). Many of these refugee

populations have been displaced for decades (UNHCR, 2023).

The difficulties faced by forcibly displaced populations across the region continued to be aggravated by food ration reductions and cuts to other essential services in camps and settlements due to funding shortages. In March 2023, WFP was forced to reduce rations for more than 200 000 refugees in United Republic of Tanzania from 80 percent to 65 percent and to 50 percent by June, which was likely to have left thousands of refugees struggling to meet their nutritional needs just as food prices rose and more people sought refuge in the country from Democratic Republic of the Congo (WFP, May 2023).

New arrivals prompt rising nutrition concerns


Throughout 2023 and into 2024, thousands of Chadians as well as Central African returnees fleeing violence and intercommunity tensions related to transhumance have been arriving in the northwestern Ouham prefecture of Central African Republic, one of the most food-insecure areas in the country. Staying with host families, themselves facing high levels of vulnerability, both population groups have very limited access to fields for food production. According to local authorities, the number of inhabitants in some villages has increased almost tenfold, straining infrastructure and access to basic services (OCHA, January 2024).

Nutrition in refugee settlements and camps

Over the last two years, SENS surveys have collected nutrition data in refugee camps in Malawi (one camp), Congo (five camps), the United Republic of Tanzania (three camps), Zambia (three camps) and Zimbabwe (one camp).

The prevalence of acute malnutrition was above 5 percent, considered Medium, in one camp in Congo and in all three monitored camps in Zambia. Across the remaining nine monitored camps, the prevalence of acute malnutrition was Low. Micronutrient deficiencies led to high levels of anaemia among children under 5 years old in

MAP. 2.2 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

all countries except in Malawi and Zimbabwe, and to high levels of anaemia among women in all the monitored camps in Congo and Zambia. Exclusive breastfeeding targets of 75 percent for children under 6 months old were not met, except in Malawi and two camps in the United Republic of Tanzania.

Indeed, malnutrition in Mantapala camp in Zambia was very concerning. Around 2.6 percent of children aged under 5 were suffering severe acute malnutrition and around 27 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished (MUAC < 23cm). It had critically low rates of exclusive breastfeeding (20 percent) and a very high prevalence of poor food consumption (43 percent), measured by the FCS (UNHCR, October 2021).


ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Five food crises in the region had data for acute malnutrition, with an estimated 3.9 million children under 5 years old acutely malnourished, of whom 1.2 million were severely malnourished.

The majority of children and women with acute malnutrition were estimated in Democratic Republic of the Congo, the largest food crisis at global level.

Out of the five countries with IPC AMN analyses covering 2022 and 2023, the prevalence of acute malnutrition reached Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) levels in some analysed areas of Angola, Central African Republic, western Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar's Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est, and northern Mozambique.

Democratic Republic of the Congo had the highest number of acutely malnourished children under 5 years old, with 2.8 million children, of whom 0.9 million were severely malnourished, according to a partial IPC analysis (IPC AMN, December 2022). **Madagascar** had the next highest number (again according to a partial analysis of the Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est), followed by **Central African Republic, northern Mozambique, Angola** and **Congo**.

FIG. 2.8 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in five food crises, 2023



Source: IPC TWG and UNICEF WCARO, 2023.

Data for acute malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) were only available for six of the 13 countries, where a total of 2.5 million PBW were acutely malnourished in 2023, with 88 percent of them in Democratic Republic of the Congo (IPC AMN, December 2022).

In Central African Republic, over 162 000 PBW were affected by acute malnutrition with particularly high numbers in the northwest and southwest, and the capital Bangui (IPC AMN, January 2023).

The highest national prevalence of acute malnutrition among children aged under 5, based on SMART surveys conducted in 2021 and 2023, occurred in Mozambique (13 percent, considered High). However, the national prevalence can often mask a concerning local nutrition situation in these countries, specifically in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Mozambique. In Democratic Republic of the Congo, localized prevalence reached as high as 11 percent in areas of South Kivu (SMART 2023).


Drivers of acute malnutrition

Lack of food High levels of acute food insecurity – due to limited access and availability of nutritious foods, especially during the lean season – were identified as a major contributing factor to acute malnutrition in the five countries with IPC AMN analyses. Pockets of conflict/insecurity in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique led to high acute malnutrition among displaced populations.

Inadequate practices Low rates of exclusive breastfeeding and poor complementary feeding practices were considered major contributors to acute malnutrition in the Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est regions of Madagascar (IPC AMN, October 2022).


Inadequate feeding practices were common across the Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique, as evidenced by poor dietary diversity with fewer than 10 percent of children under 5 years old consuming a Minimum Acceptable Diet (MAD)

FIG. 2.9 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, 2023



Sources: Central African Republic IPC TWG, January 2023; Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, December 2022; Madagascar IPC TWG, October 2023; Mozambique IPC TWG, November 2023; UNICEF WCARO, 2023 (Congo).

FIG. 2.10 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition by country, 2023



Sources: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2023; Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, December 2022; Madagascar IPC TWG, August 2023; Mozambique IPC TWG, November 2023; UNICEF, 2023 (Congo).

(IPC AMN, November 2023). In United Republic of Tanzania, exclusive breastfeeding of children under 6 months old has increased substantially over time to 64 percent in 2022, but only 8 percent of children aged 6–23 months received an MAD (DHS, October 2023).

Conversely, in eastern areas of Democratic Republic of the Congo, where conflicts and population displacements are the main drivers of acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition classifications are less severe than that of acute food insecurity thanks to protective practices such as high exclusive breastfeeding rates, consumption of non-wood forest products, and adults reducing their food intake in favour of children and other vulnerable household members, which seem to limit acute malnutrition among children (IPC AMN, June 2023).

In parts of Central African Republic, other factors mitigate the nutritional situation, including good exclusive breastfeeding rates (80 percent), and high coverage of measles vaccination and vitamin A supplementation (IPC AMN, January 2023).

Inadequate services In drought-affected areas, water scarcity had a deleterious effect on WASH services, while across Malawi and Mozambique, flooding and damage caused by cyclone Freddy destroyed infrastructure, while

hampering access to health and other basic services. This exacerbated the cholera outbreaks the two countries were experiencing (UNICEF, March 2023).

About 188 000 cholera cases, including 3 000 related deaths have been reported in eight countries in Southern Africa since January 2023. Malawi reported 59 000 cases, the highest in the region. Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe reported between 10 000 and 50 000 cases (OCHA, January 2024).

A severely malnourished child is 11 times more likely to die from cholera than a well-nourished child (UNICEF, March 2023). Infectious diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea can exacerbate wasting among children and increase mortality risk, but also, acutely malnourished children are more likely to be affected by such diseases.


In western, central and southern areas of Democratic Republic of the Congo not affected by conflict and population displacements, acute malnutrition was worse than acute food insecurity. This may be attributable to high levels of isolation in certain areas of the country, poor hygiene conditions and poor access to health infrastructure leading to low coverage of measles vaccination and vitamin A supplementation (IPC AMN, December 2022).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Southwestern areas were the most affected by acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (FEBRUARY–MAY)

1.3M people or 4% of the country's total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season.

The provinces of Cunene, Huíla and Namibe were classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The analysis is not comparable with the 2022 peak due to a change in data source.



Source: FEWS NET, February 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE)

Up to **1.5M** people or 5% of the population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

This increase since the 2023 peak period reflects the expectation of poor rainfall during the 2023/24 cropping season, low household food stocks, and persistent food and fuel inflation.

Note: the projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.

Source: FEWS NET, December 2023.



DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Weather extremes The compounding effects of consecutive years of dry weather conditions, including during the 2022/23 season, significantly reduced agricultural production, which is the main source of food for rural households in the southwest (WFP, September 2023).

Southeastern areas experienced rainfall deficits during the last months of 2023 linked to the El Niño event while cumulative rainfall was average to above average in the rest of the country. Abnormally heavy rains in Luanda in December disrupted food availability in markets in the capital and in rural areas supplied from the capital (FEWS NET, December 2023).

Dry weather conditions are foreseen for the 2023/24 cropping season with poor rains likely to lead to low crop production and aggravate acute food insecurity levels in 2024 (FAO-GIEWS, November 2023).

Economic shocks Raised food prices throughout 2023 were partly attributed to local currency depreciation between May and July 2023 (FAO-GIEWS, November 2023) and the removal of fuel subsidies contributing to increasing production and distribution costs (FAO, November 2023). Annual food inflation in January 2023 was at 11.5 percent and marginally declined during the first months of the year to 9.3 percent in April. From May onwards, food prices steadily increased reaching almost 22 percent by December (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023).

Planned further cuts to fuel subsidies are expected to inflate fuel prices (FEWS NET, December 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

0.05M refugees and asylum-seekers, 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.1M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in April 2021–February 2022



Source: Angola IPC TWG, August 2021.

As of 2022, acute malnutrition was a serious public health problem in drought-hit southern provinces, driven by a range of factors including reduced agricultural production for subsistence farmers, poverty, poor sanitation and hygiene conditions, and low access to safe water sources.


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION

Lack of food Poor food availability and access due to drought led to inadequate and poor dietary intake, especially during the lean season. There was a strong correlation between acute food insecurity and malnutrition according to respective IPC analyses.


Inadequate services An estimated 1.2 million people faced water scarcity as a result of the drought, exposing them to compromised water, sanitation and hygiene conditions.

Inadequate practices Only 12 percent of children aged 6–23 months received a Minimum Acceptable Diet, which is considered Critical by the IFE Core Group. Just 37 percent of children under 6 months were exclusively breastfed, which is considered Seriously by UNICEF thresholds (UNICEF, 2020). Low health-seeking behaviour for sick children was identified as the main driver of acute malnutrition in seven municipalities (IPC, September 2021). More than half of children were not vaccinated against measles (IPC, June 2021).

PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER 2021–FEBRUARY 2022)



Source: Angola IPC TWG, September 2021.





ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Insecurity due to armed groups and displaced populations drives high levels of acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (SEPTEMBER 2022–MARCH 2023)

2.7M people or **44%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This included 0.6 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Insecurity and violence continued to impact food availability and access, with 19 areas classified in IPC Phase 4. The situation was worst in Nana-Mambéré prefecture where 64 percent of the population faced high acute food insecurity.





Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2022.

PROJECTION 2024 (APRIL–AUGUST)

2.5M people or **41%** of the total population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. This included 0.5 million in IPC Phase 4.

The situation is projected to stay relatively calm during the lean season. Five areas are projected to be in IPC Phase 4, an improvement since the 2023 peak.



Note: the projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.

Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Violent incidents and population displacement decreased in 2023 compared with 2021, but security remained precarious in the north, northeast and southeast with armed groups attacking civilians and driving population displacement. The

presence of armed groups disrupted agropastoral relations, and limited access to cropland and agricultural inputs, which affected food production. Conflicts in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan led to increased arrivals of refugees, putting pressure on livelihoods in border areas (IPC, October 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

0.5M forcibly displaced people, 2023


Economic shocks Prices of basic goods remained very high, particularly in the most insecure areas where armed groups disrupt market functionality (FEWS NET, September 2023). High prices for imported fertilizers constrained access for those who use them, with reductions on their 2023 crop production.

0.5M IDPs and **0.07M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, June 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG.

A protracted major food crisis A low-income country, the security crisis that has affected the country since 2013 was superimposed on a fragile national context. According to the INFORM risk index, the country is at the highest risk of humanitarian crisis in the world. It has been included as a major food crisis in all editions of the GRFC and has been included almost continuously among the ten countries with the highest prevalence of high levels of acute food insecurity, reaching 51 percent at the height of COVID-19 restrictions in May–August 2020.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.3M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, October 2022–August 2023

0.2M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, September 2023–August 2024

0.2M MAM

0.1M SAM

Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, January 2023.

Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2023.

Conflict, internal displacement, disease, acute food insecurity and poor WASH drove deteriorating nutrition between 2021/22 and 2022/23, although the situation was expected to improve in 2023/24.


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate services High levels of disease (diarrhoea, malaria and acute respiratory infections) and poor access to clean drinking water are major contributors to malnutrition. Conflict and insecurity disrupt already inadequate basic services and make it difficult to supply as well as access nutritional assistance and prevention.

Lack of food While food insecurity is a major contributing factor, especially during the lean period, the IPC analyses showed a greater severity of acute food insecurity than acute malnutrition partly explained by the fact that the acute food insecurity analysis took place during the lean season. It also suggests that other factors mitigate the nutritional situation including good exclusive breastfeeding rates (80 percent), and high coverage of measles vaccinations and vitamin A supplementation (IPC, January 2023).

Inadequate practices Fewer than 10 percent of children receive a Minimum Acceptable Diet, which is considered Extremely Critical by the IFE Core Group (IPC, January 2023).

PEAK 2023 (MARCH–AUGUST)



Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, January 2023.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Around one-third of residents and two-thirds of refugees faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER–NOVEMBER)

 **1.9M** people or **31%** of the country's total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the peak of the lean season. Around **1.7%** faced severe acute food insecurity, according to CARI methodology (WFP, forthcoming).

Direct comparison with 2022 is not possible as the country did not have an assessment meeting GRFC technical requirements.

There are no projections for 2024.

DISPLACEMENT

 **0.1M** forcibly displaced people by 2023

 **0.03M** IDPs  **0.07M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IDMC, 2023, *Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.*


Around 70 000 refugees and asylum-seekers, 71 percent of them women and children, have fled conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic, and others are unable to voluntarily return to Rwanda (UNHCR, December 2023).


Refugee populations have mostly settled in the northern departments of Brazzaville, Likouala and Plateaux and they rely heavily on humanitarian assistance.

According to a 2022 assessment in Bétou and Bouémba refugee sites, the food security situation deteriorated compared with the previous year, more pronouncedly for asylum-seekers from Democratic Republic of the Congo than refugees from Central African Republic. Some 68 percent of asylum-seekers and 63 percent of refugees were food insecure. Around 21 percent of asylum-seekers and 14 percent of refugees faced severe acute food insecurity (WFP, September 2022).

More than 20 percent had poor food consumption (according to the FCS), which is almost double the 2021 assessment, and over half spent more than 75 percent of their income on food, an indicator of very high food insecurity (WFP, September 2022).

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Weather extremes** Congo is prone to recurrent flooding along the river corridor, affecting around 0.2 million people each year. Extreme rains since October 2023 led the Oubangui, a tributary of the Congo River, to overflow, causing unprecedented floods, the worst in six decades. On 29 December, the government declared a state of emergency due to flooding (UN, January 2024). Around 2 300 hectares of cultivated land were flooded and, in the north, access remained challenging for months (OCHA, January 2024).

 **Economic shocks** Both the oil and non-oil sectors continued sustaining the Congolese economy in 2023 after growing by an estimated 1.5 percent in 2022. However, GDP growth was negative in 2022 and poverty incidence increased slightly to an estimated 46.6 percent (WB, September 2023).

The country is highly susceptible to global food price fluctuations since it imports 70 percent of its food requirements. In 2023, increased domestic demand drove food inflation, which stood at 4.2 percent in November 2023 (WFP, January 2024).

 **Conflict/insecurity** The country hosts refugees and asylum-seekers who have fled conflict/insecurity in Rwanda three decades ago and more recently in Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Both host and displaced communities face food shortages and limited livelihood opportunities (WFP, September 2022).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.1M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, 2023


0.06M MAM 0.04M SAM

Source: UNICEF WCARO database, 2023.

0.03M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2023



Source: SMART 2021.

 Acute malnutrition affects 5.2 percent of children under 5 years, of whom 1.4 percent are severely acutely malnourished, corresponding to almost 39 000 children. Around 33 700 pregnant and breastfeeding


women suffer from acute malnutrition (MUAC <23 cm). Nearly half (48 percent) of Central African refugee children and 30 percent of asylum-seekers from Democratic Republic of the Congo are chronically malnourished (UNHCR, July 2021).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | An improving situation according to an analysis carried out before the October 2023 major escalation of violence.

PEAK 2023 (JANUARY–JUNE)

25.8M people or **25%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

This decline of 0.6 million people since the 2022 peak in July–December followed the harvest, but escalating armed conflict and displacement led to a 5 percent increase in the number of highly acutely food-insecure people in North Kivu and Ituri (IPC, May 2023). Around 3.4 million people faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4).




Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, May 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JANUARY–JUNE)

23.4M people or **22%** of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

This marks a third consecutive decline, with 2.43 million fewer people compared with the 2023 peak, but still very high due to persisting conflicts, political instability and displacement (IPC, September 2023). Around 2.9 million people were projected in IPC Phase 4.



Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, September 2024.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity The 2023 resurgence of armed groups targeting civilians in eastern areas led to mass population displacement and disruption of agricultural activities and livelihoods. From January–November, 1.1 million people were newly displaced in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. Armed conflict and intercommunal violence hampered access to and delivery of humanitarian aid (IOM, January 2024).

Economic shocks Local currency depreciation and foreign currency scarcity contributed to increasing food prices. Prices of key staples were higher than the previous year and five-year average throughout 2023, which, coupled with chronic underemployment and

poverty, constrained household purchasing power and food access (FEWS NET, December 2023).

Weather extremes Delayed rains at the start of the late 2023 crop season in some areas and prolonged below-average rainfall in others may affect yields (FEWS NET, November 2023). Many provinces experienced destructive flooding.

DISPLACEMENT

7.4M forcibly displaced people by 2023


6.9M IDPs

0.5M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, January 2024.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG.

A protracted major food crisis A low-income country, Democratic Republic of the Congo has been among the ten largest food crises in all eight editions of the GRFC, reflecting the humanitarian impact of more than three decades of conflict and insecurity, in a context of very low capacity to cope with shocks. The highest prevalence of acute food insecurity was in 2020 when 33 percent of the analysed population was in IPC Phase 3 or above. The population analysed has increased from 65–69 percent in 2018–2020 to 91–94 percent in 2021–2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

2.8M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

1.9M MAM | 0.9M SAM

Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, December 2022.

2.2M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023

Acute malnutrition among women and children is concerning, especially in the northeastern provinces following the escalation of conflict and major disease outbreaks (SMART 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Inadequate practices Poor child-feeding practices drove malnutrition in health zones classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above), with better practices having a protective role in others (IPC AMN, December 2023). Just 5–15 percent of children receive the Minimum Dietary Diversity (IPC, October 2022).

limit access to and availability of food.


Inadequate services Access to basic health services is limited by conflict and displacement, leading to low vaccination and vitamin A supplementation rates and enabling outbreaks of measles and cholera, especially in North Kivu and South Kivu. Poor sanitation and lack of access to potable water increased the risk of disease, especially among displaced people (IPC AMN, December 2023).

Lack of food Acute food insecurity was an underlying driver in many areas, in particular where conflict and displacement

PEAK 2023 (JANUARY–JUNE)



Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo, IPC TWG, December 2022.





ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Decrease in prevalence of high acute food insecurity since 2022.

PEAK 2023/24 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)


 **0.3M** people or 24% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This includes 0.01M people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This is an improvement compared with the worst period in 2022 when the peak figure reached 29 percent of the analysed population in the December 2021–March 2022 lean season. However, there has been a marginal deterioration since the lean season of October 2022–March 2023, underpinned by the reduced maize harvest and high food prices, as well as income losses associated with a slow economic recovery from the pandemic.



Source: Eswatini IPC TWG, August 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023




Source: Eswatini IPC TWG.

A protracted major food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Eswatini has had at least 21 percent of its population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in each GRFC edition. In 2016, it was affected by the 2015–16 El Niño-related drought. In 2020/21, it had its highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in eight years of reporting, at 366 000 – corresponding to 31 percent of the analysed population, driven by COVID-19-related income losses and high prices.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024


 **Economic shocks** Household purchasing power has been constrained by limited economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, including high unemployment and lower wages, and high food prices largely attributable to increases in global commodity prices. The high cost of mineral fertilizers in 2022 also led to reduced application which contributed to curbing crop yields in 2023 (IPC, August 2023).

 **Weather extremes** Prolonged dry spells interspersed with excessive rainfall between January and March 2023 resulted in flooding in the Lubombo region, contributing to reduced crop production. Production of the staple cereal maize was an estimated 15 percent below the five-year average. The prevailing El Niño event is expected to bring drier-than-normal weather conditions between October 2023 and June 2024, and may lead to another season of reduced yields in 2024 (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).



Note: While the size of the bars reflects rounding to two decimal points, the labelling is rounded to one decimal point.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Since 2022, acute food insecurity has remained largely stable.

PEAK 2023/24 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)


 **0.3M** people or 22% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season.

In rural areas of Lesotho, the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during the 2022–23 lean season, when households were expected to have depleted their own food stocks and be reliant on buying food, was slightly lower than in early 2022. No populations faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the latest analysis.



Source: Lesotho IPC TWG, September 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Note: While the size of the bars reflects rounding to two decimal points, the labelling is rounded to one decimal point.

Source: Lesotho IPC TWG.



A protracted food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Lesotho has been included in all editions of the GRFC and as a major food crisis five times due to the high share of people facing acute food insecurity, with populations facing Emergency each year except 2023. Levels of high acute food insecurity peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic with 40 percent of the analysed population facing Crisis or worse between October 2020 and March 2021. Widespread poverty and vulnerability to climate extremes underlie food insecurity.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Clear improvement despite rainfall deficits in the Grand Sud and slow post-cyclonic recovery in the Grand Sud-Est.

PEAK 2023 (NOVEMBER 2022–MARCH 2023)

2.2M people or **36%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in the Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est during the lean season. Of them, around 0.3M people faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

In the Grand Sud, compared with 2021, the food security situation improved, with no districts classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the 2022/23 peak period.





Source: Madagascar IPC TWG, January 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (FEBRUARY–APRIL)

1.7M people or **22%** of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity at the end of the lean season. Around 0.1M people are projected to face IPC Phase 4.

Prevalence of high acute food insecurity is projected to be better than early 2023, but seasonal lack of food availability, El Niño-related rainfall deficits and the ongoing impacts of cyclone Freddy still drive a concerning food crisis.



Source: Madagascar IPC TWG, January 2023.


DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Weather extremes In early 2023, the Grand Sud was still recovering from the devastating impacts of multi-season droughts in 2020–22. The slight delay to the rainy season between November and December 2023 due to the strong El Niño event delayed plantings, and shortened the growing season, which could lead to lower harvests. In the Grand Sud-Est, households were still recovering from the negative agricultural impacts of cyclone Freddy in February–March 2023. Erratic and below-average rainfall is expected to cause below-average

agricultural production during the 2023/24 season (FEWS NET, November 2023, December 2023 and January 2024).

Economic shocks Below-average incomes from agricultural labour and crop production after successive years of weather shocks, and the need to service debts accrued during the consecutive years of severe drought, meant that poor households reliant on market purchases for food during the lean season were unable to meet their food needs (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: Madagascar IPC TWG.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Madagascar has been included as a major food crisis in all eight editions of the GRFC. The analyses have always focused on the most food-insecure areas – the Grand Sud affected by prolonged drought and the Grand Sud-Est affected by tropical cyclones, which severely impact agricultural production and infrastructure. The drought of 2020–2022 – the worst in more than 40 years – brought populations to the brink of famine. The projection of a Risk of Famine and nearly 28 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) from late October 2021 (IPC, July 2021) was avoided largely thanks to humanitarian assistance (IPC, December 2021).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.5M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in March–May 2023

0.4M MAM 0.1M SAM

Source: Madagascar IPC TWG, October 2022.

0.03M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, June 2023–April 2024

Source: Madagascar IPC TWG, August 2023.

A precarious acute malnutrition situation in the Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est is expected to worsen during the January–April 2024 lean season with most areas classified in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) and some in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4).


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate practices The percentage of children aged 6–23 months receiving a Minimum Acceptable Diet was Extremely Critical in the Grand Sud (0–3.7 percent) and Grand Sud-Est (0–6.3 percent). At 54.4 percent nationally, exclusive breastfeeding rates of infants under 6 months were classified as Alert (IPC AMN, August 2023).


Lack of food Acute food insecurity was identified as a major contributing factor to acute malnutrition in most analysed districts (IPC AMN, August 2023).

Inadequate services Limited access to health and nutrition services, poor sanitation and low use of improved water sources (only 34.8 percent of households in analysed regions have safe drinking water) contributed to high disease prevalence, including diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and malaria (IPC AMN, August 2023). More than 40 percent of WASH infrastructure was destroyed or contaminated by cyclones in the Grand Sud-Est. Coverage of measles vaccinations and vitamin A supplementation remained low (OCHA, October 2023).

PEAK 2023 (JANUARY–APRIL)




Source: Madagascar IPC TWG, October 2022.




ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Sharply increasing levels of acute food insecurity driven by climate-related shocks, economic decline and high food prices in both rural and urban areas.

PEAK 2023/24 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)


 **4.4M** people or **22%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in the lean season. This includes 0.3M people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This is the highest number in the last six years of GRFC reporting, around 0.6 million more people than during the previous peak in October 2022–March 2023. This reflects the impact of low cereal production due to cyclone damage in southern areas combined with high prices of staple foods constraining households' economic access to food. A majority of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) live in rural areas but around 0.5 million of them reside in the cities of Blantyre, Zomba, Lilongwe and Mzuzu, with all except Lilongwe classified in IPC Phase 3.

Source: Malawi IPC TWG, August 2023.




DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Weather extremes** In March 2023, tropical cyclone Freddy brought strong winds, flooding and landslides to 15 districts in southern Malawi, leading to crop losses, disrupting livelihoods, damaging critical infrastructure and displacing 650 000 people right after the cyclone (UNHCR, June 2023). Although many of them returned, 0.2 million people remained displaced by April 2023. The impacts of the cyclone decreased food availability, increased prices and limited access to food (IPC, August 2023).

The cyclone's damage to irrigation infrastructure, particularly in Chikwawa and Phalombe, could have a negative impact on 2024 production (FAO-GIEWS, September 2023), particularly considering that the prevailing El Niño event is expected to bring drier-than-normal weather conditions until June

2024 (FAO-GIEWS, September 2023). The likely delayed onset of rains due to El Niño could reduce agricultural income-earning opportunities for poor households who rely on daily labour during the lean season to purchase food.

Overall, the 2024 maize harvest is expected to be below average due to the combined impacts of cyclones, the forecasted below-average and delayed rains, and limited access to agricultural inputs (FEWS NET, September 2023).

 **Economic shocks** The devaluation and depreciation of the local currency drove up the import prices of fuel, fertilizers, pesticides and other agricultural inputs, thereby increasing the cost of producing and transporting food in the main cereal-producing Central and Northern regions.

Coupled with the low national maize harvest in 2023, these factors had a

rebound effect on staple food prices, making it increasingly challenging for households with limited financial resources to purchase enough food to meet their dietary needs (IPC, August 2023).

The national average retail price of maize reached new record highs in October and was nearly double that of a year earlier (FAO, November 2023). However, the price growth was decelerating by the latter half of 2023, reflecting the offloading of maize stocks by farmers to generate cash to purchase agricultural inputs and an uptick in imports

from neighbouring countries that somewhat eased market supply pressure (FAO, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

 **0.7M** forcibly displaced people by 2023


 **0.7M** IDPs

 **0.05M** refugees and asylum-seekers


Source: IOM, April 2023.

Source: UNHCR.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION


 In May 2023, UNICEF warned that at least 573 000 children under 5 years old were at risk of suffering from malnutrition due to acute food insecurity – compounded by recurrent climate shocks, preventable disease outbreaks, economic instability and chronic underfunding in the social sectors. The agency alerted that, in 2023 alone, over 62 000 children under 5 years old were at risk of SAM (UNICEF, May 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

 **Inadequate services** Inadequate access to safe WASH facilities was compounded by the damage inflicted by tropical cyclone Freddy, which left many people with limited access to safe drinking water. This exacerbated one of the worst cholera outbreaks in a decade, leading to the highest number of cholera cases in an African country for 2023 as reported by WHO. Nearly 59 000 cases were reported between the start of the outbreak in March 2022 and August 2023 (WHO, September 2023).

 **Inadequate practices** The latest available data reported Extremely Critical levels of Minimum Acceptable Diet among children aged 6–23 months. Around 64 percent of children under 6 months were exclusively breastfed, which is considered an Alert level (MICS, 2019–2020). Anaemia levels among pregnant and breastfeeding women were 31.4 percent, considered a moderate public health problem (UNICEF, 2021).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024



Source: Malawi IPC TWG.



A protracted major food crisis Malawi is a low-income country that has been defined as a major food crisis in all eight editions of the GRFC with more than 1 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity each year. The southern districts of Balaka, Chikwawa and Nsanje have consistently been classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Food insecurity is driven by underlying structural problems that have left the country vulnerable to extreme weather events, especially drought and cyclone-induced floods, particularly in the southern region where most rural households (90 percent) depend on rain-fed subsistence farming and income from casual agricultural labour (WFP, 2023). Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity have almost doubled since 2020, consistent with trends driven by global shocks including COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. The numbers were lowest in 2019/20 and 2021/22, attributable to good production seasons.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The magnitude and severity of the crisis deepened.

PEAK 2023/24 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)

3.3M people or 20% of the analysed population in 72 of Mozambique's 156 districts faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This included 0.2M people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The situation has deteriorated compared with the 2022/23 lean period; the share of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in districts classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) has increased from 23 to 50 percent. Two newly analysed districts in Cabo Delgado have been classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).



Source: Mozambique IPC TWG, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Despite a reduction in conflict in Cabo Delgado, sporadic attacks disrupted local food systems in the province in 2023. From December, insecurity deteriorated sharply. More than 0.7 million people were still displaced as of October 2023 while another 0.6 million had returned to safe areas (IPC, November 2023).

Weather extremes In February 2023, floods in the south were closely followed by two landfalls of tropical cyclone Freddy across eight provinces. An estimated 4 percent of the total cropland, largely concentrated in central and southern provinces, were impacted by floods (FAO, March 2023).

High winds and widespread flooding led to displacement and extensive damage to infrastructure, crops and livestock, reducing food stocks and access to income-generating opportunities, especially in Zambezia province (WFP, December 2023).

Below-average rainfall in November 2023, high temperatures and the likelihood of a poor rainy season due to the strong El Niño were expected to lower crop production and contribute to rising food prices in 2024 (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Economic shocks Scarce employment opportunities in areas affected by weather shocks and conflict reduced household purchasing power, reducing consumption. Annual food inflation reached 18.3 percent in March and declined to 3.2 percent by the end of October before rising again to 9.1 percent at the end of the year (WFP, December 2023).

DISPLACEMENT


0.7M forcibly displaced people, 2023

0.7M IDPs
0.02M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, December 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023/24



Source: Mozambique IPC TWG.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Population analysed Population not analysed Total population Not analysed

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.2M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.13M MAM 0.07M SAM

Source: Mozambique IPC TWG, November 2023.

0.07M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023

While most analysed districts were classified in Minimal (IPC AMN Phase 1), Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) levels of acute malnutrition were estimated in Palma district in Cabo Delgado where conflict has driven population displacement.


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate services Poor access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation contributed to high levels of diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia. In Nampula province, 70 percent of households had poor drinking water (WFP, November 2023).

Flooding and damage to WASH infrastructure following cyclone Freddy in February and March 2023 accelerated the spread of the cholera outbreak that began in September 2022. Between February and late April, the number of cholera cases increased tenfold to reach a total of 28 000 (UNICEF, April 2023).

Inadequate practices There was poor consumption of food groups rich in protein, vitamin A and heme iron across the country, with the lowest rates in Cabo Delgado and Tete (WFP, November 2023). Fewer than 10 percent of children aged 6–23 months had a Minimum Acceptable Diet, which is considered Extremely Critical. Low healthcare-seeking behaviour for sick children adds to the disease burden (IPC, November 2023).

PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)



Source: Mozambique IPC TWG, November 2023.


1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical Not analysed Inadequate evidence MUAC

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Localized production shortfalls and high inflation worsened this food crisis.

PEAK 2023/24 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)


0.7M people or **26%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This included 0.07M people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This represents a deterioration since the 2022/23 lean season when 15 percent of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity and is only slightly lower than the record high of December 2021–March 2022 (30 percent of the population). The most affected regions were Kavango East and Kavango West with 10 percent of their populations facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). From April 2024, the situation was projected to improve, mainly due to the arrival of a new harvest season, with 0.5 million people or 19 percent of the population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).



Source: Namibia IPC TWG, September 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2024



Note: While the size of the bars reflects rounding to two decimal points, the labelling is rounded to one decimal point.

Source: Namibia IPC TWG.

History of the food crisis An upper-middle-income country, Namibia is the second most unequal country in the world in terms of per capita consumption with access to jobs and land being severely constrained and uneven (WB, March 2022). Both the severity and magnitude of acute food insecurity have risen steadily since 2019. The country was classified as a major food crisis in the GRFC 2022 due to 30 percent of its population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in December 2021–March 2022. Namibia's deteriorating food security is driven by dry spells and erratic rainfall, price shocks, economic decline and unemployment.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024



Weather extremes

Below-average rainfall in northern crop-growing regions during the 2022/23 agricultural season, and localized flooding in January 2023 in the northeast, resulted in low crop production. Poor grazing, disease and pests deteriorated livestock condition and production, especially in Kavango West and East, resulting in low livestock prices in some regions (IPC, September 2023).

Households faced an early start to the 2023/24 lean season due to lower food stocks. Prolonged dry spells and erratic rainfall, exacerbated by El Niño, in the 2023/24 rainfall season will have a negative impact on crop and livestock production in 2024 (IPC, September 2023).



Economic shocks

Food and non-food prices increased in March 2022 with the war in Ukraine and continued to rise into 2023, driven partly by the high import costs of fuel, food and fertilizer; this further diminished the purchasing power of poor households. Food inflation reached 14.6 percent in March 2023 – the peak of the lean season when reliance on markets for food is highest. Since peaking, and in part reflecting price trends in South Africa, the country's main trading partner, the food inflation rate gradually declined and reached 7.4 percent in December 2023 (Namibian Statistics Agency, December 2023).



1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Prolonged dry spells and high food prices contributed to acute food insecurity in early 2023.

PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER 2022–FEBRUARY 2023)

1.1M people or 10% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season in 28 analysed districts of the north and northwest Tanzanian mainland and five districts of Zanzibar (IPC, December 2022).

Dry spells, crop pests and price shocks compounded by limited casual labour opportunities sustained high levels of acute food insecurity. Around 18 000 people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).





Source: United Republic of Tanzania IPC TWG, December 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (NOVEMBER 2023–APRIL 2024)

0.9M people or 13% of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 21 analysed district councils of the mainland. No populations are projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This increasing share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in late 2023 and early 2024 is driven mainly by a prolonged dry spell and erratic rainfall, affecting crop and livestock production.



Source: United Republic of Tanzania IPC TWG, December 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Weather extremes Below-average rainfall during the February–May 2023 Masika growing period in coastal areas and prolonged dry spells in January–February, coupled with pest outbreaks in southern and central areas, negatively impacted crop production. Up to 70 percent of cropland was affected by drought in localized areas (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

Besides limiting food availability, this led to food access constraints as casual farm labourers had fewer earning opportunities and lower incomes. Beyond April 2024, food security was expected to improve as normal to above-normal forecast rainfall in many areas was likely to increase food production (IPC, December 2023).

Economic shocks High fertilizer costs reduced application rates and affected yields of most crops. The national average price of maize almost doubled between March 2022 and March 2023 as seasonal patterns were compounded by a fast depletion of stocks due to reduced production in 2022.

Subsequently, prices declined by 12 percent between March and May 2023 with the beginning of the Msimu harvest, but remained significantly higher than the previous year with sustained export demand exerting additional upward pressure (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023). Food inflation reached 9.7 percent in March 2023. By October, it had declined to 4.5 percent (WFP, December 2023).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

The prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years old reduced to 3 percent in 2022 from 5 percent in the previous survey. The prevalence was higher in Zanzibar (at 8 percent) than on the Tanzanian mainland (3 percent) (DHS, 2022).


Exclusive breastfeeding of children under 6 months has increased substantially over time, from 26 percent in 1991/92 to 64 percent in 2022, but only 8 percent of children aged 6–23 months received a Minimum Acceptable Diet (DHS, October 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

0.3M refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2024



Source: United Republic of Tanzania IPC TWG.

History of the food crisis The United Republic of Tanzania has been included as a food crisis in the GRFC for six of the past eight years, primarily due to extreme weather conditions and pests (GRFC, April 2022). It has been identified as a major food crisis in four editions with at least 1 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The magnitude of acute food insecurity persisted amid high levels of poverty, macroeconomic instability and weather shocks.

PEAK 2023/24 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)

2.0M people or 23% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 0.06M people faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The analysis coverage decreased from 13.5 million people in 91 districts in 2022/23 to 9.1 million in 76 districts.

When considering the same districts analysed during the two periods, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased significantly. This is largely driven by prolonged dry spells and flooding, pests, diseases, high food and input costs, and low labour opportunities and wages for poor households.



DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks Prices of maize reached record levels in October 2023 and were 80 percent higher year-on-year – due to currency weakness increasing fuel and transport costs and strong export demand for Zambian maize (FAO, November 2023).

The impact of the war in Ukraine also contributed to pushing up domestic prices, due to the disruptions it caused to the global food market (IPC, November 2023).

Labour opportunities and wages for poorer rural households were expected to be lower than average due to increases in the cost of agricultural inputs (IPC, November 2023).

Weather extremes Maize production increased by 22.9 percent year-on-year for the 2023/24 consumption period, largely thanks to increased planting and generally good weather conditions. However, localized flooding and prolonged dry spells in western and southern provinces, and the lower valleys of eastern provinces, caused reduced harvests.

of rains, which may extend the lean period beyond March 2024.


This could have a negative impact on labour opportunities since many areas rely on agriculture and livestock as their major source of food and income (IPC, November 2023).

In February 2024, the President of Zambia declared a national drought disaster and emergency. The dry spell from mid-January affected most of the central and southern half of the country, destroying almost half of the country's maize cultivation (UN, March 2024). Poor pasture and water conditions from early 2024 were already leading to an atypically high number of livestock deaths in southern Zambia, ahead of the July–September 2024 dry season (OCHA, February 2024).

Crop diseases and pests Almost all the provinces that grow cassava reported cassava brown streak disease, while army worms devastated field crops in affected districts (IPC, November 2023).

Source: Zambia IPC TWG, November 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024



A protracted food crisis Zambia is a lower-middle-income country that has been defined as a major food crisis in six of the eight editions of the GRFC, even as the coverage of the analysis has varied widely (between the 2022/23 and 2023/24 lean seasons the analysis coverage decreased from 71 percent to 47 percent). The increasingly protracted nature of this food crisis is largely due to the impact of weather extremes on the food security and livelihoods of smallholder farming households that are responsible for up to 90 percent of food production, including frequent, prolonged dry spells, extreme high temperatures and floods. Zambia faces underlying structural problems, such as very high poverty rates and a high public debt burden that undermines efforts to deliver social services and alleviate poverty (WFP, 2023).

Source: Zambia IPC TWG.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Population analysed Population not analysed Total population Not analysed

DISPLACEMENT

0.08M refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.


The projected number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 considers the expected impacts of the prevailing El Niño event, including dry spells across the country and delayed onset

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | A deteriorating situation as exceptionally high food prices eroded household purchasing power.

PEAK 2023 (JANUARY–MARCH)

3.5M people or 23% of the total country population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

The increase of around 0.5 million people since the 2022 peak in October–December mostly reflects the continued economic downturn, coupled with localized production shortfalls in southern and western areas.



Source: FEWS NET, January 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (MARCH)

Up to **3.5M** people or 23% of the total country population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

Anticipated El Niño-induced below-normal rainfall in January–March is expected to lower seasonal agricultural labour opportunities, particularly in semi-arid areas, and negatively impact cereal production in 2024. The cost of living is expected to continue to increase as an upturn in demand for grains, reflecting anticipated poor harvests in 2024, is likely to trigger stronger-than-normal price increases through to the next harvest (FEWS NET, December 2023).

Source: FEWS NET, September 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks Exceptionally high food prices – the food inflation rate throughout 2023 has consistently been in double-digit figures peaking at 71.9 percent in January and falling to 29.2 percent by December (WFP, December 2023) – significantly eroded household purchasing power. Prices of maize meal, the key national food staple, were more than four times higher in September 2023 than 2022. They fell in October but were significantly higher year-on-year (FAO, November 2023).

Maize grain prices were expected to rise throughout the lean season in early 2024 especially in deficit-

producing and remote areas due to limited or erratic maize supplies, poor road conditions and high transportation costs. Subdued remittance income and increased competition for petty trading work were expected to diminish household income (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Persistent currency weakness, high prices and low incomes severely diminished the capacity of farmers to purchase sufficient agricultural inputs, curbing yield potentials in 2023, while the continued high costs are also expected to affect crop performance in 2024 (FAO-GIEWS, October 2023).

Weather extremes While national cereal production was estimated to be above average in 2023, reflecting overall conducive weather conditions in key producing northern provinces, southern and western areas faced localized shortfalls due to inadequate rains (FAO-GIEWS, October 2023).

Poor and erratic rainfall linked to El Niño conditions were expected to reduce the area planted for 2024 crops (in late 2023), limiting seasonal agricultural labour opportunities and wage rates, and reducing household income. Inadequate rainfall and heat stress due to above-average temperatures


through May 2024 were expected to bring a below-average 2023/24 harvest, depleting household food stocks early (FEWS NET, November 2023). Poor pasture and water conditions from early 2024 were already leading to an atypically high number of livestock deaths in western Zimbabwe, ahead of the July–September 2024 dry season (OCHA, February 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

0.02M refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2022–2024



Source: FEWS NET.

A protracted major food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Zimbabwe has been identified as a major food crisis since the first edition of the GRFC due to weather extremes and, increasingly, economic shocks. The number of acutely food-insecure people are not comparable over the years given differences in methodology. IPC analyses available for 2019 and 2020 estimated that over 1 million people faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4) each year, corresponding to 12 percent and 11 percent of the analysed population respectively.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.01M children under 5 years old with severe acute malnutrition in 2023

2.9% of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023 – Manicaland had the highest prevalence at 6.6%

Source: ZimVAC, 2023.

The national prevalence of wasting among young children has reduced from 7.2 percent in 2022 despite rising levels of acute food insecurity (ZimVAC, August 2022 and 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate practices Only 1.3 percent of children aged 6–23 months consumed a Minimum Acceptable Diet. This is considered Extremely Critical by IFE Core Group thresholds. About 78 percent of children were exclusively breastfed (an increase from 49 percent in 2020) (ZimVAC, August 2023).

Lack of food Only 19 percent of women of reproductive age were consuming a Minimum Dietary Diversity (ZimVAC, August 2023).

Inadequate services While around 85 percent of households were connected to water, only 25 percent received water seven days a week. Around 64 percent of households (nationally) had no access to handwashing services and 53 percent no access to improved sanitation facilities (ZimVAC, August 2023). Between February 2023 and the end of the year, there were more than 13 000 suspected cases of cholera (WHO, December 2023).

East Africa



The magnitude and severity of food crises in East Africa worsened in 2023, with the largest year-on-year deterioration in the Sudan following the onset of the conflict in April 2023.

.....

The return of rainfall to most areas of the Horn of Africa began to ease the impacts of the historic drought, but its lingering damage coupled with flooding in late 2023 impacted food access and availability.

.....

Conflict in the Sudan and armed clashes in parts of Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan deepened the region's highly complex displacement crisis. In Somalia and South Sudan, 0.1 million people faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

.....

Acute malnutrition levels continued to deteriorate, exacerbated by inadequate child-feeding and low access to basic WASH, health and nutrition services.

.....

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is projected to decline in 2024. However, the situation in the Sudan is rapidly deteriorating. The risk of weather extremes and escalation of conflicts in areas of Ethiopia and South Sudan could also drive catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity.

East Africa

The lingering impact of the unprecedented 2020–2023 drought, El Niño-driven floods, heightened conflicts and continued macroeconomic instability exacerbated already high levels of acute food insecurity in eight countries across East Africa. Households experienced limited food availability due to decreased agricultural production and constrained financial access to food. Huge numbers of displaced people from the conflict in the Sudan put additional strain on already meagre resources in areas within the country and at its borders.

64.2M 

people or 24% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in eight countries.

20.7M 


forcibly displaced people by 2023 – consisting of 15.9 million IDPs and 4.8 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

12.1M 

children were acutely malnourished with 3 million of them suffering the most severe form in eight countries.

Burundi | Djibouti | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda

FIG. 2.3 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in eight countries, 2023




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.



Sources: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Ethiopia and Uganda).

FIG. 2.11 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



The total population was analysed in all countries, except for Kenya (32%).



How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

The compounding nature of the climatic, economic and conflict-related shocks that the region has faced over the past three years drove an additional 7 million people to face high levels of acute food insecurity between 2022 and 2023.

The share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 22 percent in 2022 to 24 percent in 2023, suggesting that households' capacity to cope has been severely eroded, leading more people to experience large consumption gaps, acute malnutrition and/or depleted livelihood assets.

The Sudan became the largest food crisis in the region in terms of numbers and recorded the largest year-on-year deterioration due to the onset of the conflict in April 2023.

Burundi, Djibouti, Somalia and comparable areas of Kenya also experienced significant deteriorations in their acute food insecurity situations.


In South Sudan, the situation remained persistently dire, with 63 percent of the population experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Only Uganda saw a slight decline in the number of people who urgently needed assistance from 5 percent to 4 percent of its analysed population, which equated to a decrease of 0.5 million people.

The analyses for Ethiopia are not directly comparable as two different methodologies are used to measure acute food insecurity between 2022 and 2023.

All eight countries with data available in East Africa met the criteria for being defined as major food crises, with four of them – Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan – being protracted major food crises.

FIG. 2.12 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Sources: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Ethiopia and Uganda).

Severity of acute food insecurity

For the six countries where data could be disaggregated by IPC phase (i.e. all countries except Ethiopia and Uganda in which FEWS NET analyses were used), there were large shifts in the severity of food insecurity outcomes.

0.08 million people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) across Somalia and South Sudan

Around 43 000 people were projected to face starvation and death (IPC Phase 5) during the lean season (April–July 2023) in the Akobo, Canal/Pigi and Fangak counties of South Sudan's Jonglei state, as well as Leer and Mayendit counties of Unity state. While there was no longer a Risk of Famine in Somalia, there remained 40 400 people across Bakool, Bay, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, Mudug and Togdheer states who were projected to experience the most extreme levels of acute food insecurity from April to June 2023 (lean season). Compared with the previous year, the overall

number declined from 301 100 in 2022 to 83 400 in 2023, mostly due to the positive impact of the early 2023 rains and sustained humanitarian assistance.

12.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across six countries

Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan all recorded increases in the populations experiencing large food consumption gaps and/or employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. The prevalence of these outcomes ranged from 1 percent of the analysed population in Burundi to as high as 23 percent in South Sudan. The largest increase was recorded in the Sudan, where the population in IPC Phase 4 doubled from 3.1 million in 2022 to 6.3 million in 2023.


30.2 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across six countries

The number of people urgently in need of assistance in this phase increased by over 38 percent from 21.8 million in 2022. The largest country increases were recorded in the Sudan followed by Burundi, Somalia and Kenya.

35.2 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across six countries

The 2.5 million person increase in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes from 32.7 million in 2022 happened in parallel to a decrease of nearly 2.5 million in the number of people in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), indicating a deteriorating situation. The largest increase was in Burundi – up from 3.6 to 5.5 million people, an increase of over 50 percent.

FIG. 2.13 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: GRFC 2017–2024.

1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse or equivalent Total population

Acute food insecurity since 2016

Levels of acute food insecurity in East Africa remained relatively stable through 2019, but, with the convergence of multiple shocks, the magnitude and severity of the region's food crises have since increased rapidly.

The impact of COVID-19, consecutive years of drought, and conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan undermined people's already limited capacity to cope with shocks, particularly among pastoralist groups. The war in Ukraine had repercussions on food access and availability as many net food-importing East African countries rely on Ukraine and the Russian Federation for agricultural inputs as well as wheat and sunflower oil (WFP, November 2022).

The end of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 made it increasingly difficult and expensive to import and produce staple foods (IFPRI, August 2023).

Acute food insecurity in East Africa has historically been extremely severe, with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) since 2016 in South

Sudan. In recent years, people have faced IPC Phase 5 in Somalia and Ethiopia (Tigray region).¹

The increases in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity from 2019 onwards were also attributable to increased analysis coverage.

Some countries, such as Djibouti, were not included every year, while others (Ethiopia and Uganda) saw major changes in the geographic coverage of analyses and methodologies. Kenya, by contrast, saw increases in the analysed population in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs).

Many of the drought-affected areas in the Horn of Africa received adequate or above-average precipitation levels in early 2023, allowing for the regeneration of rangelands primarily used by pastoralists, and improved crop and livestock development. While it will take years for households to fully recover from the drought's toll, these improved weather conditions improved projected food security outcomes for 2024.

¹ The Government of Ethiopia did not endorse the May 2021 IPC analysis.

Outlook for 2024

Levels of acute food insecurity in East Africa are currently projected to decline to 47.6 million – or 19 percent of the analysed population – by July 2024. Nonetheless, these levels remain high by historical standards.

This number is an aggregation of projections from the six countries where data are available: Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda. There were no projections available for Djibouti or Somalia as of January 2024.

Nearly all countries with data available are expected to see a decline in the number of people requiring urgent assistance, mostly due to the end of the drought in the Horn of Africa.

The severity of these food crises is also projected to diminish, as the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is set to decrease while the number of people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) will increase. However, the notable exception is in South Sudan where the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is likely to almost double to 79 000 (IPC, November 2023).

Levels of acute food insecurity could deteriorate further during the latter half of 2024 if conflicts intensify and/or weather patterns become severe. Both could exacerbate disruptions to agricultural production, which could pose a threat to food availability in parts of the region. High staple food prices in markets across the region are also likely to continue constraining food access and undermining households' purchasing power, but not to the same extent as in 2022 and 2023 (IPC, November 2023).

The ongoing conflict in the Sudan is unlikely to end in 2024 (ACLEDA, January 2024). The improvement in food availability from the February 2024 harvest is expected to be marginal compared with the 2023 lean season due to the negative impact of conflict on agricultural production and livelihoods, and as a result, the hostilities' widespread impacts on civilians will worsen. According to FEWS NET, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widespread,

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes exist in heavily impacted urban areas, and some households could deteriorate to Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Omdurman of Khartoum and El Geneina of West Darfur during the lean season (FEWS NET, February 2024). Should the security situation further affect the delivery of humanitarian assistance in these areas, other populations could also face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes (IPC, December 2023).

The conflict has also been a major driver of displacement, as South Sudanese returnees from the Sudan are exacerbating already high levels of acute food insecurity in South Sudan, leading to the projection of populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the lean season (IPC, November 2023).

Strong El Niño conditions and a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD), forecast to continue through early 2024, led to above-average rainfall in eastern parts of the region and below-average rainfall in western areas. This change in the weather pattern was expected to increase crop and livestock production in some areas, generating improved levels of food security. However, there was also a risk of widespread flooding contributing to displacement, crop and livestock losses, disruption to livelihood and trade activities, and disease outbreaks (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Ethiopia is experiencing both extremes of this shifting weather pattern: drought in the north, including in Afar and Amhara regions, and El Niño-induced flooding in the south, including Somali and Oromia regions. These weather extremes coupled with conflict, limited humanitarian assistance and persistent macroeconomic instability make Ethiopia a very critical hunger hotspot in 2024 (WFP/FAO, October 2023).

According to FEWS NET, in the Tigray region, Meher crop losses due to the El Niño-associated drought raised the risk of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes during the region's lean season in February–April 2024 (FEWS NET, December 2023; OCHA, December 2023).

Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024



Weather extremes were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in five countries where 35.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Weather extremes were the primary driver of food consumption gaps and/or households' employment of negative coping strategies in the region, principally affecting **Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia** and **Uganda**.

Five seasons of below-average rainfall from late 2020 to early 2023 created the worst drought conditions that the Horn of Africa has experienced in nearly 40 years, affecting rangeland and water resources and, in turn, crop and livestock production.


The consecutive years of below-average harvests and a substantial reduction in herd numbers resulted in livelihood losses and increased displacement as people in the region searched for better livelihood and grazing resources. The drought also led to seasonal increases in food prices, which constrained household purchasing power (WFP, July 2023; OCHA, May 2023).

Livelihood recovery will take years and may not be possible for all households, also considering the increasing frequency of drought and floods due to climate change.

Households in pastoral areas of southern Ethiopia, northern and northeastern Kenya, and Somalia were among the hardest hit by this drought. There are roughly 13 different pastoralist communities in Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda, with a total population of approximately 4.5 million. These communities use transhumance as a strategy for managing rangeland and coping with the variable climate of the drylands. In doing so, they can come into conflict with other pastoralists and land users when competing for resources, particularly during times of drought (FAO/IGAD, November 2023).


Shifting weather patterns provided two periods of above-average rainfall in 2023. The first occurred

FIG. 2.14 Food inflation tended to be highest in the first quarter of 2023



Data were not available in Sudan after February 2023. This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023. Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

FIG. 2.15 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

between March and May 2023 when tropical cyclone Freddy and the Madden–Julian oscillation over the Indian Ocean created the conditions for high levels of precipitation across nearly all of the Horn of Africa – except for in south-central Somalia and parts of southwest Kenya (WFP, July 2023).

The second happened during the latter half of 2023 when a strong El Niño event coupled with a positive Indian Ocean Dipole once again created wetter-than-normal conditions throughout East Africa.

This precipitation supported improvements in crop and livestock development, and the acute food insecurity situation in some areas improved. However, it also triggered flooding in others, as the soil was unable to absorb large quantities of water, leading to loss of lives, livestock and livelihoods as well as human displacement. More than 3.1 million people were estimated to be affected by the heavy rains and flooding between September and mid-November 2023, with at least 772 000 people being displaced in Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Burundi,

and southern and southeastern Ethiopia (OCHA, November 2023).

The El Niño event also worsened drought conditions in Ethiopia’s Tigray and Afar regions. In the Tigray region, one of Ethiopia’s crop-producing areas, the dry conditions severely hindered Meher crop development, and in many instances, led to crop failure. The Meher harvest was assessed at being 65 percent below the regional average, and such losses are likely to have widespread impacts during Tigray’s 2024 lean season (February–April) (FEWS NET, January 2024; OCHA, December 2023).

In the Afar region, where livestock rearing is the main livelihood activity, drought conditions affected rangeland resources and animal body conditions in an area where a significant number of animals were killed during the conflict in neighbouring Tigray from 2020 (FEWS NET, January 2024).



Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in the Sudan where a total of 20.3 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver of the largest year-on-year deterioration in acute food insecurity in East Africa. Hostilities in the Sudan escalated into a nationwide conflict in April 2023, exacerbating an already severe socioeconomic crisis, as well as contributing to mass internal and cross-border displacement. It is likely that this conflict will continue to have far-reaching and devastating regional repercussions in 2024.

Localized conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan also undermined acute food security and nutrition outcomes in the region. Clashes between armed groups in Ethiopia’s northern Amhara and central Oromia regions are of high concern in 2024, as this conflict has already led to large numbers of forcibly displaced people, as well as market disruptions and livelihood losses (FEWS NET, December 2023).



Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Djibouti and South Sudan, where 8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

The inflationary shock stemming from the lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine led to elevated borrowing costs and debt burdens, depleted foreign reserves and depreciation of national currencies (IMF, October 2023). These impacts to East African economies have reduced vulnerable households' purchasing power while limiting governments' public policy response (GRFC 2023, May 2023).

Inflationary pressures receded slightly in 2023, but the cost of living in East Africa remained high, with the annual inflation rate across the region averaging 13 percent in September 2023 (WFP, November 2023). Similarly, food prices in the eight countries declined slightly but remained above pre-pandemic levels given the upward pressure from reduced food availability and high fuel prices inflating production and transportation costs of food and non-food items (WFP, November 2023). Double-digit inflation persisted throughout the year in Burundi and Ethiopia (see figure 2.14).

The current global economic climate has hampered governments' ability to address the ongoing cost-of-living crisis, particularly in Djibouti and South Sudan, leading economic shocks to be considered the primary driver of high levels of acute food insecurity in both countries. Djibouti's economy is reliant on foreign markets and was therefore vulnerable to price increases. Its economy began to recover in 2022 (IMF, January 2024), but the fiscal situation remained under strain due to diminished tax revenues, recent tax exemptions and mounting public debt servicing costs, which have translated into increases in consumer price indices (WB, December 2023).

In South Sudan, while economic shocks were identified as the primary driver, in reality it is the combination of the economic crisis (currency depreciation and high food prices) with frequent

climate-related shocks and conflict/insecurity – including the spillover effects of the conflict in the Sudan – that are equally contributing to the country's dire situation (IPC, November 2023). The economy's modest recovery from the civil war was undone by the COVID-19 pandemic and flooding (WB, September 2023). The economy relies on revenues from oil production, which became more costly in 2023 due to the conflict in the Sudan and production bottlenecks (IMF, December 2023). South Sudan saw a significant increase in staple food prices due to spikes in fuel prices (leading to high transportation costs), significant currency depreciation, and reduced trade volumes from the Sudan (WFP, July 2023).

Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises







East African countries have various underlying structural vulnerabilities that significantly impact their ability to address and cope with high levels of acute food insecurity.

Not only do they face environmental vulnerabilities that increase their risk due to the intensification of recurrent shocks such as droughts and floods, but they are also faced with economic vulnerabilities that increase their exposure to shocks.

All the East African countries with major food crises, except for Kenya, are designated as Least Developed Countries by the United Nations (UNCTAD, January 2024), which means they are characterized by historically weak development capacity, low and unequally distributed income, and scarcity of domestic financial resources.

These vulnerabilities limit the capacity for human development, as evidenced by the low scores and rankings these countries receive on the Human Development Index (HDI). Kenya ranks slightly better than the other countries, but there are huge disparities between the country's different regions, as the ASALs have much lower HDI scores than urban areas such as Nairobi. This divide in urban and rural development outcomes is typical in sub-Saharan Africa where roughly 70 percent of people

TABLE 2.2 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%) 	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%) 	Crop growing period affected by drought conditions (%) 	Rangeland growing period affected by drought conditions (%) 	INFORM Risk Index (0-10) 	HDI global ranking (1-192) 
BURUNDI	22.9	85.9	7.4	8.5	5.6	187th
DJIBOUTI	98.8	1.2	N/A	15.6	4.9	171st
ERITREA	N/A	62.4	19.2	16.5	6	176th
ETHIOPIA	6.6	63.7	14.6	19.6	7	175th
KENYA	41.1	33	12.6	17.6	6.6	152nd
RWANDA	34.0	54.7	8.8	16.3	4.2	165th
SOMALIA	N/A	26.3	21.1	16.1	8.5	N/A
SOUTH SUDAN	N/A	62.1	13.5	18.1	8.5	191st
SUDAN	33.5	40.6	18.6	18.6	7.3	172nd
UGANDA	8.9	62.9	7.1	10.6	7	166th

Sources: FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought conditions); EC-JRC (Rangelands growing period affected by drought conditions); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).

living in rural areas are multidimensionally poor, while in urban areas that percentage decreases to just over a quarter (OPHI/UNDP, 2022). Poverty is particularly concentrated in East Africa, as 38 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's poor live in the region (OPHI, 2020). The highest incidences of poverty (where data are available) in the region are in South Sudan and Ethiopia, where 9 out of 10 and 8 out of 10 people are poor, respectively (OPHI, 2020). High levels of poverty and dependence on imports to meet domestic food demand make it difficult for vulnerable populations to afford food in a context of high food prices.

Households are also typically reliant on agriculture for livelihoods and subsistence. Around 68 million people depend on agriculture, fishing and forestry for their employment and livelihoods across East Africa, making up over half the employment opportunities in Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda. It reaches as high as 86 percent in Burundi (FAO, 2023). Djibouti has the lowest share at around 2 percent, as the country's economy relies primarily on providing port services due to

its strategic location on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Less than 1 percent of the country is made up of arable land, which makes it almost entirely reliant on imports to meet its food demand (WB, December 2023).

When limited coping capacities combine with higher risks and exposure to shocks, households in the region become more vulnerable to crises. East African countries ranked highly on the global INFORM Risk Index, with most countries landing in the top 20. Somalia and South Sudan tied for being the second most vulnerable countries in the world.

Somalia also ranked second on the list of countries with the highest exposure to hazards, especially drought. The 21 percent frequency for crop-growing period affected by drought in table 2.2 can be interpreted as severe drought affecting one season in every five over the period 2003–2023. Observation of drought frequency shows that over the last seven years, one season in two has been affected by severe drought (EC-JRC).

DISPLACEMENT | A complex and escalating regional displacement crisis driven by conflict and weather extremes

East Africa has more forcibly displaced people than any other geographical region in the GRFC with a total of 20.7 million, most of them internally displaced in the Sudan and Ethiopia followed by South Sudan and Somalia.

There are interconnected and compounding factors that lead people to move frequently throughout the region, causing this displacement crisis to be complex and dynamic in nature.

While conflict and insecurity forced a high proportion of displacements in 2023, climate and natural disasters also figured prominently in people’s motivations to relocate. Displaced people typically moved to places with only marginally better conditions, where host populations also faced a multitude of challenges that ranged from conflict and frequent population movements to chronic poverty and weather extremes.


These challenges hindered the host communities’ capacities to support and integrate displaced populations, often resulting in temporary stays and onward movements to seek refuge and opportunities. They often led to tensions over competition for resources and livelihood opportunities (Joint Statement, June 2023).

The acute food insecurity and malnutrition data that are available for displaced populations in 2023 show a bleak picture.

The Sudan experienced the region’s largest displacement crisis

The conflict in the Sudan triggered the latest wave of widespread displacement in the region, with over 6 million people internally displaced between April 2023 and the end of the year, totalling 9.1 million IDPs overall. Prior to the start

FIG. 2.16 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers in 8 countries in the region, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

of hostilities, the Sudan hosted over 1 million refugees, making it one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world and the second largest in Africa (Joint Statement, June 2023) (see *Focus on the Sudan*, page 53).

Drought and conflict perpetuated extensive displacement in Ethiopia

Prior to the conflict in the Sudan, Ethiopia had the largest number of forcibly displaced people in the region, with 3.5 million people internally displaced across 24 sites and camps, primarily due to conflict (65 percent of IDPs) followed by drought (18 percent). The Somali region hosted the highest number of IDPs who were displaced by drought, while the Tigray region hosted the highest number displaced by conflict (IOM, October 2023). Ethiopia’s refugee population of around 1 million people is predominantly from South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea.

IDPs and refugees experienced large food consumption gaps and lacked access to services, leading to disease outbreaks, as well as acute food insecurity and malnutrition levels that were similar to those of the host population (UNHCR, February 2024).

Very concerning acute malnutrition levels in refugee camps in seven countries


Uganda is Africa’s largest host of refugees, with over 1.6 million people, primarily from South Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo, living

across 13 settlements (UNHCR, December 2023). Inflation, sluggish recovery from COVID-19 and reduced humanitarian funding have resulted in a deteriorating nutrition situation for refugees and host families in 2023. According to the IPC acute malnutrition analysis, two settlements were classified in IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) and six in IPC AMN Phase 2 (Alert) from April to September 2023 (IPC, November 2023). The situation could deteriorate further in 2024 with diminished international funding (European Commission, October 2023).

Nearly half of the SENS nutrition assessments conducted across 66 refugee camps in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda found High (>10%) or Very High (>15%) levels of acute malnutrition among children under the age of 5 years (UNHCR, 2023).

The situation was most concerning in Ethiopia where the levels were High or Very High in 14 out of 21 camps, in South Sudan (High or Very High


FIG. 2.17 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

in four out of eight camps), in the Sudan (seven out of nine camps) and in Djibouti (all three camps). High levels of anaemia among children under 5 years old and women of reproductive age were widespread in refugee camps. Refugees in all assessed camps had inadequate food consumption (according to the FCS indicator). In some camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan, more than 70 percent of refugees had a poor FCS (see *Technical Notes*, page 165) (UNHCR, 2021–2023).

MAP 2.4 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Inadequate health and WASH services, disease outbreaks, and poor infant and young child-feeding practices exacerbated by years of drought conditions, inflation and conflict-related displacement drove high levels of acute malnutrition, particularly in Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan and Kenya.

More than 12 million children under 5 years old were acutely malnourished in the eight food-crisis countries in East Africa, 3 million severely so.

The severity of acute malnutrition varied throughout the region in 2023, with countries such as Burundi and Uganda primarily experiencing Acceptable and Alert (IPC AMN Phase 1 and 2) situations while Djibouti, Somalia and South Sudan predominantly faced Serious and Critical (IPC AMN Phase 3 and 4) outcomes.

In early 2023, acute malnutrition in Kenya's drought-stricken ASALs was Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) or Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in many counties and even worse than in 2022. A July 2023 IPC AMN analysis showed an improving but still critical situation.

At over 4 million, Ethiopia was the country with the highest GAM burden in the region, with the total number of SAM cases reaching over 1 million (HRP 2023 Ethiopia, February 2023). SMART surveys conducted in August 2023 in rural areas and IDP sites across the Tigray region indicated a Very High/Critical prevalence of acute malnutrition, with the highest prevalence among IDPs (26.5 percent). Some 61 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were suffering from acute malnutrition (MUAC < 23cm), indicating an Extremely Critical situation (SMART, August 2023).

In the Sudan, sharply escalating conflict since April 2023 has led to increased vulnerability to malnutrition, due to high inflation, reduced access to food, lack of water, poor hygiene and increased risk of infections and communicable diseases, such as measles, especially among the millions of displaced people.


According to the revised HRP, the number of children with acute malnutrition increased by an estimated 30 percent in areas with active hostilities, by 15 percent in IDP-hosting states and by 10 percent elsewhere. However, the interruption in nutrition monitoring and reporting impacted the understanding of the evolving nutrition situation in most parts of the country, particularly in the hotpot areas (OCHA, May 2023).

Drivers of acute malnutrition

Lack of food A deterioration in acute food insecurity due to weather extremes, continued macroeconomic instabilities, escalating conflicts and mass displacement, particularly in the Sudan, led to poor dietary intake by women and children in terms of quantity and quality. In pastoral communities such as in northern Kenya, Somalia and southern Ethiopia, low livestock production resulted in limited availability of milk for children's diets, which was a leading contributor to their poor nutritional status. Limited food access during the temporary halt of humanitarian distribution and the onset of the lean season in Ethiopia were likely to have impacted children's nutritional status (SMART, August 2023).

Inadequate services Poor access to improved drinking water and sanitation as well as limited access to health services increased the risk of disease. Many of the drought-affected areas of the region had limited water (IPC, February 2023). In the Tigray region of Ethiopia, most households (82 percent) lack improved sanitation facilities, rising to 92 percent in the Central zone (SMART 2023). Major disease outbreaks including cholera, measles, malaria and other diseases across the region were worsened by the rise in El Niño-induced flooding and fragile

FIG. 2.18 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in eight food crises, 2023




Source: IPC and HNO.

health systems. As of 31 January 2024, Ethiopia had around 32 000 cholera cases and Kenya 12 000 (WHO, February 2024). Some disease outbreaks are vaccine preventable, but routine immunization services along with maternal and childcare programmes have been disrupted for several years due to COVID-19 and lack of accessibility in remote, rural areas.

Ongoing conflicts in the region also affected service delivery at health facilities, exposing vulnerable populations, including women and children, to increased risks (WHO, March 2023). In the Sudan, critical civilian infrastructure including water systems and hospitals have been destroyed. Repairs to damaged infrastructure typically cannot be undertaken due to issues of access and security (OCHA, May 2023).

Inadequate practices Inadequate feeding practices of infants and young children, were another high-risk contributing factor to acute malnutrition. All countries in the region had suboptimal levels of exclusive breastfeeding. The percentage of children aged 6-23 months receiving a Minimum Acceptable Diet was low across the region and at Extremely Critical/Catastrophe levels in Burundi (4 percent), Somalia (8.7 percent), South Sudan (5 percent), the Karamoja region of Uganda (2.9 percent) and Tigray region of Ethiopia (0-6 percent) (SMART 2023).

FIG. 2.19 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, 2023




* HNO Estimates prior to the conflict in April 2023.

Source: Ethiopia HRP 2023, February 2023; Burundi IPC TWG, September 2022; Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2023; Kenya IPC TWG, September 2023; Somalia IPC TWG, April 2023; South Sudan IPC TWG, November 2023; Sudan HNO 2023, November 2022; Uganda IPC TWG, June and November 2023.

3.4M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in eight food crises, 2023

Source: GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024.

FIG. 2.20 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition by country, 2023



Source: Burundi IPC TWG, September 2022; Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2023; Ethiopia HRP 2023, February 2023; Kenya IPC TWG, September 2023; Somalia IPC TWG, April 2023; South Sudan IPC TWG, November 2023; Sudan HNO 2023, November 2022; Uganda IPC TWG, June and November 2023.

Focus | Conflict in the Sudan

Heavy fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023 has had devastating consequences across the Sudan and in the neighbouring countries of Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan.

The humanitarian situation is dire. Millions of people among the displaced and host communities, especially women and children, are experiencing severe access constraints to basic goods and services, including food, water and shelter, with profound and prolonged impacts on their food security and nutrition.


The Sudan became East Africa's largest food crisis

In 2023, during the June–September lean season, around 20.3 million people, or 42 percent of the total population, experienced high levels of acute food insecurity, 74 percent more than during the 2022 lean season (IPC, August 2023). Seasonal improvements in food access and availability from October 2023 to February 2024 following the main harvest were expected to be limited by the severity of the conflict's impact in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Khartoum and Gezira. Around 17.7 million people were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during this post-harvest period (IPC, December 2023).

Major impact on the country's agriculture sector

The conflict has severely restricted access to land for cultivation, livestock movement and seasonal activities, making it extremely difficult for households to produce food. Major infrastructure for food production and storage has been destroyed, including in southeastern areas – the country's breadbasket. Supply chain disruptions further limited the availability and distribution of seeds, inputs and agricultural finance. Irrigation

MAP 2.5 Number of forcibly displaced people between mid-April 2023 and February 2024



Source: IOM, OCHA, UNHCR and COR, February 2024.

canals cannot be maintained. Violence is reducing access to water and pasture for livestock and disrupting seasonal migrations in many areas (IPC, December 2023). The sorghum and millet harvests in Gezira, Sennar, White Nile and South Kordofan were significantly disrupted. In 2024, the conflict affected key production areas, including the Gezira irrigation scheme, which produces 40–50 percent of the national wheat output and where critical irrigation infrastructure was damaged (FEWS NET, February 2024).

According to the findings of a 2023 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission, cereal production is estimated at well below average levels (FAO, March 2024). In this context, food import requirements

– which covered 80–85 percent of countrywide wheat consumption needs before the conflict – are expected to increase further. Lower food availability is expected to have a compounding impact on already widespread and high levels of acute food insecurity across the country (FEWS NET, February 2024).

The world's largest internal displacement crisis

By the end of 2023, about 7.7 million people had been displaced since the onset of hostilities in April 2023, including about 6 million IDPs, 1.5 million refugees, and nearly 200 000 self-relocated refugees internally displaced in the Sudan (UNHCR, December 2023; IOM, December

2023). When added to the millions of people internally displaced by conflict over two decades, there were an estimated 9.1 million IDPs by the end of 2023, including 3 million children – the largest internal displacement crisis worldwide (IOM, January 2024).

As Map 2.5 shows, the number of displaced people continued to increase rapidly in early 2024, reaching a total of 8.2 million by February, consisting mainly of IDPs/self-relocated refugees followed by Sudanese refugees/asylum-seekers and refugee returnees of other nationalities (UNHCR, February 2024).

The limited humanitarian access to conflict hotspots due to recurring telecommunications issues, security concerns and high fuel costs hindered domestic travel to conduct reverification exercises, undermining the provision of assistance and support to affected populations, thereby contributing to rising numbers of IDPs (IOM, January 2024) and acutely food-insecure populations.

Alarming levels of acute malnutrition threaten the lives of children and women

The Sudan is among the food crises with the highest prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) among children under 5 years old, at an estimated 13.6 percent, a High severity according to WHO thresholds (OCHA, December 2023) even before the outbreak of the conflict. Massive displacement – resulting in lack of water and poor hygiene, increasing risk of infections, and limited access and availability to basic health and nutrition services – worsened malnutrition among children and women since April 2023. About 76 percent of the 3 million acutely malnourished children under 5 years old and 0.9 million acutely malnourished pregnant and breastfeeding women (OCHA, May 2023) were in areas most affected

by conflict. In these areas, the GAM prevalence was above the Very High threshold of 15 percent (OCHA, December 2023).

Micronutrient deficiencies are widespread, evidenced by the fact that 48 percent of children aged under 5 suffer from anaemia due to iron deficiency. Only 25 percent of children aged under 5 achieve Minimum Dietary Diversity, a situation worsened by extensive displacement limiting access to nutritious foods and disrupting regular feeding and caregiving practices (OCHA, December 2023).

The nutrition outlook is expected to deteriorate in 2024, particularly during the June–September lean season, due to ongoing conflict, worsening food insecurity, compromised health, WASH and nutrition services, prolonged displacement and extremely high food prices. More than 3.5 million children are projected to be acutely malnourished in 2024, of whom more than 0.7 million are expected to be severely affected – and at increased risk of death without timely treatment (UNICEF, HAC, December 2023).

A crisis beyond the country's borders

The ongoing conflict in the Sudan has had a profound impact on border regions in neighbouring countries, where refugees, asylum-seekers and returnees are gathering in significant numbers. These areas, including parts of **Central African Republic, Chad and South Sudan**, were already grappling with severe acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition before the conflict (GRFC 2023, May 2023).

The increased influx of refugees is intensifying competition for limited resources, raising the potential for tensions between displaced and local communities, while stretching already scarce resources.

By the end of 2023, among the 1.5 million people who fled the Sudan, including Sudanese nationals and refugees from neighbouring countries who were hosted in the Sudan, 0.5 million were in both South Sudan and Chad, 0.4 million in Egypt,



Many of those crossing the border are South Sudanese refugee returnees travelling on boats to reach their communities of origin where they face extreme levels of economic hardship and hunger.

43 700 in Ethiopia and nearly 26 000 in Central African Republic. Most of the cross-border displacements into South Sudan were refugee returnees (UNHCR, January 2024).

In **Chad**, the arrival of new refugees added to the over 0.4 million Sudanese refugees who had been living in camps there for over a decade (ACAPS, January 2024), putting more pressure on the limited resources of host communities, with the number of refugees and returnees approximately four times greater than the local population in places such as Adré town (Ouaddai province) (ACAPS, January 2024). A Cadre Harmonisé special protocol activated to assess the acute food insecurity situation of these affected populations found that 24 percent of nearly 315 000 refugees analysed in two eastern provinces (Sila and Wadi Fira) faced high levels of acute food insecurity in October–December 2023 (CILSS, November 2023).


Humanitarian needs among **South Sudanese** refugee returnees, who have been displaced

several times, are dire. Around 28 000 or 10 percent of the returnee population are expected to face catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) in April–July 2024 (IPC, November 2023).

Following the RSF attacks on Wad Madani in the heavily populated Sudanese state of Gezira in December 2023, the number of Sudanese refugees arriving in South Sudan also increased considerably, spiking in the first half of January. Average daily arrivals fluctuated between about 1 500 and 2 500 per day and were expected at similar levels in 2024 as the conflict continues (FEWS NET, January 2024).

In **Central African Republic**, many refugees were hesitant to travel far from the border and stayed in the Amdafock area in the rainy season instead of moving to Korsi, a refugee reception centre in the city of Birao. As conflict continued in South Darfur, by the end of 2023 many had relocated to Korsi to seek protection. As of January, the data cut-off date for the GRFC, no data were available on the

FIG. 2.18 Prevalence of acute malnutrition among refugees at border crossings, 2023



food security conditions of Sudanese refugees in these areas. A report by IOM indicated that about 40 percent of them said they crossed the border seeking humanitarian assistance (IOM, July 2023).

Levels of acute malnutrition surpassed Very High thresholds among those fleeing the Sudan


Regarding nutrition, refugee and returnee populations who have sought refuge in Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan had MUAC measurements indicating levels of wasting above the 15 percent Very High WHO threshold for all countries, except Ethiopia.


The situation was the most severe in border points in South Sudan, with screenings between May and November, indicating that 30 percent of children under 5 years old and a staggering 58 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) were acutely malnourished.

This situation was also extremely concerning in Chad, where MUAC screening at border points indicated 29 percent of children aged under 5, and 11 percent of PBW were acutely malnourished. In border crossing points of Central African Republic, the prevalence was 17 percent among children under 5 years (see figure 2.18). In Ethiopia, the acute malnutrition situation is relatively better but still above the High WHO threshold, at 12 percent for children and 13 percent for PBW.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | A poor early 2023 harvest, high food prices and dwindling wages led to the worst acute food insecurity since 2018.


PEAK 2023 (APRIL–MAY)

 **2.3M** people or **19%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during this lean season. This includes **0.1M** people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This is a 65 percent increase from the 2022 peak (October–December) when 1.4 million people were experiencing these conditions. The deterioration is due to the below-average first crop harvest and high inflation.




Source: Burundi IPC TWG, May 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JANUARY–MARCH)

 **1.2M** people or **10%** of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.


The significant improvement includes the seasonal post-harvest effect and assumes an above-average 2024 season A harvest despite localized flood-related crop losses.




Note: the projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.

Source: Burundi IPC TWG, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Weather extremes** A poor first harvest in late 2022–early 2023, caused by poor rainfall followed by flooding and landslides, curtailed food availability (IPC, May 2023). Normal to above-average rainfall in most areas in the February–May 2023 growing season enabled a better second harvest, but hail and violent winds destroyed crops in some areas (IPC, November 2023).

 **Economic shocks** Shortages and increased prices of fuel and agricultural inputs constrained crop yields and increased food transportation costs, contributing to rising food prices. Currency depreciation raised the cost of imported food. Escalating insecurity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo limited crop production

and increased demand for rice and maize exports there, further contributing to price increases (IPC, May 2023; FEWS NET, November 2023). Between August 2022 and 2023, the food basket cost increased by 40 percent while agricultural labour wages increased by only 7 percent (IPC, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

 **0.2M** forcibly displaced people by 2023


 **0.1M** IDPs

 **0.1M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, July 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: Burundi IPC TWG.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Burundi has been a major food crisis each year except 2019, when no IPC analysis was available and FEWS NET estimated that 0.2 million people (2 percent of the population) were facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Prevalence was highest in 2017, largely due to political tensions, poor rainfall, high food prices and crop diseases (IPC, April 2017). From 2017 to 2022, Dépressions du Nord, Dépressions de l'Est and Imbo Plains were the most food-insecure livelihood zones (IPC, September 2022).


ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.3M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, March 2022–February 2023


0.05M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2023–2024


0.24M MAM | 0.06M SAM


Source: Burundi IPC TWG, September 2022.

 **Around half** of Burundi's 48 analysed health districts are classified in Alert (IPC AMN Phase 2) with 5–9.9 percent of children acutely malnourished.


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

 **Inadequate practices** Only 4 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive a Minimum Acceptable Diet, which is considered Extremely Critical (SMART 2022). Anaemia levels were a severe public health problem among children aged 6–59 months (58 percent) and a moderate public health problem among women of reproductive age (38 percent) (WHO, 2021). However, breastfeeding rates are Acceptable at 85 percent of children under 6 months (SMART 2022).

 **Lack of food** Inadequate consumption of food (both in quality and quantity) is a greater risk factor during the lean season between July and September.

 **Inadequate services** During the rainy season, access to clean water and adequate hygiene is challenging, increasing illnesses such as malaria, acute respiratory infections and diarrhoea cases among children, and leading to peaks of acute malnutrition.

PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER 2022–FEBRUARY 2023)



Source: Burundi, IPC TWG, September 2022.


ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Deteriorating situation due to prolonged drought conditions and continued food price volatility.

PEAK 2023 (JULY–DECEMBER 2023)

0.3M people or 24% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the peak of the lean season. This includes 0.1M people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This marks a nearly 50 percent increase from the same peak period in 2022 when 0.2 million people (16 percent of the analysed population) were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

The worst-affected population groups were refugees living in three camps and the pastoralists in the Obock, Tadjourah and Dikhil regions, whose livestock were impacted by very high temperatures and transhumance movements (IPC, June 2023).



Source: Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks Djibouti is almost completely reliant on imports to meet its food needs, and increases in international food prices have severely impacted its economy (WFP & FAO, November 2023). Supply chain disruptions have led to higher and more volatile prices of food imports and further decrease in vulnerable households' purchasing power (WFP, October 2023).

On average 60 percent of households allocate more than 75 percent of their expenditure to food, which highlights their exposure to food insecurity linked to food price volatility. Rural households in Tadjourah, Obock, Arta and Dikhil allocate a particularly high share of their spending to food (FSNMS, March 2023).

Weather extremes The country suffered from five successive below-average rainy seasons in the 2020–2023 drought, limiting already poor water availability and affecting pastoralism and vegetable production. The livestock population reduced by

about half, constraining incomes and purchasing power for pastoralists (FAO, August 2023). Their market reliance increased at a time of higher domestic food prices due to livestock deaths and a lack of crop irrigation (ACAPS, March 2023).

There was a brief respite in the dry conditions at the start of 2023, but then very high temperatures and below-average rainfall returned in July–September 2023, which affected pastoralists in the inland areas (FAO, August 2023; WFP & FAO, November 2023). El Niño brought heavy rainfall to parts of the country during November 2023, leading to flooding.

DISPLACEMENT

0.04M forcibly displaced people by 2023

6 000 IDPs **0.03M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, September 2022.

Source: UNHCR Newcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.03M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in January–December 2023

3 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.03M MAM 6 000 SAM

Source: Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2023.

Recurrent drought, low purchasing power and food price shocks contributed to a severe acute malnutrition crisis with 15–29.9 percent of children in rural regions of Obock and Tadjourah, and urban Dikhil acutely malnourished (IPC AMN, June 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Lack of food An estimated 39 percent of the rural population has a poor FCS (IPC, June 2023).

resulted in additional malnutrition cases. This affected the nutritional situation in border zones, creating additional challenges in already vulnerable areas.

Inadequate services Poor WASH conditions led to high prevalences of diseases, with those of diarrhoea up to 37 percent, malaria up to 57 percent and acute respiratory infections up to 44 percent. Limited access to health services, including low vaccination coverage and vitamin A supplementation, compounds the nutrition problem. The movement of populations, particularly refugees,

Inadequate practices At the national level, just 31 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive a Minimum Acceptable Diet, which is classified as Severe by the IFE Core Group diet, though the prevalence is Extremely Critical in some areas. Only 22 percent of children under 6 months are exclusively breastfed, which is classified as Critical (UNICEF).


PEAK 2023 (AUGUST–DECEMBER)



Source: Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2023.

1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical
Urban settlement classification IDPs/other settlements classification

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: Djibouti IPC TWG.

History of the food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Djibouti has been selected for all GRFC editions. The lower numbers in 2017 may be attributable to lower analysis coverage (31 percent of the population).


In 2018 and 2019, no IPC analyses were available. There was a sharp deterioration in the severity of acute food insecurity between 2022 and 2023, with the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increasing from just over 12 000 to over 100 000, mainly due to pockets of drought in rural areas and economic shocks, which increased prices of staple foods and limited household purchasing power.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Ethiopia remains one of the most severe food crises due to the persistence of drought conditions, macroeconomic challenges and internal conflict.

PEAK 2023 (AUGUST–SEPTEMBER)

19.7M people or **17%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity, with the worst conditions being recorded in the southern, southeastern and northern regions of Afar, Amhara, Central Ethiopia, Oromia, Somali, Sidama, SNNP and Tigray.

The situation was particularly severe for pastoralists who have few livestock holdings and income-generating activities after the 2020–2023 drought and 2020–2022 conflict.




In August 2023, the South Ethiopia Region referendum led to the dissolution of the SNNP, and the establishment of South Ethiopia and Central Ethiopia regional states.

Source: FEWS NET, August 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE)

Up to 18M people or **16%** of the total population are projected to experience high levels of acute food insecurity in June 2024.

Although lower than the 2023 peak, populations are projected in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) at the start of the lean season in Tigray, Afar and Amhara (FEWS NET, December 2023). Coping capacities have been eroded by conflict and drought-driven decreased agricultural productivity, leaving populations with depleted stocks and fewer income sources.



In August 2023, the South Ethiopia Region referendum led to the dissolution of the SNNP, and the establishment of South Ethiopia and Central Ethiopia regional states.

Source: FEWS NET, December 2023.



DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Weather extremes In southern Oromia and southern Somali pastoral areas, favourable March–May 2023 Gu/Genna rains regenerated rangeland resources and marked the end of the severe late 2020–early 2023 drought. Although milk production generally increased, it remained below average due to low conception rates and 4.5 million livestock deaths during the drought (FAO-GIEWS, June 2023).

In western crop-producing areas, insufficient rains in some areas during the main June–September 2023 Kiremt rains resulted in localized shortfalls in cereal production (FAO-GIEWS, November 2023).

Exceptionally abundant Deyr/Hageya rains from October to December, mainly due to El Niño and positive Indian Ocean Dipole conditions, triggered widespread floods, which destroyed infrastructure, croplands and income sources, and displaced 0.6 million people (OCHA, November 2023). In northern pastoral areas (Afar) drought conditions have substantially impacted the

availability of livestock products, diminishing livelihood opportunities for farmers and herders at a time when they were still recovering from conflict in Tigray (FEWS NET, October 2023).

Conflict/insecurity The signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement by the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in November 2022 improved the security situation and allowed the economies in Tigray, Amhara and Afar to begin a gradual recovery (FAO-GIEWS, June 2023). However, violence returned in August 2023 in localized areas of Oromia and Amhara, which displaced populations and disrupted typical livelihood and economic activities (ACLED, September 2023).

Economic shocks Double-digit headline inflation, continuing currency depreciation and growing debt repayments contributed to higher food prices at a time when many people were market dependent (FEWS NET, June 2023; UNDP, April 2023). High fuel prices,

as well as several seasons of below-average harvests for key staples (maize, sorghum and teff) from drought and localized conflicts, put additional inflationary pressure on already-elevated food prices (FEWS NET, June 2023). This resulted in double-digit food price inflation throughout 2023, ranging from 26 to 34 percent (WFP, January 2024).

A protracted major food crisis Ethiopia has ranked among the ten largest food crises in terms of numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in all eight editions of the GRFC, reflecting the protracted and multidimensional nature of its food crisis.

Sources, as well as the coverage, have varied over the years, which challenges comparability between annual peak numbers and prevalence. However, the drivers have not, with weather extremes – namely drought – being the primary factor in undermining households’ access and availability to food each year except for in 2020 and 2021 when economic shocks and conflict/insecurity, respectively, dominated. In 2023, the dire situation was further compounded by a four-month pause in humanitarian food assistance through international pipelines due to concerns about aid diversion (WFP & FAO, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

4.5M forcibly displaced people by 2023

3.5M IDPs **1.0M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, September 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

4.1M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

3.0M MAM **1.1M SAM**

Source: HRP Ethiopia, 2023.

1.0M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2023

Continual shocks and underlying structural fragilities contribute to high levels of acute malnutrition. Very High/Critical acute malnutrition prevalences were reported in rural areas and IDP sites in Tigray, with IDP populations more severely affected. Some 61 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women in surveyed areas were acutely malnourished (MUAC < 23cm) (SMART, August 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate practices Only 11 percent of children aged 6–23 months consume a Minimal Acceptable Diet, considered Critical. Fewer than 6 percent in Tigray received a Minimum Acceptable Diet, considered Extremely Critical (SMART, August 2023).

Lack of food In Tigray, 38 percent of the population experienced inadequate food consumption, particularly impacting the nutrition status of women and children (EFSA, February 2023). WFP food distributions were suspended nationwide between June and mid-December 2023.



Inadequate services WASH services are under strain because of persisting epidemics and displacement induced by conflict, drought and flooding, as well as the influx of refugees fleeing conflict in the Sudan since April (UNICEF, November 2023; IOM DTM Ethiopia, June 2023). In August 2022, the country’s longest recorded cholera epidemic began, with 11 regions affected and some 29 400 cases in 2023 (OCHA, January 2024). Malaria and measles outbreaks continue throughout the country.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Severity in the ASALs peaked in the first half of 2023 after the multi-year drought, but improved with good rainfall.

PEAK 2023 (MARCH–JUNE)

5.4M people in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) or **32%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This included **1.2M** people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The situation has slightly deteriorated compared with the same time period in 2022. Northern and eastern pastoral areas were the worst affected due to the lingering impacts of the 2020–2023 drought.





Source: Kenya IPC TWG, February 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (OCTOBER 2023–JANUARY 2024)

1.5M people in the ASALs or **9%** of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir counties will see marked improvements in the severity of acute food insecurity following abundant rainfall.



Note: the projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.

Source: Kenya IPC TWG, September 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Weather extremes The unprecedented 2020–2023 drought led to widespread livestock deaths and crop failures affecting both pastoral and agricultural areas (IPC, February 2023). Despite abundant rains in March–May, household income still had not recovered from low agricultural and livestock production in previous years (FEWS NET, April 2023). The October–December rainy

season was characterized by very high rainfall due to the strong El Niño, reinforcing the drought recovery, but also leading to heavy storms and flooding in the northern counties, with livestock losses and damaged agricultural land in some areas (ACAPS, November 2023).

Economic shocks Local currency depreciation and high fertilizer and fuel prices raised food production and marketing costs (IPC, September 2023). Years of low food production, rising fuel prices, and reduced food imports from neighbouring countries contributed to high staple food prices in the first half of the year (WFP, April 2023).

Household purchasing power improved in the latter half due to better crop yields and market availability (WFP, October 2023).

DISPLACEMENT


0.7M forcibly displaced people by 2023

0.03M IDPs **0.7M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, December 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2024



Source: Kenya IPC TWG.

A protracted food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Kenya has been included in all eight editions of the GRFC, and as a major food crisis in seven of them. Food security deteriorated from 2021 due to the cumulative effects of the multiyear drought.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

1.0M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in March–May 2023

0.73M MAM 0.24M SAM

Source: Kenya IPC TWG, February 2023.

0.1M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023

Source: Kenya IPC TWG, September 2023.

In early 2023, acute malnutrition in Kenya's drought-stricken ASALs was Extremely Critical or Critical in many counties and even worse than in 2022. A September 2023 IPC AMN analysis showed an improving but still critical situation.

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023


Lack of food Poor milk consumption was a major driver due to continued very low milk production in pastoral drought-affected areas where it is a key component of children's diets. There is a greater severity of acute malnutrition than acute food insecurity, demonstrating the important contribution of non-dietary factors to the very high levels of acute malnutrition.

essential health services, and limited access to safe disposal of human waste contribute to a high disease burden. The drought worsened water availability, compromising hygiene and sanitation practices, leading to high incidences of diarrhoea, while the dusty environment aggravated acute respiratory infections. Measles outbreaks were reported in Turkana West, Garissa and Mandera.


Inadequate services Low vaccination coverage, low vitamin A supplementation, lack of access to and poorly supplied

Inadequate practices Poor health-seeking behaviour and inadequate child-feeding practices contribute to high levels of acute malnutrition.

PEAK 2023 (MARCH–MAY)



Source: Kenya IPC TWG, February 2023.





ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Despite declining numbers of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), the magnitude of the crisis worsened in 2023.

PEAK 2023 (APRIL-JUNE)

6.6M people or 39% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 2.5M are IDPs.


This figure is the highest in GRFC history and includes roughly 1.9M in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), although the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) declined since 2022. The situation was expected to improve from August 2023.



- At least 25% of households meet 25-50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance
- IDPs/other settlements classification
- Urban settlement classification

Source: Somalia IPC TWG, April 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016-2023



Source: Somalia IPC TWG.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Over **40 300** people were estimated to be facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the April-June 2023 peak, a significant decrease from 200 000 the previous year due to the positive impact of the 2023 Gu rains and sustained humanitarian assistance. Around 12 000 of them (down from 194 000 in 2022) were Mogadishu IDPs, Baidoa IDPs and Burhakaba agropastoral groups who faced a Risk of Famine in 2022 (IPC, April 2023).

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023-2024

Weather extremes Households were still highly vulnerable due to the effects of drought between 2020 and 2023, with low food availability and access across most of Somalia. Household food stocks were low after the dismal 2022 cereal harvest and widespread livestock deaths, which reduced livestock products such as milk (FEWS NET, April 2023; FAO-GIEWS, April 2023). Erratic and heavy rainfall driven by El Niño affected the Gu (April-June) and Deyr (October-November) rainy seasons in Hiiraan and south and central Somalia respectively, leading to flooding, displacement and destruction of infrastructure and crops (FEWS NET, June 2023; OCHA, 2023).

Conflict/insecurity In addition to causing loss of life, population displacement and property damage, conflict disrupted crop planting activities in Hiiraan riverine areas and localized areas of the Lower and Middle Shabelle and Lower and Middle Juba regions. The insecurity disrupted trade flows, increasing transportation costs (FEWS NET, June 2023).

Economic shocks Staple food prices declined from April to June 2023 though they continued to be higher than the long-term average (WFP, July 2023). Household purchasing power remained constrained at a time of extreme market reliance, mostly due to reduced domestic production and erosion of livelihoods. Currency depreciation led to higher-than-average prices for imported foods (FEWS NET, April 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

1.3M forcibly displaced people by 2023

1.2M IDPs **0.04M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, March 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

1.8M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in August-December 2023

1.3M MAM 0.5M SAM

Source: Somalia IPC TWG, April 2023.

0.4M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023

Source: Somalia HRP 2023, February 2023.

Better milk availability and access, reduced food prices, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance improved the nutrition situation between late 2022 and late 2023. However, it remained Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) among many population groups, including IDPs, as conflict restricted access to humanitarian assistance and essential services.

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023-2024


Lack of food Access to goat milk improved but the previous protracted drought still affected cow and camel milk availability. High levels of acute malnutrition in some urban areas – especially Galkayo – are linked to low incomes and poor food access (IPC, September 2023).

Inadequate services Almost half of the surveyed populations lack access to safe water and sanitation. Heavy October-December 2023 rains linked to the

ongoing El Niño were expected to compromise WASH practices, limit access to health facilities and increase disease outbreaks. Limited humanitarian funding is affecting health and nutrition services with blanket supplementary feeding discontinued (IPC, September 2023).

Inadequate practices Only 8.7 percent of children aged 6-23 months receive a Minimum Acceptable Diet, considered Extremely Critical by IFE Core Group thresholds (HNO, 2023).

PEAK 2023 (MARCH-JUNE)



Source: Somalia IPC TWG, April 2023.



1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical MUAC
Not analysed Urban settlement classification IDPs/other settlements classification

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The food crisis in South Sudan was as severe in 2023 as in 2022.

PEAK 2023 (APRIL–JULY)

7.8M people or **63%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity, including **2.9M** people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). These peak numbers have barely changed since the same lean season period in 2022 but decreased through 2023.

In April–July 2023, **43 000** people were projected in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Akobo, Canal/Pigi and Fangak counties of Jonglei state, and the Leer and Mayendit counties of Unity state.





Source: South Sudan IPC TWG, November 2022.

PROJECTION 2024 (APRIL–JULY)

7.1M people or **56%** of the total population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

The number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was projected to increase to **79 000** during the April–July 2024 lean season, including **28 000** returnees.

The slight decrease in magnitude is due to an expected favourable 2023/24 harvest.



Source: South Sudan IPC TWG, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks Sharp currency depreciation, in addition to high fuel prices, transportation costs and reduced trade from the Sudan, continued to put upward pressure on staple food prices, which constrained economic food access (IPC, November 2023).

Conflict/insecurity Localized intercommunal fighting, particularly in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, displaced households and disrupted trade and delivery of assistance. The influx of Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees from the Sudan led to clashes in border areas. Thousands arrived in remote areas in desperate need of food, water and medical care (FAO, November 2023; FEWS NET, June 2023).

Weather extremes Unpredictable rainfall, characterized by sporadic dispersion and intensity in 2023, led to reductions in crop production in some areas and localized flooding in others. Cereal production was higher than in 2022, mainly due to reduced flooding, but lower than the population's requirements (FAO/WFP CFSAM, 2023).


DISPLACEMENT

2.4M forcibly displaced people by 2023

2.0M IDPs **0.4M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, April 2023. Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: South Sudan IPC TWG.

A protracted major food crisis A low-income country, South Sudan has consistently ranked among the worst food crises in the GRFC in terms of prevalence and severity due to recurrent conflict, and economic and weather shocks overlaid on high structural vulnerabilities. Since 2021, over 60 percent of its population has faced IPC Phase 3 or above during the April–July lean period. It has had populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) each year, including outside the peak in 2020.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

1.7M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in July 2023–June 2024

0.9M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023

1.2M MAM 0.5M SAM

Source: South Sudan IPC TWG, November 2023.

South Sudan continues to face an alarming malnutrition crisis. In more than half of counties, levels of acute malnutrition are Critical.

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Inadequate services Limited health services, especially in areas with flooding and conflict, and poor access to improved drinking water and sanitation, drive high levels of illness and malnutrition. Limited funding for nutrition services restricts support to areas with extreme needs only. More than 40 percent of the population have no access to improved drinking water. Half of households in 56 counties report open defecation. More than half of children were ill with fever, cough and/or diarrhoea in the two weeks before the assessment.

Displaced populations are highly vulnerable to disease during seasonal floods, and health and nutrition service providers are overwhelmed (IPC, November 2023).

Inadequate practices Only 5 percent of children aged 6–23 months received a Minimum Acceptable Diet, considered Extremely Critical by the IFE Core Group (IPC, November 2023).

Lack of food High levels of acute food insecurity in most counties contribute to acute malnutrition.

PEAK 2023 (JULY–SEPTEMBER)



Source: South Sudan IPC TWG, November 2023.

1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | With the onset of conflict in April 2023, levels of high acute food insecurity have increased sharply.

PEAK 2023 (JULY–SEPTEMBER)

20.3M people or **42%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This included **6.3M** people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This marks a 74 percent increase since the corresponding 2022 lean season peak when 11.7 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. The most severe outcomes were recorded in conflict-affected areas of Greater Darfur, Kassala, Khartoum and Greater Kordofan regions (IPC, August 2023).




Source: Sudan IPC TWG, August 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (OCTOBER 2023–FEBRUARY 2024)

17.7M people or **37%** of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of those, **4.9M** (10% of the population) are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Although these numbers represent a decrease from the 2023 peak, they are the highest numbers of people facing acute food insecurity recorded for the country's harvest season. The projection was updated in December 2023 to account for the increased impacts of the ongoing conflict in the country.



Note: the projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.

Source: Sudan IPC TWG, December 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity The deepening conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023 drove over 7.5 million people from their homes (6 million

internally and 1.5 million externally) by the end of 2023. With few assets or savings, they are heavily dependent on host populations and/or assistance (IOM, December 2023; FEWS NET, December 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

10.0M forcibly displaced people by 2023

Some humanitarian food distribution operations have been suspended due to insecurity, looting and attacks on aid workers (ACAPS, January 2024; FEWS NET, December 2023). In Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, insecurity impeded access to fields, resulting in reduced plantings. Insufficient availability and high prices of key agricultural inputs also curbed yields in these main cropping regions. Production of sorghum

9.1M IDPs

1.0M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, December 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

and millet is preliminarily forecast to be about 25 and 50 percent, respectively, down from the previous year (FAO, November 2023).

Economic shocks The conflict has disrupted economic activity and exacerbated the country's macroeconomic challenges with persistently low foreign currency reserves, high inflation and local currency depreciation. The banking system has collapsed, preventing larger farms in the main crop-producing regions from accessing financial resources to purchase key agricultural inputs. Prices of cereals

rose to exceptionally high levels due to the confluence of these macroeconomic factors, reduced trade flows, seasonal shortages from June to September and higher transportation costs, constraining food access in a context of reduced household purchasing power (FAO-GIEWS, August 2023).

Weather extremes Spatial and temporal anomalies in rainfall and above-average temperatures in the rainy season (June–September) affected key crop-growing areas in the southeast (FAO, November 2023).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

3.0M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in early 2023

0.9M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023



Source: HNO, 2023.

Heavy fighting, collapsed basic services and mass displacement were expected to lead to a 30 percent increase in the number of children with acute malnutrition after April 2023 (HNO 2023, May 2023 Update).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Inadequate practices Even before the conflict, child-feeding practices were poor. Displacement, lack of access to services and reduced incomes are likely to have reduced them further.

old had a Minimum Dietary Diversity (HRP 2024, December 2023).

Lack of food Sharply escalating conflict has diminished all pillars of food security – availability, access, utilization and stability (IPC December 2023). Only 25 percent of children under 5 years

Inadequate services Already poor WASH facilities have deteriorated. A pre-existing high disease load is complicated by a rapidly spreading cholera outbreak (OCHA, December 2023). Some 70 percent of health facilities in conflict-affected areas are no longer functional (UNICEF, December 2023).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024




Source: Sudan IPC TWG.


A protracted major food crisis A low-income country, the Sudan has been included in every edition of the GRFC as a major food crisis. The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity has steadily increased since 2019, with the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increasing sixfold by 2023. The magnitude and severity of this food crisis have worsened over the years due to conflict and intercommunal tensions that have been compounded by poverty, underdevelopment and environmental factors. These multidimensional challenges have affected the availability and accessibility of food.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Food security improved overall, except in the Karamoja region where it deteriorated.

PEAK 2023 (APRIL–JULY)

 **1.8M** or 4% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the 2023 lean season.

This represents a 22% decrease from the previous year's peak of 2.3M (5% of the analysed population) from June to August 2022. People in northern and eastern Uganda experienced the worst outcomes, especially those in Karamoja, after erratic rainfall affected crop production and food prices.




Source: FEWS NET, April 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE)


 **Up to 2M** or 5% of the total population are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity, which is a slight increase over the 2023 peak.

Improved weather conditions should increase food accessibility in northern and eastern areas, but Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely persist in Karamoja during the peak of the lean season and among refugees.



Source: FEWS NET, December 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Weather extremes** Erratic and below-average March–June rains in bimodal areas throughout the country, except unimodal Karamoja region, led to a below-average first season harvest (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023). For many areas, this was the second year of below-average crop production, limiting households' capacity to cope with their depleted food stocks (FEWS NET, June 2023).

In Karamoja, several seasons of below-average rainfall affected livestock holdings and crop production. This resulted in high staple food prices during the March–July 2023 lean season, constraining household purchasing power at a time of higher market reliance due to depleted household food stocks (FEWS NET, June 2023).

 **Conflict/insecurity** The country's 1.6 million refugees and asylum-seekers in 2023 were reliant on humanitarian assistance (UNHCR). Livestock raiding in Karamoja and road ambushes hindered agricultural production and constrained livelihood opportunities (FEWS NET, June 2023).


 **Economic shocks** Low staple food supply after consecutive poor harvests in bimodal areas in tandem with sustained export demand exerted upward pressure on staple food prices during the first half of the year (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

 **1.6M** refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024



Source: FEWS NET.

A protracted food crisis While year-on-year differences to the coverage areas and data sources challenge comparisons over time, Uganda has been selected as a major food crisis in seven out of eight editions of the GRFC based on having over 1 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above. Looking at the peak numbers from the same methodology, high acute food insecurity levels have remained above 1.8 million since 2021, indicating continued fragility. The more severe outcomes over the years have been in northeastern parts, particularly Karamoja.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION (Karamoja, and refugee and host districts)


0.2M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, 2023

0.16M MAM 0.04M SAM

Source: Uganda IPC TWG, June 2023 and September 2023.

0.02M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023




 Acute malnutrition levels increased in Karamoja, with Kaabong district in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). Two refugee settlements were classified in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) and six in Alert (IPC AMN Phase 2). Eleven out of 12 host districts were in Minimal (IPC AMN Phase 1).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024



 **Inadequate practices** Time poverty, alcoholism and economic stress among Karamojong women underlie poor child-rearing practices. Only 2.9 percent of children aged 6–23 months in Karamoja, 11 percent in refugee settlements and 18 percent in host communities received a Minimum Acceptable Diet (IPC AMN, June and September 2023).

due to limited resources. Micronutrient deficiencies account for high levels of anaemia among children and women of reproductive age in Karamoja and in the 13 refugee settlements analysed, indicating a public health problem.


 **Inadequate services** Only 21 percent of households in Karamoja and 34 percent in refugee settlements access enough water for use and 12 percent have access to improved sanitation services. Diarrhoea and malaria outbreaks remain high risk factors (IPC AMN, June and September 2023).

 **Lack of food** High acute food insecurity contributed to poor diets for children and women, particularly for populations in refugee settlements, as food assistance was significantly reduced


KARAMOJA PEAK 2023 (MAY–SEPTEMBER)




REFUGEE AND HOST DISTRICTS PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)



Source: Uganda IPC TWG, June 2023.



Eritrea and Rwanda (refugees) were selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2024 but did not have data that met GRFC technical requirements.



Eritrea

Eritrea has qualified for inclusion in all GRFC editions as it is monitored by FAO-GIEWS, but data on acute food insecurity have not been available for any of these years. Satellite data indicate that the country experienced similar drought conditions to those that affected the Horn of Africa between 2020 and 2023 (WFP, July 2023).

These conditions likely had a negative impact on the food security of the population who depend on pastoralism and rain-fed agriculture and who faced a prolonged recovery period. Between March and May 2023, the country received average to above-average rains (WFP, July 2023)

resulting in good vegetative growth in July/August. Despite concerns for the rest of the agricultural season due to forecasts of erratic and unfavourable weather (FAO, August 2023), the harvesting of main season cereals took place in good conditions (GEOGLAM, December 2023).

In June 2023, Eritrea rejoined IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) after a 16-year hiatus.

Rwanda (refugees)

The refugee population in Rwanda has been selected for inclusion in the GRFC for the past five years due to the country's request for external assistance for displaced populations. This year the data did not meet GRFC technical requirements.

As of October 2023, there were over 135 000 refugees and asylum-seekers, primarily from Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, living in five refugee camps (UNHCR, January 2024).

Most refugee households rely on humanitarian aid to meet their daily needs but several factors in 2023 constrained assistance

operations. The number of refugees has increased since 2022 with new arrivals due to conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo. Double-digit food inflation declined from nearly 60 percent at the start of 2023 but remained at 9 percent in December (WFP, February 2024), eroding the purchasing power of cash assistance to refugees (FEWS NET, October 2023). Funding shortfalls, particularly towards the end of the year, reduced the assistance received (FAO-GIEWS, November 2023). As a result, the food insecurity situation deteriorated (FEWS NET, October 2023; FAO-GIEWS, November 2023).

■ Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed ■ Data gap

West Africa and the Sahel



Escalating conflicts mostly in Sahelian countries together with economic shocks sustained high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023.

.....

Chad, Liberia and Senegal experienced worsening acute food insecurity since 2022, while other countries, such as Mauritania and Guinea, saw significant improvements, thanks to favourable agricultural outputs and the impacts of humanitarian assistance.

.....

Populations in severely conflict-affected areas of Burkina Faso and Mali faced Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).

.....

The region experienced a major displacement crisis driven by worsening conflicts, with hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving in eastern Chad from the Sudan.

.....

The region is facing a worrying child and maternal nutrition situation, fuelled by food insecurity, limited access to basic services and poor nutritional practices.

West Africa and the Sahel

Escalating conflicts in West Africa and the Sahel and neighbouring the Sudan have sustained high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023. Weather extremes also remained significant drivers of food crises in many countries.

High levels of displacement and acute malnutrition heighten the complexity of the food crises. In some countries, favourable agricultural outputs led to improvements, tempering the negative effects of sustained inflation, market disruptions and livelihood losses.

44.3M 

people or 11% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in 14 countries.

9.7M 


forcibly displaced people in 13 food-crisis countries in 2023 – consisting of 7.5 million IDPs and 2.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

14.0M 

acutely malnourished children in 14 food-crisis countries with 3.9 million of them suffering the most severe form of wasting.

Benin | Burkina Faso | Cameroon | Chad | Côte d'Ivoire | Guinea | Liberia | Mali | Mauritania | Niger | Nigeria | Senegal | Sierra Leone | Togo

MAP 2.6 Number of people and share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 14 countries in 2023



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, 2023.

The discrepancy between the number of people facing acute food insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel, as reported by CILSS in March 2023 for June–August 2023, and the GRFC estimates arises because not all countries with Cadre Harmonisé (CH) data were classified as facing food crises. This includes Cabo Verde, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and the Gambia. Additionally, Benin and Cameroon had their peak estimates in March–June 2023, whereas the peak for the other 12 countries was during June–August 2023.

How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

Escalating conflict/insecurity, mostly in Sahelian countries, coupled with persisting economic shocks that have affected countries across the region, were the primary drivers sustaining high levels of acute food insecurity.


The overall share of population facing high levels of acute food insecurity decreased slightly since 2022 when it was the highest in CH history, at 12.5 percent of the population analysed.

Expanded analysis coverage largely explain the increases in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity since 2022 in two countries: in Chad, coverage expanded from 94 percent to 100 percent of the population, while in Nigeria it increased from 72 percent to 91 percent. Worsening insecurity conditions and economic shocks also contributed to increases in Chad, Liberia and Senegal.

Conversely, Mauritania and Guinea saw over 40 percent reductions in the number of highly acutely food-insecure people, followed by Mali, Sierra Leone, the Niger and Cameroon, mostly due to overall favourable crop and pastoral production. Burkina Faso and Togo saw marginal year-on-year improvements but maintained high levels of acute food insecurity. Year-on-year comparisons were not feasible in Benin and Côte d'Ivoire, as neither country was included in the GRFC 2023, as well as in Chad due to an increase in the population analysed with the notable inclusion of the capital city in the analysis in July 2023.

Nine countries were classified as major food crises, with Nigeria having by far the largest population facing high acute food insecurity, followed by Burkina Faso, the Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, each surpassing 1 million people in these phases.

FIG. 2.20 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, 2023.

Severity of acute food insecurity

All 14 food crises in the region had CH analyses with data disaggregated by phase of acute food insecurity.

45 200 people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) across two countries

Around 42 700 of them were in the Sahel and Boucle du Mouhoun regions in Burkina Faso between June and August 2023, where worsening conflict and insecurity severely impeded the functioning of markets and prevented populations from adequately accessing basic foods, with some areas under security blockade. This number of people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) represented the highest on record for the CH in Burkina Faso, nearly doubling from 22 500 people during March–May 2023.

The remaining 2 500 people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) were in the Ménaka region in Mali during June–August 2023, with conflict and high population displacement at the root of these conditions. This represents the first time in CH history that people have faced this most severe form of acute food insecurity in Mali.

Compared with 2022, this situation marks an improvement in Nigeria, from 3 000 people estimated in this phase in October–December 2022 to none in 2023.

2.7 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) across 13 countries


Out of the 14 countries with disaggregated data, all had populations in CH Phase 4 except Côte d'Ivoire. The severity of acute food insecurity was higher among Sahelian countries such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Niger

and Mali, reflecting the effects of protracted conflict/insecurity. Nigeria had the largest number of people in CH Phase 4, mostly in northern states, while Burkina Faso had the highest share of people in this phase at nearly 3 percent.

Cameroon, Chad, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo experienced increases in the number of people in CH Phase 4 since 2022, indicating more severe conditions. Conversely, Guinea, Mauritania and the Niger saw significant reductions, suggesting improvements in food access and availability, particularly in remote conflict-affected areas.

In Burkina Faso and Mali, a reduction in the population in CH Phase 4 occurred in tandem with increases in the population in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) – indicating a deterioration in severity for populations in areas severely affected by conflicts.

FIG. 2.21 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: Cadre Harmonisé.

■ 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed ■ Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse ■ Total population

41.5 million people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) across all 14 countries

In most conflict-affected countries with high numbers of displaced people – Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and the Niger – 10–12 percent of the analysed population were in Crisis (CH Phase 3), while in Mali the prevalence of people in this phase stood at 5 percent. Among countries mostly affected by economic shocks, Sierra Leone had the highest prevalence (15 percent) followed by Mauritania and Liberia. Since 2022, the share of analysed population in Crisis (CH Phase 3) slightly increased from 10 to 11 percent.

109.4 million people in Stressed (CH Phase 2) across all 14 countries

Compared with 2022, the number of people in Stressed (CH Phase 2) significantly increased in the region. This reflected worsening conditions as the increasing share of population in this phase (up from 26 percent to 29 percent) corresponded to a decrease in the share of population in Minimal (CH Phase 1), from 62 percent to 59 percent.

Acute food insecurity since 2016

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the region has increased almost every year since 2016, except for 2018.

Between 2016 and 2023, it almost quadrupled from around 11.6 million to 44.3 million. The prevalence of acute food insecurity grew from 5 percent in 2016, peaked at 12.5 percent in 2022, and remained at 11 percent in 2023.

The overall increase in the absolute numbers partly reflects an expansion of the coverage of CH analyses. The population analysed in the region saw a 30 percent increase from 2016 to 2022, with Nigeria contributing significantly to this rise since 2021.

The population analysed in Nigeria increased from 49 percent in 2020 to 91 percent in 2023, expanding from 16 states in 2020, to 21 states in 2021 and reaching 26 states in 2023, in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

Out of the 14 countries selected in the GRFC 2024, 11 are protracted food crises, having been

consistently identified as food crises since 2016, and four are protracted major food crises: Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria (in 2017, 2018 and 2019, they were included as part of the Lake Chad Basin regional crisis). Other countries in the region move in and out of food crisis as they face varying shocks.

Outlook for 2024

Persistent conflicts, with further associated displacement movements, and lingering economic shocks are expected to maintain high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024.

This situation is likely to be exacerbated by localized climate shocks during the 2023 agricultural season in certain countries, despite average seasonal rainfall leading to overall favourable agricultural and pastoral conditions (PREGEC, November 2023).

All the selected 14 countries except Liberia have projections for the period June–August 2024 from the CH analysis cycle of November 2023.¹ At the regional level, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is projected at 44.4 million in the 13 countries with CH data in both 2023 and 2024, which represents an additional 670 000 people compared with 2023.

This increase is largely attributable to increased analysis coverage. The population analysed increased by 18 million people in 12 out of the 13 countries with data for 2023 (mostly in Nigeria, Guinea and Mauritania). This includes about 2 million people in Emergency, a significant decline compared with 2.7 million in 2023.

As of the January cut-off date for data inclusion, no populations were projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5). This implied a decline in severity based on increased humanitarian

assistance and assumptions of slightly improved security conditions in some heavily conflict-affected areas for the projected period. However, the CH analyses of March 2024 updated several projections for the June–August 2024 lean season and estimated 2 600 people would be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Mali (CH, March 2024).

At the country level, the share of population facing high levels of acute food insecurity was projected to increase in Chad (4 percentage points), Sierra Leone (3 percentage points) and to a lesser extent Mali (0.3 percentage points). For Chad, this reflected ongoing displacement from the Sudan, conflicts in western border areas and reduced cereal production. In Sierra Leone, this mostly reflected rampant inflation.

The other ten countries were projected to experience decreases in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, mostly based on improved food supplies from favourable 2023 season outputs and subdued inflation. The prevalence in Nigeria is projected to marginally decline from 12.8 percent to 12.6 percent of the analysed population. However, the number of people projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity is expected to increase.

Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024


Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in six countries where a total of 38 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity

Conflict and civil insecurity, identified as the primary drivers of acute food insecurity, significantly impacted six countries, affecting 38 million people. In regions with long-standing issues, such as the Liptako–Gourma area, the Lake Chad Basin and parts of Cameroon, these conditions persisted and even intensified in 2023.

The resulting insecurity led to widespread internal and cross-border displacements, disrupting traditional agricultural practices, pastoral transhumance, and the functioning of markets

¹ Since the cut-off date for data inclusion in the GRFC 2024 was 7 January 2024, this analysis did not take into account the CH estimates released in March 2024. The updated projections from the March 2024 CH analyses will be included in the forthcoming FSIN CILSS report to be published in June 2024.


FIG. 2.22 Very high food inflation throughout 2023 in several coastal countries of the region



This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 15 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

FIG. 2.23 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

and trade. The countries most affected included Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria, encompassing 26 states and the FCT.

As 2023 progressed, the number of violent incidents generally increased in these countries, with Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Mali experiencing a significant increase in instability, as reported by ACLED in November 2023. Escalating insecurity was a key factor in driving populations in Burkina Faso and Mali towards Catastrophe (CH Phase 5). Communities in these areas faced extreme challenges in accessing markets, maintaining their livelihoods, and receiving humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, the insecurity crisis in the Central Sahel continued to spread to northern regions of coastal countries such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. Previously considered a risk, this expansion had an increasingly adverse effect on food security due to cross-border population movements and the deterioration of local economic activities.

In Chad, the continuous influx of refugees and returnees fleeing the Sudan compounded acute food insecurity challenges in the eastern border regions, with the arrival of 0.7 million people by the end of 2023. Meanwhile, ongoing conflict and insecurity in western Cameroon and northern Nigeria persistently disrupted market activities and livelihoods, exacerbating the food security situation.

The situation led to a significant increase in regional displacement, with 9.7 million people displaced by mid-2023. This figure included 7.5 million IDPs and 2.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR, December 2023; GRFC Displacement TWG, 2024). The extensive displacement, coupled with the severe disruption of agricultural and pastoral activities and trade, underlined the critical and interconnected nature of the food security and displacement crises in these regions.



Economic shocks were the primary driver in eight countries where 6.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Unsustainable debt and slow growth, amid uncertainty due to rising geopolitical tensions and the lingering effects of COVID-19, contributed to currency depreciation, high inflation, reduced fiscal capacity to provide assistance as well as low income-generating opportunities for households. Economic and political sanctions in certain countries of the region, spurred by coups d'état, contributed to market disruptions, resulting in shortages of goods, adding inflationary pressure to food prices and the cost of humanitarian assistance as well as restricting mobility of people and pastoral transhumance (PREGEC, November 2023).

Coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea were the most affected by economic shocks, but conflict-

affected countries were also impacted. Inflation was persistently high in several countries in the region, notably in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Guinea, underpinned by significant depreciation of national currencies against the US dollar, elevated prices of fertilizers and a high dependency on imports of essential goods. The unification of the exchange rates and the removal of fuel subsidies in Nigeria in mid-June further drove inflation beyond its borders, as the country is a key supplier of essential commodities in the region, including fuel and food (Trading Economics, 2024).



Weather extremes were not the primary driver in any country but still impacted food security in certain areas.

Although weather conditions were favourable in most parts of the region, localized erratic rains, floods and cumulative rainfall deficits affected crops in certain countries, notably in Chad, the Niger and Nigeria. These weather extremes also

affected pastoral resource availability, resulting in an early start to the pastoral lean season. Floods impacted several countries of the region, including Chad, Nigeria and Mali. In Nigeria, the largest affected area was registered peaking at nearly 1.5 million hectares of land, including over 400 000 hectares of croplands (FAO, November 2023). Elsewhere in the region, weather conditions were conducive for agricultural production, boosting food access and availability.

Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises

Structural inequalities and vulnerabilities in West Africa have been exacerbated by multiple crises in recent years.

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and the war in Ukraine have led to a reversal of years of growth and development progress, including in key areas such as poverty eradication, nutrition, health, education and gender equality.







As these countries try to get back on track, 11 out of the 14 West African countries selected for inclusion in the GRFC (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo) are currently considered Least Developed Countries by the United Nations (UN, January 2024).

Many countries are resource-rich and export commodities such as oil (Nigeria), cocoa (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana) and cotton (Benin, Burkina Faso).

The agriculture and food sector remains central to most countries' economies (WB, January 2024), with agriculture providing between 22 and 73 percent of employment in each country in 2021. In total, around 67 million people were employed in agriculture, fishing and forestry across the 14 countries (FAO, 2023).

In 2023, growth was uneven, with countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU – Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Mali and the Niger) set to grow

TABLE 2.3 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%) 	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%) 	Crop growing period affected by drought condition (%) 	Rangeland growing period affected by drought condition (%) 	INFORM Risk Index (0–10) 	HDI global ranking (1–192) 
BURKINA FASO	6.4	15.8	15.8	17.1	7	184th
CAMEROON	31.4	9.6	9.6	4.9	6.6	151st
CHAD	3.8	14.8	14.8	21.4	7.8	190th
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	45.0	10.2	10.2	10.0	4.6	159th
GHANA	36.2	12.3	12.3	12.0	3.5	133rd
GUINEA	25.5	5.7	5.7	5.1	4.5	182nd
LIBERIA	60.7	10.3	10.3	4.1	4.5	178th
MALI	4.3	10.5	10.5	15.0	6.8	186th
MAURITANIA	58.6	14.2	14.2	20.1	4.3	158th
NIGER	13.7	18.5	18.5	15.8	6.6	189th
NIGERIA	17.6	15.6	15.6	18.9	6.6	163rd
SENEGAL	43.3	N/A	N/A	7.1	4.2	170th
SIERRA LEONE	N/A	19.1	19.1	21.5	4.1	181st
TOGO	21.2	11.9	11.9	N/A	4.3	162nd

Source: FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (Rangeland growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).

by 5.1 percent while those in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC – Cameroon and Chad) and Nigeria underperformed (WB, October 2023). Chad and Ghana initiated debt restructuring efforts in 2023.

Rapid population growth and urbanization pose a challenge to improving socioeconomic indicators. The population is mostly concentrated in coastal areas, while landlocked countries generally experience lower density (WB, January 2024). The Niger's population is rising at the fastest rate of the 14 countries. There is a mix of HDI ratings throughout with Cameroon being classified

as a medium development country based on having scores above 0.55, while the remaining countries are all considered to have low human development.

Chad, Guinea, Mali and the Niger are among the lowest ten countries in the HDI rankings.

DISPLACEMENT | The situation of displaced populations in West Africa and the Sahel has been increasingly challenging due to escalating conflict, deteriorating security and environmental factors, including climate change.


This fragile context was compounded by deteriorating political, security and economic conditions, characterized by coups d'état, armed conflict, increased criminality and extreme poverty in 2023.

Insecurity crises continued to be concentrated in border areas, notably the Central Sahel (or Liptako–Gourma region), the Lake Chad Basin, northwestern and north-central Nigeria, and western Cameroon (PREGEC, November 2023; ACLED, 2023). New areas of concern due to conflicts in neighbouring countries were the northern borders of coastal countries, notably Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo, and the eastern border of Chad.

The region faced a growing internal displacement crisis with 7.5 million IDPs in seven countries by mid-2023, about half a million more than by the end of 2022, mostly due to conflict and insecurity in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin (UNHCR, December 2023). The biggest increases were in northern Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Cameroon. Together these three countries had about 86 percent of the region's IDPs (GRFC Displacement TWG, 2024). In Togo, about 18 000 new IDPs were reported.

Out of the 2.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers in the region, about 80 percent were hosted in Chad (primarily from the Sudan, and to a lesser extent from Central African Republic), Cameroon (mainly from Central African Republic, Nigeria and Chad) and the Niger (mainly from Nigeria and Mali). Countries with long-term refugee populations include Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania

FIG. 2.24 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers in the region, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, December 2023.

and the Niger, reflecting lack of opportunities to return to their countries of origin (GRFC Displacement TWG, 2024).

Food insecurity among displaced populations

Analyses on the acute food insecurity situation were available for IDPs in Burkina Faso and Nigeria and for refugees in Chad and Mauritania. An assessment in the Niger covered both IDPs and refugees in parts of the country.

According to CH analyses, across the Sahel, Est and Centre-Nord regions of Burkina Faso, 60 percent of IDPs (about 0.6 million people) faced high levels of acute food insecurity in June–August, including 0.2 million in Emergency (CH Phase 4) and 28 000 in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).

In Nigeria's northern Sokoto and Zamfara states, nearly 18 000 IDPs or 30 percent of the analysed IDP population were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the peak period of June–August. A later CH analysis outside of the 2023 peak, covering October–December, and also covering Borno State, where 1.4 million IDPs were analysed, indicated that about 0.4 million IDPs or 28 percent of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity, including 86 000 people facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CILSS, CH March 2023; CILSS, CH November 2023).

A CH special protocol was activated to assess the acute food insecurity situation of refugees


and returnees fleeing the conflict in the Sudan in eastern areas of Chad. About 74 000 or 24 percent of nearly 315 000 refugees analysed in two eastern provinces, Sila and Wadi Fira, were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity during October–December 2023, including 28 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

In Mauritania, in October 2023, Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) was carried out among 105 000 Malian refugees primarily located in M'bera camp, where they are heavily dependent on WFP food aid. About 54 percent of households did not have an income-generating activity while 7 percent engaged in daily labour or petty trade, and the rest were involved in livestock, domestic work or handicraft production (WFP, July 2023).

In the Niger, a joint assessment by WFP and UNHCR indicated significant food security challenges among refugees, IDPs and host populations. Based on the FCS indicator, around 16 percent of refugees, 17 percent of IDPs and 10 percent of host communities had unacceptable food consumption.


Significant variations in unacceptable food consumption levels were observed among refugees, with those in Tillabéri's urban and non-urban areas experiencing higher rates (42 percent and 33 percent respectively) compared with 5 percent in Tahoua's non-urban areas and

FIG. 2.25 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

MAP 2.7 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

8 percent in Diffa's non-camp areas. Some 47 percent of refugees and 41 percent of IDPs have a very low capacity to meet their essential needs, compared with 27 percent of hosts (WFP-UNHCR, 2023).

Malnutrition among refugee populations

Data from UNHCR Standardised Expanded Nutrition Surveys (SENS) were available from 34 refugee sites in Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria.

In Cameroon, the prevalence of GAM among children aged under 5 years ranged from Medium to High in five out of six sites, with the highest prevalence observed in sites hosting Central African Republic refugees in Adamaoua and Est regions. Chronic malnutrition prevalence was over 40 percent in all sites, ranking as Very High. Acute malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW), based on MUAC measurements, was particularly high, at over 27 percent in sites in the Adamaoua and Est regions (UNHCR, 2023).

In Chad, the GAM prevalence was Very High in ten sites, High in eight and Medium in one. Stunting levels were also very high, indicating long-term nutritional deficits. Anaemia levels among children under 5 and PBW were mostly Medium to High (UNHCR, 2023).

In the Niger, Medium to High GAM levels across the five sites analysed indicated concerning levels of acute malnutrition in refugee children, notably in the Abala and Ayerou sites. Stunting rates were Very High in all sites while the prevalence of anaemia among children aged under 5 years and among women were mostly High, underscoring widespread acute and chronic malnutrition challenges (UNHCR, 2023).

In five refugee sites in Nigeria, acute malnutrition was classified as Low while stunting prevalence was Very High. Household food consumption scores across all five sites ranked as unacceptable, demonstrating low quality diets (UNHCR, 2023).


ACUTE MALNUTRITION | The nutritional situation is precarious across food crises in the region and has deteriorated in a number of countries, especially in the Sahel where worsening conflicts have disrupted services or even led to the closure of health centres and nutritional care facilities.

All countries affected by food crises in the region had recent (2021–2023) estimates of the number of acutely malnourished children.

Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger and (northern) Nigeria had IPC AMN analyses. While Cameroon, Guinea, Mauritania and Sierra Leone had recent prevalence data, the remaining five countries lacked data, partly reflecting better-off nutritional outcomes as the latest data indicated a prevalence below the Low WHO threshold. However, concerns remain, mostly in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, amid increasing acute food insecurity levels.


Data collection was hampered by insecurity preventing regular nutrition surveys in some areas, such as in Burkina Faso, where the nutritional surveys of 2021 and 2022 only covered 11 out of 13 regions. Some countries have reduced the geographical coverage of their nutrition surveys and/or their frequency because of reduced humanitarian funding.

FIG. 2.26 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, in 14 food crises, 2023



Source: GRFC Nutrition TWG, 2024.

FIG. 2.27 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, 2023



Sources: Burkina Faso IPC TWG, January 2024; Chad IPC TWG, February 2023; Mali IPC TWG, November 2022; Niger IPC TWG, March 2023; Nigeria IPC TWG, November 2022; WCARO Database 2023 (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Togo); WFP Food Security and Nutrition Hotspot Analysis, April 2023 (Mauritania, Senegal); UNICEF 2023 (Cameroon, Guinea, Sierra Leone).

A high burden of acute malnutrition among children and pregnant women

In the 14 food-crisis countries in 2023, about 14 million children under 5 years old were estimated to suffer from acute malnutrition, with 3.9 million of them severely malnourished. Sahelian countries severely affected by conflicts were at the forefront of this crisis, with Nigeria's northeastern and northwestern states accounting for nearly 6 million acutely malnourished children, of whom over 1.6 million were severely affected.

Data for acute malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women were only available for seven out of 14 countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone – where a total of 1.5 million PBW were acutely malnourished.

Severity of the nutrition crises

IPC AMN analyses reported a concerning nutrition situation across conflict-affected areas of Sahelian countries. Chad, Mali, the Niger, and northeast and northwest Nigeria all had areas classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4), with 15–30 percent of children under 5 years old acutely malnourished. According to recent nutritional surveys, Mauritania had High levels of acute malnutrition (13.5 percent), while levels were lower in Cameroon's Extrême-Nord (8 percent), Adamaoua (7 percent), Nord (6 percent) and Est (4 percent) regions (SMART, December 2022). The conflict-affected Nord-Ouest and Sud-Ouest regions did not have recent data. The national prevalence was Medium in Guinea at 6.7 percent (SMART, 2022) and Sierra Leone at 5 percent (SLNNS, 2021).


Drivers of acute malnutrition

Lack of food Increasing levels of acute food insecurity were primary contributors, mostly linked to the escalation of conflicts in border areas in the Sahel and high food prices across the region. In zones where humanitarian access was limited and in those seeing major influxes of displaced populations, children and women experienced limited nutrient intake while loss of livelihoods, reduced income-generating opportunities and high food prices made basic foods inaccessible for vulnerable populations.

A nutritious and healthy diet was about three times more expensive than a calorie-sufficient diet, making it unaffordable for more than half of the households in the region, particularly in nine countries that conducted cost of diet analyses between 2019 and 2022 (Bouscarat, Heinriqs and Zougbedé, 2023).

Inadequate services Access to health care and nutrition interventions is limited, especially in conflict-affected areas/countries. Many health centres in rural areas are no longer functional or operate at a minimum. In Burkina Faso, about 500 health facilities in provinces with limited humanitarian access have been closed. Massive population displacements have put

FIG. 2.28 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2023



* Data covering 2022.

Sources: Burkina Faso IPC TWG, January 2024; Chad IPC TWG, February 2023; Mali IPC TWG, November 2023; Niger IPC TWG, March 2023; Nigeria IPC TWG, October 2023; UNICEF 2023 (Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone).

pressure on the provision of health care in accessible areas (IPC, January 2024). In Mali, coverage of integrated child disease management programmes was low in all regions classified in IPC AMN Phase 3 or above, except in Taoudéni (IPC, November 2022).

According to IPC AMN analyses, poor access to WASH services and a high prevalence of infectious diseases such as diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections, malaria, fever and measles were a major driver of acute malnutrition in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria.

Inadequate practices Some areas had Extremely Critical levels of children receiving a Minimally Acceptable Diet (MAD), including the northeastern states of Nigeria, where fewer than 10 percent of children received an MAD (IPC AMN, November 2022). Other countries with critically low levels were the Niger at 7 percent, Sierra Leone at 4.9 percent, Mali at 4.2 percent, and Guinea at 4 percent.



Inadequate feeding practices were mirrored in the high rates of anaemia in the region, with Mali and Burkina Faso recording anaemia in over 75 percent of children under 5 years old and in more than 50 percent of women of reproductive age.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Improved harvests led to a significant reduction in acute food insecurity in 2023, with favourable projections for 2024.

PEAK 2023 (MARCH–MAY)

0.5M people or 4% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Over 14 000 of them were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

This is a significant improvement compared with 1.23 million facing high levels of acute food insecurity during the March–May 2022 peak, reflecting favourable crop production, increased food availability and subdued food inflation.





Source: CH Benin, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.2M people or 3% of the analysed population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

A further improvement is projected, mostly underpinned by above-average cereal harvests. However, high prices of cereal staples, mainly rice and maize, are expected to constrain access for vulnerable households.



Note: the projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.
Source: CH Benin, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks In 2023, Benin experienced a decline in food inflation, with negative rates registered between August and December. However, prices of maize, sorghum and rice remained notably higher than the previous year. This surge in prices was driven by high fuel and agricultural input costs, and increased transport expenses due to informal fuel imports from Nigeria and its removal of the fuel subsidy in May. Furthermore, reduced trade flows from the Niger linked to ECOWAS sanctions added pressure on prices (Benin PREGEC-CH, November 2023; FAO, December 2023).

Conflict/insecurity The spread of violence by non-state armed groups from the Central Sahel to northern areas of Benin, mainly the regions of Atacora and Alibori, remains a cause for serious concern for the security situation in these areas. Insecurity also poses a threat to economic activities as the northern regions are the primary producers of cotton, Benin's main cash crop (FAO, October 2023).

Weather extremes Overall production in southern bimodal and northern unimodal rainfall areas was favourable, reflecting adequate cumulative rainfall amounts during the June–October rainy season. However, rainfall deficits between July and September affected parts of northern Benin, which likely resulted in localized shortfalls in production (FAO, November 2023). Furthermore, worsening security, due to the spillover of violence from the Central Sahel, also contributed to the decline in production in these areas (GRFC Food Security TWG, 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

0.01M refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.


ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.2M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.19M MAM 0.06M SAM

Source: WCARO Database, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2021–2024



Source: CH Benin.



History of the food crisis A low-income country, Benin has been included in the GRFC twice, in the 2022 and 2024 editions, reflecting recent shocks to food security mostly associated with the lingering economic effects of COVID-19 and generalized food inflation. Benin was not selected as a food crisis last year for the GRFC 2023 as it did not request external assistance. However, CH data available for March–May 2022 estimated 1.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity with 43 000 in CH Phase 4. A spillover of insecurity in northern areas bordering Burkina Faso and the Niger is of growing concern for the food security of local populations.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Despite improved harvests, persistent conflicts and high food prices sustain high levels of acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

3.4M people or **15%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Despite a decrease of **0.1M** people since the 2022 peak, mainly due to improved harvests, persisting conflicts and high food prices sustained high levels of acute food insecurity. Around **0.6M** people were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).



Around **42 700** people were in **Catastrophe (CH Phase 5)** in the Sahel and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, where conflict/insecurity disrupted livelihoods and markets, limiting food access. This is the highest level of Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in CH history for Burkina Faso.



Source: CH Burkina Faso, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

3M people or **13%** of the total population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. The projected improvement is based on an above-average cereal harvest and declining prices of staple cereals. In areas affected by Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in 2023 the lack of evidence did not allow for a comprehensive projection. Around **0.4M** people were projected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4).



Source: CH Burkina Faso, November 2023.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Escalating conflict since 2018 has led to mass internal displacement, disrupting livelihoods, transhumance, agriculture and markets. In Centre-Nord, Est and Sahel regions during the 2023 peak, 44–85 percent of IDPs faced high levels of acute food insecurity, far exceeding the 15 percent national average. Approximately 65 percent of those in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) were IDPs, mainly in Soum Province (Burkina Faso CH, November 2023).

Economic shocks High food prices and low economic activity in conflict-affected areas constrained household purchasing power (FEWS NET, November 2023). Elsewhere, prices of cereals declined due to good harvests and the release of subsidized cereal stocks (FAO,

December 2023). Raised taxes reduced the purchasing power of the urban poor while costly fertilizers affected the output of rainfed crops (Burkina Faso CH, November 2023).

Weather extremes Rainfall deficits caused losses of maize, cowpea and assets in the Centre-Nord, Boucle du Mouhoun, Plateau-Central and Centre regions (Burkina Faso CH, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT


2.1M forcibly displaced people by 2023

2.1M IDPs **0.04M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: CONASUR, March 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Burkina Faso.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Burkina Faso has been in all editions of the GRFC and included as a major food crisis since 2019, due to the Central Sahel conflict. Populations were in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in mid-2020 (11 400), outside the peak in late 2022 (1 800) and in mid-2023 (42 700). Despite the severe conditions, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is projected to decrease in 2024.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.5M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in August 2023–July 2024

0.1M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition between August 2023 and July 2024

0.4M MAM 0.1M SAM

Source: IPC TWG, January 2024.

While malnutrition rates decreased since 2022 acute malnutrition cases remained high, particularly considering that conflict-affected zones were not analysed. Further improvement is projected (February–April 2024) followed by deterioration (May–July 2024).


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate practices Poor feeding practices and lack of dietary diversity are major drivers in Boucle du Mouhoun and Centre-Ouest.

Lack of food Populations in areas classified in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) have poor food consumption with overlap between areas of high acute food insecurity and high malnutrition rates, except in Sissili and Bale which are more affected by malnutrition, due to high disease loads, poor sanitation and feeding practices.

Inadequate services Health services and humanitarian aid have reduced due to conflict, with 63 percent of health structures in the Sahel Region and 51 percent in Centre-Nord closed. This, combined with limited access to clean water and poor sanitation, particularly during the rainy season, sustains high disease rates in general, and is a major driver in the Est Region.

PEAK 2023 (AUGUST 2023–JANUARY 2024)



Source: Burkina Faso, IPC TWG, January 2024.



1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical Inadequate evidence

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Despite improvements, conflicts and high food prices continued to lead to high numbers of acutely food-insecure people.

PEAK 2023 (MARCH–MAY)

3.0M people or **11%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

This represents a decrease of about 0.6 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity compared with the October–December 2022 peak. The 17 areas classified in Crisis (CH Phase 3) were mainly located in the Sud, Sud-Ouest, Nord-Ouest and Extrême-Nord regions.





Source: CH Cameroon, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

2.5M people or **9%** of the analysed population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

A further significant improvement associated with increased crop production is projected, with only 4 out of 58 areas in CH Phase 3 in the Extrême-Nord region. No populations are projected in Emergency (CH Phase 4). However, high prices and conflict-related livelihood disruptions continue to drive acute food insecurity.



Note: the projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.
Source: CH Cameroon, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Persisting conflicts in the Sud-Ouest and Nord-Ouest regions caused displacement and contributed to seven consecutive below-average harvests, reducing food stocks and purchasing power amid rising staple food prices.

In the Extrême-Nord, ongoing insurgency negatively impacted livelihoods, hindering crop production and livestock sales. Civil insecurity, including hostage-taking along the Nigerian border in the Nord and Adamawa regions, affected household livelihoods (CILSS, November 2023; FEWS NET, November 2023).

Economic shocks In 2023, high prices of key food items and agricultural inputs constrained food access and availability. Despite a decrease in food inflation from 14 percent in January, prices of staple foods remained well above their previous-year levels by the end of 2023 (FAO FPMA Tool, December 2023).

The 2022–2023 agricultural campaign was adversely affected by elevated costs of agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizers and pesticides, further straining the country's economic conditions (CH, March 2023; FAO, November 2023).

Weather extremes Floods damaged crops in several localities, while some areas experienced drought and crop pest attacks, leading to localized production losses. By late October, about 47 000 hectares of croplands were flooded with a localized impact on agriculture (FAO, November 2023). At the national level, however, crop production in 2023 is expected to be well above the poor 2022 levels.

DISPLACEMENT

1.6M forcibly displaced people by 2023

1.1M IDPs

0.5M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM and OCHA, December 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.3M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2021 in Extrême-Nord, Nord, Adamawa and Est regions

0.2M MAM 0.1M SAM

Source: UNICEF, 2023.

The prevalence of acute malnutrition among children was highest in the Extrême-Nord (5.9 percent) which is affected by the Lake Chad Basin conflict (HNO 2023, March 2023).


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION

Inadequate practices Among the host population of the Adamawa, Est, Extrême-Nord and Nord regions, 30–45 percent of children aged 6–23 months received a Minimum Acceptable Diet, which is considered Serious/Alert (SMART 2021). In Nord-Ouest, only 43 percent of infants under 6 months old were exclusively breastfed. In Sud-Ouest, it was slightly higher at 58 percent (SMART 2021).

Lack of food Nearly one-third (32 percent) of households in Cameroon had a poorly diversified diet, more so in the Extrême-Nord (39 percent) and Nord-Ouest (37 percent) regions (HNO 2023, March 2023).

Inadequate services Conflict in Extrême-Nord, Sud-Ouest and Nord-Ouest has had a major impact on access to essential healthcare. Poor WASH services – exacerbated by heavy rains and floods – contributed to high levels of disease. In 2023, there were 21 300 cases of cholera, up from 15 100 in 2022 (ECDC, January 2024). According to the SMART/SENS survey of 2021, few children had been vaccinated against measles. Measles outbreaks occur almost every year affecting several health districts. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a relative decrease in attendance at healthcare facilities for routine vaccination activities (WHO, December 2023).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024



Source: CH Cameroon.


A protracted major food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Cameroon has been consistently included as a food crisis in all GRFC editions. Initially part of the Lake Chad Basin regional crisis as its Extrême-Nord region suffered spillover effects of the Boko Haram insurgency, it has been recognized as a major crisis independently since 2019, with full population coverage from 2020. The number of people in CH Phase 3 or above has been rising steadily since 2018, reaching a record high in 2022, exacerbated by poor harvests. Conflicts leading to high levels of displacement have been the main driver, with people facing CH Phase 4 peaking in 2023.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | An escalating conflict-driven food crisis compounded by high cereal prices and weather shocks.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

2.3M people or **13%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity; of them, **0.2M** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

Constrained food access due to conflict and high prices pushed acute food insecurity levels above the 2022 peak. Of the 69 areas analysed, 22 were in Crisis (CH Phase 3) in the western and eastern regions of the country.




Source: CH Chad, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

2.9M people or **17%** of the analysed population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

Conflict, trade disruptions and high food prices, coupled with anticipated lower agricultural production, will likely worsen acute food insecurity. This could push more areas into Crisis (CH Phase 3), especially northern regions impacted by insecurity.



Source: CH Chad, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Conflict, especially in Lake Chad Basin, drives internal displacement and disrupts livelihoods, markets, pastoral movements and agriculture. The large number of refugees, fleeing conflict in the Sudan, face deteriorating food insecurity due to increasing pressure on food stocks and local livelihoods. Host communities in eastern areas are also affected (FAO, November 2023).

Economic shocks Amid scarce income-generating opportunities and reduced household purchasing power, Chad saw significant price rises for key cereals due to reduced cross-border flows from the Sudan, insecurity near the Libyan border, and high transport costs. Increased demand from Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees in eastern provinces

contributed to the price increases (FAO, November 2023).

Weather extremes The 2022 floods caused crop and livelihoods losses, significantly impacting food security in 2023. Biomass deficits, dry spells and crop pests in the 2023 agricultural season will likely result in below-average production, further limiting food availability and access into 2024 (CILSS, July & November, 2023).

DISPLACEMENT


1.3M forcibly displaced people by 2023

0.2M IDPs and **1.1M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, November 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Chad.

A protracted major food crisis Chad is a low-income country and has been in all editions of the GRFC, as a major food crisis in 2016 and every year since 2020. Further deterioration is anticipated in 2024. Acute food insecurity levels have consistently increased, tripling by 2023, due to conflict and insecurity, weather extremes, internal displacement, refugee influxes and economic difficulties following COVID-19.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

1.8M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in October 2022–September 2023

0.3M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition between October 2022 and September 2023

1.4M MAM and 0.4M SAM

Source: IPC TWG February 2023.

Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) levels of acute malnutrition were widespread, with conflict and flooding exacerbating structural drivers of malnutrition (IPC TWG, February 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Inadequate practices Poor infant and young child-feeding practices underlie acute malnutrition. Around 12 percent of children aged 6–23 months consumed a diet meeting the Minimum Dietary Diversity (IPC, February 2023). Exclusive breastfeeding rates of children under 6 months old were Extremely Critical, at 7.3 percent nationally (SMART, 2022).

purchasing power and increased prices. Food insecurity was a major contributor to malnutrition in 9 of 35 analysed departments (IPC, February 2023).


Inadequate services Only 6 percent of households had access to an improved water source, affecting hygiene and enabling waterborne diseases (UNICEF, 2020). High child morbidity in most departments, including diarrhoea, measles and malaria, contributed to poor nutrition (IPC, February 2023).

Lack of food Access to food was limited by decreased

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–SEPTEMBER)



Source: Chad IPC TWG, February 2023.





ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Côte d'Ivoire is classified as a major food crisis for the first time in GRFC history as the high cost of living hindered food access.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.0M people or 5% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. No populations were estimated in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

Although Côte d'Ivoire was not included in the GRFC 2023, previous CH analyses showed that this is an increase of nearly 0.2 million compared with October–December 2022, mostly due to sustained food inflation.





Source: CH Côte d'Ivoire, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.0M people or 4% of the analysed population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. No populations were projected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

A moderate improvement is anticipated based on higher food availability stemming from good harvests.



Source: CH Côte d'Ivoire, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks Overall food availability was good in 2023, with rural households largely relying on food from their own production. Urban and rural markets were well supplied with national agricultural products and imports. However, eroded livelihoods and high living costs impeded access to staple foods (FAO, December 2023). Overall, prices of staple cereals increased in 2023 and were about 11 percent above the five-year average (PREGEC, November 2023). Despite being lower than in neighbouring countries, food inflation in Côte d'Ivoire consistently hovered around 6 percent throughout the year (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023).

Conflict/insecurity No major conflicts were reported as a driver of acute food insecurity in the country. However, as in other coastal countries such as Ghana, Togo and Benin, the security crisis of the Central Sahel has spilled over to northern areas of the country. About 40 000 refugees from the Central Sahel were registered in the country (IOM, February 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

0.04M refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.6M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.3M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition 2022


0.4M MAM 0.2M SAM

Source: UNICEF WCARO Database, 2023.

Source: UNICEF, 2022.

Recent malnutrition data are not available and concerns remain on the acute malnutrition situation as acute food insecurity levels have been on the rise since 2021.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Côte d'Ivoire.



History of the food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Côte d'Ivoire has been included in all GRFC editions except 2023 as it did not seek external aid for food in 2022. CH data were available every year except 2017. In 2016, high acute food insecurity resulted from civil unrest causing displacement and livelihood losses. Between 2018 and 2019, food security levels improved, but from 2020, acute food insecurity escalated again due to the impact of COVID-19, with the share of acutely food-insecure people rising from 0.3 percent in 2019 to 5 percent of the analysed population in 2023. The country is classified as a major food crisis for the first time in GRFC history in this edition, with more than 1 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Good harvests and subdued inflation marked a significant reduction in acute food insecurity levels.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.7M people or **6%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

A significant decline of 0.5 million people compared with the 2022 peak was driven by ample harvests and subdued inflation. About 12 000 people were estimated in Emergency (CH Phase 4).





Source: CH Guinea, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.7M people or **5%** of the total population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

This further improvement is based on higher food availability following the above-average cereal harvest.



Source: CH Guinea, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks In 2023, Guinea experienced high basic food prices despite sufficient market supply. Most cereals saw year-on-year price declines as of October 2023, except for imported rice and millet. Overall, prices of cereals remained above the five-year average.


High annual food inflation rates, peaking at 19 percent in April, and only falling slightly to 15 percent by December, impacted households' ability to afford basic items

and negatively affected food consumption and livelihoods (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023). The rise in prices of livestock and cash crops such as groundnuts and palm oil helped balanced producers' purchasing power. This was reflected in the relatively stable terms of trade, slightly offsetting the impact of rising food costs on household access to food (CH Guinea, 2023).

Weather extremes The good rainfall amounts since the start of the growing season in May

supported crop growth and development. Production from the agricultural campaign was above the five-year average for main cereals and tuber (PREGEC, November 2023). Localized flooding in Conakry and the prefectures of Coyah, Kindia and Siguiri impacted agriculture, livestock and housing. These floods affected around 11 800 people, with a localized impact on farming activities and livelihoods (CH Guinea, 2023).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Guinea.

History of the food crisis A low-income country, Guinea has been consistently included as a food crisis in all editions of the GRFC but it only escalated to a major food crisis in 2022, when over 1 million people were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above). Between 2019 and 2022, this number more than quadrupled, from 287 000 to 1.2 million. This escalating vulnerability stems from socioeconomic and political challenges, including an economy highly reliant on mining and agriculture, which is characterized by low productivity due to inadequate farming techniques and significant post-harvest losses. Additionally, poor road infrastructure further restricts market access and development, exacerbating food insecurity.

DISPLACEMENT

2 200 refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.4M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.25M MAM

0.15M SAM

Source: UNICEF, 2023.

The number of acutely malnourished children under 5 years old was projected to increase slightly between 2022 and 2023, largely attributable to increasing acute food insecurity and the factors that underpin it, as well as poor dietary practices (UNICEF, 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate practices Only 4 percent of children aged 6–23 months received the Minimum Acceptable Diet, while 44 percent of infants under 6 months were exclusively breastfed. Around 74 percent of children under 5 years and 48 percent of women of reproductive age were anaemic, indicating a severe public health concern (SMART 2022).

to malnutrition. Coverage of nutrition services, specifically wasting prevention and management as well as promotional interventions, remained low (UNICEF, 2022). Most health services have a very low rate of use (16 percent) (SMART 2022).

Lack of food Acute food insecurity linked to high food prices and low agricultural output contributed to acute malnutrition by limiting dietary intake of children and women. An estimated 89 percent of the general population could not afford a healthy diet as of 2021 (FAO, AUC, ECA & WFP, 2023).



Inadequate services About 64 percent of households had access to basic drinking water, falling to 51 percent among the rural population, increasing the risk of disease outbreaks and vulnerability

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Economic access constraints drove up acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.5M people or **11%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.


This marks an increase of around 160 000 people since the 2022 peak, largely reflecting the impact of high food prices and low household purchasing power. About 21 400 people were estimated to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4). No CH projection data were available for 2024.



Source: CH Liberia.



Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: CH Liberia.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Liberia has been included as a food crisis in all GRFC editions, but never as a major food crisis. The year 2021 marked the highest level of acute food insecurity for Liberia in CH history, when 20 percent of the analysed population faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), reflecting the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. From 2016 to 2019, the country experienced relatively low acute food insecurity with around 50 000 people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above).

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks In Liberia, economic access constraints were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in 2023. Despite favourable weather conditions leading to average national crop production, poor road infrastructure and high costs of imported cereals and petroleum limited food availability and access, especially in rural communities (Liberia CH, November 2022).

April, reaching 27 percent in August (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023). The increasing prices were associated with a depreciation of the local currency against the US dollar in the first half of 2023, increasing the costs of imported foods, notably rice, the most consumed cereal in the country. In 2022, the country imported more than half of its rice consumption needs (FAO-GIEWS, November 2022).

The international market conditions, worsened by the war in Ukraine, contributed to increasing food insecurity as the country is highly reliant on the import of basic commodities.

Annual food inflation, which had negative values at the end of 2022 and early 2023, spiked from

DISPLACEMENT

1 900 refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.07M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.04M MAM 0.03M SAM



Source: WCARO Database, December 2023.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Persistent conflict and economic shocks drove acute food insecurity, despite good harvests.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.3M people or **6%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

The reduction by 0.58 million of the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity as compared with the same period in 2022 reflects good crop harvests. However, severity worsened in conflict-affected areas.





It is the first time that Mali had people estimated in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) with around **2 500** people in this phase in Ménaka.

Source: CH Mali, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.4M people or **6%** of the total population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

A moderate increase in acute food insecurity, with the Ménaka region still classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4) and 12 other areas in Crisis (CH Phase 3), reflects the compounding effects of persistent conflict and anticipated inflation. No populations were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) during this period at the time of the analysis.



Source: CH Mali, November 2023.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Persisting civil insecurity in central and northern Mali, particularly in Kidal and Ménaka, has led to displacement, limited rural employment opportunities, disrupted agriculture and pastoral movements, and increasing looting and damage to productive assets. Markets have been severely disrupted and access to basic existing social services reduced. Humanitarian access is extremely limited (CH Mali, November 2023; FEWS NET, November 2023).

Economic shocks Prices of staple cereals declined seasonally by the end of 2023 yet remained high compared with the five-year average. Elevated cereal prices at most markets impacted poor households' access to food, forcing them to adopt negative

coping strategies (FAO, November 2023; FEWS NET, November 2023).

Weather extremes About 100 000 farmers, 12 000 of whom were women, were affected in 2023. Floods destroyed about 12 500 hectares while dry spells affected another 110 000 hectares, resulting in localized production losses in Gao, Mopti, Ségou and Koulikoro (CILSS, March and November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT


0.4M forcibly displaced people by 2023

0.4M IDPs **0.07M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, December 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Mali.

A protracted food crisis Mali is a low-income country that has been included in all editions of the GRFC. Since the start of the Central Sahel crisis in 2019, it has been classified as a major food crisis, driven by deteriorating security across the north and centre, including the Liptako-Gourma region. The population in Crisis peaked at 1.8 million people in mid-2022 and in 2023 populations were projected to be in Catastrophe in Ménaka.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

1.5M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in June 2022–May 2023

1.1M MAM 0.4M SAM

Source: Mali IPC TWG, November 2022.

0.09M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in June 2023–May 2024

Source: Mali IPC TWG, November 2023.

In 2023, acute malnutrition remained dire among children under 5 years old and deteriorated severely among PBW, increasing by 85 percent since 2022. Higher rates of malnutrition are primarily in conflict-affected areas (IPC, November 2023).


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate services Poor coverage of acute malnutrition management programmes and increased child morbidity, including diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and malaria, are major contributors in Kayes, Taoudénit and Kidal regions. Limited water supply, limited access to potable water and inadequate sanitation services increase disease prevalence and seasonal epidemic risks. High measles prevalence is contributing to acute malnutrition in Mopti and Timbuktu (IPC, November 2023).

Inadequate practices An Extremely Critical (IFE Core Group) 4.2 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive a Minimum Acceptable Diet (SMART 2022). Dietary diversity is poorest in Gao, Ménaka and Kidal regions, at 3.5–9.5 percent (IPC, November 2023).

Lack of food Acute food insecurity leading to poor quantity and quality of diet is a major driver in most areas with high malnutrition (IPC, November 2023).

PEAK 2023 (NOVEMBER 2022–MAY 2023)



Source: Mali IPC TWG, November 2023.



1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical
 Not analysed Inadequate evidence MUAC

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Despite continued economic and weather challenges, food security improved in Mauritania.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.5M people or 13% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 28 000 were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).



This number has almost halved since the peak period of 2022 when the country was still experiencing the effects of the 2021 drought that decimated local food production.



Source: CH Mauritania, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.4M people or 8% of the analysed population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 7 100 are projected in CH Phase 4. The reduction of 0.1 million people assumes good 2023 irrigated rice production.



Source: CH Mauritania, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks High prices of food continued to strain the most vulnerable populations, despite annual food inflation declining from a 16 percent peak in March 2023 to 5 percent by December 2023 (WFP Economic Explorer, 2024).

Prices of local staple cereals declined seasonally, with adequate market

supplies from the harvest, but still remained high. Overall, prices of rice were 60 percent above the five-year average and wheat 43 percent above by October 2023 (Mauritania CH, November 2023).

Weather extremes In 2023, Mauritania faced dry spells in July and August, impacting pastures and rainfed crops and necessitating re-sowing in various areas. Rainfall deficits particularly affected poor households in northern agropastoral and southeastern pastoral zones. While rice production increased in 2023, production of rainfed sorghum, millet and maize declined. However, the aggregate cereal output was still slightly above the five-year average.

High temperatures and uneven rainfall adversely affected pastures in the north and southeast, prompting early internal transhumance and reliance on animal feed. This situation was exacerbated by over 80 bushfires reported by 30 September, 2023 (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Conflict/insecurity By the end of 2023, UNHCR estimates that Mauritania hosted approximately 118 000 refugees and


asylum-seekers, predominantly from Mali, fleeing escalating conflicts. Residing mainly in the M'béra Camp, more than half of them lack regular work, with a small fraction engaged in daily labour or trade. The majority rely on activities such as livestock rearing, domestic work or handicrafts, and are heavily dependent on humanitarian food aid to meet their consumption needs (FEWS NET, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

0.1M refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Mauritania.

History of the food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Mauritania has been included in all eight GRFC editions largely due to the impact of weather extremes on food production. It has been classified as a major food crisis only once – in the GRFC 2023 – as about 20 percent of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in June–August 2022.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.2M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, 2023



Source: WCARO Database, December 2023.

Two consecutive years of SMART surveys pointed to High and worsening acute malnutrition levels in Mauritania. The GAM levels passed the emergency threshold of 15 percent in most regions of the country, with Guidimaka being of greatest concern (CH, March 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate practices At the national level, 60 percent of children under 6 months benefited from exclusive breastfeeding (SMART, 2021), while only 22 percent of children aged 6–23 months received a Minimum Acceptable Diet.

35 percent of residents use water from unprotected wells as their main source of drinking water, which increases the risk of waterborne diseases such as diarrhoea (SMART 2021).

Inadequate services The increased influx of refugees fleeing insecurity in Mali, as well as returning Mauritians, put additional pressure on scarce resources, including basic services such as health, nutrition, water and sanitation (UNICEF, 2023).



Lack of food Acute food insecurity linked to increasing food prices is a contributing factor to increasing undernutrition. Micronutrient deficiencies account for anaemia in approximately 66 percent of children aged 6–59 months and 43 percent of women of reproductive age (15–49 years), indicating a severe public health problem for both (SMART 2021).

In Guidimaka, which has the lowest rate of tap water use at 50 percent,

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Conflict, economic shocks and weather extremes continue to drive acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)



3.3M people or **13%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity, of them **150 200** people were in Emergency (CH Phase 4). Improved harvests contributed to this decrease of 1.1 million people since the same period in 2022. However, the estimate is based on projections made before the July 2023 coup d'état and therefore did not factor in its likely impacts.



Source: CH Niger, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

3.2M people or **12%** of the total population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Modest improvement is projected based on sufficient market availabilities, despite anticipated below-average cereal harvests. About 95 000 people were projected in CH Phase 4.



Source: CH Niger, November 2023.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Insecurity continued to disrupt agricultural production and livestock movements in Tillabéri, northern Tahoua, Diffa and southern Maradi. It exacerbated agro-pastoral tensions over resources and restricted humanitarian access to affected populations. Insecurity following the July 2023 coup d'état disrupted trade, markets and humanitarian assistance (CILSS, November 2023).

Economic shocks Economic sanctions following the coup, including the border closure with Benin and Nigeria, underpinned high domestic prices of cereals, which were up to 50 percent higher year-on-year by December 2023 (FAO, January 2024).

Weather extremes Dry spells, floods and pest outbreaks led to a 13 percent drop in cereal crops since 2022 (Government of Nigeria, November 2023). Heavy rains in August damaged productive assets and infrastructure nationwide. Bushfires damaged forage production in some areas (CILSS, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

0.7M forcibly displaced people by 2023


0.4M IDPs

0.3M refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: IOM, December 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Niger.

A protracted major food crisis The Niger is a low-income country included in all editions of the GRFC as a major food crisis. Since 2017, it has been affected by insecurity due to crises in the Lake Chad Basin and, from 2020, in the Central Sahel, primarily in the regions of Diffa, Maradi, Tillabéri and Tahoua. Worsening security conditions, internal displacement, high food prices, floods, droughts and the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19 have resulted in consistently high numbers of people facing acute food insecurity, peaking in 2022 at 4.4 million.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

1.9M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in January–December 2023

0.2M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in January–December 2023



Source: IPC TWG, March 2023.

The Niger continued to face a dire acute malnutrition situation. Since 2022, the number of acutely malnourished PBW increased by 141 percent. Drivers include conflict, displacement, flooding and high levels of poverty (IPC TWG, March 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Inadequate practices Low dietary diversity for children and PBW are major contributors. The Minimum Acceptable Diet among children aged 6–23 months ranges from Poor to Extremely Critical. Only 22 percent of infants under 6 months old are exclusively breastfed, considered Critical (UNICEF, 2022).

children, such as fever and diarrhoea, especially during the rainy season (IPC, March 2023; IFRC, May 2022). Due to insecurity, border closures and economic sanctions, health centres have closed and nutrition programmes have been negatively affected (IPC, March 2023).

Inadequate services Lack of basic sanitation facilities (13 percent) and high levels of open defecation (71 percent) contribute to poor hygiene conditions and high prevalence of disease among

Lack of food Acute food insecurity was considered a major contributing factor in Diffa and two subregions of Maradi and Tillabéri, but a minor factor elsewhere (IPC, March 2023).

PEAK 2023 (MAY–JULY)



Source: Niger IPC TWG, March 2023.

1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical
Not analysed Inadequate evidence



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Escalating conflict and economic shocks worsened acute food insecurity despite increased humanitarian efforts.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

24.9M people or 13% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. About 1.1 million people were in Emergency (CH Phase 4). This significant increase since the 2022 peak is attributable to expanded analysis to cover further vulnerable states (35 million additional people) as well as conflict/insecurity and economic shocks.

About 0.4 million IDPs or 75 percent of the analysed IDP population in Benue, Sokoto and Zamfara faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Source: CH Nigeria, March 2023.





PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

26.5M people or 13% of the analysed population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. This increase in numbers reflects additional coverage (+16 million people), worsening insecurity and high inflation. About 1 million people are projected in CH Phase 4. Around 0.5 million IDPs in Borno, Sokoto and Zamfara are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

This increase in numbers reflects additional coverage (+16 million people), worsening insecurity and high inflation. About 1 million people are projected in CH Phase 4. Around 0.5 million IDPs in Borno, Sokoto and Zamfara are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

Source: CH Nigeria, November 2023.



DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity In 2023, insurgents in northeastern Nigeria, mostly in Borno, raided croplands and triggered population displacement, while widespread insecurity in northwestern and north-central regions also displaced households and impaired harvests and market functionality (CH, November 2023).

Economic shocks Currency devaluation and surging petrol prices raised transportation and food costs, especially in conflict areas. High agricultural input prices constrained production. Inflation increased, reaching the highest since 1996 in January 2024 (Focus Economics, February 2024).

Weather extremes Favourable weather conditions were positive for the 2023/24 cropping season, though pockets of drought in Bauchi, Borno and Yobe states adversely affected agricultural output in local areas (CH, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

3.5M forcibly displaced people by 2023


3.4M IDPs

Source: IOM, December 2023.

0.1M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Newcast estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Nigeria.

A protracted major food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Nigeria has been included in all editions of the GRFC as a major food crisis, with acute food insecurity worst in the conflict-affected northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. The CH coverage expanded from 16 states in 2016–2020 to 21 states and the Federal Capital Territory in 2021, and to 26 states in 2023, over 90 percent of the population. In Borno, around 55 000 people faced Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in late 2016 and 50 000 in mid-2017. In October–December 2022, 3 000 people were in this phase. No populations were estimated in Catastrophe for 2023 or projected for 2024.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

5.9M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in northwestern and northeastern areas, May 2022–April 2023

4.3M MAM

1.6M SAM

Source: Nigeria IPC TWG, November 2022.

0.6M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in May 2023–April 2024

Source: Nigeria IPC TWG, October 2023.

One-fifth of analysed areas were classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) largely due to insecurity, poor diet and collapsed services. Lack of access hindered data collection in two conflict-affected areas.


DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate practices The Minimum Acceptable Diet among children aged 6–23 months ranged from Serious to Critical. Poor childcare practices, including inadequate exclusive breastfeeding, further aggravate the situation.


Lack of food High levels of acute food insecurity driven by high food prices and inflation contributed to poor food consumption in terms of both quantity and quality.

Inadequate services Poor health-seeking behaviour, the collapse of health and nutrition services as well as limited access to WASH infrastructures contribute to the high prevalence of disease among children, including fever, malaria, acute respiratory infections and diarrhoea as well as measles and cholera outbreaks (IPC AMN, October 2023).

PEAK 2023 (JANUARY–APRIL)





Source: Nigeria IPC TWG, November 2022.



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | An escalation to a major food crisis for the first time in 2023, largely due to persistently high food prices.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)



1.3M people or 7% of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity, of them 57 200 people were in Emergency (CH Phase 4). This represents 0.4 million more people than during the same peak period in 2022 due to sustained inflation and high food prices.



Source: CH Senegal, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.7M people or 4% of the population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. The anticipated improvement is attributable to abundant cereal harvests and lower food inflation. The population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) was projected to decrease significantly to 44 000.



Source: CH Senegal, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks In 2022, Senegal experienced a sharp rise in food inflation, peaking at 21 percent in November. However, in 2023, food inflation steadily decreased, reaching negative values by November 2023, alleviating some pressure on poor households (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023).

While prices of key locally produced cereals such as rice, millet and maize were declined significantly throughout the year, they remained high compared with the five-year average. In September, millet prices were 62 percent higher than the five-year average and maize prices 37 percent higher. Conversely, livestock prices saw substantial increases, with cattle up by 41 percent, sheep by 27 percent, and goats by 18 percent, due to reduced pastoral resources (CH Senegal, November 2023).

Weather extremes and crop pests The 2023 agricultural season was favourable overall with an early start for the season and higher-than-normal rainfall.

Some challenges faced by the agricultural sector included pests such as hairy caterpillars, fall armyworms and locusts, which infested about 38 700 hectares of farmland. Most of them were treated. Also, below-average fodder availability in key central and western areas, exacerbated by localized bush fires, led to early transhumance (CH Senegal, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

0.01M refugees and asylum-seekers by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION


0.3M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, 2023



Source: FS and Nutrition Hotspot Analysis, 2023.

Levels of acute malnutrition among children under 5 have passed the Emergency level of 15 percent in several areas (CH, March 2023). Concerns remain due to the lack of recent nutrition surveys, amid increasing acute food insecurity levels since 2022.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Senegal.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population



A protracted food crisis Senegal has been identified as a food crisis in all editions of the GRFC as it required external assistance to respond to economic shocks and weather extremes. It was defined for the first time as a major food crisis in this year's edition as the number of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in 2023 exceeded 1 million, marking the highest level of acute food insecurity in the country in CH history.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Rampant inflation expected to drive high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.2M people or **16%** of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

This marks a significant decline since the same peak period in 2022, when 1.6 million people or 19 percent of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity as favourable weather conditions led to increased agricultural production. Nevertheless, 34 400 people were in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – 8 000 more than the previous year.





Source: CH Sierra Leone, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.5M people or **19%** of the population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

This projected deterioration mostly reflects the likelihood of high inflation constraining household purchasing power. However, no populations are projected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4).



Source: CH Sierra Leone, November 2023.


DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks Food inflation steadily increased between early 2022 and September 2023, when the annual rate peaked at 65 percent. Across most markets, there was a noticeable increase in the prices of all major agricultural products compared with the previous year. Specifically, prices of local and imported rice, the country's staple cereal, were up to 55 percent higher compared with November 2022 (FAO FPMA, 2023; Sierra Leone CH, November 2023).

Global increases in input costs, such as fuel and fertilizers, coupled with exchange rate fluctuations, substantially influenced domestic food prices (CH, November 2023).

Conflict/insecurity No major insecurity was reported to have had an impact on food security. However, a growing risk of conflict between livestock herders and farmers in the Northern and Eastern regions could lead to reduced agricultural and pastoral productivity in 2024 (CH, November 2023).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Sierra Leone.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Sierra Leone has been included in all eight editions of the GRFC, and for the last four years has been classified as a major food crisis with more than 1 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above).

The food crisis escalated in June–August 2020, mainly driven by price spikes and job losses associated with COVID-19, and peaked in 2021 at 1.8 million people. In 2023 and 2024, levels are still above 1 million people, mostly reflecting persisting economic access constraints amid high food inflation rates.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.2M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.14M MAM

0.06M SAM

Source: SMART, 2021.

The number of acutely malnourished children under 5 years old was projected to increase marginally between 2022 and 2023. Child acute malnutrition levels were classified as Medium at 5 percent at the national level, while they were up to 10 percent in the Western Area Urban District and 8 percent in Western Area Slums (SMART, 2021).

Around 6 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished (MUAC <23cm) which is considered a medium prevalence (SLNNS, 2021).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate practices An Extremely Critical 5 percent of children aged 6–23 months received a Minimum Acceptable Diet. The situation was worst in the southern district of Bonthe (SLNNS, 2021).

Just over half (53 percent) of infants up to 6 months old were exclusively breastfed – considered Alert.

Inadequate services Around 12 percent of assessed children experienced one or more communicable childhood diseases (e.g. fever, cough, diarrhoea, among others) in the two weeks prior to the assessment. Morbidity levels were aggravated by the poor WASH conditions in many parts of the country, characterized by poor access to safe drinking water, lack of sanitation facilities and poor handwashing practices at critical times (SMART, 2021).


Lack of food High consumption of cheaper starchy staple diets and poor consumption of iron-rich animal-sourced foods, such as milk, meat and eggs, led to nutrient intake deficits. Micronutrient deficiencies accounted for anaemia in approximately 73 percent of children aged 6–59 months and 43 percent of women of reproductive age (15–49 years), indicating a severe public health problem for both (WHO, 2019).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | High food prices and rising conflict in the north drive acute food insecurity in Togo, despite slight improvements.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.5M people or **8%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. About 40 000 people were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

This slight improvement since the October–December 2022 peak period reflects above-average crop production. However, compared with the previous year, populations in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) were more concentrated in conflict-affected northern areas.




Source: CH Togo, December 2022.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.5M people or **8%** of the analysed population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

An anticipated further slight improvement, reflecting good crop production, particularly in southern areas, and a decline in the price of maize. However, concerns arise in northern Savanes region due to increasing insecurity. No populations were estimated in CH Phase 4.



Source: CH Togo, November 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024


Economic shocks In 2023, the availability and prices of agricultural inputs, including fertilizers and pesticides, were impacted by international market disruptions and insecurity in the north of the country. In spite of measures to improve farmer's access to inputs, cereal retail prices remained high, with those of sorghum increasing up to 30 percent between May and August and those of maize remaining stable or slightly increasing. By the end of 2023, sorghum prices were 10 to 30 percent above the year-earlier levels while maize prices were near or below last year's levels (FAO, December 2023). Livestock prices remained stable compared with the five-year average, but unfavourable livestock/cereal terms of trade affected livelihoods of pastoralist households (CH Togo, November 2023).

Conflict/insecurity In 2023, approximately one-third of the people facing high levels of acute food insecurity resided in the Savanes region, where a state of emergency was extended until April 2024 due to violence from the Central Sahel (FAO, December 2023). This led to significant displacement, including nearly 19 000 refugees and asylum-seekers from Burkina Faso, heightening humanitarian needs in the north (UNHCR, 2023).

Non-state armed group attacks and suspended cross-border transhumance since 2021 restricted farmland access and livestock mobility, forcing extensive pastoralist displacement southward. This negatively affected staple crop production in this region, which accounts for about 20 percent of the national output of cereals and pulses (CH Togo, November 2023).

Weather extremes The country experienced short to medium duration dry spells in bimodal southern areas and unimodal northern areas during the main rainy season, affecting crop production in localized areas. Additionally, the minor rainy season in the south began earlier than usual, leading to flooding and affecting the city of Lomé. In spite of these conditions, crop production was above average at the national level (CH Togo, November 2023).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2020, 2022–2024



Source: CH Togo.

History of the food crisis A low-income country, Togo has been included in three editions of the GRFC. Post-COVID-19 economic shocks have been the key driver leading to higher levels of acute food insecurity, which peaked in 2022 at 0.6 million people or 9 percent of the analysed population, reflecting record high food prices. Despite improvements since 2022 and a further decrease in acute food insecurity projected for 2024, a worsening security situation in the north is very concerning.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Population analysed Population not analysed Total population

DISPLACEMENT

0.05M forcibly displaced people by 2023

0.02M IDPs **0.03M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, July 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.1M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.1M MAM

0.03M SAM

Source: WCARO Database, December 2023.

Ghana (refugees) was selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2024 but did not have data that met GRFC technical requirements.



Ghana (refugees)

There were around 7 000 refugees and nearly 16 000 asylum-seekers in Ghana by the end of 2023 (UNCHR, 2023; IOM, February 2024). Refugees in Ghana were selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2024 for the first time, as the country requested external aid to assist these populations in 2023. However, there is a notable absence of acute food insecurity data on these displaced populations.

Primarily from Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, which are increasingly affected by the Central Sahel crisis, these refugees have experienced severe

livelihood losses, which have limited their access to income and intensified food access constraints. This situation was exacerbated by high food inflation in Ghana which, despite declining from 61 percent in January 2023, remained at 28.7 percent by December 2023 (World Bank, 2024).

Staple cereals such as maize, rice and sorghum saw significant price increases, attributable to increased production and transportation costs and the national currency's depreciation (FAO, November 2023).

■ Data gap

Asia



Macroeconomic crises characterized by low incomes and rising food and agricultural input costs as well as the impacts of widespread weather extremes and the escalating conflict in Myanmar drove almost 60 million people across five countries to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

.....

Improvements were observed in Afghanistan but it remained an extremely concerning food crisis with 46 percent of its population facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

.....

With little prospect of safe return to Myanmar, the majority of the nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees in camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, face high levels of acute food insecurity and rely on humanitarian aid that is susceptible to funding cuts.

.....

The outlook for 2024 is mixed. Should economic stability hold in Afghanistan, acute food insecurity was projected to make gradual improvements – though dryness in late 2023 may impact spring and summer crops. Escalating violence in Myanmar threatens to drive more displacement and acute food insecurity.

Asia

Nearly one-third of the total analysed population across five countries in the region faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 due to sustained economic crises driving high unemployment and food prices, rising insecurity and displacement in Myanmar, and widespread destructive weather extremes and natural disasters.

59.8M 

people or 30% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in five countries.

11.8M 


forcibly displaced people in four countries by 2023 – consisting of 8.7 million IDPs and 3.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

5.4M 

acutely malnourished children in two countries with 1.5 million of them suffering the most severe form.

Afghanistan | Bangladesh | Myanmar | Pakistan (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh) | Sri Lanka

MAP 2.8 Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in five countries, 2023



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Legend:

- Population size ranges: <1.0 million, 1-2.99 million, 3-4.99 million, 5-9.99 million, 10-14.99 million, ≥15 million
- Not selected for analysis
- Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed
- Data gap
- Major food crisis (indicated by exclamation mark icon)
- Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

Source: IPC TWGs; WFP CARI (Sri Lanka); Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP.

How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

Out of the five food crises with data meeting GRFC technical requirements, only Afghanistan and Sri Lanka had analyses for 2023 that were directly comparable with 2022.

Afghanistan was again Asia’s largest food crisis, accounting for 33 percent of the region’s population in the highest phases of acute food insecurity. During the November 2022–March 2023 lean season, 46 percent of its population faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), down from 55 percent during the same period the previous year (IPC, January 2023; IPC, October 2021).


The 2023 IPC analysis for Bangladesh, which covered 23 percent of the population, including Rohingya refugees, found 31 percent of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This is not directly comparable with the previous year’s data from the Joint Response Plan, which only covered Rohingya refugees (IPC, June 2023). In Pakistan, a significantly expanded 2023 IPC analysis showed an improvement in the food security situation in areas covered by the 2022 post-flood analysis (IPC, October 2023).

In Myanmar’s conflict-driven food crisis, the situation remained of great concern with 19 percent of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity though the analysis is not comparable with that of 2022 (OCHA, December 2023).

Sri Lanka has experienced improvements in food security since 2022 attributable to better food supplies, lower prices and increased capacity to import food, although 24 percent of its population still faced high levels of acute food insecurity compared with 28 percent the previous year (WFP, December 2023).

All five countries are considered major food crises, each with over 1 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Only Afghanistan is considered a protracted major food crisis.

FIG. 2.30 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Source: IPC TWGs; WFP CARI (Sri Lanka); Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP.

Severity of acute food insecurity

Disaggregated data by phase were available for four out of five countries in the region, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan. Data for Sri Lanka were derived from the WFP CARI methodology and therefore no breakdown by IPC phase of acute food insecurity was available.

No populations faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 2023, down from over 20 000 people (in Afghanistan) in March–May 2022.

11.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across four countries

More than half of the region’s total population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) were in Afghanistan. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan had 2.2 million people in this phase each, and Myanmar had 1.4 million people. Afghanistan also had the highest proportion of population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) at 14 percent.


42.4 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across four countries

Afghanistan had 13.8 million people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of acute food insecurity, while each of the other countries with disaggregated data had just under 10 million people in this phase. Afghanistan had the highest proportion of its analysed population in this phase (32 percent).

57.1 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across four countries

All countries in the region have at least 30 percent of their analysed population in this phase, representing 13–17 million people in each country. Pakistan had the highest proportion of its analysed population in this phase (at 36 percent).

FIG. 2.31 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2017–2024.

1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse Total population

Acute food insecurity since 2016

Afghanistan and the Rohingya refugees in the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh have been consistently included as major food crises in each edition of the GRFC.

Pakistan has been a major food crisis since GRFC 2018 with analyses varying in geographical coverage of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces.

Afghanistan has been classified as one of the ten worst food crises in every edition of the GRFC, with over 40 percent of the analysed population in the highest levels of acute food insecurity from 2020 to 2023. While Afghanistan has remained

among the ten largest food crises in the GRFC over the past eight years, it has experienced a gradual improvement since 2021.

In Bangladesh, changing methodological approaches and coverage challenge year-on-year comparisons. Myanmar and Sri Lanka were classified as major food crises for the first time in the GRFC 2023.

A lack of systematic and consistent data limits a more thorough regional analysis over time, as the number of countries selected for analysis and with acute food insecurity data available significantly varied year-on-year in the eight editions of the GRFC.

Outlook for 2024

Around 40.5 million people or 30 percent of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 in Afghanistan, Myanmar and Pakistan, including 8.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The high cost of fuel and fertilizer – coupled with currency devaluations and supply chain disruptions – will continue to burden producers and drive high food prices and inflation that directly impact the food insecurity of households.

Flooding and extreme weather from monsoons and cyclones are a perennial concern for the region, while the potential for conflict to escalate in Myanmar or Afghanistan poses a major risk.

In Afghanistan, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity was projected to be 21 percent lower in the November 2023–March 2024 lean season period than the previous lean season. This improvement is driven predominantly by the extensive delivery of humanitarian food and agriculture assistance (IPC, December 2023). However, the improvement may be tempered by the negative impact of poor rainfall in late 2023 on 2024 wheat production.

In Myanmar, the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity is projected to increase to 12.9 million people in the June–August 2024 period, corresponding with the lean season, due to protracted conflict and escalating displacement and a further rise in food prices with decreasing job and income opportunities depressing household purchasing power (OCHA, December 2023). Acute food insecurity projection data are not available for Sri Lanka, but the economic situation is expected to continue to improve throughout 2024, according to the IMF and World Bank, as the country should see modest GDP growth, the effects of recent debt restructuring, and a recovery in the tourism and manufacturing sectors (WFP and FAO, May 2023; WB, January 2024; WB, October 2023).

Additional analysis projecting beyond January 2024 is not available for Pakistan, but indications

suggest that flooding will once again pose a risk to food security due to above-normal snowfall and rainfall in the winter season into early 2024 (IPC, October 2023). The area planted with wheat is forecast at a level well above the five-year average, driven by record prices, while good supplies of quality seeds, fertilizers and herbicides augur well for yields (FAO, November 2023). However, if the economic crisis, militant attacks in provinces bordering Afghanistan and civil unrest escalate, acute food insecurity could further deteriorate.

Acute food insecurity projection data are not available for Bangladesh, but the country is forecast to see a slowing in GDP growth in 2024 in part due to low foreign exchange reserves and import restrictions impacting private investment ((UN DESA, January 2024; WB, January 2024). In addition, more than 20 percent of the country’s population experience high levels of chronic food insecurity (IPC Chronic Food Insecurity analysis, June 2022), which means they normally experience ongoing or seasonal food consumption gaps even in non-exceptional conditions.

Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024



Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka where 37.3 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.


Macroeconomic shifts that led to decreases in foreign exchange reserves (Bangladesh and Pakistan) and currency depreciations (Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan) drove rising food costs for households and rising input costs for agricultural producers, in part due to a high reliance on imports. Headline inflation was persistently high in Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh, while Afghanistan and Sri Lanka experienced deflationary trends by the end of 2023 (WFP, December 2023; WB, December 2023).

The food-crisis countries in the region are particularly reliant on imports from the Russian Federation for the domestic commercial agriculture sector, with Bangladesh importing 75 percent of the potash it uses to make fertilizer from there, but supply chain challenges and global restrictions on the Russian market have posed challenges (IPC, June 2023). Even countries that do not rely on the Russian Federation for fertilizer inputs, such as Pakistan, continued to experience rising prices due to supply chain disruptions (IPC, October 2023).

Economic shocks – characterized by stagnant wages, widespread unemployment, reduced public spending, the effects of women being banned from the workplace and decreased remittances – were the primary drivers of acute food insecurity in Afghanistan (IPC, December 2023).

More positive conditions prevailed in Sri Lanka as the country rebounded slightly from the worst of its 2020 economic crisis with a gradual increase in foreign reserves and currency appreciation that helped the country import food to meet its 1.8 million tonne cereal import requirement (WFP and FAO, May 2023).


FIG. 2.32 While Pakistan and Bangladesh experienced high food inflation during 2023, Sri Lanka saw a vast reduction despite an uptick at the end of the year



This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

FIG. 2.33 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.



Weather extremes were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Pakistan where 11.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Weather extremes were an additional driver in all the other food-crisis countries in Asia. The region is susceptible to increasingly powerful cyclones and heavy monsoon seasons that cause displacement, destroy croplands and damage infrastructure, limiting the income-generating opportunities of vulnerable populations. Heavy monsoons trigger periods of food insecurity that extend beyond the monsoon season as households face long recovery times to regain assets, as was the case in 2023 in Bangladesh's Haor region and Sindh province of Pakistan following severe monsoon flooding in 2022 (IPC, June 2023; IPC, October 2023).

While 2023 did not see the scale of destruction caused by historic floods in 2022, Pakistan again experienced record-breaking rainfall that triggered flooding and damage to crops, shelters and water supply infrastructure, including in June which was the second rainiest June in the past 63 years (IRC, August 2023). In addition to disrupting food production, consumption and the livelihoods

of flood-affected people, flooding drove mass displacements in 2023 in Myanmar and in Sri Lanka following extreme weather in October (OCHA, December 2023; IFRC, November 2023).

Cyclone Mocha made landfall in Bangladesh and Myanmar in May and caused widespread destruction of farmlands and crop losses and damage to IDP camps in Myanmar and camps in Cox's Bazar (ACAPS, May 2023). The cyclone impacted 3 million people in Myanmar as well as 327 000 hectares of agricultural land and an estimated 2.3 million people in Bangladesh (OCHA, December 2023; ACAPS, May 2023). Flash floods in mid-August 2023 affected an estimated 1.3 million people in four hilly districts of Chattogram. Some of them were still recovering from cyclone Mocha and were later impacted by cyclones Hamoon and Midhili (UNICEF, December 2023).

Afghanistan continued to feel the effects of a third year of drought, which contributed to a 30–35 percent deficit in wheat production, with western provinces in particular seeing lower-than-average harvests (WFP, June 2023).



Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Myanmar where 10.7 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

The security situation in Myanmar deteriorated throughout 2023 with a serious escalation in violence since the end of October 2023 when a coalition of armed organizations launched renewed attacks on military positions and captured several towns in the process (ACAPS, November 2023). This conflict precipitated an increase in displacements and further limited humanitarian access to communities, particularly in Shan, Sagaing and Rakhine states (UNHCR, November 2023; ACAPS, November 2023).

Despite prioritizing the eventual reintegration in Myanmar of the over 900 000 Rohingya refugees based in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, the security and political situation suggests there is no prospect of safe return in the foreseeable future (JRP, March 2023).

Political instability in Pakistan had regional implications for acute food insecurity in 2023. Pakistan forcibly deported over

500 000 undocumented Afghans, while the demand for seasonal migrant labour from Afghanistan to Pakistan is expected to decrease, leading to greater competition for agricultural wage work in Afghanistan and decreased remittance flows into Afghanistan (IPC, December 2023; IOM Pakistan, January 2024).

While the presence of active conflict has dwindled in Afghanistan following the consolidation of control by the de facto authorities (DFA) in August 2021, the DFA continue to issue new decrees and directives that change the operating environment for humanitarian workers and disrupt the delivery of food assistance (ACAPS, June 2023).



Natural disasters – Afghanistan was hit by three powerful earthquakes in October.

The earthquakes caused widespread destruction in Herat province and affected about 275 000 people as a result of lost livestock and food stock and damage to homes and critical water and sanitation infrastructure (IPC, December 2023).

Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises

The persistence of acute food insecurity and continual inclusion of these countries as major food crises reflect structural factors.

High levels of poverty, government debt, high population growth, high exposure to natural hazards, gender and income inequality, and low levels of education all decrease households' and communities' abilities to withstand and recover from shocks.

Food-crisis countries in the Asia region have a particularly high dependency on imports, with Afghanistan and Sri Lanka both relying on imports for over 30 percent of their required national caloric intake. Asia also has three countries in the bottom quartile globally for HDI – Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar – a reflection of the compounding effects of poor health resources, limited education opportunities and low incomes in these countries.






The same three countries also received Very High or High INFORM Risk scores based on the risk of humanitarian crises and disasters, while Bangladesh was considered the country most vulnerable in the world to river flooding (European Commission, September 2023).

Gendered views of women's roles in society limit employment opportunities for women in Afghanistan, a situation that has become institutionalized since the August 2021 takeover by the de-facto authorities (DFA), and has created a particularly precarious situation for women-headed households (CARE, November 2022). Further, mobility restrictions outside the home implemented by the DFA have discouraged women from travelling to markets as frequently, leading to negative impacts on food accessibility (CARE, November 2022).

In Pakistan, 75 percent of rural women and girls are engaged in agricultural work but the majority of this work remains unpaid and informal, limiting the potential of women to participate in markets, gain access to credit, and diversify their food sources (FAO Pakistan, December 2023).

Agriculture, forestry and fishing employed around 69 million people across the five countries affected by food crises in the region and represented up to 46 percent of total employment in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Food production is therefore key for the food security and livelihoods of vulnerable populations in the region.

TABLE 2.4 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	GDP ranking	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%) 	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%) 	Crop growing period affected by drought condition (%) 	INFORM Risk Index (0–10) 	HDI global ranking (1–192) 
AFGHANISTAN	138	31.8	46	19.51	8.1	180th
BANGLADESH	34	11.2	37.1	15.57	5.7	129th
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA	N/A	17.8	43.5	9.86	4.1	N/A
KYRGYZSTAN	148	18.5	18.5	20.98	3.1	118th
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	133	-3.2	2.9	15.19	3.5	140th
MYANMAR	86	-2.7	12.5	14.86	7.1	149th
PAKISTAN	41	-18.6	20.2	20.99	6.1	161st
SRI LANKA	76	30.5	20.9	7.22	3.1	73rd
TAJIKISTAN	149	47.5	50.4	16.44	4.4	122nd
VANUATU	196	87.2	100.00	N/A	4.2	140th

Source: WB (GDP ranking); FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).


DISPLACEMENT | The 11.8 million forcibly displaced people in Asia face a growing number of threats and vulnerabilities due to sustained conflict, climate change, social and economic isolation in their host communities, and political instability.

The prospect of a safe and dignified return to countries of origin remains a challenge for population groups such as the Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh (JRP, March 2023). Weak public service infrastructures and lack of funding are straining the humanitarian response in countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan (WFP, May 2023).

Of the total displaced population in four countries in the region, 8.7 million people or 73 percent are internally displaced. Afghanistan has the region’s highest number of IDPs with 5.7 million, followed by Myanmar, Pakistan and Bangladesh.


While a recent decrease in active conflict in Afghanistan following decades of instability that drove displacement has allowed for modest returns, with 1.6 million displaced Afghans returning to their areas of origin, nearly 1 in 7 Afghans remains displaced (OCHA Afghanistan, December 2023). In Myanmar, an escalation of

FIG. 2.34 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in four food-crisis countries, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, 2023 and 2024.

FIG. 2.9 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, 2023 and 2024.

violence has led to over 1 million new IDPs year-on-year (OCHA Myanmar, December 2023). The nearly 600 000 Rohingya who remain in Myanmar face movement restrictions, reduced access to basic services and no pathway to formal citizenship, which drives food insecurity (OCHA Myanmar, December 2023). Pakistan was still recovering from devastating 2022 floods that triggered its largest displacement event in a decade, when localized flooding as well as spates of violence in 2023 causing new displacements (IDMC, April 2023).

The Asia region is home to large, long-standing refugee populations residing in countries bordering two of the region’s most intractable conflicts – Afghanistan and Myanmar. Nearly 3.2 million registered refugees are hosted in four countries in the region. Pakistan hosts nearly 2 in 3 of the refugees in the region at 2.1 million, followed by Bangladesh and Afghanistan (UNHCR, December 2023). Pakistan (Afghan refugees) and Bangladesh (Rohingya refugees) are among the ten countries hosting the largest refugee populations in the world (UNHCR, December 2023).

Nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees who escaped violence in Myanmar live in congested camps in

Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char Island in Bangladesh (UNHCR, December 2023). Personal safety concerns limit the ability of vulnerable populations to access humanitarian assistance and sanitation and health services (IPC, June 2023).

The tenuous legal status of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh prevents formal employment within host communities in Cox’s Bazar, increases dependence on humanitarian assistance, and often forces refugees into informal work that increases their risk of exploitation (IPC, June 2023).

The food rations that refugees rely upon were reduced at the beginning of 2023 due to funding cuts at WFP, but were increased slightly to USD 10 per person per month from January 2024, although this is still below the USD 12 per person per month ration amount before March 2023 (WFP, December 2023).


The IPC analysis classified the Rohingya refugee camps in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in May–September 2023 with around 0.6 million refugees or 65 percent of the total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC, June 2023). Acute food insecurity in camps increases protection risks among Rohingya refugees since

it makes them more likely to risk exploitative livelihood opportunities or face exploitation by traffickers as they attempt to leave camps (UN, June 2023).

The massive influx of refugees into the crowded camps of Cox’s Bazar is having a deleterious effect on livelihood opportunities for host communities. Deforestation to construct the camps and for firewood has cleared 1.67 percent of all forest area in Cox’s Bazar and caused erosion, while dependence on groundwater has reduced the water table by 4 metres, making it more difficult to access water for agricultural and household needs (IPC, June 2023). The increased risk of erosion raises the prospect for deadly and destructive landslides in this cyclone-prone coastal region (JRP, March 2023). Around 40 percent of the host community or 0.1 million people also faced high acute food insecurity in May–September 2023 (IPC, June 2023).

Pakistan has hosted large refugee populations from Afghanistan for four decades as a result of prolonged conflict and instability. They face high levels of food insecurity and economic and social marginalization. However, 2023 saw a shift in government policy towards refugees, with over 500 000 Afghans forcibly returned in September 2023 (IOM Pakistan, January 2024).

FIG. 2.35 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION | A national-level IPC analysis for Afghanistan and a partial analysis for Pakistan showed widespread Critical levels of acute malnutrition across the two countries.

In Afghanistan, 17 provinces were classified in IPC AMN Phase 4 (Critical) during the winter lean season of November 2022–April 2023 as the crisis deteriorated due to higher risk of diarrhoea and acute respiratory infection.

Pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) in Afghanistan also faced a concerning malnutrition situation with 804 000 experiencing acute malnutrition (IPC AMN, January 2023).

Acute malnutrition levels were Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in 23 out of 32 analysed districts in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces in Pakistan, between March and September 2023. In four districts, primarily in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the situation was expected to worsen in October 2023–January 2024 (IPC AMN Pakistan, October 2023).

While no recent data were available for the resident population of Bangladesh, the 2023 SENS results indicated a deteriorating acute malnutrition situation among Rohingya refugee populations, with Very High levels in mega camps (15.4 percent) in Cox’s Bazar and Medium levels in registered camps (9.6 percent) (UNHCR, December 2023).

No recent nutrition data were available for Myanmar, but the Nutrition Cluster indicated a progressive deterioration of the situation amid worsening contributing factors (OCHA, January 2023).

Drivers of acute malnutrition

Inadequate practices The low proportion of children aged 6–23 months receiving a Minimum Acceptable Diet (MAD) was a very high risk factor associated with child acute malnutrition in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, only 16 percent of children received an MAD, which is considered Critical, with lower levels in rural areas than urban (IPC AMN, January 2023)

Inadequate services In Afghanistan, the late 2021 suspension of direct international development assistance, which previously accounted for 75 percent of public expenditure, further weakened the already-fragile public health system.


Most health facilities have poor infrastructure and there are fewer qualified healthcare workers due to emigration, restrictions on women’s movement and employment, and reduced funds to pay salaries and keep facilities open. Access to health services is also very limited by long distances to travel and the cost of transport, medicines and treatment in a context of severely eroded purchasing power (OCHA, December 2023).

The decree that women must travel accompanied by a male has limited access to what health services remain. As women cannot be treated by male health workers, the limitation on female employment is a further obstacle to them receiving treatment (UN Women, June 2022).

The expected early 2023 winter season deterioration in child nutrition in Afghanistan was partly linked to challenges accessing health and nutrition services to treat infectious disease outbreaks, including measles, acute watery diarrhoea and fever that are overwhelming the increasingly strained health system (IPC, January 2023).

Due to drought and water crisis, 79 percent of households do not have enough safe water for drinking, cooking and bathing (IPC Afghanistan, January 2023), and 28 percent of rural households reported using unimproved sanitation facilities in

FIG. 2.36 Number of children under 5 with acute malnutrition in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2023



Sources: SMART (2021 and 2023); DHS 2021.


2023 with WASH needs expected to deteriorate in 2024 (OCHA, December 2023). Lack of supplies, including chlorine, fuel, spare parts and equipment, and repair capacity following the cessation of direct international development funding significantly hampered water supplies in major urban areas (OCHA, December 2023).

In Pakistan, flooding disrupted access to essential healthcare services, while also damaging sanitation and safe drinking water infrastructure, contributing to disease outbreaks (IPC AMN Pakistan, October 2023).

In the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, only 45 percent of the waste is properly processed and latrines often overflow. Health services in the camps are under enormous pressure as they struggle to keep pace with the medical outcomes of dire living conditions, including frequent outbreaks of scabies, dengue fever and cholera (MSF, March 2023).


In Myanmar, conflict has led to the politicization of care and severely constrained the availability of healthcare services with a growing reliance on private facilities and local civil society organizations (OCHA, January 2023). The lack of affordability of private services is a major constraint, with marginalized minorities, rural areas and displaced populations facing the highest barriers to accessing services. Some 40 percent of IDPs reported impediments to accessing health services (OCHA, December 2023).

FIG. 2.37 Number of children under 5 years with acute malnutrition by country, 2023



Sources: Afghanistan IPC TWG, January 2022; Pakistan IPC TWG, October 2023.

FIG. 2.38 Number of PBW with acute malnutrition by country



Sources: Afghanistan IPC TWG, January 2022; Pakistan IPC TWG, October 2023.

Lack of food Acute food insecurity driven by inadequate quality and quantity of food continued to contribute to acute malnutrition, especially during the winter lean seasons in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

An escalation in fighting in Myanmar in the last quarter of 2023 created new access blockages that increased incidence of malnutrition (OCHA, December 2023).


WFP’s 33 percent General Food Assistance (GFA) ration reduction in 2023 for Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, made households 80 percent more likely to adopt food-based coping strategies and was expected to reduce caloric intake and put young children and PBW at increased risk of malnutrition and anaemia (MSF, March 2023).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | An improving situation by late 2023 but still among the world's largest and most persistent food crises.

PEAK 2023 (NOVEMBER 2022–MARCH 2023)

19.9M people or **46%** of the total population were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the 2022/23 winter lean season. Of them around 6.1 million people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Compared with the same period of the previous year, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity was 13 percent lower.




Source: HNO 2023, January 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (NOVEMBER 2023–MARCH 2024)

15.8M people or **36%** of the total population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the winter lean season. Of them, 3.6 million people were projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This represents an improvement due to good harvests, reduced inflation and humanitarian food assistance, despite an expectation of extreme assistance cuts. However, the numbers did not factor in the impacts of the severe winter drought on crop production.



Source: Afghanistan IPC TWG, December 2023.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks Domestic food prices fell but households faced stagnant wages, high unemployment, dwindling savings and reduced public spending. Bans on opium cultivation dented farmers' incomes. The economy grappled with a lack of development aid and women being banned from employment (WFP, September 2023). Political instability in neighbouring countries limited labour migration, while repatriations from Pakistan may put pressure on already strained resources (IPC, December 2023; UNHCR, November 2023).

Weather extremes Climatic conditions improved but a 30–35 percent wheat deficit was anticipated after a third consecutive drought year (WFP June 2023).

Natural disasters The October 2023 earthquakes in Hirat caused widespread destruction that affected about 275 000 people (IPC, December 2023).


DISPLACEMENT

5.7M forcibly displaced people by 2023

5.7M IDPs **0.05M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, December 2023. UNHCR Nowcasted estimate December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



2019–2022 population estimates are based on Flowminder. Previous IPC reports (as well as the GRFC) employed National Statistics and Information Agency of Afghanistan (NSIA) population estimates.

Source: Afghanistan IPC TWG; HNO (2022/23).

A protracted major food crisis A low-income country, Afghanistan has been included in all GRFC editions and always classified as one of the ten worst food crises with conflict/insecurity the main driver until the GRFC 2023 when economic shocks became the principal driver following the Taliban's takeover. Severity of acute food insecurity has been a constant concern with such large numbers in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In March–May 2022, over 20 000 people were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

3.2M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition, September 2022–April 2023

0.8M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023

2.3M MAM 0.9M SAM

Source: Afghanistan IPC TWG, January 2023.

Afghanistan's alarming acute malnutrition situation is linked to years of war, low socioeconomic status, social and cultural norms, recurrent natural disasters and limited health and nutrition services.

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Lack of food Low household income, increasing food prices and the lean winter season limited access to healthy diets, contributing to increased levels of malnutrition.

In 25 of the 34 provinces, more than one third of children under 5 had experienced diarrhoea in the fortnight before the survey. Limited access to basic health and nutrition services, especially among rural communities, was another contributor. About 38 percent of households could not access functional health facilities nearby (REACH, April 2022).

Inadequate services Nearly 80 percent of households did not have enough water for drinking, cooking, bathing and washing. About half reported using unimproved sanitation facilities (WoAA, 2022). This contributed to disease outbreaks – especially acute watery diarrhoea, cholera and measles – which in turn exacerbated

Inadequate practices Only 16 percent of children consumed a Minimum Acceptable Diet. This prevalence is deemed Critical (REACH, April 2022).

PEAK 2023 (NOVEMBER 2022–APRIL 2023)




Source: Afghanistan IPC TWG, January 2023.



1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely critical
MUAC

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Record cereal harvests improved food availability, but high food inflation severely constrained food access.

PEAK 2023 (MAY–SEPTEMBER)

 **11.9M** people or **31%** of the analysed population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season.

This includes over 0.6M Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, or 65% of the refugee camp population. Out of over 2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), around 240 000 were Rohingya refugees.



Source: Bangladesh IPC TWG, June 2023.

A protracted food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar district has been included in the GRFC as a major food crisis since 2017, due to the arrival of around 750 000 refugees from Rakhine State in Myanmar.

In 2023, an IPC analysis expanded coverage to approximately 30 percent of the country and 23 percent of its population, focussing on areas prone to climatic disasters – monsoon floods, cyclones, tidal surges, landslides and riverbank erosion – as well as forcibly displaced Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox's Bazar. Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to disasters, and there is no prospect of dignified return of Rohingya refugees in the foreseeable future.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023

 **Economic shocks** Despite record cereal harvests in 2022 and 2023 improving food availability, food prices remained high with food inflation reaching 7.8 percent in January 2023 and 12.6 percent by the end of October. This marked the highest food inflation for over a decade, stemming from the country's reliance on the Russian Federation and Ukraine for imports of fuel, essential food commodities like wheat, and fertilizer and livestock feed. The war in Ukraine disrupted supplies of these commodities, which, coupled with steep currency depreciation and decreased foreign reserves, drove up the cost of producing domestic cereals at a time of lower cereal imports (FAO-GIEWS, October 2023; WFP, October 2023).

The persistent high food inflation severely constrained food access for vulnerable households who faced increasing expenditure and lower incomes, especially during the monsoon (FAO-GIEWS, October 2023; WFP, October 2023).

Almost 1 million Rohingya refugees face extreme restrictions on movement and are not legally

permitted to work, leaving them dependent on humanitarian assistance. Yet in the first half of 2023, funding shortfalls forced WFP to cut rations from USD 12 in March 2023 to USD 8 in June (IPC, June 2023).

 **Weather extremes** Atypical monsoon floods in 2022 impacted over 7 million people and displaced over 2 million mainly in the northeast region. They caused widespread asset loss and damage and weakened households' ability to cope with shocks in 2023.

Heavy monsoon rains in August brought severe flash floods and landslides in Chattogram (including Cox's Bazar) and Sylhet divisions, which affected 1.3 million people (WFP, August 2023). Of these, 0.6 million were in critical need of basic necessities, such as food, clean water, medicine and electricity (UN Bangladesh, September 2023). During the same month, Rajshahi experienced heatwaves and there were cyclones and landslides throughout the country (WFP, October 2023).

 **Conflict/insecurity** Rohingya refugees have no foreseeable prospect of return to Myanmar due to the country's protracted conflict that escalated in both 2022 and 2023.

Tensions between the Rohingya refugees and vulnerable host community members are widening due to the strain on labour market opportunities, incomes, land, and drinking water sources (Bangladesh Red Crescent, October 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

 **1.1M** forcibly displaced people by 2023


 **0.1M** IDPs

 **1.0M** refugees and asylum-seekers


Source: IOM, September 2022.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.


ACUTE MALNUTRITION


 The 2023 SENS results indicated a deteriorating acute malnutrition situation of Very High public health concern in Mega Camps (15.4 percent) and an unchanged situation of Medium public health concern in Registered Camps (9.6 percent).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023

 **Lack of food** The impact of seasonal employment and recurrent disasters on food access and availability created major nutritional gaps. Nationally, only 13 percent of households had iron-rich food in their regular diet, falling to only 6 percent of low-income households. All households had a large protein and vitamin A-rich food consumption gap (WFP, October 2023).

Two ration cuts for Rohingya refugees in 2023 had a deleterious impact on food consumption. Due to ration cuts, by December 2023, only 30 percent of Rohingya refugee households had an acceptable Food Consumption Score, down from 56 percent in 2022 (WFP, June 2023).

 **Inadequate practices** Only 16 percent of Rohingya refugee children aged 6–23 months received a Minimum Acceptable Diet, which is a Very High public health concern and 70 percent of infants under 6 months old were exclusively breastfed, considered Acceptable (UNHCR, January 2024). Anaemia levels were a severe public health problem (>40 percent) across all camps for women, and children aged under 5, reaching over 60 percent for children aged 6–23 months (UNICEF, March 2023).


 **Inadequate services** While 93 percent of sanitation facilities were reported as functional in the refugee camps, challenges remained, especially in hygiene and solid WASH management, as only 45 percent of the waste is properly processed and latrines often overflow. Health services in the camps are under enormous pressure as they struggle to keep pace with the medical outcomes of dire living conditions, including frequent outbreaks of scabies, dengue fever and cholera (MSF, March 2023).

Reduced calorific and nutritional intake due to ration cuts increased the risk of outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as measles (MSF, March 2023). As of 7 November 2023, 283 600 dengue cases had been recorded, with 1 400 deaths (UNICEF, November 2023).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | A very concerning food crisis driven by the impact of conflict, cyclone Mocha, flooding and crop pests on agricultural production.

PEAK 2023 (SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER)

10.7M people or **19%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Among them, 1.4 million people faced Emergency (equivalent to IPC Phase 4).




Source: Pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the 2024 projection used by the Myanmar HNRP 2024.


PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

12.9M people or **23%** of the population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (HNRP 2024, January 2024). Of them, 2.4 million are projected to be in Emergency (equivalent to IPC Phase 4).

The worsening situation is due to intensifying conflict, and lower food availability during the height of the lean season, coupled with a high risk of flooding during the monsoon rains (OCHA, January 2024).



Source: HNRP 2024.



This map portrays the food security situation at area level but does not detail the food security status of the IDPs in these areas nor humanitarian assistance provided to them.



DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Since the February 2021 military takeover and subsequent state of emergency, insecurity has driven displacement, destroyed infrastructure, hindered access to basic services and prevented movement of agricultural goods and food. Conflict intensified towards the end of year, with an estimated 628 000 people displaced between October and December 2023 (OCHA, January 2024).

Over half of the IDPs, including in Rakhine, southern Shan, Kayah and Kachin, depend on external assistance for food. Restrictions on freedom of movement and insecurity complicate the humanitarian response.

In mid-2023 a quarter of farmers reported difficulty accessing fertilizer in insecure areas, leading to reduced planted areas, especially among smallholder farmers (OCHA, January 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

2.6M IDPs by 2023

Source: UNHCR, January 2024.

History of the food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Myanmar has been included in six out of eight GRFC editions. Although a change in methods does not allow direct comparison of numbers, Myanmar was classified as a major food crisis for the first time in the GRFC 2023, and again in this edition. This is largely due to instability and conflict following the 2021 military takeover, which prompted displacement, destruction of fields and homes, and restricted market access.

Economic shocks The retail price of rice increased from early 2022 to reach record levels in September 2023, driven by tight market availabilities and conflict-related disruptions (FAO, November 2023). Seasonal price decreases were offset by the below-average rice harvest, high prices of agricultural inputs and of transport. By November these were about 65 percent higher than the already high levels of 2022 (FAO, January 2024). The average cost of the food basket was 69 percent higher in January 2024 than January 2023 (WFP Price Update, January 2024).

Weather extremes Cyclone Mocha made landfall in May 2023 causing widespread flooding and infrastructure destruction that affected 3.4 million people and damaged or flooded 326 000 hectares of farmland, impacting food availability for subsistence farmers, especially in western and northwestern regions where insecurity is most intense (OCHA, May 2023; OCHA, January 2024).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.4M children under 5 years old at risk of acute malnutrition in 2024

0.36M MAM 0.07M SAM

Source: Myanmar HNRP 2024, December 2023.

0.03M pregnant and breastfeeding women at risk of acute malnutrition in 2024

Acute food insecurity is driving a malnutrition crisis requiring life-saving treatment and humanitarian assistance, particularly for IDPs in the northwest and Rakhine state (OCHA, December 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Lack of food Food insecurity linked to market disruptions and reduced mobility, destruction of cropland, and high inflation that disrupted household consumption patterns and impacted the affordability of a healthy diet drove malnutrition (OCHA, December 2023).

Inadequate practices A lack of safe spaces for breastfeeding persisted in camps and among displaced populations (OCHA, January 2024).

Inadequate services Open defecation and drinking from contaminated water sources was common in camps and displacement sites as IDP infrastructure struggled to meet the needs of a burgeoning displaced population. Over half of IDPs reported sharing water facilities, while use of non-improved drinking water sources was common among all population groups in Myanmar during the dry and monsoon seasons (OCHA, December 2023).


In Shan, Kachin and Rakhine states, healthcare facilities have been damaged or abandoned due to a new wave of fighting since November 2023. Severe movement restrictions are preventing humanitarian actors from providing health and nutrition care (MSF, January 2024).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The situation improved since 2022, but the impacts of the unprecedented 2022 monsoon flooding persisted.

PEAK 2023 (NOVEMBER 2023–JANUARY 2024)

11.8M people or 32% of the analysed population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 43 of Pakistan's flood-affected rural districts in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces during the winter lean period. Of them 2.2M people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This marks an improvement in 16 analysed districts of Sindh and Balochistan provinces since the 2022 post-flooding peak of September–December 2022, with the prevalence of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity decreasing from 49 to 32 percent (IPC, October 2023).



Source: Pakistan IPC TWG, October 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Weather extremes Although national cereal production was forecast to be above average in 2023 (FAO-GIEWS, November 2023), districts affected by the 2022 floods in the Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh continued to face crop and livestock production challenges. Households reduced livestock production, a major source of income and household consumption (IPC, October 2023).

Heavy monsoon rains and flash floods from June–September 2023 submerged extensive farmland, leading to localized crop losses (WFP, November 2023).

Economic shocks The high cost of living constrained vulnerable households' purchasing power. Food price inflation steadily increased from February 2022, reaching 49 percent in May

2023 (WFP, January 2024) mainly driven by tight market supplies and high costs of production and transport due to the increased cost of fuel imports (IPC, October 2023). Significant local currency depreciation since early 2022 made imports more expensive and aggravated high food prices (WFP, Rabi season plantings, which lowered 2023 harvests and reduced incomes, and food availability for own-consumption. Livestock deaths from diseases and/or shortage of fodder after the floods constrained livestock production, a major source of income and household consumption (IPC, October 2023).

DISPLACEMENT


2.4M forcibly displaced people by 2023

0.2M IDPs **2.1M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source:

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2024



Source: Pakistan IPC TWG.

A major food crisis Since 2017, Pakistan, a lower-middle-income country, experiences frequent shocks including flooding and drought, with the arid south-eastern and western areas of Sindh Province affected by successive crop failures since 2013. The geographical coverage of IPC analyses has varied but focused primarily on Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Shocks included drought in Sindh in 2017–18, drought in Balochistan and Sindh in 2019 and 2021, and flooding in all three provinces in 2022.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Not analysed Population analysed Population not analysed Total population

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

2.1M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in March 2023–January 2024

1.5M MAM 0.6M SAM

Source: Pakistan IPC TWG, October 2023.

Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces were facing an extremely concerning acute malnutrition situation with most analysed districts classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) between October 2023 and January 2024 (IPC AMN October 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Inadequate practices The low proportion of children aged 6–23 months receiving a minimum acceptable diet was a very high risk factor associated with child acute malnutrition in 21 of the 32 analysed districts.

Inadequate services Inadequate sanitation coverage, high rates of disease, such as fever, diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections, and poor health-seeking behaviours contributed to the high levels. The

2022 floods disrupted health and nutrition services and cut off access to safe water and sanitation facilities.

Lack of food Insufficient access to healthy food due to high food prices, especially during the winter lean season, was a major contributor. However, as the maps show, the acute malnutrition situation was worse than acute food insecurity in most of the 32 districts included in both analyses, suggesting the importance of other contributing factors.

PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER 2023–JANUARY 2024)



Source: Pakistan IPC TWG, October 2023.


1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely critical Not analysed MUAC

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The number of people facing high acute food insecurity decreased substantially as the financial crisis stabilized and food prices fell, but worrying food access issues remained.

PEAK 2023 (AUGUST–OCTOBER)

 **5.5M** people, 24% of the total country population were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity.


This is an improvement since 2022 – when 6.3 million people or 28 percent of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity as assessed by CARI methodology. It reflects the improving economy and better affordability of nutrient-rich food groups. Pockets of acute food insecurity were still very concerning, particularly among chronically vulnerable populations (those living in the Estate sector or dependent on the informal sector for income).



Source: WFP CARI, December 2023.

A periodic food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Sri Lanka has been selected as a food crisis for each GRFC but only reported data in 2017 resulting from drought assessments, and has been defined as a major food crisis since 2022, when the country experienced its worst economic crisis since independence in 1948. Critically low foreign exchange reserves, the socioeconomic effects of COVID – including a drop in tourism – and the effects of the war in Ukraine on fuel and other commodity prices prompted the government to declare sovereign default in May 2022. Together with a sharp national currency depreciation these factors limited import capacity, causing acute shortages and further price spikes for essential products, including fuel, medicines, food and inputs, bringing economic activities to a halt and pushing food inflation to an all-time high of 95 percent (FAO/WFP, September 2022).

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Economic shocks** The gradual increase in foreign exchange reserves, disbursement of donor funds and modest currency appreciation strengthened the financial capacity of the country to import food (FAO/WFP, May 2023).


With donor support, chemical fertilizers were imported, and domestic food availability improved compared with the severely reduced level in 2021/22 (FAO/WFP, May 2023).

Food prices started to decline from August 2022 following the harvest and significant imports of rice. Food inflation decreased through 2023 from 60 percent in January to below zero in July and -5.2 percent by the end of October, before increasing slightly to 1.6 percent in December (WFP, December 2023; WB, March 2024). Nevertheless, high prices of fuel, fertilizers, agrochemicals, seeds, labour and mechanized operations hampered Mala crop production of maize and rice during the first half of the year (FAO-GIEWS, June 2023). Government-subsidized fertilizer supported increased rice paddy production during the Yala season, which elevated 2023 yields at the end of the year (Ministry of Agriculture and Plantation Industries, February 2024). Livestock production was expected to decline compared with the already reduced level in 2022 because of limited availability and high costs of feed concentrates. High fuel, labour, equipment and ice costs severely curtailed income from

fishing for communities reliant on it (FAO/WFP, May 2023).


Lack of income curtailed food access, especially for wage labourers. According to the March 2023 food security survey, about 62 percent of households reported that their total monthly income had reduced compared with the previous year.

Farmgate prices of crops did not rise proportionally with the sharply increased crop production costs. For resource-poor smallholder farmers with between 0.25 and 2 hectares of land – who constitute over 50 percent of paddy farmers – production costs often exceeded their returns (FAO/WFP, May 2023).


 **Weather extremes** With the intensification of the southwest monsoon, Sri Lanka experienced heavy rainfall in the Western, Sabaragamuwa, and Southern provinces in October 2023. Floods and landslides displaced populations in the Gampaha, Matara, and Galle districts and affected more than 75 000 people in 13 districts.


The heavy rains, high winds and floods damaged agricultural lands and standing crops in low-lying areas with more than 7 500 farmers losing their crops, wage labour was also affected, particularly in the Matara district (IFRC, November 2023).


ACUTE MALNUTRITION

 The impacts of the country's political and economic crisis likely drove a deterioration in the nutrition situation. The National Nutrition and Micronutrient Survey 2022 indicated 'very high' acute malnutrition among children aged 6–59 months at 19.8 percent up from 13.2 percent in 2021. The prevalence of severe acute malnutrition also increased from 1.7 percent to 2.5 percent (Department of Nutrition Medical Research Institute, March 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

 **Inadequate services** The inability to import medicines due to depleted foreign reserves caused shortages that severely impacted healthcare supplies. While about 84 percent of households had access to safe drinking water nationally, about 66.8 percent of households in the estate sector did not (OCHA, October 2022).

 **Inadequate practices** Dietary diversity was inadequate, resulting in suboptimal intake of micronutrient-rich foods.

 **Lack of food** Amid the hike in prices for nutritious food and nationwide food rationing in 2022, nutritional assistance was temporarily reduced, including the delivery of Thripasha, a nutrition supplement targeting acutely malnourished children and pregnant and breastfeeding women. This left many children untreated and many PBW at risk of malnutrition. Schools still serving meals significantly cut portion sizes and protein density.

Despite clear improvements in food security since 2022 food consumption of some key food groups remained limited during the lean season: protein-rich food groups were consumed an average three days a week each (WFP, December 2023).

Five countries selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2024 either had data gaps or data not meeting GRFC technical requirements in the region.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been selected for inclusion in all editions of the GRFC because it is monitored by FAO-GIEWS but has remained a data gap in the GRFC for the last seven years due to lack of information on acute food insecurity.

The government has not published statistics on food production since 2020 but according to Chinese Customs data, its total exports of cereals and fertilizer to the country were similar to the elevated levels of 2019 (General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, December 2023).

The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reported that it met 103 percent of its food production target for 2023 (WPK Central Committee, December 2023). For 2024, the seasonal forecast suggests that rainfall and temperatures are expected to support the early-stage development of winter season crops. However, it is too early to forecast the weather from April until the main crop harvests later in 2024.

There is little verified data available on the public distribution system and food prices, nor on the availability of agricultural inputs like fertilizers, improved seeds, farming equipment, and energy.


Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has been selected for inclusion in all editions except the GRFC 2023. For this edition, it was selected based on a request for external assistance due to hostilities, but lacked data on acute food insecurity that met GRFC technical requirements. Persistently high inflation and growing rates of poverty have contributed to the erosion of resilience, adoption of negative coping strategies, and worsening nutritional status (WFP, August 2023).

The dry weather conditions have resulted in wheat and barley harvests that were 25 and 15 percent below average respectively (FAO, February 2024). The population is highly dependent on remittances that constitute 28 percent of GDP (WB, December 2022).

According to the latest census data, about 1 million people migrate for labour, of whom 89 percent work in the Russian Federation (IOM, February 2022). If the Russian economy deteriorates as a result of sanctions in 2024, there could be a return of Kyrgyz labour migrants, reduced trade and hindered growth (IMF, October 2023).

In August, flooding and mudflows damaged shelters and transportation infrastructure, and impacted the livelihoods vulnerable households (ICRC August 2023). Instances of violence along Kyrgyzstan's border regions decreased slightly in 2023 after a surge in 2022 (ACLED, February 2023).



Lao People's Democratic Republic

The Lao People's Democratic Republic has been selected for inclusion in every edition of the GRFC since 2020 based on requests for external assistance, but the country did not have data that met GRFC technical requirements in 2023. Macroeconomic pressures diminished the purchasing power and savings of vulnerable populations, with the Lao currency continuing to slide against the US dollar in 2023 over concerns about the government's ability to meet debt obligations (FAO-GIEWS, August 2023). The country is vulnerable

to climate shocks based on high dependence on climate-sensitive natural resources (WFP January 2024). Dry spells linked to high temperatures in Vientiane and southern provinces in 2023 impacted rice paddy yields, and maize crops for the late 2023 harvest were below average (FAO-GIEWS, August 2023; USDA, February 2024). Following a surge in the cost of rice in 2022, food inflation reached a ten-year peak of 52.2 percent in May 2023. Average food inflation in 2023 was 39.5 percent in 2023 nearly double that of 2022 (FAO-GIEWS, August 2023; WFP, January 2024).

Tajikistan

Tajikistan has been selected for inclusion in every edition of the GRFC since 2020 because of requests for external assistance, but available data have not met the GRFC technical requirements. Remittances, largely from the Russian Federation, make up a larger percentage of Tajikistan's GDP than any country in the world and despite steady growth in remittances over the last ten years, projected flows were expected to decline in 2023 contributing to a deceleration in GDP growth to

6.5 percent (World Bank, December 2022). Food expenditures were comprising an increasingly large proportion of household expenditures leading to an increase in negative coping strategies such as limiting portion sizes and borrowing food from friends and relatives (FAO/WFP, December 2023). Climatic conditions were conducive to strong harvests in 2023 with cereal outputs 22 percent above five-year averages (FAO-GIEWS, October 2023).

Vanuatu

Vanuatu qualified for the 2017, 2021 and 2024 editions of the GRFC due to external assistance received in response to natural disasters, but it has always been a data gap due to lack of availability of acute food insecurity data that meets GRFC technical requirements.

In early March 2023, Category 4 cyclones Judy and Kevin struck in succession causing significant damage to housing, water and health infrastructure, agriculture and aquaculture. They impacted an estimated 250 000 people, about 75 percent of the total population. In March 2023, a 6.5 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Espiritu Santo Island (CID, November 2023). In October 2023, another Category 4 tropical cyclone Lola made landfall, affecting an estimated

150 000 people, about 45 percent of the population (IFRC, November 2023). By May–June, 46 percent of households were adopting crisis or emergency livelihood coping strategies, such as reducing health expenditures. Food prices were reported as a major concern by 41 percent of households (WFP, May 2023).

The Fiji Meteorological Service assumes an elevated risk of cyclones through the 2023/2024 season as well as reduced rainfall due to the El Niño event (IFRC, November 2023). The country is highly vulnerable to climate change and is facing rising ocean levels and a higher frequency and severity of natural disasters (WB, November 2021), which pose a challenge to government capacity to respond.



Europe

Over 7 million people in Ukraine faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, which represents an improvement since 2022.

.....

The Ukrainian economy stabilized somewhat in 2023, with positive shifts in real GDP growth and inflation, but unemployment levels were the highest in over a decade and lack of livelihood opportunities hindered financial access to food and other necessities.

.....

Ukraine's agrifood sector has suffered massive losses that have negatively impacted crop and livestock activities within the country, as well as global markets.

.....

The displacement crisis stemming from the war in Ukraine, with 3.7 million IDPs, is the largest Europe has experienced since the Second World War.

Focus | The far-reaching impact of the war in Ukraine

Damages and losses to Ukraine’s agriculture sector as a result of the war are having significant repercussions at the domestic, regional and international levels, with impacts on acute food insecurity and malnutrition.

Prior to the war, agriculture contributed 11 percent of Ukraine’s GDP, accounted for over 40 percent of exports, and employed 15 percent of the population (FAOSTAT, January 2024). In 2021, Ukraine was among the world’s top ten producers and exporters of wheat and oilseeds, especially sunflower (USDA, April 2022). However, as the war continues unabated, Ukraine’s position as a major agricultural producer and exporter is coming under increasing pressure.

In 2023, the number of air strikes increased, primarily targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. These attacks, as well as the subsequent disruptions to economic flows and production, have been particularly severe on Ukraine’s agriculture sector, causing an estimated USD 10 billion in damages and USD 70 billion in losses (RDNA3, February 2024).

Huge damage to agricultural infrastructure and abandonment of cropland

Grain storage facilities, irrigation systems, farms and agricultural machinery have either been stolen, damaged or destroyed, exacerbating issues with supply chains and export logistics (including


lack of sea access in the early months of the war and then frequent delays in processing of vessels) and increasing production costs. Arable land has been contaminated by mines. The June 2023 attack that destroyed the Kakhovka Dam impacted agriculture, fisheries, commerce and industry, with consequences for the economy of the region. Irrigation damage from the dam breach led to USD 377 million of crop losses (PDNA, October 2023).

The damages and losses to Ukraine’s agriculture sector are changing the nature and scale of the country’s agricultural activities. The total planted area decreased in 2023, with 7 percent of Ukraine’s total cropland – mostly along the

frontlines – being abandoned. This now-fallow land is primarily located in the southern and eastern oblasts where the majority of Ukraine’s two largest crops for export were harvested and produced: wheat and sunflower seed. This land would have been worth USD 2 billion in wheat and oilseeds in 2023 (NASA Harvest, December 2023). Frontline oblasts (Kharkivska, Khersonska and Zaporizka) experienced the largest losses. The Vinnytska oblast in central Ukraine also experienced large losses without being directly affected by ground battles (RDNA3, February 2024).


Small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises reported a 9 percent reduction in the cultivated area for grain and oilseed crops compared with

MAP 2.10 Average wheat and sunflower seed production, 2016–2020



Source: US Department of Agriculture/State Statistics of Ukraine.

MAP 2.11 Spatial evolution of the war, February 2022–31 December 2023




Source: Map based on Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), considering average monthly conflict events.

before the war, rising to a 20 percent reduction for those in frontline areas (FAO, April 2023). The total planted area of wheat declined by over 750 000 hectares while that of sunflower declined by 90 000 hectares between 2022 and 2023. There was a concomitant drop in the area harvested, but favourable weather conditions throughout 2023 allowed for an increase in yields and production relative to 2022 for both wheat and sunflower (NASA Harvest, December 2023).

However, remote sensing indicated that almost 30 percent of the 2023 wheat output was produced in the occupied eastern oblasts, meaning that Ukraine's overall agricultural production remained below 2021 levels and the five-year average (NASA Harvest, December 2023). Reductions in productivity coupled with high input costs (namely for fertilizers and fuel) led to significant reductions in farm gate prices, limiting farmers' profits and liquidity (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

The effect of the war on Ukraine's agriculture sector is obstructing the production of export-oriented commodities critical to Ukraine's economy and livelihoods (RDNA2, March 2023). If these damages and losses continue to accumulate it could dramatically impact Ukraine's agricultural production outlook for years to come, and may,

FIG. 2.39 Wheat: planted areas, yield and production, 2022 versus 2023



Source: NASA Harvest, December 2023.


in the worst-case scenario, lead to agricultural production being unable to meet domestic and export demand (UN, November 2023). This concern is particularly apt for wheat as farmers are adapting to the war context by altering which crops are produced. In the occupied oblasts, farmers primarily sowed winter crops (wheat), and those in the government-controlled areas shifted towards sunflower seed and rapeseed, which require fewer inputs and therefore have lower production costs than wheat or other cereals (NASA Harvest, December 2023).

Limitations on Ukraine's export capacity affected food-crisis countries

Both Ukraine and global markets were forced to adjust to Ukraine's constrained export capacity.

The blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea ports following the full-scale invasion in February 2022 severely limited Ukrainian farmers' ability to export agricultural products to their intended markets. With limited access to efficient export routes, many Ukrainian farmers have been unable to sell already-harvested crops, reducing their incomes and curbing their capacity to pay debts and invest in future activities.

FIG. 2.40 Sunflower seeds: planted areas, yield and production, 2022 versus 2023



Source: NASA Harvest, December 2023.

Ukraine's limited maritime export capacity has caused its export patterns to shift towards Europe, sometimes at the expense of markets in low-income countries. In 2023, more than half of Ukrainian wheat and maize exports were destined for European markets, which posed a food security risk for people living in Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs) that are highly dependent on imported foodstuffs from Ukraine, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa and Southeast Asia. Many of these countries saw their imports of Ukrainian wheat halved between 2021 and 2023 (IFPRI, February 2024).

In early 2023, the limited supply of wheat and sunflower seed increased the cost of importing those goods, pushing up retail food prices (FAO, July 2023), although in many cases those countries managed to switch to alternative suppliers.

Ukrainian exporters sought alternative safe export routes

The EU introduced solidarity lanes in May 2022 to facilitate the movement of Ukrainian goods through rivers and over land via rail and roadways instead of the maritime shipping routes in the Black Sea, which at the time were not viable. Between March 2022 and January 2024, over 61 million tonnes of Ukrainian grain, oilseeds and related products were transported through the lanes, enabling the export of around 60 percent of Ukraine's grain since the start of the war (EU, February 2024).

While the solidarity lanes have facilitated the export of Ukrainian cereals and oilseeds (among other goods), they are a rather imperfect solution. Onward transport and storage infrastructure in the countries that border Ukraine (Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) has been unable to absorb the additional volume of goods, increasing the cost of Ukrainian exports. As a result, significant quantities of Ukrainian products remained in these bordering countries' domestic markets rather than being transported to third countries, which contributed to prices in those markets decreasing (IFPRI, April 2024).

Farmers in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia began protesting against Ukrainian goods flooding their domestic markets, filling up storage facilities and putting local producers at a disadvantage in 2023. Governments imposed temporary import bans on Ukrainian grains and oilseeds. This further pushed down prices in Ukraine and reduced producers' profitability (IFPRI, April 2024). The EU and Ukraine collaborated to alleviate the market distortions in these countries and stabilize the situation through diplomatic means, and it was agreed that the solidarity lanes would remain open with provisions to safeguard against import surges (European Commission, September 2023; IFPRI, February 2024).

The lack of safe maritime shipping routes for Ukrainian products through the Black Sea since the onset of the war has impacted global food markets. From July 2022 to July 2023, the shipments facilitated by the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), brokered by the United Nations and Türkiye, eased pressure on international supplies, and most importantly, on humanitarian food aid. Nearly 33 million tonnes of grains, maize and other agricultural commodities were exported from Ukraine through this agreement, with over half going to low and middle-income countries and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Somalia (UN, July 2023).

The Russian Federation's termination of the BSGI led Ukraine to create a "humanitarian corridor" that hugs the western coast of the Black Sea beside Bulgaria and Romania in August 2023. The corridor, as of November 2023, had allowed 151 ships carrying a total of 4.4 million tonnes of cargo, including 3.2 million tonnes of grain, to pass through safely (Reuters, November 2023).

Despite these efforts, export volumes have been limited throughout 2023, which could have longer-term implications for domestic production. It could also negatively impact availability in global food markets and contribute to price volatility should there be any unforeseen shocks (WFP/FAO, November 2023).

Is the war in Ukraine still impacting food inflation in food-crisis countries?

The supply disruptions caused by the onset of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 sent shockwaves through global food markets as they magnified pre-existing international market vulnerabilities created by the COVID-19 pandemic. This led to high inflation that exacerbated macroeconomic instabilities and aggravated already-elevated levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in food-crisis countries/territories (GRFC 2023).

After peaking in March 2022, global food prices on aggregate declined thereafter with strong agricultural production and reductions in the cost of energy, fertilizers and shipping (FAO, January 2024; IMF, October 2023). Nonetheless, they remained high by historical standards, with large differences also prevailing across different commodity groups, and rice and sugar particularly elevated.


Price declines did not transmit to domestic markets at the same rate, particularly in low-income countries. Domestic food prices measured in national currencies – the prices that matter to consumers – continued to increase, feeding a cost-of-living crisis for many low-income households (IFPRI, December 2023).

Domestic market distortions, currency depreciations, weather extremes and/or conflicts as well as limited food storage capacity contributed to high prices (IMF, October 2023).

This slow price transmission was mirrored in the GRFC food-crisis countries/territories: over half (56 percent) started 2023 with double-digit domestic food inflation, dropping to 25 percent by the end of the year. These reductions often were not linear and tended to exhibit volatility (WFP, February 2024) (see map 2.12).

Several GRFC countries/territories without official food inflation figures saw evidence of increasing prices. For example, in Myanmar, the cost of a food basket increased by 80 percent over the last year (WFP, December 2023).

MAP 2.12 Annual food Inflation rates by end 2023 in GRFC-qualifying countries/territories




Source: Trading Economics and other relevant sources, 2023.


Multiple factors likely to influence food prices throughout 2024

Global suppliers will need to continue to make up for shortfalls in Ukrainian production and exports, which will keep markets tight and vulnerable to large production shortfalls elsewhere in the world (IFPRI, February 2024).


In the same context, any disturbance to the Black Sea shipping routes, including attacks on infrastructure or vessels, could result in higher insurance premiums. This increase would make the routes commercially unviable and put an upward pressure on both the level and volatility of food prices (FAO, December 2023).


In addition, other supply shocks could put upward pressure on or introduce additional volatility to international food prices in 2024.

 There will likely be production losses from El Niño conditions, resulting in lower global food availability and, in turn, higher prices. During a typical El Niño event, global declines in the production of major staple crops (wheat, rice and maize) and associated increases in their prices are observed (GRFC Mid-Year Update, September 2023).

 As of the first quarter of 2024, higher prices for crude oil could negatively affect production costs by making agricultural inputs more expensive. Brent crude oil prices were forecast to rise to over USD 80 per barrel through

the first half of 2024 due to uncertainty around shipping routes through the Red Sea, and then the price per barrel is expected to decline during the latter half of the year (EIA, February 2024).


 Shipping disruptions driven by insecurity in the Red Sea and reduced water flows in the Panama Canal due to drought could upend supply chains and increase shipping costs, with increased costs passed down to consumers (IFPRI, January 2024).

 Export restrictions imposed on important commodities, such as rice, could create additional upward pressure on food prices (IFPRI, February 2024).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The impact of the war on food access and availability maintained high levels of acute food insecurity, particularly in frontline areas in the eastern and southern oblasts.

PEAK 2023 (SEPTEMBER)

7.3M or 20% of the population faced moderate or severe acute food insecurity in September 2023, which represents a decrease from the previous year when 8.9M or 25% of the population experienced these conditions. The areas directly affected by the war had the highest levels of acute food insecurity (HNRP, January 2024).



Source: REACH/WFP, October 2023.

Proportion of households facing moderate or severe acute food insecurity



History of the food crisis A lower-middle-income country, armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine started in 2014. The eastern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2018–2022 due to localized conflict and high food prices that limited access to markets, basic services, and livelihood opportunities.

The country has been classified as a major food crisis four times – in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2023 with at least 1 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. The severity and magnitude of the food crisis escalated sharply after the conflict expanded into a full-scale war in February 2022. Ukraine's agrifood sector has suffered massive losses that have negatively impacted crop and livestock activities within the country, and resonated through global markets.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity The war in Ukraine continued to disrupt the country's economy, including the agrifood sector throughout 2023, as air and ground attacks hindered agricultural activities. This constrained the availability of food in some markets and reduced livelihood opportunities. Issues of food access and availability were exacerbated by the physical damage to critical infrastructure, including homes, energy infrastructure, dams, ports, warehouses and hospitals (OCHA, October 2023).

The damage and losses suffered by Ukrainian agriculture are estimated to amount to USD 80.1 billion. Machinery and equipment damage account for the largest share of total damage (57 percent), followed by stolen inputs and outputs (18 percent) and damaged storage facilities (18 percent) (RDNA3, February 2024).

The impacts of the war also led to the abandonment of arable land – mostly in current and past conflict zones – due to contamination from large numbers of mines and unexploded ordinances as well as lack of irrigation water following the Kakhovka dam collapse (JRC Bulletins, September and June 2023).

The hostilities have constrained humanitarian access in the eastern and southern oblasts as humanitarian facilities, delivery points and workers have been targeted. Humanitarian access is very restricted in the areas under the temporary military control of the Russian Federation (OCHA, October 2023).

Economic shocks Although the Ukrainian economy continued to face challenges related to the war, positive shifts in real GDP growth and inflation were observed. After contracting by nearly 30 percent in 2022, the Ukrainian economy grew by 4.8 percent in 2023. Headline inflation slowed, declining to 5.1 percent year-on-year by December 2023 (National Bank of Ukraine, January 2024). Favourable weather conditions and improved harvests in addition to lower global energy prices eased upward pressure on prices in the country.

However, the formal labour market has been severely constrained by displacement and military service, with Ukraine recording the highest unemployment levels in over a decade (HNRP, January 2024).

Households employed coping strategies with increased frequency, particularly in the eastern and southern oblasts, including spending savings, reducing medical costs, and buying cheaper foods (HNRP, January 2024).

Lack of livelihood opportunities hindered financial access to food. The economy was still facing a massive deficit going into 2024.

Europe's largest displacement crisis since World War II

3.7M forcibly displaced people by 2023

3.7M IDPs **3 300** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, December 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate December 2023.

Out of the 6 million Ukrainian refugees globally, 5.9 million live across Europe, with close to 2 million of them in neighbouring countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Most are women and children, with adult men making up only 19 percent (UNHCR, January 2024).

In recognition of refugees' protracted displacement, the EU extended the region's Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), facilitating Ukrainians' access to safety, legal status, rights and services in the EU through to March 2025. Country implementation of this directive varied, and many refugees still report that they had at least one basic need unmet, including food access, education, healthcare and housing.

There is still cause for concern for acute food insecurity among certain refugee population groups – including the unemployed and the elderly – as some are struggling to meet their minimum food needs given overall limited income and the pressures of inflation (FEWS NET, September 2023).

IOM estimates that 3.7 million IDPs and 4.6 million returnees reside in Ukraine. Some 80 percent of IDPs have been displaced for more than one year and around 39 percent more than once. Almost half of the total IDP population originated from just two oblasts: Donetsk (24 percent) and Kharkivska (22 percent) (IOM, September 2023).

IDPs' most acute needs were for cash and financial support (56 percent). Their primary coping mechanisms to meet basic needs were switching to cheaper food and non-food items (69 percent), reducing the quantity of food consumed (63 percent), and spending savings (61 percent). As IDP households deplete their savings, they are likely to resort to more severe coping strategies (IOM, December 2023).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

No 2023 nutrition data were available for Ukraine, but the nutritional status of children has likely deteriorated. Destruction of civilian infrastructure caused millions to struggle with inadequate access to water, food, health, housing, protection and other essential services and supplies, especially during the winter months. This damage, in addition to issues of affordability, limited healthcare, nutritional and WASH services, put many at risk of disease (HNRP, December 2023).

Moldova was selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2024 but did not have data that met GRFC technical requirements.



Moldova (refugees)

Moldova has been selected as a food crisis for the first time in the GRFC 2024 because of the external assistance provided for the refugee influx from Ukraine. The data used to assess food insecurity do not meet the GRFC technical requirements.

From February 2022, Moldova received 0.9 million Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war. Of them, 0.1 million were still recorded in the country as of November 2023 (UNHCR, February 2024). Results from the Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment did not indicate notable food security

concerns. Around 98 percent of households had an 'acceptable' Food Consumption Score. Relying on cheaper and less preferred foods were the main coping strategies employed over seven days in response to lack of food or money to purchase it (MSNA, October 2023).

Integration of the refugees in Moldova is progressing, and around 97 percent of the working-age refugees were earning an income in August 2023 (MSNA 2023).

■ Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed



Latin America and the Caribbean

The share of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity declined across countries included in both years – from 27.3 percent in 2022 to 26.5 percent in 2023, but availability of 2023 data for Colombia (residents) and migrant and refugee populations in Peru contributed to a regional increase in numbers since 2022.

.....

Haiti was the most severe food crisis in the region, driven by insecurity, gang violence and sustained economic difficulties.

.....

Weather extremes were a more prominent driver than in 2022 due to El Niño, which resulted in erratic and reduced rainfall across the region.

.....

Compared with 2022, Guatemala Honduras and El Salvador saw a moderate decrease in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity despite localized crop losses.

.....

The region is experiencing a substantial displacement crisis with 12 million people forcibly displaced.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Weather extremes associated with El Niño and persistent economic shocks, with high though overall declining food inflation rates in 2023, were the main drivers sustaining high levels of acute food insecurity.

The inclusion of two additional food crises – due to the availability of evidence meeting GRFC technical requirements for residents in Colombia for the first time as well as migrants and refugees in Peru – led to an increase in people facing high levels of acute food insecurity regionally.

19.7M 

people or 17% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in nine countries.

12.0M 

people forcibly displaced in five countries by 2023 – consisting of 7.3 million IDPs and 4.8 million migrants and refugees.

0.3M 


children were acutely malnourished in Haiti, 0.1 million of them suffering the most severe form of wasting.

Colombia (residents and migrants) | Dominican Republic | Ecuador (migrants and refugees) | El Salvador | Guatemala | Haiti | Honduras | Nicaragua | Peru (migrants and refugees)

MAP 2.13 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in nine countries in 2023



FIG. 2.41 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



In all countries/migrant and refugee populations, the total population was analysed, except for Haiti (91%).

Legend:
■ Share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 + above or equivalent
■ Population analysed
■ Population not analysed

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Legend:
■ <1.0 million
■ 1–2.99 million
■ 3–4.99 million
■ 5–9.99 million
■ 10–14.99 million
■ ≥15 million
■ Not selected for analysis
■ Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed
■ Data gap
● Major food crisis
○ Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

Sources: FEWS NET (Nicaragua); IPC TWGs (Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras); HRP (El Salvador); WFP CARI (migrant and refugee populations in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and resident populations in Colombia).

How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

Overall, the estimated number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in food-crisis countries in the region increased from 17.8 million in 2022 to 19.7 million in 2023 due to the inclusion of two additional population groups – residents in Colombia and migrants and refugees in Peru.


Across the countries with comparable data for 2022 and 2023, around 425 000 fewer people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. The prevalence declined from 27.3 percent to 26.5 percent. This was attributable to moderate declines in **Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador**, reflecting subdued inflation and near-average crop production, despite localized weather-related crop losses.

Conversely, **Haiti**, the most severe food crisis in the region, experienced an increase of approximately 166 000 people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, underpinned by persisting insecurity and gang violence, coupled with high food prices, poor economic activity and reduced agricultural production due to weather extremes.

For the migrant and refugee populations in Colombia and Ecuador, the same assessment as last year was used, indicating severe acute food insecurity challenges (WFP, 2023). FEWS NET estimates for Nicaragua indicated a stable situation between the two years. Peak estimates for the Dominican Republic occurred during October 2022–February 2023 and therefore a year-on-year comparison cannot be made.

Colombia (residents), Colombia (migrants and refugees), the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras were classified as major food crises, each surpassing 1 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Haiti is the only country of the region considered a protracted major food crisis.

FIG. 2.42 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Sources: FEWS NET (Nicaragua); IPC TWGs (Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras); HNO 2024 and HRP 2024 (Colombia); HRP (El Salvador); WFP CARI (migrant and refugee populations in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru).

Severity of acute food insecurity

Five of the nine food-crisis countries in the region – the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras – had data disaggregated by phase of acute food insecurity.

No populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the peak period of acute food insecurity in 2023

Prior to the peak period of acute food insecurity in 2023, Haiti had around 19 200 people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the Cité Soleil commune of the capital Port-au-Prince from September 2023 to February 2024. Concerns were mainly focused on vulnerable communities facing acute constraints to access essential services, reduced food and fuel supply in markets, and limited income-generating activities. An improvement in the security situation enabled better food access and availability by March–June 2023 (IPC, March 2023).

3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across the five countries with IPC data

All five countries with disaggregated data had populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Haiti had the highest numbers with 1.8 million people or 18 percent of the analysed population. Reflecting the severity of its food crisis, 15 out of 32 analysed areas were classified in IPC Phase 4. Guatemala and Honduras had over 600 000 and 350 000 people respectively in this phase, mostly due to the severe impacts of reduced rains in drought-prone areas. Compared with 2022, the number of people in IPC Phase 4 remained virtually unchanged in Haiti and Honduras and increased in Guatemala and El Salvador, reflecting the severe impacts of weather extremes on household livelihoods and food access.


11 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across the five countries with IPC data

In 2023, four out of the five countries with disaggregated data had over 1 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Guatemala had the highest number at 3.7 million people followed by Haiti, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. El Salvador was the only country with fewer than 1 million people in this phase.

15.7 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across four countries with IPC data

The prevalence of analysed population in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) exceeded 20 percent in four countries, reaching over 30 percent in Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, and 27 percent for Haiti. No disaggregated data for this phase were available for El Salvador.

FIG. 2.43 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: GRFC 2017–2024.

1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse or equivalent Total population

Acute food insecurity since 2016

Levels of acute food insecurity have been overall increasing since 2016.

In the five food-crisis countries consistently included in the GRFC with data between 2017 and 2023 – El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua – the estimated number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased steadily between 2020 and 2022, from 11.8 million to 13.1 million, before slightly decreasing to 12.7 million in 2023.

The main increases in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity during this period occurred in Haiti, passing from 4.1 million in 2020 to 4.9 million in 2023. In terms of prevalence, the share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 17 percent in 2018 to 25 percent in 2023 in these five countries. At the same time the analysed population increased from 46 percent in 2018 to 98 percent in 2023. The other four food-crisis countries included in this edition have not qualified as food crises in every edition of the GRFC, depending on the occurrence of shocks

and data availability. The Dominican Republic has been included twice, in the GRFC 2023 and 2024, while migrant and refugee populations in Colombia and Ecuador have been included in four editions (2019, 2020, 2023 and 2024). Migrant and refugee populations in Peru have been included twice, in the GRFC 2019 and 2024.

Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024

Weather extremes were the primary driver in five countries, where 12.2 million people faced high acute food insecurity.

Weather extremes were a more prominent driver in 2023 than 2022 due to the El Niño event which resulted in erratic and reduced rainfall across the region. They were the main driver in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua but also affected food security in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Cereal production in 2023 was expected to be below the five-year average in Haiti, due to constrained access and availability of agricultural

inputs, including shortages of seeds and unfavourable weather conditions, leading to low plantings and yields. Favourable rainfall during the third maize crop was expected to be countered by high production costs and seed shortages from prior low harvests limiting the planted area, resulting in a reduced national cereal output.

In El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, average to above-average production of staple crops (maize and beans) is expected at the national level. However, erratic rainfall reduced crop yields, resulted in crop damage in some areas, affecting subsistence farmers.


In El Salvador and Nicaragua's Dry Corridor, insufficient rainfall and higher-than-normal temperatures, a pattern often linked to the El Niño phenomenon, contributed to below-average yields in some areas. Meanwhile, Honduras experienced generally good conditions, except for some northern areas, predominantly cultivating cash crops such as sugar cane and bananas and with less staple cereal production (FAO, December 2023).

Economic shocks were the primary driver in three food crises where 2.6 million people faced high acute food insecurity

Resident populations in the Dominican Republic and migrants and refugees in Ecuador and Peru were mainly affected by challenging economic conditions, notably reduced income opportunities and increasing food prices, exacerbated by macroeconomic difficulties and uncertainty in international markets. The combination of these factors eroded households' purchasing power (IPC, December 2023; WFP, April 2023; WFP, 2023).

Migrant and refugee households, typically facing higher integration challenges, relied on daily wages from the informal sector. Even though in Colombia the main driver of acute food insecurity was weather extremes, migrants and refugees in the country were significantly affected by economic shocks (WFP, May 2023). The prevalence of acute food insecurity among migrant populations was

FIG. 2.44 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2023



Source: WFP, 2024.


generally higher than resident populations across the region and was estimated at between 50 and 60 percent.

For some countries economic shocks were not the primary driver but still significantly affected acute food insecurity. These included El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua (OCHA, January 2023; IPC, June 2023; IPC, September 2023; IPC, May 2023; FEWS NET, November 2023).

A high reliance on imports of food, fertilizers and fuel combined with currency depreciation, mainly in Haiti, have added further upward pressure on food prices. According to the latest data, food inflation rates declined but remained high across the nine countries of the region in 2023 (WB, 2024).

As of December 2023, annual food inflation was particularly high in Haiti at 28 percent, while in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua it ranged between 4 and 9 percent (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023).

FIG. 2.45 Food inflation broadly declined across eight countries in 2023



This graph only includes countries where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

TABLE 2.5 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)	HDI global ranking (1–192)	GDP ranking	INFORM Risk Index (0–10)	Crop growing period affected by drought conditions (%)
COLOMBIA	63.6	15.9	118th	43	5.3	5.9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	65.8	8.3	80th	64	4.1	5.6
ECUADOR	34.7	32.2	95th	62	4.7	16.8
EL SALVADOR	53.5	15.2	125th	101	4	5.3
GUATEMALA	52.9	29.2	135th	69	5.1	2.8
HAITI	82.5	45.6	163rd	119	7.2	11.7
HONDURAS	60.2	24.8	137th	102	4.8	4.3
NICARAGUA	40.6	28.7	126th	132	4.1	6.7
PERU	54.2	27.9	84th	51	4.8	15.5

Sources: FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); UNDP (HDI Global Index); World Bank (GDP ranking); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought conditions).



Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in Haiti, where 4.9 million people faced high acute food insecurity.

Increasing insecurity and political instability as well as economic hardship and reduced agricultural production led to the deterioration of the acute food insecurity situation in Haiti. In 2022 and 2023, gang violence reached extremely high levels especially in urban areas, disrupting markets and the movement of people and goods, severely hindering economic activity and the provision of basic services (IPC, September 2023). This resulted in poor market supplies and shortages of essential commodities, including fuel, which contributed to sharp increases in food prices.

Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crisis

Structural factors in Latin America and the Caribbean inhibit the ability to effectively address acute food insecurity and further explain why three countries in the region – Haiti, Guatemala and Honduras – have been considered major food crises in at least five editions of the GRFC.

Haiti is the only low-income country of the region, while Honduras and Nicaragua are lower-middle income; all the other countries of the region included in this edition of the GRFC are upper-middle income, which allow them to have better capacities to absorb shocks.

The included countries in the region exhibit high cereal import dependency, with 62 percent of cereals imported in Colombia and 60 percent in Haiti, which heightens their susceptibility to food price fluctuations.

Despite a significant reliance on imports for food, a large share of employment in the domestic economy is in the agriculture, forestry and fishery sectors, with the higher rates observed in Haiti at 45 percent, Ecuador at 32 percent and Guatemala at 29 percent. The most recent data used to

calculate the Gini coefficient show that the region has high rates of economic inequality that can limit available resources reaching those with the most needs, including migrants and refugees, with Colombia and Ecuador both among the 25 countries with the highest level of inequality globally.

Poverty levels vary and composite scores measuring disaster and climate resilience suggest that countries in the region are in a precarious position. In Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, over 30 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line, with 3–6.6 percent falling under the international poverty line. Migrants intending to remain face many barriers to economic integration, including low levels of education and lack of legal status to work (WFP, May 2023).

Haiti received Very High INFORM Risk scores, which reflects its highly limited ability to respond to disasters based on hazard exposure, socioeconomic vulnerability and institutional coping capacity. Colombia and Guatemala, upper-middle income countries, also received High INFORM Risk scores.

Peru and Ecuador face the highest index risk for crop growing period affected by drought conditions in the region, indicating the high potential of crop and grazing land anomalies inducing food insecurity.


DISPLACEMENT | Despite efforts to integrate migrants and refugees into host countries across Latin America by granting stay and work permits, millions faced significant difficulties in accessing basic needs such as food, shelter, health care, education and formal employment.

The challenges faced by migrants and refugees were compounded by the global and regional cost-of-living crisis, which further eroded their purchasing power, and by high levels of vulnerability that place them at increased risk of falling victim to human trafficking, forced recruitment and gender-based violence.

The lack of stable livelihood opportunities hampers the ability of migrants and refugees to integrate effectively and contribute to their host communities. Furthermore, while a significant share of refugees and migrants have documentation, this has not guaranteed them a dignified life or adequate access to basic rights (WFP, May 2023; WFP, April 2023).

Conflict/insecurity was the main driver of internal displacement in Colombia and Haiti. Decades of

FIG. 2.46 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers in the region, 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

conflict and civil insecurity in Colombia led to the internal displacement of about 6.9 million people as of November 2023, of whom 1.1 million were displaced since the 2016 Peace Agreement signed between the Government of Colombia and one of the main insurgent groups. According to official figures, nearly 290 000 people were displaced in 2022 and an additional 163 000 in 2023, reflecting continued conflict and insecurity (UNHCR, 2024).

In Haiti, widespread insecurity and gang violence, predominantly in the Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince (ZMPP) and extending to other departments such as Ouest, resulted in the internal displacement of 314 000 people (IOM, December 2023).

Natural disasters, conflicts, insecurity and challenging economic conditions have driven cross-border displacement from Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua (GRFC Displacement TWG, 2024). About 4.8 million migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and other people requiring international protection are seeking refuge, across eight countries included in this edition of the GRFC (UNHCR, December 2023).

Food insecurity among displaced populations

Analyses on the acute food insecurity situation were available for populations on the move in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and for IDPs in Colombia.

In Colombia, home to a high number of migrants and refugees, acute food insecurity among this population was alarmingly high. During the peak of 2022 (June–August), 2.88 million people, or 62 percent of the analysed migrant and refugee population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity. The situation was particularly dire for pendular and in-transit migrants and refugees, with 73 percent experiencing high acute food insecurity levels, compared with about 52 percent of those intending to settle (WFP, May 2023). This is above the prevalence of 55 percent assessed among these populations during the last analysis in 2019 (GRFC 2020, April 2020).


In Ecuador, during the peak period of July–August 2022, 0.3 million people or 60 percent of the analysed migrant and refugee population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Challenges such as marginalized legal status and complex regularization processes hinder migrants and refugees' ability to obtain formal employment and access basic services, pushing many into the informal sector. Weather extremes, including El Niño-induced heavy rainfall, have compounded these challenges, affecting key paddy-producing areas. These include Guayas and Los Ríos provinces, which host large refugee and migrant populations (ACAPS, September 2023). The impacts on paddy production translated into an upsurge in rice prices in the third quarter of 2023 (FAO, December 2023).

Acute malnutrition among displaced populations

Acute malnutrition data were only available for migrant and refugee populations in Colombia, notably for children aged under 5 years old and pregnant women. Over 70 percent of children with acute malnutrition live in food-insecure households, underscoring the interrelations with food insecurity and their increased risk of illness because of their precarious situation (WFP, May 2023).


Migrants and refugees face considerable nutritional challenges linked to various forms of malnutrition, including acute malnutrition,

FIG. 2.47 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region 2013–2023



Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2023, IOM.

MAP 2.14 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country, 2023



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

■ IDPs ■ Refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

anaemia and stunting, with girls under the age of 5 from in-transit migrant and refugee households being the most vulnerable. As of 2022, 5.2 percent of children under 5 years old in the in-transit migrant and refugee group and 2.8 percent of children under 5 in the migrants and refugees with intention to stay group were estimated to be acutely malnourished. These levels are considered Medium and Low respectively (WFP, May 2023). High levels of anaemia, which limits physical and cognitive development and is caused by poor diet quality, were of particular concern for migrant and refugee children, with between 44 and 55 percent of migrant and refugee children under 5 affected across subgroups, while levels were slightly lower at 37 percent for pregnant women (WFP, May 2023). About 43 percent of children under 6 months were exclusively breastfed and only 24 percent of children aged 6–23 months were estimated to consume a Minimum Acceptable Diet (WFP, May 2023).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION | In Latin America and the Caribbean, levels of acute malnutrition are lower compared with other regions analysed in the GRFC, reflecting a lower severity of the food crises and better coping capacities of governments to support the nutritional situation of vulnerable children and women.


Comprehensive data on acute malnutrition were available for Haiti while data for migrants and refugees were only available in Colombia.

Historically low levels of acute malnutrition confirmed by screenings and data on admissions elsewhere in the region are the main reason associated with the absence of prevalence and burden data at the national level for resident populations.

Concerns remain regarding the lack of assessments on the nutrition situation for migrant and refugee populations. In Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, more than half of the analysed migrant and refugee populations faced high levels of acute food insecurity, experienced challenges caring for young children and had limited access to health services, which are all contributing factors to child wasting and maternal malnutrition.

In Haiti, the most severe food crisis in the region with nearly half of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, about 260 000 children suffered from acute malnutrition, around 100 000 of them severely so. More than half a million pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished (HNO 2023, March 2023). The prevalence of child acute malnutrition was 5.1 percent at the national level. However, in metropolitan areas it reached High and Very High levels, estimated at 19.2 percent in Croix-des-Bouquets and 11.7 percent in Delmas (SMART, 2023).

FIG. 2.48 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in Haiti in 2023



No malnutrition data were available for the other countries in the region.

Source: HNO 2023, March 2023.



0.5M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in Haiti in 2023

Source: HNO 2023, March 2023.

There were increased cases of acutely malnourished children among migrants and refugees in Colombia due to elevated levels of acute food insecurity, challenges in caring for young children, and limited access to health services.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Impacts of El Niño drove rural food insecurity while lack of work opportunities and high poverty levels constrained migrants and refugees' economic access to food.

Residents

PEAK 2023 (NOVEMBER–DECEMBER)

 **1.6M** people or 3% of the analysed resident population faced severe levels of acute food insecurity based on the WFP CARI.


The severity of food insecurity was higher in rural areas and particularly in the departments of La Guajira, Sucre, Caquetá, Córdoba, Arauca and Putumayo, mostly due to low incomes and high vulnerability to weather extremes. Meanwhile, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is higher in urban areas reflecting population density.

Source: WFP, February 2024.

History of the food crisis The resident population of Colombia was first identified as facing a food crisis in GRFC 2023 but only in GRFC 2024 have available data met the technical requirements of the GRFC partnership. An upper-middle-income country, Colombia has a high government capacity to assist its population and ranks highly on the Human Development Index. Furthermore, the country's economy has recovered remarkably well from the COVID-19 crisis. This exposes the resident population to vulnerability to acute and chronic food insecurity.

Migrants and refugees

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST 2022)

 **2.9M** people or 62% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 14% faced severe acute food insecurity.

Colombia hosts a large number of migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries. Around 73 percent of pendular and in-transit migrants faced high levels of acute food insecurity compared with about 52 percent of migrants with intention to settle (WFP, May 2023).

Source: WFP, May 2023.

History of the food crisis Colombia (migrants and refugees) has been included in all editions since the GRFC 2019, but data did not meet GRFC requirements in the 2021 and 2022 editions.


The acute food insecurity crisis has deteriorated for migrant and refugee populations since the previous analysis conducted by WFP in 2019, when 55 percent of the total population of 1.6 million refugees and migrants with intention to settle faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, November 2022). The size of the analysed population has also surged, with over four times more migrants and refugees analysed in Colombia in 2023 than in 2018.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Weather extremes** were the primary driver of acute food insecurity for **resident populations**. Colombia is prone to both localized drought and heavy rainfall during El Niño events and the Caribbean and Andean regions saw reduced rainfall from August onwards as a result. In general, the 2023/24 El Niño event represents a risk for around 9.3 million people in half of the country's municipalities, with 2.9 million highly likely to be affected by the effects of drought and losses of crops and livestock (HRP 2024).

Flooding and landslides damaged transportation and shelter infrastructure, limiting livelihoods and hindering access to WASH

facilities and public services (ACAPS, January 2024). However, production of staple paddy crop was above average in 2023, with the supply situation likely to be adequate for consumption requirements (DANE, 2023).

 **Conflict/insecurity** Despite current peacebuilding efforts, Colombia is classified as Extreme on the ACLED Conflict Index (ACLED, January 2024). Armed groups increasingly targeted civilians in 2023 in Colombia's border departments of Arauca, La Guajira, Cesar, Norte de Santander and Nariño. **Residents and migrants and refugees** both experienced displacement and disruption of

social services, with marginalized indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities often the most affected (ACLED, August 2023). Many migrants and refugees, in transit to other destinations or engaged in pendular movements, are likely to be in dangerous and inaccessible border areas such as Darien and experience personal security threats from traffickers (RMNA, September 2023).

 **Economic shocks** The acute food insecurity of **migrants and refugees** is intrinsically linked to lack of economic opportunities. Years of economic hardship in their country of origin had already depleted their economic resilience. The unemployment rate for migrants

and refugees was almost double that of residents at 18 percent while 37 percent reported discrimination when seeking employment opportunities. Around 70 percent of migrant or refugee households have earnings below the national poverty line (which was USD 347 for a family of four in 2021) and cannot cover their basic needs. Elevated food and rent prices led to an erosion of purchasing power, jeopardizing their consumption of nutritious food, and leading to negative coping mechanisms (RMNA, September 2023).

Resident populations were better positioned to benefit from a general improvement in the macroeconomic

picture in 2023, with a slight improvement in the employment rate and a decrease in the headline inflation rate to 9 percent at the end of 2023. Food inflation decreased throughout the year from 26 percent in January 2023 to 5 percent by December (WFP, December 2023).

Larger areas being planted drove above-average domestic rice and maize production in 2023, which was expected to bolster food supplies in a country that is highly reliant on food imports to meet national consumption requirements (FAO-GIEWS, November 2023). However, low income levels of a large share of the resident population, particularly in rural areas, impeded

an adequate diet diversity for many households, driving acute food insecurity levels (WFP, February 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

 **9.4M** forcibly displaced people by 2023

 **6.9M** IDPs

Source: Government of Colombia, November 2023.

 **2.5M** migrants and refugees



Source: Mid-Year Trends 2023, June 2023; UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | High food prices and hurricanes drove acute food insecurity in early 2023. However, improvements are foreseen through August 2024.

PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER 2022–FEBRUARY 2023)

1.6M people or **15%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 142 500 people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The estimate is from the first IPC analysis conducted for the country, which was conducted in 2022. The high numbers reflect price surges in the preceding years that affected the real income and food access of vulnerable households. A later analysis found that, by November 2023, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity was down to 1.2 million people (11 percent) due to lower prices and increased employment opportunities.





Source: Dominican Republic IPC TWG, January 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (DECEMBER 2023–APRIL 2024)

1.1M people or **10%** of the analysed population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 19 700 people were projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This is a significant decline compared with the 2023 peak, especially in the number of people in IPC Phase 4, reflecting increased crop production and subdued inflation, amid a modest growth of economic activity in 2023. The decreasing trend is expected to continue due to an anticipated increase in the minimum wage, decreasing unemployment and favourable weather conditions in the first months of 2024 (IPC, 2023; FAO, 2024).



Source: Dominican Republic IPC TWG, December 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks After almost a decade of economic growth and reduced poverty rates (OECD, December 2023), from 2022 the country faced significant growth and reduced poverty rates (OECD, December 2023), from 2022 the country faced significant economic shocks, with food prices, particularly for basic grains, reaching their highest in 15 years by the end of 2022 and early 2023. In January 2023, food inflation peaked at 11.4 percent, severely impacting food access. The lingering impacts of COVID-19 and a high prevalence of respiratory infections and dengue fever led to job losses and reduced income in informal sectors and tourism, constraining household purchasing power during the October 2022–February 2023 peak period (IPC, January 2023). However, by early 2024, food inflation had decreased to 5.3 percent, marking some economic improvements (WB, February 2024).

Border closures with Haiti and Haitian population movements negatively impacted the Dominican agricultural labour force and bi-national trade, affecting food availability and access in three provinces (IPC, December 2023).

Favourable climate conditions forecasted for 2024 could positively influence crop planting and labour

demand, potentially creating employment opportunities and enhancing economic access to food (IPC, December 2023).

Weather extremes Localized food shortages adversely affected food availability, particularly in areas where many households had depleted their reserves and resorted to crisis or emergency strategies. The situation was exacerbated in 2022 by hurricane Fiona, which affected around 10 000 households in 12 provinces. Torrential rains in mid-November 2023 displaced 37 000 people and cause significant economic losses to the agricultural sector (FAO, February 2024). On the other hand, forecasts predicting neutral El Niño conditions in 2024 offer optimistic prospects for crop production, with a likely positive impact on food availability and access (IPC, January 2023; IPC, December 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

0.1M refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants by 2023

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

History of the food crisis Included for the first time in the GRFC 2023, this upper-middle-income country has recorded a decline in the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) since October 2022–February 2023, to 1.1 million during December 2023–April 2024. Analysis for the May–August 2024 period projects fewer than 1 million people.

The number of people in IPC Phase 4 has followed a similar trend, going down from 142 000 in the 2023 peak to a projected 20 000 in the May–August 2024 post-harvest period, mostly driven by the arrival of good 2024 harvests.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | High food prices and the impacts of El Niño drove acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (MARCH–JUNE)




0.9M people or 14% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, over 62 000 people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This marks a marginal decrease in magnitude from nearly 1 million acutely food-insecure people since the March–May 2022 peak, but a notable decrease in severity as the number of people in IPC Phase 4 nearly halved from 120 000 in 2022.

Despite increased incomes from higher labour demand in the agricultural, trade and tourism sectors, high food prices and localized food shortages persisted in areas affected by poor rains. The most affected departments were Ahuachapán, San Vicente, Usulután, Cabañas, Morazán and La Unión.

Source: HRP, April 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2023



Notes: While the size of the bars reflects rounding to two decimal points, the labelling is rounded to one decimal point. In 2023, no disaggregated data for phases 1 and 2 were available.
Source: El Salvador IPC TWG, 2017–2022; HRP 2023.

History of the food crisis An upper-middle-income country, El Salvador has been identified as a food crisis in all editions of the GRFC since the 2018 edition. Initially it was included as part of Central America's Dry Corridor crisis, but more recently it has been included independently using national-level data. Since 2020, the coverage extended to the entire country and, after an initial increase in the numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, reaching a peak in 2021, the numbers marginally declined in 2022 and 2023.

The increase into 2021 was driven by recurrent droughts and exacerbated by economic shocks and catastrophic cyclones since 2020. The improvements in 2022 and 2023 reflected above-average crop production, which improved household food stocks and enhanced food access.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024



Weather extremes In the Dry Corridor of El Salvador, low precipitation amounts and above-average temperatures, conditions typically associated with the El Niño phenomenon, led to below-average crop yields in 2023.

Seasonal improvements in food availability and access from the Postrera harvest in December were limited and estimated to be less than normal due to diminished yields for rural households caused by erratic El Niño-related rainfall, resulting in a premature termination of household staple food reserves (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Higher rainfall accumulations due to the passage of tropical storm Pilar in late October and seasonal cold fronts led to agricultural damage in specific areas, especially to small farmers' bean crops due to the development of fungal diseases caused by high humidity. The impact was estimated to be localized and moderate (FAO, November 2023).



Economic shocks Food inflation peaked in February 2023 at 12.7 percent and then declined steadily through the end of the year, standing at 4.7 percent in November (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023).

Despite this easing of inflationary pressure, persisting high prices of food and other basic services limited the purchasing power of poor urban and rural households, leading to negative coping strategies such as adjusting the quality of the diet to meet food needs (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Prices of beans were over 10 percent higher than their year-earlier levels while prices of maize and sorghum were lower by the end of 2023 (FAO FPMA, 2023).



1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed Total population

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Improvements in 2023, but the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity remained near the high of 2022, mostly due to escalating food prices and low rural incomes.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)

4.3M people or **24%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the peak of the lean season. Of them, 0.6M people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Despite a moderate decrease of 0.3 million people since the 2022 peak, high levels of acute food insecurity persist, reflecting elevated food prices, low labour demand due to a seasonal reduction of agricultural activities aggravated by the occurrence of El Niño, and depletion of household food stocks.





Source: Guatemala IPC TWG, June 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (SEPTEMBER 2023–FEBRUARY 2024)

3.1M people or **18%** of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

This seasonal decrease assumes improved food availability, a high demand for casual agricultural labour and a seasonal reduction in staple food prices – although still higher than before the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in localized areas, dry conditions and torrential rains adversely affected crop production. The projection includes over 0.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).



Source: Guatemala IPC TWG, June 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024


Economic shocks High food prices and limited income opportunities for daily wage earners significantly impacted household purchasing power. This curtailed food access when smallholder households' grain reserves ran out during the June–August 2023 lean season (IPC, June 2023).

Prices of staple foods, mainly beans and maize, declined during the last two months of 2023 from their previously elevated levels. As of December, the price of beans remained more than 20 percent higher year-on-year, while the price of maize was below year-earlier levels (FAO, January 2024). Food inflation

stood at 8.5 percent (WFP Economic Explorer, 2023).

Weather extremes The El Niño phenomenon was linked to below-average rainfall and higher temperatures, especially in northern regions, impacting crop production in the Primera cycle, particularly for subsistence farmers (FEWS NET, September 2023). About 6.5 percent of the total maize-planted area was affected as of mid-October 2023 (FAO, November 2023). Despite the localized impact, 2023 maize production is expected to increase year-on-year (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Alimentación, December 2023).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2024



Note: The projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period. Source: Guatemala IPC TWG.



A protracted food crisis An upper-middle-income country, Guatemala has been included in all GRFC editions and classified as a major food crisis since 2018. Levels of acute food insecurity increased from 2018, reaching their highest in June–September 2022 due to weather-related shocks, notably drought, and hurricanes Eta and Iota in 2020, as well as the economic impacts of COVID-19 and persisting inflation sustained by high global commodity prices.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Some areas saw improvements since late 2022, while the situation in others further deteriorated.

PEAK 2023 (MARCH–JUNE)

4.9M people or **49%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in the lean season. This includes 1.8 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This is 0.2 million more people since the 2022 peak (September 2022–February 2023), but the 19 200 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) no longer faced these conditions from March 2023 thanks to assistance and improved security.





Source: Haiti IPC TWG, March 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (MARCH–JUNE)

5M people or **50%** of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

Approximately 1.6 million people face Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This reflects the surge in armed gang violence in 2024 severely limiting movement of goods and people, and driving up food prices and internal displacement.



Haiti IPC TWG, March 2024.

Urban settlement classification: At least 25% of households meet ≥50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance. At least 25% of households meet 25–50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance.

Legend: 1 - None/Minimal, 2 - Stressed, 3 - Crisis, 4 - Emergency, 5 - Catastrophe/Famine, Not analysed, Population analysed, Population not analysed, Total population

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Gang violence in Port-au-Prince severely disrupted livelihoods and markets, pushing up prices, particularly in Cité Soleil where some people faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) from September 2022 to February 2023. IDPs, mainly in the Ouest department, experienced limited food access due to lost livelihoods, exerting additional pressure on host families and communities (IPC, October 2022).


Economic shocks The Haitian economy has been battered by multiple shocks since mid-2018. Even before COVID-19, the economy was contracting and facing

significant fiscal imbalances (IPC, June 2022). Food inflation reached 53 percent in October 2022, driven by strong demand and high fuel prices. By October 2023, it stood at 21 percent with national currency appreciation, but remained high due to below-average crop production and persisting insecurity, constraining food access for poorer households (FEWS NET, November 2023; FAO, November 2023).

Weather extremes Erratic rainfall resulted in deficits between March and June and localized flooding through June and November 2023. These weather conditions had a limited negative

impact on the main cycle of maize. However, non-climate-related factors – such as the reduced availability of seeds, insecurity and high production costs – led to a contraction of planted area (FEWS NET, November 2023; FAO, November 2023; ASAP, 2023).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2024



Source: Haiti IPC TWG.

A protracted major food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Haiti has been included as a major food crisis in all editions of the GRFC. Levels of acute food insecurity have increased since 2018 due to multiple, mutually reinforcing shocks including recurrent weather shocks, the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19, rampant inflation, political instability, insecurity and poor agricultural production. The magnitude and share of acute food insecurity were projected to reach their highest levels on record between March and June 2024.

DISPLACEMENT

0.3M IDPs by 2023

Source: IOM, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.3M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.2M MAM, 0.1M SAM

Source: HNO 2023, March 2023.

0.5M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023

Source: HNO 2023, March 2023.

Nationally the prevalence of acute malnutrition was of Medium concern at 5 percent, but there were pockets of Very High prevalence in the metropolitan areas of Croix-des-Bouquets (19 percent) and Delmas (12 percent) (SMART 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

Inadequate services Gang violence and insecurity affected access to basic health, nutrition and WASH services, particularly affecting women and children (UNICEF, December 2022). Many of the poorest families have no safe drinking water, soap or basic sanitation. Nearly 60 percent of rural households, rising to 80 percent in Cité Soleil, lacked access to sufficient drinking water (HNO, March 2023).

In December 2022, 73 percent of the country's 22 largest health facilities reported that they were unable to function normally due to challenges such as road blockages, fuel shortages, social unrest and the high cost of importing medical inputs. In addition, there is a brain drain of qualified medical personnel (HNO, March 2023).

Between October 2022 and January 2023, more than 20 000 suspected cholera cases were reported, of which over 60 percent were in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (CDC, January 2023). Insecurity and fuel shortages limited access to the affected areas, hindering provision of medical supplies.


Inadequate practices Only 40 percent of children under 6 months are exclusively breastfed – considered Serious by UNICEF thresholds – and at 4–5 months, this percentage is much lower (15 percent) (SMART, 2021). Only 10 percent of children aged 6–23 months received the Minimum Acceptable Diet, considered Critical (HNO, 2021).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | High levels of acute food insecurity persisted albeit at lower levels than 2022.

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST)


2.4M people or 25% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, 0.4M were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The reduction of 0.23 million people since the 2022 lean season reflects slightly increased economic activities in sectors such as tourism and agriculture. But adverse weather, reduced income opportunities, and high food and fuel prices adversely affected poor households.



Source: Honduras IPC TWG, May 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: Honduras IPC TWG.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed 3+ - Crisis or worse Total population

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | El Niño conditions and high food prices kept levels similar to 2022.

PEAK 2023 (JULY–AUGUST)

0.2M people or 3% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season.

This is similar to the levels in 2022, when 0.2 million people were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Households experienced seasonal improvements in food availability and access from the Postrera harvest in December and increased incomes from higher labour demand in the agricultural, trade and tourism sectors.




Source: FEWS NET, June 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Weather extremes In localized areas of the Dry Corridor, low precipitation and above-average temperatures – typically associated with El Niño – led to below-average yields during the first agricultural cycle (FAO, November 2023). The temporary increase in rainfall in October–November improved agricultural conditions, boosting food reserves (FEWS NET, November 2023).

Economic shocks The poorest agricultural households experienced deteriorating livelihoods, income losses and low food reserves due to successive climatic shocks. Food inflation was 16 percent in January, declining to 7 percent by December (WFP, 2023), further hindering their access to food. Prices of maize and beans started to decline in November. By January 2024, they were lower than year-earlier levels (FPMA, February 2024).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: FEWS NET.


A protracted food crisis Nicaragua has been included as a food crisis in all editions of the GRFC, initially as part of Central America's Dry Corridor crisis and recently on its own. Recurrent extreme weather events, especially consecutive episodes of drought and hurricanes, have exacerbated food insecurity among the most vulnerable groups, particularly during the 2020–2022 period, which saw the occurrence of hurricanes Eta, Iota and Julia.

Migrant and refugee populations


Ecuador

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Difficulties accessing formal employment, El Niño-driven weather extremes and a deteriorating security situation threatened the food security of migrant and refugee populations.


PEAK 2023 (JULY–AUGUST 2022)


 **0.3M** or **60%** of the migrant and refugee population faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, April 2023).

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Economic shocks** were the primary driver of acute food insecurity among Ecuador's migrant and refugee population. The majority of Ecuador's migrant and refugee population arrived in the country in search of economic opportunities, with 74 percent stating that employment opportunities were their primary motivation for choosing Ecuador (WFP, April 2023). However, marginalized legal status and complex regularization processes make it difficult for them to obtain formal employment and access basic public services in healthcare and education (WFP, April 2023). Only 24 percent of migrants and refugees had a valid visa in Ecuador in 2023, while most migrants and refugees held jobs below their education level (WFP, April 2023; RMNA, 2023).

High levels of informal work limit the saving potential and job security of migrant and refugee populations, with 96 percent of employed migrants and refugees working in the informal sector (WFP, April 2023; RMNA, 2023).


 **Weather extremes** El Niño contributed to above-average rainfall at the end of 2023, particularly affecting regions hosting high numbers of migrants and refugees. About 70 percent of the migrant and refugee population is concentrated in the western provinces of Guayas, Manabí and Pichincha (ACAPS, September 2023). The government maintained heightened alerts for flood risks in December due to the potential for flooding to destroy shelters and public infrastructure, and to disrupt economic activity (WFP, December 2023; ICRC, August 2023).

 **Conflict/insecurity** A deteriorating security situation amid rising organized crime made Ecuador the most violent country per capita in Latin America in 2023 (WFP, December 2023). This trend is of particular concern for the large number of migrants and refugees who move through and settle in Ecuador and already faced increased threats and acts of violence by traffickers (RMNA, 2023). The spike in political violence is focused in coastal urban areas and threatens to affect the already precarious economic situation of migrants and refugees, limit government and humanitarian response capacity, and cause additional forced displacement of migrants and refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2024; ACLED, August 2023).

Peru


ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Hurdles to formal employment and El Niño -related flooding drove high levels of acute food insecurity among migrants and refugees.

PEAK 2023 (MAY)


 **0.8M** or **50%** of the migrant and refugee population faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP (unpublished), May 2023).

Peru's migrant and refugee population increased to 1.54 million people as of May 2023, up from around 0.7 million in 2018, with most migrants and refugees living in Lima (UNHCR, October 2023). Compared with settled migrant and refugee populations, in-transit populations face higher levels of acute food insecurity and additional vulnerabilities, such as exploitation by traffickers and inadequate shelter (WFP, 2022).

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Economic shocks** Restrictions affecting access to formal and reliable employment as well as a worsening economic crisis are the primary drivers of acute food insecurity among migrants and refugees. Around 42 percent of migrants and refugees still do not hold a valid visa or form of regular stay.

As a result of their precarious status, many migrants and refugees cannot access essential services and rely on informal employment in an economy that is still feeling the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (RMNA, 2023). Food inflation in Peru reached 13.2 percent in February 2023 (WFP, January 2024).

 **Weather extremes** Extreme weather events put added strain on Peru's limited public resources in 2023 and caused the localized displacement of host and migrant and refugee communities. The El Niño Costero phenomenon caused deadly flooding and the destruction of over 40 000 homes in early 2023, with nearly 800 000 people impacted mainly in the northern and southern mountains, in the provinces of Arequipa, Ica, Tumbes, Piura and Lambayeque. The flooding also triggered the largest dengue outbreak in Peru's history, with over 170 000 cases nationwide, leading to a substantial number of people being unable to work due to illness, impacting migrants and refugees' income and resilience to other shocks (CBI, 2023). From the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, heavy rainfall caused floods, triggering landslides and resulting in damage (ECHO, January 2024).

Four countries/populations groups selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2024 had data that did not meet GRFC technical requirements.



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

■ Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed.

Plurinational State of Bolivia

The Plurinational State of Bolivia has been selected for inclusion in the GRFC three times prior to this edition (2017, 2020 and 2021) due to requests for external assistance but the data have not met GRFC technical requirements. In 2023, the country was struck by weather extremes caused by a strong El Niño event, which affected 83 percent of the country's municipalities in seven of the nine departments. A state of emergency or disaster was declared by September (OCHA, September 2023). Acute drought conditions, record-breaking high temperatures and water shortages impacted agricultural production and led to the spread of forest fires (NASA,

October 2023). The most-affected populations were indigenous and rural communities, particularly in the Cochabamba, Potosí and Santa Cruz departments. Almost 2 million people experienced livelihood losses (IFRC, October 2023) with more than 23 000 hectares of crops affected and the July–September planting season not completed. Over 500 000 head of livestock had restricted pasture and more than 500 died due to lack of water resources (IFRC, October 2023). Water shortages led to poor sanitation and hygiene practices, an increase in diarrhoeal infections in children, anaemia, and malnutrition (IFRC, October 2023).

Ecuador (residents)

Ecuador has been selected for inclusion in the GRFC in 2022 and 2023, as it requested external assistance for weather extremes linked to El Niño. The data available do not meet the GRFC technical requirements.

Weather shocks, escalating violence and continued economic pressures led to deteriorating food insecurity (WFP, December 2023). Heavy rains caused the overflow of seven rivers in Esmeraldas province, damaging infrastructure and livelihoods (ECHO, June 2023). By August 2023, the Early Action Protocol for Floods related to the El Niño phenomenon was initiated, with peak rainfall anticipated between late February and early March 2024 (IFRC, January 2024), threatening infrastructure and

livelihoods in flood-prone regions (IRC, February 2024). Ecuador's oil-reliant economy has been affected by falling prices and exacerbated by the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19. Average annual inflation remained relatively stable, reaching 3.5 percent in 2022 and easing to 1.35 percent in 2023 (IMF, October 2023).

In 2024, the convergence of violence, climate change and escalating poverty risks driving displacement: as of October 2023, over 50 000 Ecuadorians were registered in Panama after crossing the perilous Darien Gap on the northern migration route (US Customs and Border Protection, February 2024).

Peru (residents)

Peru has been selected for inclusion in the latest two editions of the GRFC, as external assistance has been provided to both residents and migrants and refugees for weather extremes linked to El Niño. However, the data available on acute food insecurity do not meet the GRFC technical requirements.

The impact on the agricultural and fishing sectors of El Niño-related heavy rains and floods in northern and southern parts of the country was a determining factor in the contraction of the Peruvian economy in 2023 (BCRP, December 2023). Agricultural production declined by 4.1 percent – the worst since 1992 (IPE, February 2024). The rise in food prices, especially agricultural products, constrained poor households' purchasing power.

The floods triggered an unprecedented dengue epidemic and reaching the highest per capita dengue fever rate in the Americas, with a historical record of more

than 172,000 dengue cases and 287 deaths as of 3 July 2023 (CBI, July 2023).

In 2023, Peru's economy started to slowly recover from the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, which included surging prices of essential commodities such as oil, pulses and cereals. The economic downturn exacerbated gender disparities, particularly affecting rural women, and hindered progress in poverty reduction efforts, exposing Peru's enduring structural inequalities (WFP, April 2023).

The country had 674 declarations of drought emergencies between 2019 and 2022 (Save the Children, September 2023). Increasing weather extremes not only impacted the economy but also social stability, with disasters, particularly floods, forcing almost 700 000 people to relocate between 2008 and 2022 (IDMC, December 2022).

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has been identified as a country of concern in all editions of the GRFC. Except for the 2020 edition, the data available did not meet the GRFC technical requirements. In 2023 there was above-average domestic production of cereals. Economic growth increased somewhat, facilitated by the easing of some international sanctions and an

increase in oil and gas exports (FAO-GIEWS, February 2024). During much of 2023, year-on-year food inflation was above 200 percent although it eased significantly to 59 percent in March 2024 (Trading Economics). However, the price of a basic basket remains almost four times higher than the monthly salary (OCHA, April 2024).

Middle East and North Africa



In Palestine (Gaza Strip), acute food insecurity reached catastrophic levels in late 2023. The risk of Famine increased each day that the situation of intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted.

.....

Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic, were still the largest food crises in the region in terms of numbers of people facing high acute food insecurity.

.....

Thirteen years since the start of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic acute food insecurity among more than 12 million Syrians displaced internally and across borders is persisting or worsening amid deteriorating economic conditions and humanitarian funding shortfalls.

.....

Conflict and financing shortfalls are undermining the delivery of WASH and health services, exacerbating diseases and contributing to high levels of acute malnutrition.

.....

The outlook for 2024 is extremely concerning because of the intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access in the Gaza Strip, and risk of intensifying macroeconomic crises in the region, especially in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

Middle East and North Africa

More than half of the total analysed population across nine countries/territories in the MENA region faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 as the region grappled with increasing insecurity and instability, growing poverty, high unemployment, soaring food prices, widespread forced displacement and emerging crises – notably the devastating escalation of hostilities in Palestine (Gaza Strip) from early October 2023.

36.7M



people or 54% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in nine countries/territories.

22.2M



people forcibly displaced in nine countries/territories by 2023 – consisting of 12.3 million IDPs and 9.9 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

0.8M



acutely malnourished children under 5 years old in two countries, with 0.2 million of them suffering the most severe form of acute malnutrition.

Algeria (refugees) | Egypt (refugees) | Iraq (refugees) | Jordan (refugees) | Lebanon | Palestine (Gaza Strip and West Bank) | Syrian Arab Republic | Türkiye (refugees) | Yemen

MAP 2.15 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in nine countries/territories, 2023





FIG. 2.49 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2023



In all countries/migrant and refugee populations, the total population was analysed, except Algeria's Sahrawi refugee population (67%), Lebanon's resident and refugee population (92%) and Iraq's refugee population (97%).

Legend: Share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 + above or equivalent (dark red), Population analysed (medium red), Population not analysed (light red).

Color coding for population size: <1.0 million (lightest), 1–2.99 million, 3–4.99 million, 5–9.99 million, 10–14.99 million, ≥15 million (darkest), Not selected for analysis (grey).

Legend: Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed (light grey), Data gap (dark grey), Major food crisis (exclamation mark icon), Refugee populations (colour coding as legend) (circle icon).

Source: IPC TWGs; IPC Global Initiative; WFP CARI.

How have the food crises in this region changed since 2022?

Between 8 December 2023 and 7 February 2024, the entire population of Palestine (Gaza Strip) (about 2.2 million people) faced high levels of acute food insecurity – the highest share in IPC history (IPC, December 2023). The situation is projected to continue through July 2024. Palestine (West Bank) experienced a dramatic deterioration in acute food insecurity since 2022 linked to heightened violence, economic shocks and rising unemployment (HNO 2024, December 2023).


Yemen remained the largest food crisis in the region with 18 million people or 56 percent of its population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (FEWS NET, June 2023).

In the Syrian Arab Republic, the food crisis remained as critical as 2022, particularly for the country's 6.6 million IDPs as the economic situation continued to deteriorate amid a surge in conflict that led to more displacement (HNO 2024, December 2023).

In early 2023, Lebanon faced a worsening food crisis compared with 2022, with 42 percent of its analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in January–April, up from 37 percent in September–December 2022 due to the worsening financial crisis and food inflation (IPC, December 2023).

Funding shortfalls for aid organizations limited the aid available for refugee populations. According to analyses of Syrian refugee populations, 69 percent in Egypt, 62 percent in Jordan and 53 percent in Lebanon faced high levels of acute food insecurity amid worsening socioeconomic crises in these host countries (WFP, 2023; IPC, December 2022). Around 28 percent of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria faced high levels of acute food insecurity. The acute food insecurity situation was less severe for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and Iraq.

FIG. 2.50 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023 peak



Source: IPC Global Initiative (Palestine Gaza Strip); IPC TWG (Lebanon); FEWS NET (Yemen); HNO (Syrian Arab Republic and Palestine West Bank); WFP CARI (refugees).

Severity of acute food insecurity

Palestine (Gaza Strip) and Lebanon were the only territories/countries in the region that had countrywide IPC analyses with data disaggregated by phase. Around 4.5 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in these two territories/countries with 2.2 million in Palestine (Gaza Strip) and 2.3 million in Lebanon.

Palestine (Gaza Strip) faced a risk of Famine with 0.6 million people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), representing 26 percent of its population, the highest number and share recorded in this phase for any country in IPC history

These people were experiencing an extreme lack of food, starvation and exhaustion of coping capacities from December 2023–February 2024. The Famine Review Committee concluded that the actual numbers were likely to be even higher than these estimates. The risk of Famine was expected

to increase each day that the situation of intense hostilities and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened.

1.5 million people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across two countries/territories

In Palestine (Gaza Strip), around half the population or 1.2 million people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) from December 2023 to February 2024, the highest share ever recorded for any country in IPC history. In Lebanon, 0.4 million people (7 percent) were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Of them 0.1 million were Syrian refugees. In Akkar and Marjaayoun, around 20 percent and 15 percent of the Syrian refugee population respectively were in Emergency.

2.4 million people were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across two countries/territories

This consisted of 0.5 million people in Palestine (Gaza Strip) and 1.9 million in Lebanon. These populations are either facing large food consumption gaps and rising acute malnutrition levels or depleting essential livelihood assets and resorting to crisis-coping strategies to continue accessing food.

2.1 million people were in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in one country

In Palestine (Gaza Strip), only 2 500 people were in this phase in December 2023–February 2024, representing less than 1 percent of the population. In Lebanon, 2.1 million people were in this phase, requiring support to reduce risks related to shocks and to protect their livelihoods.

Acute food insecurity since 2016

The Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen have been among the world's worst food crises each year since the inception of the GRFC, while Palestine has been a major food crisis in seven out of eight editions. In 2023, Palestine (Gaza Strip) became the world's most severe food crisis.

For eight consecutive years, Yemen has been one of the ten countries with the largest populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, and from 2016 to 2019, it had the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the report. For nearly a decade, more than half of the population has consistently been in IPC Phase 3 or above, driven by structural instability aggravated by the protracted conflict and other human-induced factors, and weather extremes (IPC, November 2022). It had populations in, or projected to be in, Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) each year from 2018 to 2022.

The Syrian Arab Republic has also been a major food crisis in all eight editions and has always been among the ten countries with the highest number of people experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity. Since 2020, more than half of the population has been highly acutely food insecure due to the continuation of hostilities and compounding effects of the pandemic, adverse weather events, regional fragility and macroeconomic instability.

This is only the second year that Lebanon is included following the first IPC analysis carried out in September 2022. Before that food security analyses had focused on the country's Syrian refugee population. The country's financial crisis since 2019 has had grave consequences for the food security of resident and refugee populations.

Palestine (Gaza Strip and West Bank) has been included as a major crisis in seven out of eight editions of the report but changes in data sources limit comparability. Across the region, a lack of systematic and consistent data limits a more thorough analysis over time.

Outlook for 2024

The 2024 outlook depends on whether geopolitical tensions in the region escalate and on the dynamic of hostilities in Palestine. At the time of publication, the humanitarian space to deliver multisectoral assistance and services had not been restored and hostilities were ongoing.

Only three countries/territories in the region had projections for 2024 – Palestine (Gaza Strip), Lebanon and Yemen – with up to 22.37 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

An IPC analysis for Palestine (Gaza Strip) published on 18 March 2024, showed that the conditions necessary to prevent Famine – an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access to essential supplies and services for the population – had not been met. Famine was projected to occur any time between mid-March and May 2024 in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza, with a risk of Famine across the rest of the Gaza Strip through July 2024.

The devastation brought by relentless hostilities, besiegement, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure indispensable to survival, and severely restricted humanitarian access drove half of the population (over 1.1 million people) into catastrophic acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) in March–July 2024, reaching 70 percent of the population in the northern governorates (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024).

The IPC projection for April–September 2024 in Lebanon indicated an improvement compared with the 2023 peak in January–April for the country's Lebanese residents, and Syrian and Palestine refugees, despite the persisting economic and financial crisis characterized by soaring inflation, currency depreciation and income losses. When the IPC analysis was carried out in early October 2023, it was assumed that tensions at the southern border would not escalate into a wider conflict.

Given Lebanon's heavy dependence on imports and tourism, its already-failing infrastructures and fragile value chains, and its dependence on

remittances, any further escalation of the conflict would have harsh consequences (IPC, December 2023).

In Yemen, up to 19 million people or 60 percent of the population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity through June 2024. WFP's pause in General Food Assistance (GFA) from December 2023 in areas under Sana'a-based Authorities (SBA) was likely to increase severe deprivation among nearly 9.5 million beneficiaries in the north.

If geopolitical tensions continue to escalate in the region, shipping and insurance rates along the Red Sea route could continue to rise and fuel and food imports via Red Sea ports could continue falling. These developments could manifest in increasing prices of basic goods, including food and medicines, for consumers already facing high poverty levels and depleted capacities to cope. Some key traders anticipated shortages in food supply if tensions escalate further in the region.

Although no projection data were available, the alarming food crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and among so many of its 6.7 million refugees dispersed in five neighbouring countries shows no sign of abating. The HNO 2024 for the Syrian Arab Republic reported that erosion of basic service capacity was set to continue, with water and sanitation systems and public health services under immense strain, in a context of barely any development investment.

High inflation, the February 2023 earthquake, climate shocks and regional conflicts are increasing poverty and reliance on humanitarian assistance. Active conflict and military operations still impede humanitarian partners' ability to reach those in need and affected populations' ability to reach basic services and humanitarian assistance (HNO 2024). Reductions in assistance levels to populations that are dependent on it are likely to lead to negative coping strategies and could have implications for food security.

Drivers of the food crises, 2023–2024




Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in seven countries/territories where 21.5 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Rising geopolitical tensions in the region fuelled conflicts, leading to mass displacements, strained resources and widespread acute food insecurity. Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in Palestine and Yemen, as well as four countries hosting Syrian refugees (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Türkiye) as a result of the 12-year conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and Algeria, which has hosted Sahrawi refugees for over 45 years since the Western Sahara conflict. Although conflict was still a significant driver of acute food insecurity in the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon hosts the highest per capita share of Syrian refugees in the world, economic shocks were considered the primary driver in both countries.

The continued hostilities in the Gaza Strip and the escalating situation in the West Bank have posed immense difficulties for humanitarian responses (GHO 2024, December 2023), and threaten regional security and economic conditions (3RP, March 2024). The loss of agricultural, livestock and fishing production, widespread damage to farmland, greenhouses, bakeries and warehouses, as well as restrictions on commercial traffic have created catastrophic food shortages in the Gaza Strip (OCHA, January 2024) (*see Focus: Palestine (Gaza Strip), page 133*).

Relative stability between the internationally recognized government (IRG) and Sana'a-based authorities (SBA) in Yemen continued throughout 2023 after a truce formally ended in October 2022, but active fighting continued in the frontline districts, leading to displacement and disruption to provision and access to basic services. In November and December 2023, SBA forces' activities in the Red Sea threatened to destabilize the uncertain truce and induce reprisal attacks on Yemen by international coalition forces (FEWS NET, December 2023).

FIG. 2.51 Annual food inflation exceeded 50 percent each month in Lebanon, Türkiye and Egypt throughout 2023



This graph only includes countries/territories where food inflation peaked at over 10 percent in 2023.

Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, following the non-renewal of UN Security Council Resolution 2672 (2023), humanitarian access to northwestern areas remained highly constrained. The March 2020 ceasefire continued to be violated on an almost daily basis (ECHO, January 2024). In October 2023, northern Syria and Deir-ez-Zor Governorate witnessed the most significant escalation of hostilities since 2019, resulting in the displacement of over 120 000 people (OCHA, December 2023).

As hostilities escalated from early October in Palestine (Gaza Strip), violent cross-border incidents along Lebanon's southern border increased in number and intensity, causing displacement and shutting down economic activity. This was expected to have a significant impact on key economic sectors in Lebanon, particularly tourism and services (UNDP, December 2023).



Economic shocks were the primary driver in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic where 15.1 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Widespread unemployment, high inflation and economic instability have left vulnerable


populations across all countries in the region struggling to meet basic needs, including food.

Lebanon remained mired in a deep financial crisis, mitigated to a small extent by increased tourism and remittances. Record high depreciation of the local currency in early 2023 continued to lead to soaring inflation – due to Lebanon's high import dependency – and especially impacted households with limited access to US dollars.

Food inflation reached 352 percent in March 2023 with the greatest impact on vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugee households dependent on local currency incomes (IPC, December 2023).

Battered by years of conflict and the spillover effects from the financial crisis in Lebanon that, until 2019, used to act as a financial intermediary, the national economy in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to weaken. Accelerating currency depreciation throughout 2023, coupled with fuel scarcity, fuel price increases and rising transportation and freight charges, contributed to rising prices of both imported and domestically produced food (FAO-GIEWS, January 2023; WB, Summer 2023).

FIG. 2.52 Highest annual food inflation rate by country/territory, 2023



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.



Natural disaster was not a primary driver but a significant one in Northwest Syrian Arab Republic and for Syrian refugees in Türkiye.

In February 2023, the earthquakes in southeastern Türkiye and Northwest Syrian Arab Republic uprooted hundreds of thousands of families, and severely damaged infrastructure. Many families lost their main breadwinner due to death or injury, at a time when the economic situation was already dire, increasing the vulnerability of millions of people previously unable to meet their basic needs. The five most severely affected governorates – Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, Lattakia and Tartous – account for roughly 42 percent of the country's total population (HNO 2024, December 2023).

The earthquake displaced an estimated 0.7 million people, more than 98 percent of them in Aleppo, Idlib and Lattakia governorates, the same area where more than half of all IDPs in the country are living (IDMC, August 2023). It caused temporary but widespread economic and trade disruptions, and delays in delivering humanitarian assistance. The pre-existing vulnerability of Syrian households has left many ill-equipped to cope with its lingering economic impact (WB, Summer 2023).

Structural vulnerabilities underlie the region's food insecurity crises

Poverty and inequality, including gender and power dynamics, high population growth, high exposure to natural hazards, and low levels of education magnify the negative effects of conflict, weather extremes and economic shocks on food security.

Several countries of the region are also dealing with crippling budget deficits and high levels of public debt, meaning that governments are unable to provide the much-needed development investments or social safety nets (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, February 2023). Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen received Very High or High INFORM risk scores, which is a

TABLE 2.6 Structural vulnerabilities indicators

	Annual population growth: UNDESA for population (%)	Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance (%)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)	Crop growing period affected by drought condition (%)	INFORM Risk Index (0–10)	HDI global ranking (1–192)
ALGERIA	2.8	70.8	10.3	25.06	3.6	91th
EGYPT	2.1	47.4	19.8	7.1	4.9	97th
IRAQ	2.1	50.0	19.8	14.87	6.7	121st
JORDAN	6.8	100.0	3.2	15.62	3.8	102nd
LEBANON	2.8	97	3.8	23.15	4.1	112th
PALESTINE	0.9	N/A	N/A	14.51*	3.7	106th
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	2.1	29.2	12.5	13.52	7.2	150th
TÜRKIYE	2.5	11.3	17.1	N/A	4.8	48th
YEMEN	1.4	9.8	28.1	14.75	7.5	183rd

* West Bank

Source: UNDESA (Annual population growth); FAO (Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); UNDP (HDI Global Index).

composite indicator of a country's ability to respond to disasters based on hazard exposure, socioeconomic vulnerability and institutional coping capacity. Yemen and Syrian Arab Republic are in the lowest 40 of the 191 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI), a reflection of their poor health resources, limited education opportunities and low incomes.

The region is characterized by arid climates and limited freshwater resources, making agriculture heavily reliant on irrigation. Poor water management practices, coupled with the impacts of climate change, lead to dwindling water supplies for agriculture, reducing crop yields and jeopardizing food production. Eleven MENA countries are among the 17 most water-stressed countries in the world. The ASAP index shows that for all countries in the region, both crop and rangelands growing seasons are significantly affected by drought conditions affecting more than 25 percent of their total area. For Egypt, this is less problematic than for the other countries in the region due to its high share of irrigated crop land.

Despite the difficulties of producing food in the region, 20 percent of total employment in Egypt and Iraq, and 28 percent in Yemen, is in agriculture (FAO 2023).

The region also has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, meaning demand for food will keep growing while resources are being depleted. The rates are highest in Jordan at 6.8 percent (UNDESA).

With modest local food production and high population growth, the region heavily relies on other parts of the world to meet its food needs. An overreliance on food imports rather than domestic production, combined with weak, distorted and non-resilient supply chains, make the region more vulnerable to rising global prices and external shocks (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, February 2023).


DISPLACEMENT | Across the ten food crises, 22.2 million people were displaced within their own countries/territories or as refugees across borders, many of them for years and/or repeated times, leading to overcrowded camps and strained host communities.

For IDPs and refugees, the consequences of protracted displacement were aggravated by worsening socioeconomic conditions in host countries, pushing these already-vulnerable populations further into poverty. In the past year, new conflicts as well as natural disasters have shaken the region, generating yet more challenges.

Alarming levels of acute food insecurity among IDPs in Palestine (Gaza Strip), the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen


By the end of 2023, most of the Gaza Strip's population were internally displaced. In the southern governorates, almost all IDPs (91 percent) reported having no food to eat because of lack of resources to get food in the four weeks before the assessment and a similar proportion reported going to sleep at night hungry for lack of food. Half were going entire days and nights without

FIG. 2.53 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers in the region (in millions), 2023



Source: UNHCR, IOM, December 2023.

FIG. 2.54 Numbers of forcibly displaced people in the region, 2013–2023



The decrease between 2022 and 2023 could be explained by a change in methodology.


Sources: 2013–2022, UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2023, UNHCR nowcasted estimates, December 2023, IOM, UNRWA.

eating. With limited access to safe water, health, sanitation and other basic services, the risk of a large infectious disease outbreak was growing (IPC, December 2023) (see *Focus: Palestine (Gaza Strip)*, page 133).

The Syrian Arab Republic has one of the largest populations of IDPs globally, with around 6.6 million mainly displaced by conflict and violence. Around two-thirds of them are in the Northwest, most since the intensifying violence of 2013 and 2014 (IDMC, 2024). Some 2.1 million live in 1 500 often-overcrowded IDP sites with insufficient shelter, infrastructure and basic services. All IDPs living in camps and half of those living out of camps faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 (HNO 2024, December 2023).

In February 2023, the earthquakes that struck the region severely compounded their hardship. Of the reported 0.7 million people displaced by the earthquakes in Northwest Syrian Arab Republic – mainly in Aleppo, Idleb and Latakia governorates – 90 percent had already been forced to flee their homes due to conflict in previous years. Many could not access emergency/humanitarian aid, and even after six months, this remained a challenge with more than 114 000 people still displaced, most in camps. Limited data collection hampered comprehensive situation assessments, which also hindered response efforts (IDMC, August 2023).

MAP 2.16 Numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers by country/territory, 2023



Source: IOM, UNHCR and UNRWA, 2023.

Yemen remained among the ten countries with the highest number of IDPs in the world. Following nine years of conflict, sustained economic deterioration and diminished public services, IDPs face high levels of vulnerability. Most have been displaced for years, many more than once. About 1.6 million live in 2 400 camp-like hosting sites where competition over access to and use of land and water resources results in disputes with host communities, hampering the provision of shelter, health and WASH services, as well as humanitarian assistance. The remaining 2.9 million live in rental accommodation or hosting arrangements, most without rental agreements, exposing them to arbitrary price increases (HNO 2023, December 2022). Levels of wasting are higher among IDP children (12.3 percent) than among host community children (9.8 percent) (SMART 2022).

Acute food insecurity among refugee populations

The lives of refugees and those in host communities have become more challenging, exacerbated by high inflation rates and limited access to social services and economic opportunities.

Thirteen years since the start of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, 6.7 million Syrian refugees are still hosted by neighbouring countries – in Egypt, which has also received an influx of refugees from the Sudan since April 2023, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye.

The socioeconomic crises in host countries and rising poverty among host communities, coupled with declines in funding for the Syrian crisis, pose a significant risk of exacerbating tensions in several

countries, potentially undermining socioeconomic stability. The February 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye and the Syrian Arab Republic exacerbated this already-dire situation (3RP, January 2024). The prevalence of high acute food insecurity reached particularly high levels among Syrian refugee populations in Jordan at 62 percent (WFP, July 2023) and Lebanon (53 percent) (IPC, September 2022), and among all refugees in Egypt (69 percent) (see pages 136–141 for country-level overviews).

Lebanon hosts 1.3 million registered refugees and asylum-seekers, consisting of 0.8 million (mainly from Syrian Arab Republic), as nowcasted by UNHCR in December 2023, and 0.5 million Palestine refugees (UNRWA, September 2023). The number of Syrian refugees is as high as 1.5 million when including unregistered refugees (IPC, December 2023). Structural marginalization

(including employment and property ownership restrictions) compounded by 74 years of forced displacement, coupled with the deepening socioeconomic crisis in Lebanon, have pushed many Palestine refugees deeper into poverty (3RP, January 2024).

From October 2023 to March 2024, 26 percent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon and 35 percent of the Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic living in Lebanon were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC, December 2023).

The majority of the population of the Gaza Strip have been refugees since the 1967 war. Even before the escalation of conflict in October 2023, poverty rates among refugees residing inside and outside the eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip had reached 82 percent (UNRWA & PCBS, November 2021). As of the second quarter of 2022, 47 percent of Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip were unemployed (HNO 2023, January 2023).

Algeria has hosted Sahrawi refugees for over 45 years. In 2023, 173 600 lived in isolated camps near Tindouf in the Sahara Desert where they face limited livelihood opportunities and harsh environmental conditions. Due to the critical shortage of funding, minimum humanitarian standards cannot be met in most sectors, and most refugees are believed to live below the poverty line (UNHCR, 2023). Around 28 percent of the analysed population of 133 700 people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in June 2023, according to CARI methodology (WFP, June 2023).

Nearly 100 000 refugees in Yemen, mainly from Somalia, endure overcrowded spaces without access to water or sanitation, particularly in urban areas. The collapse of the economy and public services, and legal barriers to formal employment, have severely affected their capacity to be self-reliant. They often suffer high levels of stigma, discrimination and exclusion from local systems of support and community-based protection mechanisms and frequently lack access to health care, shelter or cash (HNO 2023, December 2022).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Only two of the nine food-crisis countries/territories had data on the burden of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years old in 2023 – the Syrian Arab Republic and a partial analysis for Yemen.


Reports from Palestine (Gaza Strip) confirm an escalating acute malnutrition crisis (see Focus: Palestine (Gaza Strip), page 133).

In Yemen, in June–September 2023, all 16 analysed zones in IRG-controlled areas were classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above). Of them, seven were in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in the lowlands of Abyan, Shabwah, Hodeidah Southern Lowlands, Ta'iz Lowland, Ta'iz City, Ad Dhalī' and Lahj Lowland (IPC AMN, June 2023). Around 14 percent of women of reproductive age (15–49 years) were acutely malnourished. Prevalence was even higher among PWB (25 percent) and among IDP women (16 percent) (SMART 2021-2022).

In the Syrian Arab Republic, according to a 2022 SMART survey conducted in nine northwestern districts in Aleppo and Idlib governorates near the Turkish border, the prevalence of GAM increased from 2.5 percent in 2021 to 3.3 percent in 2022, and the prevalence of SAM from 0.4 percent to 0.9 percent. This GAM prevalence is considered Low by WHO thresholds in spite of very high levels of acute food insecurity. Acute malnutrition appears to be far more concerning among pregnant and breastfeeding women than children. Nationally around 13 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished due to poor diets and suboptimal treatment programmes (SMART 2022).

Among Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf camp in Algeria, 11 percent of children under 5 years old were acutely malnourished, which is considered a High prevalence (UNHCR, September 2022).

FIG. 2.55 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in two food crises, 2023



Source: Syrian Arab Republic HNO/HRP 2023; Yemen IPC TWG, June 2023.


Drivers of acute malnutrition

Lack of food In Palestine (Gaza Strip), the latest data show that virtually all households are skipping meals every day. In four out of five households in the northern governorates and half the displaced households in the southern governorates, people go entire days and nights without eating. Many adults go hungry so children can eat (IPC, December 2023). Women and girls are expected to be hit the hardest by the unprecedented levels of acute food insecurity levels as women tend to vastly deprioritize their food intake when access to food is restricted. This puts pregnant and breastfeeding women at even higher health and malnutrition risks, not only to themselves but to their babies (UN Women, January 2024).

In Lebanon, more than one in every four children under the age of 5 (among Lebanese and refugee population) – or 85 000 children – live in and suffer from extreme food poverty, being fed extremely poor diets consisting of at most two food groups, often cereal and possibly some milk (UNICEF, 2023).

Inadequate practices Across the conflict-affected countries in the region, high levels of displacement diminish the capacity of mothers to care for their children. In Yemen, around 20 percent of children under 6 months old are exclusively breastfed in the first six months of life

FIG. 2.56 Number of children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, 2023 (millions)



Source: Syrian Arab Republic HNO/HRP 2023; Yemen IPC TWG, June 2023.

in two-thirds of analysed areas, which is classified as Critical by UNICEF. About 11.5 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive a Minimum Acceptable Diet with prevalence below 6 percent in Shabwa, Al-Jawf and Al-Baidha (IPC, June 2023). In Syrian Arab Republic, only 4.6 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive an MAD, down from 11 percent in 2021 (SMART 2022). Child-feeding practices are extremely concerning in Lebanon with an Extremely Critical 6 percent of children aged 6–23 months receiving an MAD (SMART 2022).

Inadequate services Conflict and severe government and humanitarian financing shortfalls are devastating the provision of WASH and health services, exacerbating communicable diseases.

The availability of water in the Gaza Strip stands at a fraction of pre-crisis levels. Lack of hygiene is leading to escalating numbers of communicable diseases – acute respiratory infections, diarrhoea and hepatitis A – while the conflict's devastating impact on health care is severely limiting the capacity to respond (OCHA, January 2024).

In Yemen, eight years of conflict and economic collapse have devastated health, nutrition, WASH and other child and maternal health support services. These factors, coupled with low immunization coverage, have led to the high prevalence of diseases and elevated acute

malnutrition levels (IPC, June 2023). Between July and December 2023, Yemen had the highest number of reported measles cases in the world (18 500) (CDC, February 2024).

Water shortages in many regions of the Syrian Arab Republic due to reduced flow of the Euphrates River and lower rainfall have led to dangerously low water levels in dams, forcing people to rely more on well water, which is also in short supply and becoming more saline and polluted, posing a health risk. In the northeast, where small communities and informal sites are cut off from water networks, populations often rely on untreated water sources and inadequate sewage systems, increasing the risk of waterborne disease, especially cholera (REACH, November 2023).

When the earthquakes hit Northwest Syrian Arab Republic in February 2023, communities were already experiencing a cholera outbreak, overwhelmed health facilities and harsh winter weather (Nutrition Cluster, Save the Children, UNICEF, February 2023).


In Lebanon, the exodus of doctors and nurses is severely undermining service delivery. The increasing cost of medicines following the removal of subsidies has pushed them out of the reach of vulnerable families. Many wastewater treatment facilities are not functional or ceased operations due to electricity cuts and budget shortages, leading to increasingly severe sanitation issues (OCHA, 2023).

Focus | Palestine (Gaza Strip)

By late 2023, the Gaza Strip had become the most severe food crisis in IPC and GRFC history, with 100 percent of its population (about 2.2 million people) facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Between early December and early February, 0.6 million or 26 percent of the population were estimated to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and 1.2 million, or 50 percent of the population, in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). According to the IPC Famine Review Committee, the people of the Gaza Strip faced a risk of Famine through May 2024 with the risk increasing each day that hostilities continued or intensified, and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened (IPC Global Initiative, December 2023).

FIG. 2.57 Impacts of the conflict since October 2023



Source: WB, February 2024; UNRWA, February 2024.

An IPC analysis published on 18 March 2024, showed that the conditions necessary to prevent Famine – an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access to essential supplies and services for the population – had not been met.

Famine was projected to occur any time between mid-March and May 2024 in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza, with a risk of Famine across the rest of the Gaza Strip through July 2024 (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024).


The devastation brought by relentless hostilities, besiegement, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure indispensable to survival, and severely restricted humanitarian access drove half of the population (over 1.1 million people) into catastrophic acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) in March–July 2024, reaching 70 percent of the population in northern governorates (IPC Global Initiative, March 2024).

As of 20 January 2024, an estimated 1.7 million people or over 80 percent of the population were internally displaced (UNRWA, February 2024) due to continued air, land and sea operations, destruction of shelter, military evacuation orders, and lack of access to food, basic services and humanitarian assistance. Many were displaced multiple times in search of safety. More than half the population of the Gaza Strip was living in displacement in Rafah governorate, raising the already extremely high population density to four times pre-conflict levels (OCHA, January 2024). The high population concentration, inadequate shelter and lack of access to basic services were major factors increasing the risk of Famine (IPC Global Initiative, December 2023).

A devastating escalation of an anthropogenic, protracted food crisis

Palestine – consisting of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank – has been identified as a major food

MAP 2.17 IPC acute food insecurity situation, December 2023–February 2024 and March–July 2024




crisis in the last seven editions of the GRFC. The escalation of violence since 7 October 2023 drastically worsened the pre-existing and protracted crisis. Although the source of analysis changed, limiting data comparability, in 2022, 53 percent of the Gaza Strip's population, totalling 1.2 million people, faced high levels of acute food insecurity and required assistance (HNO 2023, January 2023).

Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the ensuing economic blockade and restrictions imposed by Israel profoundly impacted daily living conditions, livelihoods and the local economy, resulting in high unemployment, food insecurity and dependency on aid (UNRWA, August 2023). During this 17-year-long economic blockade, Israel has also designated Access Restricted

Areas (ARAs) on both land and at sea, with up to 35 percent of the Gaza Strip's agricultural land and as much as 85 percent of its fishing waters affected at various points between 2007 and 2017 (UNSCO, July 2017). Between 2006 and 2022, real GDP per capita shrank by 37 percent, while the Gaza Strip's share in the Palestinian economy contracted from 31 percent to 17.4 percent (UNCTAD, October 2023).

High levels of debt, incurred primarily to meet basic needs, exacerbated households' financial precariousness: 79 percent of households had taken on debt in 2022 (MSNA, July 2022). During the second quarter of 2022, the unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip exceeded 45 percent, soaring to over 73 percent for 19–29 year-old graduates with a diploma certificate or higher (PCBS, February 2023). In the same year, the percentage of the

FIG. 2.58 Daily truckloads of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, October 2023–March 2024



Source: UNRWA.

population living below the national poverty line stood at 53 percent (IMF, September 2023).

Even before early October 2023's rapidly escalating hostilities, the Gaza Strip had been among the world's top recipients of aid per capita with around 80 percent of Gazans dependent on international aid (UNCTAD, October 2023).

A multifaceted food crisis affecting all pillars of food security since October 2023

Food availability: Availability of food decreased due to the complete disruption of markets and commercial activities, extremely limited flows of humanitarian aid, and severe damage to agriculture and livestock production resulting from conflict and displacement. Between the beginning of the conflict in October 2023 and February 2024,

about 42.6 percent (6 700 hectares) of cropland in the Gaza Strip was damaged, with the Gaza governorate accounting for the most damage (1 900 hectares) (FAO, 2024). The port of Gaza City was damaged to the point of being non-operational (FAO, December 2023).

Considering the restrictions and the impossibility for the private sector to restart commercial activities, only minimal quantities of food items, primarily rice and vegetable oil, were available and household food stocks were limited/non-existent, particularly in central and northern governorates. In November 2023, no bakeries were operational in the northern governorates, and the supply of wheat flour had stopped (WFP Gaza Food Security Assessment, December 2023). Before the escalation, an average of 150–180 food trucks

entered the Gaza Strip daily. After the end of the humanitarian pause on 30 November 2023, an average of 30 food trucks entered daily with almost none reaching the northern governorates (IPC Famine Review Committee, December 2023) (see figure 2.58). Between 1 and 25 January 2024, eight of the 51 planned deliveries of food, medicines, water and other life-saving items reached northern governorates and 25 percent of humanitarian missions to Deir al-Balah governorate were denied access (OCHA, January 2024).

Agriculture was an important contributor to food availability before the conflict and the Gaza Strip's food production allowed self-sufficiency in most fruits and vegetables (FAO-CIRAD-EU, 2023). Agricultural production will likely collapse in the northern governorates by May 2024, due to the displacement of farmers and breeders and the destruction of fields and other assets (IPC Famine Review Committee, December 2023).

Access to food: The few supplies of food that do exist are largely inaccessible. Prevailing insecurity and unclear safe zones (MSF, December 2023) limit physical access to food, whether from markets, solidarity networks or food distribution points. The economic repercussions of the conflict have left most residents without income, with the unemployment rate reaching 79 percent in December 2023 (UNCTAD, January 2023).


Finally, the scarcity of food commodities in markets led to soaring prices, with wheat flour prices increasing by approximately 50 percent between September and December 2023, vegetables by 200 percent, rice by 45 percent, and fuel by over 500 percent (WFP, December 2023).

Food utilization: Household capacity to prepare food that is available or accessible and individual capacity to absorb its nutrients are severely limited. Shortages of water and gas for cooking, as well as safety concerns, impair household ability to prepare meals, and poor quality of food, illness and disease limit individual capacity to derive nutrients. IDPs in the southern governorates reported an average access of less than 2 litres of

water per person per day, well below the 15 litres recommended minimum amount of water needed in an emergency (WFP, December 2023). The absence of cooking gas has resulted in a reliance on firewood, wood residues and waste burning as a primary source of cooking fuel for three out of four households, although few can access it (WHO, December 2023).

Stability: The situation at the end of 2023 and through early 2024 was extremely volatile, with active conflict and a lack of humanitarian assistance, particularly in the northern governorates. Households are unlikely to achieve stability in their access to food and basic services in the near future, with war remnants likely to have long-term impacts on livelihoods, basic services and shelter.

MAP 2.18 Conflict-related damage to agricultural land and infrastructure as of 15 February 2024



Source: FAO, 2024.

Fast-growing nutrition crisis threatening the lives of children and women in the Gaza Strip

Prior to the conflict, wasting levels among children under 5 years old were considered Very Low by WHO thresholds at 1 percent (Global Nutrition Cluster, February 2024). However, since October 2023, the intensifying and rapidly changing conflict dynamics placed all children aged under 5 years in the Gaza Strip at elevated risk of acute malnutrition and death. Areas with limited humanitarian aid are expected to see a more rapid malnutrition deterioration, while areas with better aid access may experience a slower yet ongoing decline, resulting in continued child wasting, maternal undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies.

Between January and March 2024, acute malnutrition deteriorated among children aged 6–23 months, particularly in North Gaza and Gaza governorates where limited aid access led to acute malnutrition rates doubling to 31 percent. Although aid mitigated acute malnutrition in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah governorates, the overall prevalence increased from 1 percent pre-conflict to 6 percent (Global Nutrition Cluster, March 2024).

Some 90 percent of children under 2 years old and 95 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women face severe food poverty, consuming only two or fewer food groups per day. Around 64 percent of households only have one meal daily. More than 80 percent of households lack safe water and at least 90 percent of children aged under 5 years are affected by infectious diseases, with 70 percent experiencing diarrhoea (Global Nutrition Cluster, February 2024).

Regional repercussions of the conflict

The spillover effects of the conflict on immediately neighbouring countries – already experiencing domestic socioeconomic crises – could be significant. Potential impacts include higher and more volatile oil and gas prices and energy supply disruptions; public debt and fiscal pressures; inflationary pressures and protracted monetary



People, including children, wait in a long line to receive a small amount of food in the city of Rafah. Half of households are facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity in the Gaza Strip in March–July 2024.

tightening; currency depreciation/devaluation; trade diversion; increased transport/logistics costs; sectoral effects, including on tourism and agriculture; higher numbers of displacement; labour market disruptions; higher security provisions; and an overall decline in GDP, lower aggregate demand (including investment and consumer spending) and increases in poverty (UNDP, December 2023).

The impact of the conflict could also have longer-term implications stemming from the higher-risk environment it creates, affecting domestic and foreign direct investment, as well as political and social stability (UNDP, December 2023). The targeting of commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is disrupting critical global trade routes, increasing shipping costs and transit times, creating uncertainty about the availability of commodities such as oil and grain, and applying upward pressure on global prices. This will

have a serious impact on food prices in a region where countries depend on imports (FEWS NET, December 2023).

In the **West Bank**, the conflict is having a grave impact on the economy due to the increased Israeli military presence, violence, road closures and restricted movement. An estimated 86.5 percent of industries indicate a decline in production capacity (WB, February 2024). Trade relationships with Israel, constituting one-third of the West Bank's GDP, have been severed (OCHA, November 2023). The Israeli government's suspension of work permits for West Bank Palestinians led to an estimated 208 000 job losses, approximately 24 percent of total employment in the West Bank (ILO, November 2023). Palestinian farmers in the West Bank had their land access permits revoked by the Israeli authorities after 7 October. Settler violence worsened the situation, leading to significant losses, including over 1 200 tonnes of

olive oil in 2023, amounting to a direct monetary loss of USD 10 million (OCHA, February 2024).

In **Egypt**, tourism has declined, persistently high inflation has eroded household purchasing power, the currency is depreciating, and investor confidence has significantly declined. Egypt is already facing an influx of refugees from the conflict in the Sudan (UNDP, December 2023).

Jordan, due to its geographical proximity to the conflict and economic ties with Israel, is facing socioeconomic, diplomatic and security challenges. Tourism, a major component of GDP, has already been affected, with uncertain prospects for revival. Unemployment remains high, and although energy and food price increases have been contained, vulnerable households are seeing their purchasing power eroded (UNDP, December 2023).

In **Lebanon**, the conflict in the Gaza Strip has resulted in more than 89 000 people displaced due to increased tensions on its southern border, with Israeli airstrikes and rockets towards Israel fired from southern Lebanon (OCHA, February 2024). Damaged public infrastructure and reduced tourism are exacerbating the already dire socioeconomic conditions characterized by soaring inflation and high rates of unemployment and poverty (UNDP, December 2023).

In **Yemen**, the ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region increased shipping costs due to rising freight and insurance rates along the Red Sea route, in addition to high fuel costs. These could affect markets and the provision of humanitarian assistance. In December 2023, the volume of imported food items registered a month-on-month decline of 17 percent via Red Sea ports and 62 percent via Aden and Mukalla ports. While staple food items remained accessible in markets throughout 2023, shortages in food supply during the first quarter of 2024 are expected if tensions escalate further in the region (WFP, January 2024).


ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The four-year economic and financial crisis affected the food security of all population groups despite significant improvements expected in 2024.

PEAK 2023 (JANUARY–APRIL)


2.3M people or **42%** of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, 0.4 million were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

1.5M Lebanese residents (38% of the analysed resident population)

0.8M Syrian refugees (53% of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon)



This was 0.3 million more people than during the 2022 peak in September–December driven by the worsening financial crisis. It included a 0.1 million increase in people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).



Source: IPC TWG Lebanon, December 2022.

PROJECTION 2024 (APRIL–SEPTEMBER)


1.1M people or **20%** of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity:

0.6M Lebanese residents (15% of the resident population)


0.5M Syrian refugees (33% of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon)

0.05M Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL) (27% of the PRL)

12 100 Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic (PRS) (40% of the PRS in Lebanon)



The 49 percent projected reduction in the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above can be attributed to expected exchange rate stability, higher employment and a steady supply of subsidized wheat. However, if the conflict in Palestine (Gaza Strip) persists, food insecurity may deteriorate given Lebanon's dependence on imports and tourism.



Source: IPC TWG Lebanon, December 2023.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Economic shocks Record high depreciation of the local currency in early 2023 continued to lead to soaring inflation – due to Lebanon's high import dependency – and especially impacted households with limited access to US dollars.

Annual food inflation reached 352 percent in March 2023 with the greatest impact on vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugee households dependent on local currency incomes. The employment rate among the Lebanese resident population improved from 44 percent in September 2022 to 55 percent in May 2023 and then slightly declined in October (IPC, December 2023).

Annual food inflation declined following interventions from the Central Bank that stabilized the Lebanese pound in April/May, but it still stood at 212 percent by November 2023 (WFP, January 2024). A stable summer with over 2 million tourists brought much-needed foreign hard currency, allowing for the payment of salaries to civil servants (IPC, December 2023).

Conflict/insecurity Following the escalation of hostilities from October in Palestine (Gaza Strip), violent cross-border incidents along Lebanon's southern border increased. By mid-January 2024, over 83 000 people had been displaced, 300 000 farm animals destroyed and 460 hectares of farmland burned (OCHA, January 2023). An increase in intercommunal tensions between Lebanese and Syrian communities since early 2023 is largely attributed to competition for low-skilled jobs. Violent clashes in the country's largest Palestine refugee camp resulted in over 4 000 people evacuating their homes, heightening their humanitarian needs (IPC, December 2023).

DISPLACEMENT


1.4M forcibly displaced people by 2023

74 000 IDPs and **1.3M refugees and asylum-seekers**

Source: IOM, December 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2022–2024



Source: Lebanon IPC TWG.

An emerging food crisis This is only the second year that Lebanon has been included as a food crisis following the first IPC analysis that was carried out in September 2022. Before that, food security analyses had only covered the Syrian refugee population in the country (see *Spotlight on Displacement*, page 18).

Currency devaluation since the start of the financial crisis in October 2019 has had grave consequences given the country's high reliance on imports for most of its food and non-food needs. The damage to Lebanon's main grain silos during the Beirut port blast in August 2020, coupled with strikes by public sector workers, strained the country's food import capacity (WFP, September 2022). The first IPC analysis in September 2022, which provided the January–April 2023 peak figure, followed a period of high political and economic instability in the country and the surge in global food and energy prices that followed the war in Ukraine. Slightly improving macroeconomic conditions in 2023 were expected to lead to improvements in 2024.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

Around 25 500 children under 5 years old were estimated to be suffering from acute malnutrition in 2022 (UNICEF, 2022). This situation was mostly driven by limited access to healthcare, substandard water quality, acute food insecurity and inadequate child-feeding practices (see *regional brief*, page 132).

Gaza Strip !


ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Escalating hostilities since October 2023 created most severe food crisis in IPC history and a risk of Famine.

PEAK 2023 (DECEMBER 2023–FEBRUARY 2024)

 **2.2M** people or **100%** of the Gaza population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This is the highest share of a population in IPC Phase 3 or above in any area or country in IPC history.



0.6 million or **26 percent** of the population were estimated in **Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)** – the highest share in this phase in IPC history. A risk of Famine was projected through May 2024, if the situation of intense hostilities and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened. Some 1.2 million or 53 percent of the population were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

A March 2024 IPC analysis projected that **Famine** would occur between mid-March and May 2024 in Gaza and North Gaza governorates, with a risk of Famine in the rest of the Gaza Strip through July 2024. **Half** the population (over **1.1 million** people) was projected to face **Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)** rising to 70 percent in the northern governorates.



Source: IPC Global Initiative, December 2023 and March 2024.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine

 IDPs/other settlements classification  Risk of Famine

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

Before the conflict intensified, acute malnutrition levels among children under 5 years old in the Gaza Strip were estimated at Very Low levels by WHO thresholds.

However, since October 2023, the escalating conflict has placed all children under 5 at high risk of acute malnutrition and death, with North Gaza and Gaza City particularly affected. Child acute malnutrition levels are projected to breach Famine

thresholds by May 2024, with North Gaza likely having surpassed this by mid-March. Southern governorates of Deir Al Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah also face a risk of Famine between mid-March and mid-July 2024.

Over 82 percent of children aged 6–23 months and PBW had limited access to sufficient quantity and quality of food, consuming two or fewer food groups each day. A sharp

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Conflict/insecurity** In October 2023, escalating hostilities led to mass displacement from northern governorates. Those who stayed faced limited access to food, water, services, safe shelter or humanitarian assistance. Agriculture, livestock and fishing livelihoods have been destroyed by the hostilities, with over 27 percent of cropland damaged, mostly in Gaza governorate (FAO, December 2023).

By mid-February 2024, nearly 43 percent of all cropland in the Gaza Strip had been damaged (FAO, February 2024).

Over 75 percent of the population, or 1.7 million people, were displaced as of February 2024 (UNRWA, February 2024). Conditions are likely to continue to sharply deteriorate if hostilities persist, and humanitarian access is significantly restricted (IPC Famine Review Committee, December 2023).

The conflict disrupted markets, with only 20 percent of people in northern governorates able to buy food.

Another 40 percent relied primarily on friends and family networks although there were reports that mutual support networks were deteriorating.

In the Gaza Strip, prices of the few remaining market commodities soared, while a complete depletion of wheat flour, eggs and dairy was reported.

A further shrinking of markets was expected if conditions continued, with food accessibility constraints particularly acute among IDPs in increasingly overcrowded facilities (IPC Famine Review Committee, December 2023; WFP Gaza Market Monitor, January 2024) (see *Focus: Palestine (Gaza Strip)*, page 133).

DISPLACEMENT


 **1.7M** IDPs, as of **31 January 2024**

Source: UNRWA, February 2024.

West Bank

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Escalating violence, displacement and severe economic disruptions drove worsening acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (DECEMBER)

 **0.6M** people or **18%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity (FSC 2023).

This represents a sharp deterioration in acute food insecurity since 2022 linked to heightened violence, rising unemployment and demolition-related displacement. Increasing violence and market shocks are likely to worsen acute food insecurity in the West Bank in 2024.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Conflict/insecurity** Violence in the West Bank had already increased between October 2022 and September 2023 (ACLED, December 2023). Since early October 2023, settler violence and demolitions in the West Bank increased, resulting in more population displacement (OCHA, January 2024).

 **Economic shocks** Persistent violence has disrupted economic activities causing job losses and diminished incomes, which, combined with the irregular distribution of salaries for Palestinian Authority employees, have severely lowered household purchasing power. Nearly a third of businesses faced complete or partial closures, and over 94 percent witnessed a substantial decline in sales with Nablus, Salfit and Bethlehem the most affected (FSC, December 2023).

Agricultural and livestock production is limited due to increasing attacks, property destruction, movement restrictions, tightened checkpoints and road closures, which have prevented farmers and livestock breeders from accessing their fields, olive groves, grazing land and water resources (FSC, December 2023).

Import constraints for production inputs have led to a significant decrease in cultivated land compared with last year. Furthermore, producers cannot access regional markets to sell their produce. More than 9 500 hectares of olive groves remain unharvested due to restricted access resulting in a direct financial setback of USD 10 million (FSC, December 2023).

From 7 October, Israel revoked most of the work permits provided to the 150 000 Palestinian workers who entered Israel daily, accounting for around USD 3 billion in income. The International Labour Organization estimates that around 32 percent of employment has been lost since 7 October, equivalent to 276 000 jobs (ILO, December 2023; FSC, November 2023). The Israeli-imposed movement restrictions within the West Bank are creating difficulties for around 67 000 Palestinian workers who have jobs in governorates outside their place of residence, putting them at risk of losing their jobs (UNDP, November 2023).


ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Step deterioration of the economic situation, localized conflict and assistance cuts amplified acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2023 (AUGUST–OCTOBER)

 **12.9M** people or 55% of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 2.1 million were IDPs in camps.

Acute food insecurity levels remained as high as 2022 as the economic situation continued to deteriorate amid a surge in conflict that led to more displacement. Accelerating currency depreciation and rising prices of essential goods gravely affected households' purchasing power.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by categories of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: HNO/HRP.

A protracted major food crisis A low-income country, the Syrian Arab Republic has been included in all GRFC editions as a major food crisis and one of the ten largest food crises in terms of numbers of people for the last seven years.

The number of acutely food-insecure people increased from 6.5 million in 2018 and 6.6 million in 2019 to 12.4 million (60 percent of the population) by November 2020. This was due to protracted and intensifying conflict leading to further displacement, high unemployment and increasing food prices but also to a change in methodology for the Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment.


Since 2020, the percentage of acutely food-insecure people has remained persistently high at more than half of the population due to the continuation of hostilities and compounding effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, adverse weather events, regional fragility and macroeconomic instability.


DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

 **Economic shocks** Accelerating currency depreciation in 2023, coupled with fuel scarcity, fuel price increases and rising transportation and freight charges, contributed to rising prices of both imported and domestically produced food (FAO-GIEWS, January 2023; WB, summer 2023).

By December 2023, the cost of living (measured by the Minimum Expenditure Basket) had more than doubled for a family of five since December 2022 and quadrupled in just two years. The government's almost complete removal of fuel subsidies in September was expected to add to the cost-of-living crisis, especially during the winter (FAO & WFP, October 2023). The rising cost of agricultural inputs reduced the area planted and crop yields (FAO, 2023).

 **Conflict/insecurity** The intensity of the conflict has gradually declined over recent years, allowing aid agencies to operate in northern areas albeit in highly risky conditions. However, air strikes, shelling, raids and arrests, particularly in areas of mixed or contested control near frontlines, still hinder people's access to livelihoods and key services (Insecurity Insight, October 2023) and impede humanitarian access. In October 2023, the Northern Syrian Arab Republic and Deir-ez-Zor governorate witnessed the most significant escalation of hostilities since 2019, resulting in the displacement of over 120 000 people (HNO 2024, December 2023).

 **Natural disasters** The earthquakes that hit northern areas in February 2023 uprooted hundreds of thousands of families and severely damaged infrastructures already weakened by the conflict. They caused temporary but widespread economic and trade disruptions, and delays in delivering humanitarian assistance (WB, summer 2023). Many families lost their main breadwinner due to death or injury, at a time when the economic situation was already dire (HNO 2024, December 2023).

 **Weather extremes** During the 2022/23 season, farmers and livestock herders faced erratic temporal distribution of rainfall, heatwaves and wildfires. Although wheat production was higher than the drought-stricken 2022 harvest, it remained 29–35 percent below the pre-conflict 1986–2012 average (FAO, July 2023). The water crisis in the northeast – linked to three years of decreasing rainfall – significantly impacted livelihoods, diminished incomes for agricultural workers, decreased yields and contributed to higher food prices (REACH, November 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

 **7.3M** forcibly displaced people by 2023

 **6.6M** IDPs

 **0.6M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: H NAP 2023.

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.4M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in 2023

0.3M MAM


0.1M SAM

0.5M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition




Source: HNO 2023.

Source: HNO, 2023.


 **Recurrent disease outbreaks, waterborne diseases, a prolonged drought and water crisis, vaccine-preventable illnesses and food insecurity are contributing to increased acute malnutrition levels.** Latakia governorate reported an Emergency-level acute malnutrition prevalence of 10 percent (HNO 2024, December 2023).


According to a 2022 SMART survey conducted in nine northwestern districts in Aleppo and Idlib governorates near the Turkish border, the prevalence of GAM increased from 2.5 percent in 2021 to 3.3 percent in 2022 and the prevalence of SAM from 0.4 percent to 0.9 percent (SMART 2022).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

 **Inadequate services** In the Northeast Syrian Arab Republic, small communities and informal sites, cut off from water networks, have limited access to safe and affordable drinking water due to the ongoing water crisis. Populations often rely on untreated water sources and inadequate sewage systems, increasing the risk of waterborne disease, especially cholera (REACH, November 2023).

Communities in the Northwest were already experiencing a cholera outbreak, overwhelmed health facilities and harsh winter weather when the earthquake hit in February 2023. Access to health services and sanitation further deteriorated in areas heavily affected by the earthquake (WB, summer 2023).

 **Inadequate practices** An Extremely Critical 4.6 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive a Minimum Acceptable Diet (down from 10.9 percent in 2021) and 36 percent of children aged 6–59 months are anaemic (SMART 2022), which is considered a moderate public health problem. With only 39 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women having Minimum Dietary Diversity, maternal nutrition is also a concern. In women aged 15–49 years, 52.7 percent reportedly suffer from anaemia, which is considered a severe public health problem (Nutrition Cluster, Save the Children & UNICEF, February 2023; SMART 2022).


 **Lack of food** Food security factors – linked to market disruptions and reduced mobility, destruction of cropland, and high inflation that disrupts household consumption patterns and impacts the affordability of a healthy diet – are driving malnutrition.

Food secure Marginally food secure Food secure + marginally food secure Moderate and severe acute food insecurity Total population

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Localized conflict, economic warfare and paused humanitarian assistance are driving this alarming food crisis.

PEAK 2023 (JULY–AUGUST)

18.0M people or **56%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This FEWS NET analysis is not directly comparable with the IPC analysis for the January–May 2022 peak, which found 55 percent of the population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Yemen remained one of the three worst food crises in terms of prevalence of high acute food insecurity, driven by persistently elevated food and fuel prices amid low purchasing power in Internationally Recognized Government (IRG)-controlled areas, economic warfare and localized conflict in frontline districts in central and southwestern Yemen, including Ta'iz and Ma'rib.



Source: FEWS NET, June 2023.

PROJECTION 2024 (JUNE)

Up to 19.0M people or **60%** of the total population projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

In areas controlled by the IRG, rising food prices and declining access to income will likely impair food access. In Sana'a-based authorities (SBA) areas, a pause in humanitarian assistance for 9.5 million people began in December 2023 due to funding cuts (WFP, January 2024).

Source: FEWS NET, December 2023.

A protracted major food crisis A low-income country, Yemen has been included in all GRFC editions as one of the five worst food crises in terms of numbers and share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Conflict/insecurity has been the primary driver of acute food insecurity and malnutrition since 2015 when active fighting broke out. According to IPC analyses, populations faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the peak period each year between 2018 and 2022 primarily in SBA-controlled areas. Even before the conflict, more than half of the population was in IPC Phase 3 or above, mainly driven by structural instability aggravated by human-induced factors and weather extremes (IPC, November 2022).



DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Despite relative stability in 2023 between the IRG and SBA, localized violence continued. In 2023, IOM Yemen tracked 59 000 individuals who experienced displacement at least once from IRG-controlled areas (IOM, December 2023), which is similar to 2022. Economic warfare between the IRG and SBA thwarted the recovery of livelihoods. Most notably, the SBA blocked oil exports from IRG areas, denying the IRG its most important source of revenue and foreign exchange (FEWS NET, December 2023).

Rising tensions in the Red Sea in late 2023 threatened to destabilize the uncertain truce (ACLED, January 2024).

Economic shocks The overall volume of food and fuel imports increased by 6 percent during 2023. However, imported food items declined by 17 percent via Red Sea ports and 62 percent via Aden and Mukalla ports in December 2023 compared with November, mainly associated with geopolitical tensions in the region increasing shipping and insurance costs. Some key traders anticipated shortages in food supply in 2024 if tensions escalated in the region (WFP, January 2024).

In SBA-controlled areas, local currency appreciation eased food price increases, while in IRG areas currency depreciation contributed to increasing food prices. In the last quarter of 2023, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket was 9–23 percent higher in IRG areas and 3–18 percent lower in SBA areas (FAO, Government of Yemen,

December 2023).

A pause in humanitarian assistance for 9.5 million people in the north from December 2023 due to funding cuts was expected to lead to widening food consumption gaps and/or severe coping strategies for millions of poor households (WFP, January 2024).

In IRG areas, the SBA's blockade of oil exports exacerbated pre-existing shortages of government revenue and foreign exchange. The local currency was anticipated to continue depreciating in 2024, driving further food and fuel price increases (FEWS NET, December 2023).

Weather extremes Spring rains that were nearly double historical precipitation averages caused widespread flooding across the central highlands and western regions, including Sana'a, affecting over 165 000 people with damage to infrastructure and crops (UNDP, December 2023; EC, June 2023).

Cyclone Tej, which struck the southern Yemen coast in late October 2023, destroyed homes and public infrastructure, displaced thousands and disrupted livelihoods (FAO, Government of Yemen, December 2023).

DISPLACEMENT

2.9M forcibly displaced people by 2023

2.8M IDPs **70 600** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, September 2023. Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2023.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION

0.5M children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in October 2022–September 2023

0.3M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in October 2022–September 2023



0.4M MAM 0.1M SAM

Source: Yemen IPC TWG, June 2023.

Acute malnutrition has worsened in IRG-controlled areas since 2022 with Critical levels in parts of Abyan, Shabwah, Al Hodeidah, Southern Lowlands, Ta'iz, Ad Dhalī' and Lahj (IPC, June 2023).

DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


Inadequate practices Amid instability and a worsening economy, mothers and caregivers prioritize survival, and struggle to seek and follow recommended child-feeding practices (IPC, June 2023). Only 20 percent of children were exclusively breastfed in the first six months of life in two-thirds of analysed areas, considered a Critical level. About 40 percent of children received a minimally diverse diet (SMART 2022).

conflict have reduced the quality of health and WASH services and extent of immunization coverage. Increased incidence of waterborne diseases such as diarrhoea – especially in areas affected by flooding – as well as fever, acute respiratory infection and the persistent measles outbreak (since 2022) underlie high levels of acute malnutrition (IPC, June 2023).


Inadequate services Government and humanitarian financing shortfalls and

Lack of food The ongoing conflict disrupts markets, livelihood opportunities and access to humanitarian assistance with severe repercussions for food intake (IPC, June 2023).

PEAK 2023 (JUNE–SEPTEMBER)



Source: Yemen IPC TWG, May 2023.




ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Conflict/insecurity is the root cause of displacement and acute food insecurity among refugees in the region.

The 13-year conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic is at the root of Syrian refugees' acute food insecurity. Conditions in their home country are not yet conducive for large-scale voluntary returns in safety and dignity.

Syrian refugees in Egypt

PEAK 2023 (JANUARY–MARCH)

 **0.2M** people or 69% of the Syrian refugee population in Egypt faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, January 2023).

No data were available in 2022 but this represents a significant deterioration since 2021 when 27 percent of the analysed population faced high acute food insecurity (WFP, 2021).

The conducive protection environment in Egypt allows regular residency permit renewal for registered refugees, though permit renewal delays impact access to essential services. Syrian refugees, mainly in urban areas, access public services and government subsidies, but Egypt is facing economic strains including high inflation which stood at over 40 percent each month in May–August 2023 (WFP, 2023).

Increased living costs led to refugees adopting negative coping mechanisms (3RP, January 2024). By early January 2024, 0.4 million Sudanese refugees had sought safety in Egypt since the start of the Sudan crisis in April 2023, according to the Government of Egypt (UNHCR, January 2024).



Syrian refugees in Iraq

PEAK 2023 (AUGUST–SEPTEMBER)


 **19 000** people or 7% of the registered Syrian refugees living in camps faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, January 2023).

Data were not available for 2022. Syrian refugees in Iraq fare relatively better than in other countries in the region. They mostly live in the Kurdistan region and are largely of Kurdish origin, which may explain the high degree of acceptance by both authorities and the local population and thus, of inclusion. Refugees have access to public services and have their rights fulfilled on a par with the local community (3RP, January 2024).

Relative stability in Iraq has facilitated refugees gaining greater access to public services and social protection schemes provided by the Government, but years of conflict have weakened the capacity and resilience of national institutions (3RP, January 2024).

Syrian refugees in Jordan

PEAK 2023 (JULY–SEPTEMBER)

 **0.5M** people or 62% of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, June 2023).

Although food security overall improved compared with the previous year, in 2023 certain groups, such as female-headed households, unemployed people and disabled people have become more vulnerable. Debt levels have risen as refugees borrow to cover their basic food expenses.

While 81 percent of refugees in Jordan live outside of camps, the rest live in Za'atari and Azraq camps where they have limited freedom of movement. The average income of Syrian refugees in Jordan decreased by 12 percent between the fourth quarter of 2022 and the first of 2023. Over 90 percent were in debt to cover their basic needs. Unemployment stood at 28 percent for Syrian refugees, affecting women and youth the most. Around 0.02 million Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic (PRS) also faced

significant vulnerabilities stemming from high unemployment rates and rising living costs. According to an August 2023 UNRWA survey, only 30 percent of adult PRS in Jordan were employed (3RP, January 2024).

Syrian refugees in Türkiye

PEAK 2023 (SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER)

 **4 000** people or 8% of Türkiye's 52 500 registered Syrian refugees living in camps faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, 2023).

No analysis was available for the more than 3 million Syrians in Türkiye living outside of camps (DGMM, February 2024).

High inflation and currency fluctuations are straining both refugees and host communities. Official figures in September 2023 put inflation at 61.5 percent, with disproportionate impact on low-income households, especially in transport, food and housing. Some 85 percent of Syrian families reported a deterioration/decline in their financial situation in the past year and 92 percent reported not being able to cover all their monthly basic households needs (UNHCR, December 2023).

In southeast Türkiye, 1.7 million Syrian refugees were among the 9 million individuals affected by the earthquakes in February 2023 (3RP, January 2024).

Algeria has been hosting Sahrawi refugees in five camps near Tindouf since 1975 as a result of the Western Sahara conflict. It is understood to be the second longest standing refugee situation in the world (SSRP, November 2023).

Sahrawi refugees in Algeria


PEAK 2023 (JUNE)

 **38 000** people or 28% of Algeria's 0.2M Sahrawi refugees in camps faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, 2023).

This represents a significant improvement since 2022 when 74 percent of the analysed population faced high acute food insecurity.

Living in isolated camps near Tindouf in the Sahara desert, Sahrawi refugees face limited livelihood opportunities and harsh environmental conditions. Due to the critical shortage of funding, minimum humanitarian standards cannot be met in most sectors, and most refugees are believed to live below the poverty line (UNHCR, 2023).

Three countries/population groups selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2024 either had data gaps or data not meeting GRFC technical requirements.



Armenia

Armenia has been selected for the GRFC 2021, GRFC 2022 and GRFC 2024 because of assistance provided to refugees and host communities, but the available data did not meet GRFC technical requirements. Conflict escalation in the Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2022 after the war in 2020 led to restrictive measures in the Lachin Corridor, the only supply route to the region. Since December 2022, significant shortages of essential supplies including food, fuel, vital medical treatment and healthcare for a population of 120 000, including 30 000 children, have been

observed in the Lachin Corridor area (ACAPS, October 2023).

Between mid-September and early October 2023, military hostilities between the two countries dramatically escalated, and within weeks over 100 500 people were displaced into Armenia as refugees. This represented an estimated 80 percent of the population of the Karabakh region and, most of them women and children, already lacking food, exhausted and in need of immediate assistance. The arrival of refugees will strain the host population and public services (Armenia RRP, October 2023).

Islamic Republic of Iran (Afghan refugees)

The Islamic Republic of Iran (Afghan refugees) has qualified for inclusion in each edition since the GRFC 2020 due to displacement and recently external assistance provided to refugees. Except for this edition, for which no data on acute insecurity were available for 2023, the data have not met GRFC technical requirements.

The country hosts at least 4.5 million Afghans, the majority (71 percent) of whom are women and children. Around 33 000 of the most vulnerable documented refugees live in 20 settlements in 13 different provinces. Afghans can access education and health services, but lack of documentation makes it challenging for them to

access employment, leaving many vulnerable to unstable incomes and difficult work conditions (UNHCR, January 2024).

The Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan 2024 targets 0.6 million more refugees than in 2022. Of the 2.8 million targeted, 1.3 million are Afghan refugees, 0.5 million Afghans of other status and 1 million Iranians from the host community (UNHCR, January 2024).

Inflation and food inflation decreased over the course of 2023, but still stood at 38.5 and 38.9 percent respectively in January 2024 (Trading Economics, January 2024), making it difficult for refugee households to cover their basic needs.

Libya

Libya has been included in all editions of the GRFC until this edition when no data on acute food insecurity were available. On 10 September, Storm Daniel struck northeastern Libya with torrential rains and flash flooding affecting an estimated 884 000 people in five provinces and overwhelming local capacities to respond (OCHA, September 2023). Over 43 400 people were initially displaced, at least 4 300 people lost their lives and over 8 000 were still missing as of 31 October, 2023 (IFRC, November 2023). Damages and losses account for about 3.6 percent of Libya's 2022 GDP, with the primary

impact on infrastructure, and the cost of reconstruction and recovery estimated to be USD 1.8 billion (WB, January 2024).

The people in need of humanitarian assistance consist primarily of displaced Libyans, asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants (OCHA, January 2023). Libya is a major transit country for migrants attempting to travel to Europe through the Central Mediterranean Route and hosts over 56 000 people, mostly men, seeking international protection, primarily from the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Eritrea (UNHCR, January 2024).

■ Data gap ■ Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements/population not analysed



Appendices

Appendix 1

Trends graphs showing numbers of people by phase of acute food insecurity

.....

Appendix 2

Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024

.....

Appendix 3

Table of forcibly displaced populations, 2023

.....

Appendix 4

Indicators


.....

Technical notes

.....


Bibliography

Figure A.1 Numbers of people (in millions) in Afghanistan by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2024



Source: Afghanistan IPC TWG.


Figure A.2 Numbers of people (in millions) in Benin by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Benin CH.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.3 Numbers of people (in millions) in Burkina Faso by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Burkina Faso CH.


Figure A.4 Numbers of people (in millions) in Burundi by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2024



Source: Burundi IPC TWG.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed 3+ - Crisis or worse Total population

Figure A.5 Numbers of people (in millions) in Cabo Verde by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Cabo Verde CH.


Figure A.6 Numbers of people (in millions) in Cameroon by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2023



Source: Cameroon CH.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.7 Numbers of people (in millions) in Central African Republic by phase of acute food insecurity, 2015–2024



Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG.


Figure A.8 Numbers of people (in millions) in Chad by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Chad CH.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed 3+ - Crisis or worse Total population

Figure A.9 Numbers of people (in millions) in Côte d'Ivoire by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Côte d'Ivoire CH.


Figure A.10 Numbers of people (in millions) in Kenya by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024



Source: Kenya IPC TWG.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.11 Numbers of people (in millions) in Madagascar by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2023



Source: Madagascar IPC TWG.


Figure A.12 Numbers of people (in millions) in Malawi by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2024



Source: Malawi IPC TWG.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.13 Numbers of people (in millions) in Mali by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Mali CH.


Figure A.14 Numbers of people (in millions) in Niger by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Niger CH.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.15 Numbers of people (in millions) in Nigeria by phase of acute food insecurity, 2015–2023



Source: Nigeria CH.


Figure A.16 Numbers of people (in millions) in Senegal by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Senegal CH.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.17 Numbers of people (in millions) in Somalia by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2023



Source: Somalia IPC TWG.


Figure A.18 Numbers of people (in millions) in South Sudan by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2024



Source: South Sudan IPC TWG.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Figure A.19 Numbers of people (in millions) in Togo by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2023



Source: Togo CH.

TABLE A.1 Acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 (page 1 of 4)

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES		2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2024 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							
		SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT			
M	%			Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)	M	%			Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)	M	%			Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)		
Afghanistan	GIEWS	HNO	Nov 2022– Mar 2023	43.1	100%	14.3	33%	19.9	46%	HNO	Nov 2022– Mar 2023	43.1	100%	14.3	33%	19.9	46%	IPC	Nov 2023– Mar 2024	44.5	100%	16.4	37%	15.8	36%
Algeria – Sahrawi refugees	External assistance	WFP/ CARI ¹	Oct 2022	0.2	76%	N/A	N/A	0.1	74%	WFP/ CARI ¹	Jun 2023	0.2	67%	N/A	N/A	0.04	28%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Angola	External assistance	IPC	Oct 2021– Mar 2022	32.1	9%	0.7	25%	1.6	58%	FEWS NET (RM) ¹	Jan–Apr 2023	34.0	100%	N/A	N/A	1.3	4%	FEWS NET (RM) ¹	Jun–Aug 2024 ⁴	32.1	100%	N/A	N/A	1–1.5	3–5%
Bangladesh	GIEWS	WFP/ENA ¹	Jan–Dec 2022	164.7	1% ⁵	N/A	N/A	1.3	89%	IPC	May–Sep 2023	165.2	23%	12.9	34%	11.9	31%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Benin	External assistance	Not selected for analysis in 2022								CH	Mar–May 2023	13.0	99%	1.9	15%	0.5	4%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024 ⁴	13.0	67%	1.1	13%	0.2 ²	3%
Burkina Faso	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	21.9	97%	5.3	25%	3.5	16%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	22.3	100%	5.1	23%	3.4 ³	15%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	23.0	100%	5.3	23%	3.0	13%
Burundi	GIEWS	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	12.0	100%	3.7	30%	1.4	12%	IPC	Apr–May 2023	12.3	100%	5.5	44%	2.3	19%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2024 ⁴	12.3	100%	5.6	45%	1.2	10%
Cameroon	GIEWS	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	27.2	100%	6.8	25%	3.6	13%	CH	Mar–May 2023	28.5	95%	6.1	22%	3.0	11%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024 ⁴	28.5	98%	5.2	19%	2.5 ²	9%
Central African Republic	GIEWS	IPC	Sep 2022– Mar 2023	6.1	100%	2.0	33%	2.7	44%	IPC	Sep 2022– Mar 2023	6.1	100%	2.0	33%	2.7	44%	IPC	Apr–Aug 2024	6.1	100%	2.4	38%	2.5	41%
Chad	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	16.8	94%	4.0	25%	2.1	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	18.0	100%	4.0	22%	2.3	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	18.0	95%	5.3	31%	2.9	17%
Colombia	HNO	Not selected for analysis in 2022								WFP/ CARI ¹	Nov–Dec 2023	52.2	100%	N/A	N/A	1.6	3%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Colombia – migrants	HRP	WFP/ CARI ¹	Jun–Aug 2022	4.6	100%	N/A	N/A	2.9	62%	WFP/ CARI ¹	Jun–Aug 2022	4.6	100%	N/A	N/A	2.9	62%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Congo	GIEWS	Data not meeting the GRFC requirements								WFP/ CARI ¹	Oct–Nov 2023	6.2	100%	N/A	N/A	1.9	31%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Congo – refugees	GIEWS	WFP/ CARI ¹	Aug–Sep 2022	0.1	100%	N/A	N/A	0.04	65%	WFP/ CARI ¹	Aug–Sep 2022	0.1	94%	N/A	N/A	0.04	65%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Côte d'Ivoire	External assistance	Not selected for analysis in 2022								CH	Jun–Aug 2023	27.5	79%	3.5	16%	1.0 ²	5%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	27.5	87%	4.1	17%	1.0 ²	4%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	GIEWS	IPC	Jul–Dec 2022	109.6	94%	44.9	44%	26.4	26%	IPC	Jan–Jun 2023	109.6	94%	46.8	45%	25.8	25%	IPC	Jan–Jun 2024	113.6	96%	52.3	48%	23.4	22%
Djibouti	GIEWS	IPC	Jul–Dec 2022	1.2	100%	0.4	35%	0.2	16%	IPC	Jul–Dec 2023	1.2	100%	0.4	34%	0.3	24%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Dominican Republic	External assistance	IPC	Oct 2022– Feb 2023	10.6	100%	3.4	32%	1.6	15%	IPC	Oct 2022– Feb 2023	10.6	100%	3.4	32%	1.6	15%	IPC	Dec 2023– Apr 2024	10.7	100%	2.3	21%	1.1	10%

¹ Disaggregation as per IPC/CH five phases is not available for this methodology² Estimates for this country DO NOT include any populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above)³ Estimates for this country include populations facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)⁴ Projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.⁵ Bangladesh analysis in 2022 covered refugees population only

TABLE A.1 Acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 (page 2 of 4)

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES		2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2024 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							
FORCIBLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS ARE INDICATED IN BLUE	SELECTION CRITERIA IN 2023	SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT			
				M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)
Ecuador – migrants	External assistance	WFP/CARI	Jul–Aug 2022	0.5	100%	N/A	N/A	0.3	60%	WFP/CARI	Jul–Aug 2022	0.5	100%	N/A	N/A	0.3	60%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Egypt – Syrian refugees	External assistance	Data not meeting the GRFC requirements								WFP/CARI	Jan–Mar 2023	0.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.2	69%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
El Salvador	HRP	IPC	Mar–May 2022	6.3	100%	3.3	52%	0.9	14%	HRP	Mar–Jun 2023	6.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.9	14%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Eswatini	GIEWS	IPC	Dec 2021–Mar 2022	1.2	100%	0.4	32%	0.3	29%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	1.2	100%	0.4	36%	0.3	24%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	1.2	100%	0.4	36%	0.3	24%
Ethiopia	GIEWS	HRP ¹	Jun–Jul 2022	115.0	100%	N/A	N/A	23.6	21%	FEWS NET*	Jul–Aug 2023	115.0	100%	N/A	N/A	19.7	17%	FEWS NET ¹	Jun–24	115.0	100%	N/A	N/A	17–18	15–16%
Guatemala	HRP	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	17.4	100%	7.1	41%	4.6	26%	IPC	Jun–Aug 2023	17.6	100%	6.3	36%	4.3	24%	IPC	Sep 2023–Feb 2024 ⁴	17.6	100%	6.7	38%	3.1	18%
Guinea	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	13.3	84%	3.8	34%	1.2	11%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	13.5	85%	2.6	23%	0.7	6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	13.9	100%	2.3	17%	0.7	5%
Haiti	GIEWS	IPC	Sep 2022–Feb 2023	10.9	91%	2.8	28%	4.7 ³	48%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2023	10.9	91%	2.7	27%	4.9	49%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2024	11.7	84%	2.4	24%	5.0	50%
Honduras	HRP	IPC	Jun–Aug 2022	9.6	100%	3.7	39%	2.6	28%	IPC	Jun–Aug 2023	9.7	100%	3.4	35%	2.4	25%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Iraq – Syrian refugees	External assistance	HNO ¹	Jun–Aug 2022	41.2	15%	3.7	60%	0.2	3%	WFP/CARI ¹	Aug–Sep 2023	0.3	97%	N/A	N/A	0.02	7%	No projections available as per 7 Jan 2024							
Jordan – Syrian refugees	External assistance	WFP/CARI ¹	Jul–Sep 2022	0.7	100%	N/A	N/A	0.5	82%	WFP/CARI ¹	Jan–Mar 2023	0.7	100%	N/A	N/A	0.5	62%	No projections available as per 7 Jan 2024							
Kenya	GIEWS	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	55.0	27%	5.1	34%	4.4	29%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2023	51.5	32%	5.9	36%	5.4	32%	IPC	Oct 2023–Jan 2024 ⁴	51.5	32%	7.5	45%	1.5	9%
Lebanon	GIEWS	IPC	Sep–Dec 2022	5.8	92%	2.4	45%	2.0	37%	IPC	Jan–Apr 2023	5.8	92%	2.1	40%	2.3	42%	IPC	Apr–Sep 2024	5.6	100%	2.5	46%	1.1	20%
Lesotho	GIEWS	IPC	Jan–Mar 2022	2.1	70%	0.5	36%	0.3	23%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	2.7	55%	0.5	36%	0.3 ²	22%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	2.7	55%	0.5	36%	0.3 ²	22%
Liberia	GIEWS	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	4.8	100%	1.0	21%	0.4	8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	4.8	100%	1.4	29%	0.5	11%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Madagascar	GIEWS	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	29.0	21%	2.5	40%	2.2	36%	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	29.0	21%	2.5	40%	2.2	36%	IPC	Feb–Apr 2024	30.8	25%	3.4	44%	1.7	22%
Malawi	GIEWS	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	19.3	100%	6.7	35%	3.8 ²	20%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	19.7	100%	6.2	31%	4.4	22%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	19.7	100%	6.2	31%	4.4	22%
Mali	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	21.7	100%	4.4	20%	1.8	8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	22.3	100%	4.1	18%	1.3 ³	6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	22.9	100%	4.0	18%	1.4	6%

¹ Disaggregation as per IPC/CH five phases is not available for this methodology² Estimates for this country DO NOT include any populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above)³ Estimates for this country include populations facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)⁴ Projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.

TABLE A.1 Acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 (page 3 of 4)

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES		2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2024 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							
FORCIBLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS ARE INDICATED IN BLUE	SELECTION CRITERIA IN 2023	SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT			
				M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)
				Mauritania	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	4.4	100%			1.4	33%	0.9	20%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023			3.5	100%	0.8	23%	0.5	13%
Mozambique	GIEWS	IPC	Nov 2022– Mar 2023	32.0	100%	13.0	40%	3.1	10%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	32.4	49%	5.9	37%	3.3	20%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	32.4	49%	5.9	37%	3.3	20%
Myanmar	GIEWS	HNO*	Jan–Dec 2022	56.0	100%	N/A	N/A	15.2	27%	⁵	Sep–Oct 2023	56.5	99%	16.6	30%	10.7	19%	HNRP ¹	Jun–Aug 2024	56.5	99%	16.9	30%	12.9	23%
Namibia	GIEWS	IPC	Dec 2021– Mar 2022	2.6	100%	0.8	33%	0.8	30%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	2.6	100%	0.9	36%	0.7	26%	IPC	Oct 2023– Mar 2024	2.6	100%	0.9	36%	0.7	26%
Nicaragua	External assistance	FEWS NET (RM) ¹	Jun–Aug 2022	6.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.2	3%	FEWS NET (RM) ¹	Jul–Aug 2023	6.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.2	3%	FEWS NET (RM) ¹	Jun 2024	6.3	100%	N/A	N/A	0.1–0.2	2–5%
Niger	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	24.9	100%	7.3	29%	4.4	18%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	25.9	100%	7.3	28%	3.3	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	26.2	100%	6.7	26%	3.2	12%
Nigeria	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	219.5	72%	40.8	26%	19.5	12%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	213.4	91%	64.0	33%	24.9	13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	213.4	98%	66.9	32%	26.5	13%
Pakistan	GIEWS	IPC	Sept–Dec 2022	215.3	9%	6.2	32%	8.6	43%	IPC	Nov 2023– Jan 2024	224.8	16%	13.4	36%	11.8	32%	IPC	Nov 2023– Jan 2024	224.8	16%	13.4	36%	11.8	32%
Palestine – Gaza Strip	GIEWS	HNO ¹	May–July 2022	5.5	100%	N/A	N/A	1.5	28%	IPC	Dec 2023 – Feb 2024	2.2	100%	0.0	0%	2.2 ³	100%	IPC	Dec 2023– Feb 2024	2.2	100%	0.0	0%	2.2 ³	100%
Palestine – West Bank										FSC ¹	Dec 2023	3.2	100%	N/A	N/A	0.6	18%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Peru – migrants	External assistance	Data not meeting the GRFC requirements								WFP/CARI ¹	May 2023	1.5	100%	N/A	N/A	0.8	50%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Senegal	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	17.7	100%	3.9	22%	0.9	5%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	17.9	100%	4.4	24%	1.3	7%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	18.0	100%	4.1	23%	0.7	4%
Sierra Leone	GIEWS	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	8.6	100%	3.6	42%	1.6	19%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	7.5	100%	2.9	39%	1.2	16%	CH	Jun–Aug 2024	7.7	100%	2.9	38%	1.5 ²	19%
Somalia	GIEWS	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	17.0	100%	3.1	18%	5.6 ³	33%	IPC	Apr–Jun 2023	17.0	100%	3.3	19%	6.6 ³	39%	No projections available as per 7th Jan 2024							
South Sudan	GIEWS	IPC	Apr–Jul 2022	12.4	100%	2.9	24%	7.7 ³	63%	IPC	Apr–Jul 2023	12.4	100%	3.1	25%	7.8 ³	63%	IPC	Apr–Jul 2024	12.6	100%	3.5	28%	7.1 ³	56%
Sri Lanka	GIEWS	FAO-WFP/CARI ¹	31 May– 17 Jun 2022	22.2	100%	N/A	N/A	6.3	28%	FAO-WFP/CARI ¹	Aug–Oct 2023	22.6	100%	N/A	N/A	5.5	24%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Sudan	GIEWS	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	47.9	100%	17.6	37%	11.7	24%	IPC	Jul–Sep 2023	48.6	100%	17.1	35%	20.3	42%	IPC	Oct 2023– Feb 2024 ⁴	48.2	100%	18.0	37%	17.7	37%
Syrian Arab Republic	GIEWS	Vasyr/CARI	Jul–Nov 2022	22.1	100%	7.9	36%	12.1	55%	Vasyr/CARI ¹	Oct 2023	23.4	100%	N/A	N/A	12.9	55%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							

¹ Disaggregation as per IPC/CH five phases is not available for this methodology² Estimates for this country DO NOT include any populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above)³ Estimates for this country include populations facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)⁴ Projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.⁵ Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP

TABLE A.1 Acute food insecurity estimates, 2022–2024 (page 4 of 4)

COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES		2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people								2024 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							
FORCIBLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS ARE INDICATED IN BLUE	SELECTION CRITERIA IN 2023	SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT				SOURCE/ METHOD- OLOGY	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	REFERENCE POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ANALYSED		POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES OR EQUIVALENT			
				M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)			M	%	Phase 2 (M)	Phase 2 (%)	Phase 3 or above (M)	Phase 3 or above (%)
				Togo	External assistance	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	8.3	73%			1.4	23%	0.6	9%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023			8.3	73%	1.3	22%	0.5	8%
Türkiye – Syrian refugees	External assistance	Data not meeting the GRFC requirements								WFP/CARI ¹	Sep–Dec 2023	0.1	100%	N/A	N/A	<0.01	8%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
Uganda	GIEWS	FEWS NET ¹	Jun–Aug 2022	44.2	100%	N/A	N/A	2.3	5%	FEWS NET ¹	Apr–Jun 2023	45.6	100%	N/A	N/A	1.8	4%	FEWS NET ¹	Jun 2024	44.2	100%	N/A	N/A	1.5–2	3–5%
Ukraine	GIEWS	REACH-WFP/CARI ¹	Oct–Nov 2021	35.6	100%	N/A	N/A	8.9	25%	REACH-WFP/CARI ¹	Sep 2023	33.0	100%	N/A	N/A	7.3	22%	No projections available as per 7 January 2024							
United Republic of Tanzania	GIEWS	IPC	Oct 2022–Feb 2023	61.7	17%	3.3	31%	1.1	10%	IPC	Oct 2022–Feb 2023	61.7	17%	3.3	31%	1.1	10%	IPC	Nov 2023–April 2024	59.9	12%	2.2	31%	0.9*	13%
Yemen	GIEWS	IPC	Jan–May 2022	31.9	100%	8.6	27%	17.4 ³	55%	FEWS NET ¹	Jul–Aug 2023	32.0	100%	N/A	N/A	18.0	56%	FEWS NET ¹	Jun 2024	32.0	100%	N/A	N/A	18–19	56–59%
Zambia	GIEWS	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	18.9	71%	6.6	49%	2.0 ²	14%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	19.6	47%	3.8	42%	2.0	23%	IPC	Oct 2023–Mar 2024	19.6	47%	3.8	42%	2.0	23%
Zimbabwe	GIEWS	FEWS NET ¹	Oct–Dec 2022	15.3	100%	N/A	N/A	3.0	20%	FEWS NET ¹	Jan–Mar 2023	15.4	100%	N/A	N/A	3.5	23%	FEWS NET ¹	Mar 2024	15.3	100%	N/A	N/A	3–3.5	20–23%

¹ Disaggregation as per IPC/CH five phases is not available for this methodology² Estimates for this country DO NOT include any populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above)³ Estimates for this country include populations facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)⁴ Projection for 2024 does not refer to the expected peak period.

TABLE A.2 Forcibly displaced populations, 2023 (page 1 of 3)

 Country/territory of asylum/displacement	Total number of forcibly displaced people	Internally displaced people (IDPs)		Refugees, asylum-seekers and other people in need of international protection (OIPs)		
		Number	Source	Number	Source*	Main countries/territories of origin
Afghanistan	5.7 M	5.7 M	IOM	0.05 M	UNHCR	Pakistan; Iran (Islamic Republic of); Tajikistan
Algeria	0.1 M	-		0.1 M	UNHCR	Western Sahara; Syrian Arab Republic; Mali
Angola	0.05 M	-		0.05 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Guinea; Côte d'Ivoire
Bangladesh	1.1 M	0.15 M	IOM	1.1 M	UNHCR	Myanmar; Somalia
Benin	0.01 M	1 200	IDMC	0.01 M	UNHCR	Togo; Burkina Faso; Central African Republic
Burkina Faso	2.1 M	2.1 M	CONASUR	0.04 M	UNHCR	Mali; Central African Republic; Niger
Burundi	0.2 M	0.07 M	IOM	0.09 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Rwanda; Uganda
Cameroon	1.6 M	1.1 M	OCHA and IOM	0.5 M	UNHCR	Central African Republic; Nigeria; Chad
Central African Republic	0.5 M	0.5 M	IOM	0.07 M	UNHCR	Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Chad
Chad	1.3 M	0.2 M	IOM	1.1 M	UNHCR	Sudan; Central African Republic; Cameroon
Colombia	9.4 M	6.9 M	Government of Colombia	2.5 M	UNHCR**	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of); Ecuador; Cuba
Congo	0.09 M	0.03 M	IDMC	0.07 M	UNHCR	Central African Republic; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Rwanda
Côte d'Ivoire	0.04 M	-		0.04 M	UNHCR	Burkina Faso; Liberia; Central African Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo	7.5 M	6.9 M	IOM	0.5 M	UNHCR	Central African Republic; Rwanda; South Sudan
Djibouti	0.04 M	0.01 M	IOM	0.03 M	UNHCR	Somalia; Ethiopia; Yemen
Dominican Republic	0.1 M	-		0.1 M	UNHCR**	Data not available
Ecuador	0.6 M	-		0.6 M	UNHCR**	Colombia; Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of); Cuba
Egypt	0.8 M	-		0.8 M	UNHCR	Sudan; Syrian Arab Republic; Palestine
El Salvador	300	-		300	UNHCR	Honduras; Nicaragua
Eswatini	3 000	-		3 000	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Somalia; Ethiopia
Ethiopia	4.5 M	3.5 M	IOM	1 M	UNHCR	South Sudan; Somalia; Eritrea
Guatemala	3 500	-		3 500	UNHCR	El Salvador; Honduras; Nicaragua
Guinea	2 200	-		2 200	UNHCR	Sierra Leone; Liberia; Democratic Republic of the Congo
Haiti	0.3 M	0.3 M	IOM	-	UNHCR	
Honduras	400	-		400	UNHCR	Nicaragua; El Salvador

* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023

** UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + OIP data from UNHRC, June 2023

TABLE A.2 Forcibly displaced populations, 2023 (page 2 of 3)


 Country/territory of asylum/displacement	Total number of forcibly displaced people	Internally displaced people (IDPs)		Refugees, asylum-seekers and other people in need of international protection (OIPs)		
		Number	Source	Number	Source*	Main countries/territories of origin
Iraq	1.4 M	1.1 M	IOM	0.3 M	UNHCR	Syrian Arab Republic; Iran (Islamic Republic of); Türkiye
Jordan	3.1 M	-		3.1 M	UNHCR***	Palestine; Syrian Arab Republic; Iraq
Kenya	0.7 M	0.03 M	IOM	0.7 M	UNHCR	Somalia; South Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo
Lebanon	1.4 M	0.07 M	IOM	1.3 M	UNHCR***	Palestine; Syrian Arab Republic; Iraq
Lesotho	700	-		700	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Eritrea; Cameroon; Zimbabwe
Liberia	1900	-		1900	UNHCR	Côte d'Ivoire; Syrian Arab Republic; Democratic Republic of the Congo
Madagascar	0.09 M	0.09 M	IOM	1 000	UNHCR	Pakistan; Yemen; Mali
Malawi	0.7 M	0.7 M	Government of Malawi	0.05 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Burundi; Rwanda
Mali	0.4 M	0.4 M	IOM	0.07 M	UNHCR	Burkina Faso; Niger; Mauritania
Mauritania	0.1 M	-	IOM	0.1 M	UNHCR	Mali; Central African Republic; Syrian Arab Republic
Mozambique	0.7 M	0.7 M	IOM	0.02 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Burundi; Somalia
Myanmar	2.6 M	2.6 M	UNHCR	-	UNHCR	
Namibia	7 100	-		7 100	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Burundi; Rwanda
Nicaragua	400	-		400	UNHCR	El Salvador; Honduras; Cuba
Niger	0.6 M	0.4 M	UNHCR	0.3 M	UNHCR	Nigeria; Mali; Sudan
Nigeria	3.5 M	3.4 M	IOM	0.09 M	UNHCR	Cameroon; Syrian Arab Republic; Niger
Pakistan	2.4 M	0.2 M	IOM	2.1 M	UNHCR	Afghanistan; Somalia; Yemen
Palestine	1.7 M	1.7 M	UNRWA	-	UNRWA	
Peru	1.6 M	0.07 M	IDMC	1.5 M	UNHCR**	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of); Colombia; Cuba
Senegal	0.02 M	8 400	IDMC	0.01 M	UNHCR	Mauritania; Central African Republic; Gambia
Sierra Leone	-	-		-	UNHCR	Liberia; Côte d'Ivoire; Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Somalia	1.3 M	1.2 M	IOM	0.0 M	UNHCR	Ethiopia; Yemen; Syrian Arab Republic
South Sudan	2.4 M	2 M	IOM	0.4 M	UNHCR	Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Ethiopia
Sri Lanka	600	-		600	UNHCR	Pakistan; Myanmar; Afghanistan

* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023

** UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + OIP data from UNHCR, June 2023

*** UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + UNRWA, September 2023

TABLE A.2 Forcibly displaced populations, 2023 (page 3 of 3)

 Country/territory of asylum/displacement	Total number of forcibly displaced people	Internally displaced people (IDPs)		Refugees, asylum-seekers and other people in need of international protection (OIPs)		
		Number	Source	Number	Source*	Main countries/territories of origin
Sudan	10 M	9.1 M	IOM	1.0 M	UNHCR	South Sudan; Eritrea; Ethiopia
Syrian Arab Republic	7.3 M	6.6 M	HNAP	0.6 M	UNHCR***	Palestine; Iraq; Afghanistan
Togo	0.05 M	0.02 M	IOM	0.0 M	UNHCR	Burkina Faso; Ghana; Central African Republic
Türkiye	3.6 M	-		3.6 M	UNHCR	Syrian Arab Republic; Iraq; Afghanistan
Uganda	1.6 M	4 800	IDMC	1.6 M	UNHCR	South Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Somalia
Ukraine	3.7 M	3.7 M	IOM	3 300	UNHCR	Afghanistan; Syrian Arab Republic; Russian Federation
United Republic of Tanzania	0.3 M	-		0.3 M	UNHCR	Burundi; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Somalia
Yemen	2.9 M	2.8 M	IOM	0.07 M	UNHCR	Somalia; Ethiopia; Syrian Arab Republic
Zambia	0.08 M	-		0.08 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Burundi; Somalia
Zimbabwe	0.02 M	-		0.02 M	UNHCR	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Mozambique; Burundi

* UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023

** UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + OIP data from UNHCR, June 2023

*** UNHCR nowcasted data, December 2023 + UNWRA, September 2023

Indicators

Access to basic drinking water services

Improved drinking water sources are those which, by nature of their design and construction, can deliver safe water. The WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply Sanitation and Hygiene subdivides the population using improved sources into three groups (safely managed, basic and limited) according to the level of service provided. To meet the criteria for a safely managed drinking water service, people must use an improved source meeting three criteria: accessible on premises; available when needed; and free from contamination. If the improved source does not meet any one of these criteria but a round trip to collect water takes 30 minutes or less, then it is classified as a basic drinking water service. If water collection from an improved source exceeds 30 minutes, it is categorized as a limited service (WHO and UNICEF).

Annual population growth (WHO)

This expresses the ratio between the annual increase in the population size and the total population for that year, usually multiplied by 100. The annual increase in the population size is defined as a sum of differences: the difference between births less deaths and the difference between immigrants less emigrants, in a given country, territory or geographic area at a given year (WHO).

Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance

The indicator measures the nutritional significance of imported cereals in meeting the caloric needs of a population. This metric considers both the quantity of cereal imports and their caloric contribution to the overall diet. By weighting cereal imports based on their caloric content, this measure provides a more nuanced understanding of a country's reliance on imported cereals for

meeting dietary energy requirements. It helps assess the vulnerability of a population to fluctuations in cereal imports and highlights the importance of cereals in ensuring food security and nutrition (FAO).

Crude Death Rate (CDR)

This indicator accounts for all the deaths that have occurred per day per 10 000 people over a given recall period (often 90 days) in an area or community. According to the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis, the CDR should not include trauma-related deaths, but should include deaths due to unknown causes (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

Exclusive breastfeeding

Exclusive breastfeeding in the first 6 months followed by the timely introduction of safe and nutritionally adequate complementary foods with continued breastfeeding until 2 years of age or beyond ensures children receive all the nutrients they need. This indicator refers to the percentage of infants aged 0–5 months who were fed only breastmilk during the previous day.

Prevalence ranges	Label
> 70%	Phase 1 – Acceptable/minimal
50–70%	Phase 2 – Alert/stress
30–49.9%	Phase 3 – Serious/severe
11–29.9%	Phase 4 – Critical/extreme
< 10%	Phase 5 – Extremely critical/catastrophic

Source: adapted from UNICEF Breastfeeding Score Card.

Food Consumption Score (FCS)

The FCS is a composite score based on households' dietary diversity, food consumption frequency, and the relative nutritional value of the different food groups, and it is considered a proxy of household food intake or caloric consumption. It is based on self-reported information about the household's consumption of eight standard food groups in the seven days prior to the survey.

The FCS is used to classify households based on standard thresholds into one of three food consumption groups: poor, borderline or acceptable food consumption.

Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES)

Food insecurity as measured by the FIES refers to limited access to food, at the level of individuals or households, due to lack of money or other resources. The severity is measured using a set of eight questions asking respondents to self-report conditions and experiences typically associated with limited access to food. For purposes of the Acute Food Insecurity IPC classification, the questions are asked with reference to the 30 days preceding the survey (FAO).

Food Expenditure Share (FES)

The FES is an indicator used to measure households' economic vulnerability. It determines the economic vulnerability without the need of having reference to a poverty line or minimum expenditure basket. The higher the share of households' consumption expenditure on food – out of the total consumption expenditure – the more vulnerable the households are to food insecurity. Each of the three modules must collect information on the value of purchases made in cash or on credit, as well as the value of consumed items from in-kind assistance and in-kind gifts. The food submodule must also capture the value of consumed food from own production (WFP).

Human Development Index (HDI) ranking (global)

A country's HDI value is determined by aggregating the country's scores in a vast assortment of indicators including life expectancy, literacy rate, rural populations' access to electricity, GDP per capita, exports and imports, homicide rate, multidimensional poverty index, income inequality, internet availability, and many more. These indicators are compiled into a single number between 0 and 1.0, with 1.0 being the highest possible human development. GRFC 2024 does not report the absolute value of the indicators but rather their ranking across all countries globally (UNDP).

Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS)

The HDDS, developed by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project (FANTA) and promoted by FAO, aims to reflect the economic ability of a household to access a variety of foods, as a proxy of household access to food. It is based on the concept of household dietary diversity, or the number of different food groups over a reference period. It is measured based on the households' self-reported consumption of 12 food groups in the previous 24 hours (yesterday).

Household Economy Analysis (HEA)

This is a livelihoods-based framework founded on the analysis of people in different social and economic circumstances. In particular, the HEA examines the self-reporting of information on: (i) how people access the food and cash they need; (ii) their assets, the opportunities available to them, and the constraints they face; and (iii) the options open to them in times of crisis. Two thresholds define basic needs in the HEA: the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. The HEA Survival Threshold represents the most basic needs, including minimum food

energy requirements (calorie requirements), the costs associated with food preparation and consumption if associated inputs are purchased (such as salt, fuelwood or kerosene), and expenditure on water for human consumption (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

Household Hunger Scale (HHS)

The HHS is a household food deprivation scale that is based on household's self-reported perception-based information as to whether they have experienced problems of food insecurity in the past 30 days or 4 weeks. It is an indicator developed by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project to classify the severity of food insecurity during that period. The HHS consists of three standard questions regarding access to food and hunger in the household, and is followed by questions about the frequency of occurrence (rarely, sometimes and often). It is then classified into three household hunger categories: 0–1 = little to no hunger in the household; 2–3 = moderate hunger in the household; 4–6 = severe hunger in the household.

GDP ranking

This refers to the GDP per capita at purchasing power parity expressed in USD. The total country GDP is divided by the mid-year population figure, where GDP is the total value of goods and services for final use produced by resident producers in an economy, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. In GRFC 2024, ranking of GDP in Asia, Latin America and Caribbean countries is relative to all the countries globally (WHO).

INFORM Risk

INFORM summarises the multitude of factors contributing to the risk for humanitarian crises and disasters into a single index. It combines 54 indicators into 3 dimensions of risk:

hazards (events that could occur) and exposure to them;

vulnerability (the susceptibility of communities to those hazards);

lack of coping capacity (lack of resources that can alleviate the impact).

The results give an overall risk score out of 10 for each country, and for each of the dimensions, categories and components of risk (EC-JRC).

Livelihood Coping Strategies (LCS)

This indicator is used to better understand the longer-term coping capacity of households. LCS measures the most severe livelihood coping strategy applied by the household during the 30 days prior to the interview, or that has been exhausted by the household within the 12 months prior to the interview, in response to a lack of food or money to buy food. The module includes at least ten coping strategies (four stress strategies, three crisis strategies and three emergency strategies), contextualized to the country context, based on the master list. LCS classifies households into four categories (no coping strategies, stress coping, crisis or emergency coping) based on the highest level of severity applied.

Minimum Acceptable Diet

This composite indicator combines meal frequency and dietary diversity to assess the proportion of children aged 6–23 months consuming a diet that meets the minimum requirements for growth and development.

Prevalence ranges	Label
> 70%	Phase 1 – Acceptable/minimal
40–70%	Phase 2 – Alert/stress
20–39.9%	Phase 3 – Serious/severe
10–19.9%	Phase 4 – Critical/extreme
< 10%	Phase 5 – Extremely critical/catastrophic

Source: Preliminary thresholds suggested by IFE Core Group.

Minimum Dietary Diversity

This indicator refers to the percentage of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from five or more out of eight food groups a day. The eight food groups are: (i) breastmilk; (ii) grains, roots and tubers; (iii) legumes and nuts; (iv) dairy products (infant formula, milk, yoghurt, cheese); (v) flesh foods (meat, fish, poultry and liver/organ meats); (vi) eggs; (vii) vitamin A-rich fruits and vegetables; (viii) other fruits and vegetables. In some surveys, Minimum Dietary Diversity is calculated based on seven food groups, excluding breastmilk. In these cases, the indicator refers to the percentage of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from four or more out of seven food groups a day (UNICEF).

Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB)

An MEB is defined as what a household requires to meet basic needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its average cost. It is a monetary threshold – the cost of these goods, utilities, services and resources – and is conceptually equivalent to a poverty line. It typically describes the cost of meeting one month's worth of essential needs. Since the MEB sets a monetary threshold for what is needed to cover essential needs, households whose expenditures fall below the MEB are defined as being unable to meet their essential needs. More information is available (WFP).

Minimum Meal Frequency

The indicator refers to the proportion of children aged 6–23 months who receive solid, semi-solid or soft foods at least the minimum number of recommended times a day depending on their age and whether they are breastfed (WHO).

Percentage of crop and rangelands growing period affected by drought conditions

The percentage of crop or rangeland growing period affected by drought conditions indicates how often drought warnings were triggered by the HotSpots of Agricultural Production (ASAP) early warning system based on Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) observations between 2003 and 2023 for crops or rangeland. NDVI is a measure of plant health and biomass. Drought warnings are calculated specifically for cropland and rangelands during their respective growing seasons. Warnings are only issued when significant negative NDVI anomalies are detected across large areas (more than 25 percent of the total active cropland or rangelands). This ensures the anomalies are linked to large-scale droughts, not localized events. Higher percentages in these metrics suggest a country has experienced more frequent large-scale declines in biomass, potentially indicating a greater risk of drought impacting crops or rangeland (EC-JRC, ASAP).

Percentage of households not consuming micronutrient-rich food (analysed in refugee populations)

This refers to the proportion of households with no member consuming any vegetables, fruits, meat, eggs, fish/seafood, or milk/milk products over a reference period of 24 hours (FAO).

Prevalence of anaemia

This indicator refers to the proportion of children aged 6–59 months and of reproductive age women (15–49 years) who are anaemic. Anaemia is a condition in which the number of red blood cells or their oxygen-carrying capacity is insufficient to meet physiological needs, which varies by age, sex, altitude, smoking and pregnancy status. Iron deficiency is thought to be the most common cause of anaemia globally, although other conditions, such as folate, vitamin B12 and vitamin A deficiencies, chronic inflammation, parasitic infections and inherited disorders can all cause anaemia. In its severe form, it is associated with fatigue, weakness, dizziness and drowsiness.

Pregnant women and children are particularly vulnerable (WHO).

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 5.0%	No public health problem
5.0–19.9%	Mild public health problem
20.0–39.9%	Moderate public health problem
≥ 40.0%	Severe public health problem

Source: WHO, 2008.

Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment

The indicator refers to the proportion of the total employed population engaged in agricultural, forestry and fishery activities within a country or region. This indicator is typically expressed as a percentage and provides insights into the significance of these primary sectors in the overall labour force of an economy (FAO).

Stunting

Low height-for-age is the result of chronic or recurrent undernutrition, usually associated with poverty, poor maternal health and nutrition, frequent illness and/or inappropriate feeding and care in early life. Stunting prevents children from reaching their physical and cognitive potential (UNICEF).

Under-5 death rate (U5DR)

This refers to all deaths per day of children aged under 5 (up to 59 months) per 10 000 children over a given recall period (often 90 days) in an area or community. The U5DR is typically around twice that of the CDR (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

Wasting

Low weight-for-height often indicates recent and severe weight loss, although it can also persist for a long time. It usually occurs when a person has not had food of adequate quality and quantity and/or they have had frequent or prolonged illnesses. Wasting in children is associated with a higher risk of death if not treated properly. In this report it is used as a synonym for acute malnutrition (UNICEF).

Technical notes

FIG. TN.1 Overview of the process of production and publication of the Global Report on Food Crises



All partners are in agreement with the approximate degree of magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries included in this report except where a disclaimer is present. The differences stem from the varying interpretations of the data related to the factors which contribute to or indicate acute food insecurity.

1 | PRELIMINARY WORK

Technical consultations

Technical consultations held with the Senior Committee at the beginning of the reporting cycle aimed to:

- Reaffirm the partner organisations’ engagement and responsibilities
- Confirm the scope of the report
- Provide initial guidance
- Endorse country selection criteria
- Agree on criteria for endorsement of data/analysis
- Agree on date of release and report workplan.

Selection of food-crisis countries/territories

FSIN and the Food Security Technical Working Group (TWG) led this process. The list of countries/territories and the selection rationale was then presented to the Senior Committee for endorsement.

The process was continuous throughout 2023 and finished on 31 December to ensure inclusiveness. During the year the following were identified:

- Countries/territories that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) in 2023. FAO-GIEWS classifies and regularly updates the list of countries requiring external assistance for food, dividing them into three categories: (1) countries with an exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production and supplies; (2) countries with widespread lack of access to food; and (3) countries with severe localized food insecurity. External assistance for logistical support, for capacity building, for longer-term poverty reduction or development purposes is not considered as a qualifying factor for a food crisis.
- Countries/territories that had a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in 2023
- Countries/territories considered low or lower/upper-middle-income that had not been identified by FAO-GIEWS assessments and that did not have an HRP, but requested external food assistance because of:
 - having populations affected by conflict/insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks.
 - hosting refugee populations who were assisted by UNHCR and WFP.
 - having over 1 million or at least 20 percent of its population forcibly displaced.

For countries hosting assisted refugee populations, only the *refugee populations* were selected. The host country was only selected if its *resident population* needed external food assistance.

Countries were excluded if none of the above criteria were met, even if acute food insecurity data were available, e.g. Ghana in 2023, or Côte d’Ivoire in 2022, or if they were high-income countries (according to the World Bank definition).

73 countries/territories identified as food crises in 2023 as a result of this process.

73 countries/territories selected for the GRFC 2024, by criterion

GIEWS list

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)

Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

Emergency external assistance in response to a shock

Angola, Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Peru, Tajikistan, Togo, Türkiye and Vanuatu.

Emergency external assistance in response to hosting refugees

Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Moldova and Rwanda.

2 | RESEARCH, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

Data endorsement

FSIN and Technical Working Groups:

- Validate the reliability/relevance of the data source and methodology
- Identify and endorse peak acute food insecurity estimates for 2023
- Identify and endorse peak acute food insecurity projections for 2024
- Identify and endorse malnutrition data
- Identify and endorse displacement data
- Identify and endorse key drivers of acute food insecurity.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY DATA

FSIN facilitated discussion with the Food Security TWG on the available acute food insecurity data for the selected countries/territories.

Data gathered must follow partnership criteria and requirements. The TWG evaluated the following before final endorsement:

Methodology

Did the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis provide an estimate or a projection of acute food insecurity. Did the methodology quantifying acute food insecurity levels provide an equivalence or approximation of IPC Phase 3 or above (see data endorsement).

Timeframe

Did the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis cover at least one month of 2023 and did the projection analysis cover at least one month of 2024. If no data were available for 2023, the TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data referring to Q3/Q4 of 2022.

Coverage

Whether the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis covered the whole country/territory. If not, the Food Security TWG discussed whether for certain countries/territories limited geographical analysis was appropriate and acceptable.

Consensus and participation

Whether the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis was based on multi-stakeholder technical consensus and/or a convergence of evidence and/or based on data collection by a trusted actor and/or endorsed at country level by the national stakeholders.

59 of the 73 countries/territories identified as food crises had **data available that met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024.

Out of the 73 countries/territories identified as food crises, **14 did not have data or did not meet the GRFC technical requirements**. Available information is however included in the regional sections.


Data sources and methodologies

The preferred source of data for acute food insecurity is the IPC/CH. If unavailable, the Technical Working Groups evaluate the use of other sources of evidence. These include:

- FEWS NET analyses which are IPC-compatible;
- WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators (CARI);
- food insecurity PiN of the Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs).

Although these alternative sources do not provide comparable disaggregation into Phases 3, 4 and 5, their estimates are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

FIG. TN.2 Population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, by methodology



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2024.

The endorsement of the data gathered in most cases took the following priority ranking:

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of acute food insecurity.

There are around 30 countries currently implementing the IPC. It provides the ‘big picture’ evidence base of food crises by assessing the following: how severe, how many, when, where, why, who, as well as the key characteristics of the food crisis. It provides data for two time periods – the current situation and a projection. This information helps governments, humanitarian actors and other decision-makers quickly understand a crisis (or potential crisis) and informs appropriate action.

The IPC makes the best use of the evidence available through a transparent, traceable and rigorous process. Evidence requirements to complete classification have been developed, considering the range of circumstances in which evidence quality and quantity may be limited while ensuring adherence to minimum standards.

FIG. TN.3 IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity reference table

Phase name and description		Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine
		Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)
Priority response objectives		Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	Urgent action required to →		
				Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps	Save lives and livelihoods	Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods
First-level outcomes refer to characteristics of food consumption and livelihood change. Thresholds that correspond as closely as possible to the Phase descriptions are included for each indicator. Although cut-offs are based on applied research and presented as global reference, correlation between indicators is often somewhat limited and findings need to be contextualized. The area is classified in the most severe Phase that affects at least 20% of the population.						
Food security first-level outcomes	Food consumption (focus on energy intake)	Quantity: Adequate energy intake Dietary energy intake: Adequate (avg. 2 350 kcal pp/day) and stable Household Dietary Diversity Score: 5–12 food groups and stable Food Consumption Score: Acceptable and stable Household Hunger Scale: 0 (none) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: 0–3 Household Economy Analysis: No livelihood protection deficit Food Insecurity Experience Scale: (FIES 30 days recall): <0.58	Quantity: Minimally Adequate Dietary energy intake: Minimally adequate (avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) Household Dietary Diversity Score: 5-FG but deterioration ≥1 FG from typical Food Consumption Score: Acceptable but deterioration from typical Household Hunger Scale: 1 (slight) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: 4–18 Household Economy Analysis: Small or moderate livelihood protection deficit <80% FIES: Between -0.58 and 0.36	Quantity: Moderately Inadequate – Moderate deficits Dietary energy intake: Food gap (below avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) Household Dietary Diversity Score: 3–4 FG Food Consumption Score: Borderline Household Hunger Scale: 2–3 (moderate) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (non-defining characteristics (NDC) to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Livelihood protection deficit ≥80%; or survival deficit <20% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	Quantity: Very Inadequate – Large deficits Dietary energy intake: Large food gap; well below 2 100 kcal pp/day Household Dietary Diversity Score: 0–2 FG (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Food Consumption Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Household Hunger Scale: 4 (severe) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Survival deficit ≥20% but <50% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	Quantity: Extremely Inadequate – Very large deficits Dietary energy intake: Extreme food gap Household Dietary Diversity Score: 0–2 FG Food Consumption Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Household Hunger Scale: 5–6 (severe) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Survival deficit ≥50% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)
	Livelihood change (assets and strategies)	Livelihood change: Sustainable livelihood strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: No stress, crisis or emergency coping observed	Livelihood change: Stressed strategies and/or assets; reduced ability to invest in livelihoods Livelihood coping strategies: Stress strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Accelerated depletion/erosion of strategies and/or assets Livelihood coping strategies: Crisis strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Extreme depletion/liquidation of strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: Emergency strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Near complete collapse of strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: Near exhaustion of coping capacity
Second-level outcomes refer to area-level estimations of nutritional status and mortality that are especially useful for identification of more severe phases when food gaps are expected to impact malnutrition and mortality. For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits should be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of the classification.						
Food security second-level outcomes	Global Acute Malnutrition based on Weight-for-Height Z-score	Acceptable <5%	Alert 5–9.9%	Serious 10–14.9% or > than usual	Critical 15–29.9% or > much greater than average	Extremely Critical ≥30%
	Global Acute Malnutrition based on Mid-Upper Arm Circumference	<5%	5–9.9%	10–14.9%	≥15%	
	Body Mass Index <18.5	<5%	5–9.9%	10–19.9%, 1.5 x greater than baseline	20–39.9%	≥40%
	Mortality*	Crude Death Rate <0.5/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate <1/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate <0.5/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate <1/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate 0.5–0.99/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate 1–2/10 000/day	Crude Death Rate 1–1.99/10,000/day or <2x reference Under-five Death Rate 2–3.99/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate ≥2/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate ≥4/10,000/day
For contributing factors, specific indicators and thresholds for different phases need to be determined and analysed according to the livelihood context; nevertheless, general descriptions for contributing factors are provided below.						
Food security contributing factors	Food availability, access, utilization, and stability	Adequate to meet short-term food consumption requirements Safe water ≥15 litres pp/day	Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water marginally ≥15 litres pp/day	Inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water >7.5 to 15 litres pp/day	Very inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water >3 to <7.5 litres pp/day	Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water ≤3 litres pp/day
	Hazards and vulnerability	None or minimal effects of hazards and vulnerability on livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability stress livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in loss of assets and/or significant food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in large loss of livelihood assets and/or extreme food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in near complete collapse of livelihood assets and/or near complete food consumption deficits

To ensure the application of the IPC in settings where access for collecting evidence is limited, specialized parameters have been developed. The IPC provides a structured process for making the best assessment of the situation based on what is known and shows the limitations of its classifications as part of the process.

IPC analysis teams consolidate and analyse complex evidence from different methods and sources (e.g. food prices, seasonal calendars, rainfall, food-security assessments, etc.), but the IPC allows them to describe their conclusions using consistent language and standards and in a simple and accessible form. This harmonized approach is particularly useful in comparing situations across countries and regions, and over time.

The IPC technical manual version 3.1 provides information to understand and critically utilize IPC products and the protocols, including tools and procedures, to conduct the classification itself. See <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/ipc-manual/en/>

Classifying Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)

Famine is classified at area level in the IPC according to an internationally accepted standard based on the following three criteria:

- At least 1 in 5 households face an extreme lack of food.
- At least 30 percent of children suffer from wasting.
- At least two people for every 10 000 or four children under five years old for every 10 000 are dying each day due to outright starvation or the interaction of malnutrition and disease.

Given the severity and implications of this classification, all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols must be met before an area is classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). See IPC version 3.1.

Areas can be classified in Famine Likely if

minimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine may be occurring or will occur. This classification should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

The IPC supports Famine prevention by highlighting the following:

- IPC Phase 4 Emergency is an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.
- Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This is the case when less than 20 percent of the population is experiencing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) conditions and/or when malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not (or not yet) reached Famine thresholds. These households experience the same severity of conditions even if the area is not yet classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This can occur due to the time lag between food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality, or in the case of a localized situation.
- Projections of Famine can be made even if the areas are not currently classified in Famine, thus allowing early warning.

Risk of Famine is an IPC statement that highlights the potential deterioration of the situation compared with the most-likely scenario expected during the projection period. Although it is not an IPC classification, it indicates a worst-case scenario that has a reasonable probability of occurring.

Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multi-dimensional analytical framework used by CILSS for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

It aims to inform national and regional food-crisis prevention and management systems. It considers various indicators of food and nutrition security outcomes and contributing factors.

The CH relies on existing food security and nutrition information systems that have been in place in most Sahelian countries since 1985, and more recently in other coastal countries of West Africa.

There are 18 countries currently implementing the CH: Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

The CH manual version 2.0 clarifies the specific functions and protocols for carrying out an integrated and consensual analysis of acute food and nutrition insecurity.

See <http://www.cilss.int/index.php/2019/10/04/cadre-harmonise-manuel-version-2-0/>

IPC/CH five-phase classification

As a result of technical developments of the CH tools and processes and harmonization efforts carried out over the last decade, the IPC and the CH acute food insecurity approaches are very close to each other and give comparable figures of acute food insecurity.

The five-phase classification is the same though there are a few differences pertaining to the use of certain indicators, classification of Famine and estimation of humanitarian assistance.

Classification into five phases (1) None/Minimal, (2) Stressed, (3) Crisis, (4) Emergency, (5) Catastrophe/Famine is based on a convergence of available evidence, including indicators related to food consumption, livelihoods, malnutrition and mortality. Each phase has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene and thus influences priority response objectives. Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) are deemed to be those in need of urgent food, livelihood and nutrition assistance.

Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) require a distinct set of actions – ideally disaster risk reduction and livelihood protection interventions.

FEWS NET

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) classification is IPC-compatible, which means it follows key IPC protocols but is not built on multi-partner technical consensus, so it does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

Funded and managed by USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), FEWS NET provides early warning and evidence-based analysis of acute food insecurity to inform humanitarian and development response. FEWS NET monitors 30 countries, 22 in presence and eight remotely, where it analyses the dynamics of food, nutrition and livelihood security so policymakers can design programmes that address the root causes of persistent or recurrent acute food insecurity, undernutrition and vulnerability.

CARI

WFP has developed, and uses, the Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology. This methodology is also commonly used by other food security partners in their assessments. CARI is a widespread practice for Multi-Sector Needs Assessments, used in calculating the People in Need figure for countries/territories not covered by IPC/CH analyses.

Before any intervention, WFP analyses the food security situation with partners to perform effective targeting, determines the most appropriate type and scale of intervention and ensures the most efficient use of humanitarian resources.

The CARI addresses the multiple dimensions of food security through five indicators – Food Consumption Score, reduced Coping Strategies Index, Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) OR Food Expenditure Share, and Livelihood Coping Strategies.

Each surveyed household is classified into one

of four food security categories –food secure, marginally food secure, moderately acutely food insecure and severely acutely food insecure. The results are presented within the CARI food security console, which provides the prevalence of each available CARI food security indicator. The aggregate results provide the population’s overall food security outcome or Food Security Index (FSI).

Populations that are classified as ‘moderately acute food insecure’ and ‘severely acute food insecure’ as per WFP’s CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. In this year’s edition, for upper-middle-income countries with WFP CARI analyses only, resident populations classified as “severely food insecure” have been considered.

The indicators included within the CARI approach can be used within IPC/CH analyses, but there are many differences between the two methods. The fundamental difference is that the CARI analyses primary data from a single household survey, while the IPC/CH uses a ‘convergence-of-evidence’ approach, incorporating and analysing a variety of secondary information. While the CARI assesses the situation at a fixed point in time with no projection, the IPC/CH provides the current snapshot and a projection based on the most likely scenario for any period in the future.

Change in CARI methodology

The third edition of CARI, launched in December 2021, introduced two changes. First, the food consumption domain included a reduced Coping Strategies Index in addition to Food Consumption Group.

Secondly, Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) became the preferred measure for economic vulnerability instead of food expenditure share. This is better for assistance targeting purposes. The main implication for the use in GRFC is the comparison of the CARI findings with prior surveys.

The ECMEN indicator identifies the percentage of households whose expenditures exceed the

FIG. TN.4 Number of countries by data sources for the 2023 peak estimates and 2023 projection estimates

Data sources	Methodology	2023*	2024
IPC	IPC/CH five phase classification	24	21
CH	IPC/CH five phase classification	14	13
FEWS NET	In-country presence	4	4
	Remote Monitoring	2	2
WFP	CARI	9	
FAO/WFP	CARI	1	
REACH	CARI	1	
HNO	CARI	1	
HNO/HNRP	Other accepted food security analysis methodology at country level	4	1

* There are 59 countries/territories with data available and endorsed in 2023, but the Palestine assessment consists of different sources for West Bank and the Gaza Strip, each following a different methodology, so the numbers in this column add up to 60.

Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB). A MEB is defined as what a household requires in order to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its cost.

The MEB covers those needs that households meet fully or partially through the market. It serves as a monetary threshold that can be used to assess a household’s economic capacity to meet their needs. To compute the ECMEN, household expenditures are used as a proxy for household economic capacity.

See CARI methodology <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000134704/download/>

Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and other estimates

OCHA HNOs provide the People in Need (PiN) figure for the Food Security and Livelihoods cluster, based on data collected during the year and it is endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team in each country/territory.

Similarly, food insecurity estimates are provided by OCHA in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and Joint Response Plan (JRP). When no other

sources for acute food insecurity estimates are available, the GRFC food security TWG assesses the methodology of the PiN to ensure it is based on acute food insecurity indicators and used as an approximation to Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) for use in the GRFC. Exceptions can be made based on the Food Security TWG discussion and agreement on the data that appear to best reflect a particular country’s food security situation.

In cases where there was no consensus within the TWG, the ultimate decision over country inclusion and what data to use in the report is deferred to the Senior Committee.

All partners agree with the approximate degree of magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries/territories included in this report.

Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements and data gaps

As a result of this rigorous process, there are countries where food security information is

available, but the source does not use the methods endorsed by the GRFC Food Security TWG. The information is acknowledged but not included until further studies on its comparability with the other methodologies used mean it can be endorsed as equivalent/approximate to IPC Phase 3 and above. This is the case, for instance, for estimates acquired through remote data collection. The Senior Committee validates these data for inclusion in the report.

Such countries are listed in the GRFC as ‘**data not meeting GRFC technical requirements**’ and reported at the end of each regional section.

If no public analysis for the year in question is available, the country/territory selected for inclusion in the GRFC is a **data gap**.

Acute food insecurity peak for 2023

Among data available for a given country/territory that have been endorsed for 2023 and validated by the TWG according to the criteria listed above, the analysis/assessment reporting the highest number of acutely food-insecure people is selected as the peak. It does not necessarily reflect the latest analysis available.

The **peak** can be either an analysis made for the current period in 2023 or a projection made in 2022 or 2023 and referring to a period of the year 2023. If none of the above are available, an analysis covering Q3/Q4 of 2022 can be used as peak, if considered still relevant by the Food Security TWG.

The **peak projection** is based on the highest number of people facing high levels of acute food-insecurity in 2023, as reported by endorsed data sources available as of January 2024.

For this GRFC 2024 report, the cut-off date for data inclusion was 7 January 2024 so the projection estimates only partially cover 2024.

Analyses that straddle 2023 and 2024 are considered for both years and, if reporting the highest number of people compared to other available analyses in the two years, the same analysis is used as the peak for both 2023 and 2024.

A projection update or a new analysis covering at least part of the previous projection period overrides the original projection findings since it is based on more up-to-date information, hence providing more accurate findings.

Data from non-IPC/CH (FEWS NET, CARI and HNO analyses) sources are presented in the country narratives according to their specific terminology and categorization.

The wording 'high levels of acute food insecurity' or 'IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, or equivalent' are used to include both IPC/CH estimates and any food security estimates that are based on non-IPC/CH data sources reflecting an approximation of IPC Phase 3 and above.

Information is presented in summary tables as IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent without further breakdown to more specific IPC/CH Phases.

Major food crises

A country/territory is defined as a major food crisis when its acute food insecurity estimates meet one or more of the following criteria:

- At least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- At least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- Any area classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above.
- Included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response-level 3.

44 countries/territories were identified as major food crises in 2023.

Protracted food crises

A country/territory is defined as a protracted food crisis when it is included in all editions of the GRFC.

FIG. TN.5 The IPC Acute Malnutrition Scale

Phase name and description	Phase 1 Acceptable	Phase 2 Alert	Phase 3 Serious	Phase 4 Critical	Phase 5 Extremely Critical
	Less than 5% of children are acutely malnourished.	5-9.9% of children are acutely malnourished..	10-14.9% of children are acutely malnourished.	15-29.9% of children are acutely malnourished. The mortality and morbidity levels are elevated or increasing. Individual food consumption is likely to be compromised.	30% or more children are acutely malnourished. Widespread morbidity and/or very large individual food consumption gaps are likely evident.
The situation is progressively deteriorating, with increasing levels of acute malnutrition. Morbidity levels and/or individual food consumption gaps are likely to increase with increasing levels of acute malnutrition.					
Priority response objective to decrease acute malnutrition and to prevent related mortality. ²	Maintain the low prevalence of acute malnutrition.	Strengthen existing response capacity and resilience. Address contributing factors to acute malnutrition. Monitor conditions and plan response as required.	Urgently reduce acute malnutrition levels through →		
			Scaling up of treatment and prevention of affected populations.	Significant scale-up and intensification of treatment and protection activities to reach additional population affected.	Addressing widespread acute malnutrition and disease epidemics by all means.
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) based on weight for height Z-score (WHZ)	<5%	5.0 to 9.9%	10.0 to 14.9%	15.0 to 29.9%	≥30%
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) based on mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC)	<5%				
			5-9.9%		
					10-14.9%
					≥15%
*GAM based on MUAC must only be used in the absence of GAM based on WHZ; the final IPC Acute Malnutrition phase with GAM based on MUAC should be supported by an analysis of the relationship between WHZ and MUAC in the area of analysis and also by using convergence of evidence with contributing factors. In exceptional conditions where GAM based on MUAC is significantly higher than GAM based on WHZ (i.e. two or more phases), both GAM based on WHZ, and GAM based on MUAC should be considered, and the final phase should be determined with convergence of evidence.					

Any country/territory included in all GRFC editions and consistently identified as a major food crisis is then defined as a protracted major food crisis.

36 countries/territories were identified as **protracted food crises** in 2023, **19** of them as **protracted major food crises**.

NUTRITION DATA

FSIN facilitated discussions with the Nutrition TWG on the available malnutrition data for the selected countries/territories.

Data gathered must follow the partnership criteria and requirements. The Nutrition TWG evaluated the analyses and indicators available for the reporting year, i.e. 2023 in the case of the GRFC 2024. If no data were available for 2023, the Nutrition TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data from 2021 and 2022. Projections for 2024 were considered if the analysis covered at least one month of 2024.

Data were screened for all 73 countries/territories selected but, for internal consistency, they were aggregated and reported at global and regional level for only the 59 countries/territories that had acute food insecurity data meeting the GRFC technical requirements.

35 out of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories in the GRFC 2024 had data available on acute malnutrition that **met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024.

Data sources and methodologies

The inclusion in the GRFC of data regarding the burden of malnutrition, which covers the number of children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women between 15 and 49 years of age suffering from acute malnutrition during a specific period, adheres to a prioritized list of data

sources as follows:

1. IPC Acute Malnutrition analyses
2. Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO), or Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP)
3. National estimates, from UNICEF and WFP.

Exceptions can be made based on the Nutrition TWG discussions regarding the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's nutritional situation. This is primarily due to different analysis coverage, periods of analysis or when a country/territory has information from several sources.

For reporting on outcome levels, which refer to the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 and pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW), the following sources are considered:

1. Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys
2. Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and DHS national surveys
3. Standardised Expanded Nutrition Surveys (SENS)
4. and DHS national surveys.

The IPC Acute Malnutrition Scale


This scale classifies the severity of acute malnutrition in the population under assessment. The IPC analysis process reviews all contributing factors affecting acute malnutrition in the area of analysis, such as dietary intake, disease, feeding and care practices, health and WASH environment, and contextual information such as access to services and mortality (see figure TN.5).

SMART surveys

Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) is an inter-agency initiative launched in 2002 by a network of organizations and humanitarian practitioners.

The SMART Methodology is an improved survey method that balances simplicity (for rapid assessment of acute emergencies) and technical soundness. It draws from the core elements of

FIG. TN.6 UNICEF's conceptual framework was used as an 'entry point' for the drivers (lack of food, inadequate practices and inadequate services).



several methodologies and it is based on the two most vital and basic public health indicators for the assessment of the magnitude and severity of a humanitarian crisis (see Indicators in Appendix 4):

- Nutritional status of children under five.
- Mortality rate of the population.

For categorizing wasting from SMART surveys the World Health Organization (WHO) cut-off values for public health significance are used.

Malnutrition peak for 2023

Among the data endorsed for the GRFC 2024 and validated by the TWG based on the criteria outlined above, the analysis or assessment that reports the highest number of acutely malnourished children and PBW during a specific

period of the year is selected as the peak. This selection does not necessarily coincide with most recent analyses available.

The peak data may originate from an analysis conducted in 2023 or from projections made in 2022 or 2023, pertaining to any period within 2023. If such data are unavailable, most recent analyses from 2021 or 2022 may serve as the peak for those years, provided the Nutrition TWG deems it still relevant.

For this edition of the GRFC, the cut-off date for data inclusion was 7 January 2024.

FIG. TN.7 Severity index for prevalence of wasting in children aged 6–59 months

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 2.5%	Very low
2.5–< 5%	Low
5–< 10%	Medium
10–< 15%	High
≥ 15%	Very high

Source: De Onis et al. *Public Health Nutrition*, 2018. Available at: <https://www.who.int/nutrition/team/prevalence-thresholds-wasting-overweight-stunting-children-paper.pdf>

DISPLACEMENT DATA

FSIN facilitated discussions with the Displacement TWG on the available displacement data for the selected countries/territories.

Gathered data must follow the partnership criteria and requirements.

The TWG evaluated the analyses and data available for the reporting year. If no data were available for 2023, the Displacement TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data from the previous year.

Analyses covering the whole country/territory are generally preferred, but for certain countries/territories only some areas were analysed.

Data were screened for all 73 countries/territories selected but, for internal consistency, they were aggregated and reported at global and regional level for only the 59 countries/territories that had acute food insecurity data meeting the GRFC technical requirements.

Out of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories in the GRFC 2024, **35** had data for all categories of forcibly displaced persons that **met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024.

Data sources and methodologies

The data for refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants are provided by UNHCR

The data sources for internally displaced people adhere to the following priority ranking:

1. International Organization for Migration (IOM)
2. International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)
3. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Exceptions to the above priority rankings can be made based on the Displacement TWG discussions and agreement on the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's displacement situation. This is primarily due to different analysis coverage, timings or when a country/territory has information from several sources. For example, UNRWA is the source for Palestine displacement data for global and regional aggregations in the report.

Displacement figures for 2023

The recentness of available data varies. The most recent UNHCR data for refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants are from mid-year 2023. UNHCR also provides nowcasting data that estimates displacement figures for refugees and asylum-seekers for the end of December 2023. GRFC uses UNHCR's nowcasting data for regional and global aggregations when available. UNRWA data on Palestine refugees and asylum-seekers are from September 2023.


Data used for regional and global aggregations for internally displaced persons are the most recent available and vary depending on when the analysis is conducted at the country level. When IOM data are not available and the most recently available data (2022) from IDMC's GRID are used for regional and global aggregations.

DRIVERS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

The drivers of food crises are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, making it difficult to pinpoint one specific trigger or main driver for each food crisis.

The GRFC 2023 takes a practical approach by estimating which is the most salient driver for each country/territory out of:

- Conflict/insecurity
- Weather extremes
- Economic shocks.

 **Conflict/insecurity** includes interstate and intra-state conflicts, internal violence, banditry and criminality, civil unrest or political crises often leading to population displacements and/or disruption of livelihoods and food systems.

It is a key driver of acute food insecurity because in conflict situations civilians are frequently deprived of their income sources and or have difficulties in accessing food as food systems and markets are disrupted, pushing up food prices and sometimes leading to scarcities of water and fuel, or of food itself.


Landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices often destroy agricultural land, mills, storage facilities, machinery etc.

Conflict prevents businesses from operating and weakens the national economy, reducing employment opportunities, increasing poverty levels and diverting government spending towards the war effort.

Health systems are usually damaged or destroyed, leaving people reliant on humanitarian support – yet increasingly, insecurity and roadblocks prevent humanitarian convoys from reaching the most vulnerable, or aid agencies face lengthy delays, restrictions on personnel or the type or quantity of aid supplies, or insufficient security guarantees. Parties to conflict can deny people access to food as a weapon of war, especially in areas

under blockade/ embargo. Food insecurity itself can become a trigger for violence and instability, particularly in contexts marked by pervasive inequalities and fragile institutions. Sudden spikes in food prices tend to exacerbate the risk of political unrest and conflict (FAO et al., 2017).


For countries with conflict/insecurity as the primary driver during the past year, change to another primary driver needs serious consideration as recovery from conflict/insecurity takes a long time and may remain as the underlying cause of food insecurity. In cases where conflict/insecurity has reduced and/or localized, with other drivers showing a predominant effect, the change in the primary driver from the previous year is considered.

 **Weather extremes** include droughts, floods, dry spells, storms, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons and the untimely start of rainy seasons.

Weather extremes drive food insecurity by directly affecting crops and/or livestock, cutting off roads and preventing markets from being stocked. Poor harvests push up food prices and diminish agricultural employment opportunities and pastoralists' terms-of-trade, lowering purchasing power and access to food, and triggering an early lean season when households are more market-reliant because of reduced food stocks.

Adverse weather events are particularly grave for smallholder farmers and pastoralists who rely on agriculture and livestock-rearing to access food and often lack the resilience capacities to withstand and recover from the impacts of such shocks. People's vulnerability to weather shock events rests on their capacity to adapt and bounce back after their livelihood has been affected, as well as the scale and frequency of shocks. Repeated events further erode capacity to withstand future shocks.

Weather events and changes in climate can lead to an intensification of conflict, such as between pastoralist herders and farmers over access to water and grazing. There is ample evidence suggesting that natural disasters – particularly droughts – can aggravate existing civil conflicts.

 **Economic shocks** at country level can affect the food insecurity of households or individuals through various channels.

Macroeconomic shocks may lead to increases in acute food insecurity through for instance, a contraction in GDP leading to high unemployment rates and consequent loss of income for those affected households, or a significant contraction in exports and/or a critical decrease in investments and other capital inflows, bringing a significant currency depreciation and high inflation, increasing production costs and food prices and worsening terms of trade which may lead to increases in acute food insecurity.

High debt and limited fiscal space constrain economic growth, increase vulnerability to economic shocks and detract from development spending.

Increases in world market prices of staple grains, oil and agricultural inputs can affect food availability, push up domestic food prices for consumers and reduce their purchasing power. Economic shocks can also occur at a more localized level or hit only a particular socioeconomic category of households. For instance, pastoralists' facing lack of animal feed, veterinary services, subsequent deteriorating livestock body conditions and depressed livestock prices are likely to be affected by a reduction in purchasing power and face a constrained access to food as a result.

Crop pests, livestock disease and natural disasters are also indicated as primary/secondary/tertiary drivers when relevant.

FSIN and the Food Security TWG agree the primary driver of acute food insecurity for each selected country based on what happened in the country during the year and information on the number of people affected by each of the shocks. For countries with two or more drivers affecting different parts of the country or different population groups, the primary driver is chosen by estimating which driver affected the largest number of people and their food security at country level. While acknowledging that other

drivers underlie the acute food insecurity numbers in each country in addition to the primary driver, the GRFC aggregates the number of countries by primary driver at the global level.

For countries where the analysis is purely focused on the displaced populations, the primary driver reflects the reason those populations are displaced from their country of origin.

It is also acknowledged that food insecurity is not driven solely by the occurrence of a shock, but rather by the interaction between shocks and structural vulnerabilities. Some of the main indicators of vulnerability for each country are discussed in the regional sections of chapter 2.

Drafting

FSIN initiates the drafting process based on data endorsed by the Technical Working Groups. Some sections of the report are open to partners to contribute to the drafting directly in a shared document environment.

Visualising the data

FSIN produces relevant infographics and maps to facilitate communication of the data.

Where infographics show numbers of acutely food-insecure people, they are disaggregated by phase where possible. In order to better contextualize the levels of acute food insecurity, the total country population and numbers of people in IPC/CH phases 1 and 2 are also shown.

Maps

Boundaries and names shown, and designations used on the maps in this document do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

3 | REVIEW AND CLEARANCE

Review and quality control check

FSIN shares all drafts produced with the Technical Working Groups for technical review.

In case of controversies, discussions within the TWG take place until consensus is reached on the draft report. Otherwise it is referred to the Senior Committee to provide guidance on addressing gaps and lack of consensus as well as troubleshoot on remaining technical challenges. Comments from this first review round ensuring the technical accuracy and internal consistency of the draft report are then incorporated into the second draft of the GRFC .

The Senior Committee reviews and comments on the second draft providing recommendation on, but not limited to, the overall structure and messaging of the report. FSIN and Technical Working Groups implement Senior Committee recommendations and refine the draft.

For the GRFC 2024, there have been two iterations of review by the Senior Committee. After each review period, a discussion among partners is facilitated by FSIN to ensure consensus is reached on all aspects and information reported in the GRFC.

At the end of this process, the final draft is proof-read by FSIN.

Institutional clearance

Each member of the Senior Committee facilitates the validation of the report by each partner organisation.

4 | RELEASE AND DISSEMINATION

FSIN produces the digital and physical publication of the full GRFC report and related products.

In coordination with the Global Network Against Food Crises, a communications campaign is developed and implemented to maximize visibility and outreach. The GRFC-related products include the English, Spanish and French versions of the GRFC In Briefs, the interactive version, and stand-alone assets including maps, country pages, spotlights, technical notes and more.

The GRFC is launched during a hybrid event with the main partners.

During the calendar year and according to the assessment calendars in different regions, FSIN, in coordination with regional partners produces and publishes regional reports to provide in-depth information on specific areas and regions. Dissemination, including outreach campaigns and events, is organized in coordination with regional partners.

GRFC 2024

Limitations and data challenges

There are no estimates for populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) due to the use of non-IPC/CH data sources in 20 countries/territories: Algeria (refugees), Angola, Colombia (residents and migrants), Congo (residents and refugees), Ecuador (migrants), Ethiopia, Egypt, Arab Rep (refugees), Iraq (refugees), Jordan (refugees), Nicaragua, Palestine (West Bank), Peru (migrants), Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye (refugees), Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

Lack of/low data availability for refugee food security

Refugee food security is measured in various ways across refugee populations and data are not systematically collected, disaggregated, consolidated or shared.

WFP ENA assessments are available for refugee populations in Rwanda and Moldova but considered as ‘insufficient evidence’.

Limited availability and frequency of IPC acute malnutrition analyses

Only 18 countries conducted an IPC acute malnutrition analysis covering a portion of 2023: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. Angola had an IPC acute malnutrition analysis covering a portion of 2022.

Limited availability of updated information and frequency of national nutrition surveys

Seven out of the 44 major food-crisis countries/territories do not have national updated/recent malnutrition prevalence and IYCF data at the sub-national or national level beyond 2019.

Limited 2024 projections (acute food insecurity)

For several countries with no IPC/CH or compatible products where alternative estimates are used, 2024 projections are not available.

IPC-compatible analyses offer range values for projection rather than precise estimates.

Comparability of assessments

Assessments are only considered comparable across two years if the coverage of the analysis changed by less than 10 percent, and if carried out using the same methodology and covering the same geographical areas.

The same methodology used for the peak analysis must also be used for the projection, but a difference in analysis coverage is permitted – as in Benin, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania and United Republic of Tanzania.

The following food-crisis countries included in the GRFC 2024, do not have comparable data between 2022 and 2023.

Angola The data source and coverage changed. In 2022, the peak was derived from an IPC analysis which covered only 9 percent of the country, whereas the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET (remote monitoring) analysis with 100 percent coverage.

Bangladesh The methodology and data source changed. In 2022, the peak was derived from the Joint Response Plan on the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, analysing Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox's Bazar. In 2023, the estimate is based on a new IPC analysis covering 15 districts across Bangladesh, including FDMNs in camps. This substantial increase in the analysed population from 1.4 million to 38.2 million, along with the change in methodology, makes the two periods not comparable.

Chad While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on CH methodology, the analysed population increased by 14 percent between the two years, notably due to the inclusion of the capital city in the 2023 analysis.

Ethiopia There was a change in data source. The 2022 peak was derived from the HRP 2023, whereas the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET analysis.

Iraq There was a change in data source and population group analysed. The 2022 peak was derived from HTO, covering IDPs and returnees whereas the 2023 estimate is based on a WFP CARI analysis, covering Syrian refugees.

Jordan (refugee population) Although both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on WFP's CARI methodology, the analysed population increased by 11 percent between the two years.

Kenya While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on IPC methodology, the analysed population increased by 12 percent.

Mauritania Although both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on CH methodology, the population analysed declined by 19 percent.

Mozambique Despite both 2022 and 2023 analyses being based on IPC methodology, the analysed population declined by 50 percent.

Myanmar The methodology and data source changed between the two years. In 2022, the peak was derived from an HNO analysis, primarily based on rCARI methodology, whereas the 2023 estimate is derived from an HNRP, based on a methodology that meets GRFC technical requirements.

Nigeria The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 are not comparable due a significant expansion in the coverage of the CH analysis. The population analysed increased by 22 percent, up from 21 states and the FCT in 2022 to 26 states and the FCT in 2023. The analysed population increased from 159.1 million to 193.6.

Pakistan While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on IPC methodology, the geographical coverage increased from 28 to 43 districts. The analysed population increased from 19.8 million to 36.7 million.

Palestine The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Palestine cannot be directly compared

due to a change in methodology. In 2022, the peak was determined through an HNO analysis, encompassing both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The 2022 numbers are based on the Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) which uses different indicators including FIES with a 30-day recall period and ECMEN. The 2023 estimate for the Gaza Strip is based on an IPC analysis, while the estimate for the West Bank relies on the previous year's HNO with updated assumptions provided by the gFSC.

Sierra Leone While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on CH methodology, the lack of comparability is mainly due to an official revision of the country's population estimate based on a recent census conducted by the government, which found a 12 percent decline in the population.

Yemen The data source changed. The 2022 peak was derived from an IPC analysis, while the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET analysis.

Zambia While both 2022 and 2023 analyses are based on IPC methodology, the population analysed declined by 19 percent and the geographical coverage changed significantly (from 91 to 76 districts analysed).

Historical inclusion of countries/territories in the GRFC, 2016–23

Over the eight years of the GRFC's existence, 51 countries/territories have been systematically identified as food crises each year following the rigorous selection process: 36 have had data in all GRFC editions.

Nineteen countries have been classified as major food crises in all eight editions.

In earlier editions, several regional crises featured in the GRFC, allowing for coverage of countries that otherwise might not have qualified for inclusion as food crises individually. The Lake Chad Basin region, encompassing the Extrême Nord region of Cameroon, Chad's Lac region, Nigeria's Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states; and Niger's Diffa region, was included in the 2017, 2018 and

2019 editions. The Central Sahel region, covering Burkina Faso, Mali and the western Tillabéri and Tahoua regions of the Niger, was in the GRFC 2020. The Central American Dry Corridor region (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) was included in the 2018, 2019 and 2020 editions.

See figure TN.1 on page 165: Country selection criteria and coverage for the GRFC 2024.

FIG. TN.8 Number of food crises and major food crises, GRFC 2016–2023

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Selected food crises	65	61	66	71	79	77	73	73
Analysed food crises	48	51	53	55	55	53	58	59
Major food crises	23	29	32	35	34	35	42	44

FIG. TN.9 Countries/territories identified as major food crises (MFC) in the GRFC, 2016–2023

8 years (protracted MFC)	19 countries Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, Zimbabwe
7 years	6 countries/territories Bangladesh, Burundi, Kenya, Pakistan, Palestine, Uganda
6 years	3 countries Guatemala, Honduras, Zambia
5 years	4 countries Angola, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Mali
4 years	5 countries Djibouti, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania
3 years	2 countries El Salvador, Namibia
2 years	4 countries Colombia, Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Myanmar, Sri Lanka
Once	6 countries Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

FIG. TN.10 Frequency of inclusion of food crises countries/territories with data meeting the GRFC requirements, 2016–2023

8 years	36 countries/territories Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
7 years	10 countries/territories Angola, Djibouti, El Salvador, Gambia, Libya, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania
6 years	4 countries Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Myanmar
5 years	1 country Jordan
4 years	4 countries Cabo Verde, Colombia, Ecuador, Türkiye
3 years	5 countries Congo, Egypt, Arab Rep., Sri Lanka, Togo
2 years	7 countries Algeria, Benin, Dominican Republic, Nepal, Peru, Rwanda, South Africa
Once	3 countries Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ghana, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Bibliography

Introduction

Committee on World Food Security. *Framework for action for food security and nutrition in protracted crises.* [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/bc852e/bc852e.pdf>

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2023. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023. Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural–urban continuum.* Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3017en>

EGRIS. *International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRRS).* [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://egrisstats.org/recommendations/international-recommendations-on-idp-statistics-irrs/>

EGRIS. *International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).* [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://egrisstats.org/recommendations/international-recommendations-on-refugee-statistics-irrs/>

HLPE. 2020. *Food security and nutrition: building a global narrative towards 2030. A report by the High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security, Rome, Italy.* <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en?details=cc8166en>

UNHCR. *Master glossary of terms.* [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary>

Chapter 1

ACLED. 2024. *ACLED Conflict Index January 2024.* [Online] [Accessed on 11 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/>

CH. 2024. *Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë, mars 2024.* [Online] [Accessed 17 April 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/FICHE_COMMUNICATION_-_MARS_2024_VF.pdf

European Union. June 2023. *European Union brings relief to victims of cyclone Mocha in Myanmar.* [Online] [Accessed 11 March 2024] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/myanmar-burma/european-union-brings-relief-victims-cyclone-mocha-myanmar_en

FAO. 1996. *Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action.* World Food Summit 13-17 November 1996. Rome, Italy.

FSIN. 2023. *Global Report on Food Crisis Mid-Year 2023.* May 2023. <https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC2023-hi-res.pdf>

Global Nutrition Cluster. 2024. *Nutrition Vulnerability and Situational Analysis.* February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 21 February 2024] <https://www.nutritioncluster.net/resources/nutrition-vulnerability-and-situational-analysis-gaza>

IPC. 2023. *Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March 2023 and Projection for April - June 2023.* April 2023. [Online] [Accessed 13 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156310/?iso3=SOM>

IPC. 2023. *Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 24 November - 7 December 2023 and Projection for 8 December 2023 - 7 February 2024.* December 2023. [Online] [Accessed 13 January 2024] [https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156749/#:~:text=Between%2024%20November%20and%207,above%20\(Crisis%20or%20worse\).](https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156749/#:~:text=Between%2024%20November%20and%207,above%20(Crisis%20or%20worse).)

IPC. 2024. *Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for January - March 2024 and Projection for April - June 2024.* February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 9 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156834/?iso3=SOM>

IPC. 2024. *Haiti: Acute Food Security Situation Projection Update for March–June 2024.* March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156884/?iso3=HTI>

IPC. 2024. *Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 15 February–15 March 2024 and Projection for 16 March–15 July 2024.* March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156872/>

UNCTAD. 2022. *A Double Burden: The effects of food price increases and currency depreciations on food import bills.* December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 9 February 2024] <https://unctad.org/a-double-burden#:~:text=These%20countries%20face%20a%20double,placed%20in%20a%20vulnerable%20position.>

UNHCR. 2024. *Sudan situation – Operational Data Portal.* January 2024 [Online] [Accessed 13 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation>

UNICEF. 2021. *Conceptual Framework on the Determinants of Maternal and Child Nutrition.* November 2021. [Online] [Accessed on February 23, 2024] <https://www.unicef.org/media/113291/file/UNICEF%20Conceptual%20Framework.pdf>

WFP. 2023. *Annual Performance Report for 2022.* June 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 11 March 2024] [https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document_download/WFP-](https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document_download/WFP-0000148942?_ga=2.35964131.2128393059.1710095752-1048240437.1710095752)

[0000148942?_ga=2.35964131.2128393059.1710095752-1048240437.1710095752](https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document_download/WFP-0000148942?_ga=2.35964131.2128393059.1710095752-1048240437.1710095752)

WMO. 2024. *WMO confirms that 2023 smashes global temperature record.* January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://wmo.int/media/news/wmo-confirms-2023-smashes-global-temperature-record#:~:text=Six%20leading%20international%20datasets%20used,December%20set%20new%20monthly%20records>

Spotlight on displacement

ACLED. 2023. *Assessing Al-Shabaab's Threat to the Region as Somalia Joins the East Africa Community.* December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/2023/12/08/special-report-kenya-somalia-assessing-al-shabaabs-threat-to-the-region-as-somalia-joins-the-east-africa-community/>

ACLED. 2023. *Global Data Dashboard.* December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

CH. 2023. *Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023.* March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/Fiche_com_Mars_2023_VF.pdf

FAO. 2022. *Restoring degraded land in Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh.* December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc0518en/cc0518en.pdf>

FSNAU & IPC. 2024. *Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia: Population – 2024 (Apr-June) Summary.* January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://results.ipc.fsnau.org/so/>

IDMC. 2023. *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2023.* May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2023/>

IOM. 2023. *PROGRESS 2023: Periodic Global Report on the State of Solutions to Internal Displacement.* November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/progress#partner>

IOM. 2023. *Regional Sudan Response Situation Update, 12 December 2023.* December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/regional-sudan-response-situation-update-12-december-2023>

IOM. 2022. *Somalia Drought Response.* November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/situation_reports/file/IOM-Somalia-Drought-Response-November-2022.pdf

IPC. 2023. *Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 24 November - 7 December 2023 and Projection for 8 December 2023 - 7 February 2024.* December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156749/?iso3=PSE>

IPC. 2021. *IPC Technical Manual Version 3.1.* August 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf

IPC. 2023. *Lebanon: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis.* December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Lebanon_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Oct2023_Sept2024_Report.pdf

IPC. 2023. *Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis.* April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/Somalia-Multi-Partner-Technical-Release-on-the-March-2023-Follow-up-Assessment-Results-25-Apr-2023.pdf

IPC. 2022. *Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot – October 2022 – June 2023.* December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Somalia_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Snapshot_Oct2022_Jun2023.pdf

IPC. 2023. *South Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis.* November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sep2023_July2024_report.pdf

IPC. 2023. *South Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis.* November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sep2023_July2024_report.pdf

OCHA. 2023. *Global Humanitarian Overview 2024.* December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2024-enarfrs>

OCHA. 2022. *Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023: Syrian Arab Republic.* December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2023-humanitarian-needs-overview-december-2022-enar>

OCHA. 2023. *Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024: Syrian Arab Republic.* December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2024-humanitarian-needs-overview-december-2023>

- UNHCR.** 2022. Jordan issues record number of work permits to Syrian refugees. January 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/news-releases/jordan-issues-record-number-work-permits-syrian-refugees>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Jordan: Operational Data Portal. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/jor>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Mid-Year Trends Report 2023. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/mid-year-trends>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Over 1 million people internally displaced in Somalia in record time. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/over-1-million-people-internally-displaced-somalia-record-time>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan Situation Summary 2024. January 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 5 March 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106210>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Rohingya emergency: Emergency Appeal. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/us/emergencies/rohingya-emergency>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-explained/>
- UNHCR.** 2022. South Sudan: Regional Refugee Response Plan 2022. March 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91426>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS) Final Report: White Nile State South Sudanese Refugee Camps. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/standardized-expanded-nutrition-survey-sens-final-report-white-nile-state-south-sudanese-refugee-camps-sudan-aljameya-khor-alwaral-um-sangour-al-radis-1-2-el-kashafajouri-alagaya-algana-dabat-bosin-camps-november-2022>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Sudan situation. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 19 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation>
- UNHCR.** 2024. UNHCR Bangladesh 2023 Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS). January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/unhcr-bangladesh-2023-standardized-expanded-nutrition-survey-sens-final-executive-summary>
- UNHCR.** 2022. VASyR 2021 – Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. January 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2021-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA35urBhDCARIsAOU7QwmfJ5V-JPNqUvfZY223kMQ1p8ZVtc70hz3IY3QWcjF1MzG0AMXxQAoyzEALw_wcB
- UNHCR.** 2023. VASyR 2022 – Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2022-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon>
- UNHCR & WFP.** 2023. UNHCR/WFP Joint Post Distribution Monitoring: South Sudan. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000152712/download/>
- UNRWA.** 2024. UNRWA situation and response to the escalation in the Gaza Strip. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 19 February 2024] <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-61-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem>
- WFP.** 2023. 2023 in pictures: Ration cuts threaten catastrophe for millions facing hunger. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/stories/2023-pictures-ration-cuts-threaten-catastrophe-millions-facing-hunger>
- WFP.** 2023. Food Security in Numbers: Refugees in Jordan. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151223/download/?_ga=2.83991193.1635763400.1705779013-1803802559.1703376351
- WFP.** 2021. Jordan: Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Dashboard. June 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://unwfp.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7210a3ee33b14c5b9a989590345cb49a>
- WFP.** 2022. Regional Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA-5) Report. June 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140947/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Regional Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA-6) Report. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/refugee-influx-emergency-vulnerability-assessment-reva-6-report-june-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face grim choices as more cuts to food assistance imminent. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/news/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-face-grim-choices-more-cuts-food-assistance-imminent>
- WFP.** 2023. South Sudan Global Food Distribution (GFD) 2022 Round 1 Post Distribution Monitoring Summary Report. [Accessed on 13 February 2024]
- WFP.** 2024. Global Operational Response Plan 2024 – Update #10. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 11 March 2024] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156760/download/?_ga=2.120202123.206544037.1712657268-943906844.1671179002
- ## Chapter 2
- ### CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
- DHS.** 2023. Demographic and Health Survey and Malaria Indicator Survey (TDHS-MIS). September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 5 December 2023] <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR382/FR382.pdf>
- FAO.** 2023 Crop Prospects and Food Situation. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Southern Africa Alert: Strong El Niño will drive high needs across Southern Africa through early 2025. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fewsn.net/sites/default/files/2023-11/Alert-Southern-Africa-ElNino-20231108.pdf>
- IOM.** 2023. Record High Displacement in DRC at Nearly 7 Million. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.iom.int/news/record-high-displacement-drc-nearly-7-million>
- IPC.** 2022. Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë et de la malnutrition aiguë de l'IPC July 2022 – June 2023. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_Acute_FoodInsec_Malnutrition_July2022Jun2023_Report_French.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë October 2022 – August 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Central_African_Republic_Acute_Malnutrition_Oct2022_Aug2023_report_French.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Análise IPC da insegurança alimentar aguda e desnutrição aguda May 2023 – March 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Mozambique_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_May_2023_March_2024_report.pdf
- OCHA.** Southern Africa: Cholera Situation Snapshot. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/southern-africa-cholera-situation-snapshot-28-january-2024>
- OCHA.** 2024. Central African Republic: Situation Report. January 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 15 March 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-situation-report-5-jan-2024>
- OCHA.** 2024. Southern Africa: El Niño, Positive Indian Ocean Dipole Forecast and Humanitarian Impact. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/madagascar/southern-africa-el-nino-positive-indian-ocean-dipole-forecast-and-humanitarian-impact-february-2024>
- UN.** 2024. United Nations Responds to Zambia's Drought Disaster and Emergency. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/zambia/united-nations-responds-zambias-drought-disaster-and-emergency>
- UNICEF 2023.** Children at Risk of Cholera in Aftermath of Cyclone Freddy. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.unicef.org/esa/press-releases/children-risk-cholera-aftermath-cyclone-freddy-unicef>
- UNICEF.** 2024. Central African Republic Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/unicef-central-african-republic-humanitarian-situation-report-no-4-01-january-31-december-2023>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Central African Republic Situation. Global Focus. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/central-african-republic-situation>
- WFP.** 2023. Data Visualized: Food inflation. November 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] https://dataviz.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation
- WFP.** 2023. Critical Funding Shortage Forces WFP to Slash Food Rations for Refugees in Tanzania. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.wfp.org/news/critical-funding-shortage-forces-wfp-slash-food-rations-refugees-tanzania>
- ### Angola
- FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Brief on Angola [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=AGO>
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Southwest Angola Expected to Improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) by July 2023. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] <https://fewsn.net/southern-africa/angola/remote-monitoring-report/february-2023>
- IPC.** 2021. Angola: Acute Food Insecurity Situation and Acute Malnutrition Situation April 2021– March 2022. September 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Angola_FoodSecurity&Nutrition_2021July2022Mar_Snapshot_English.pdf
- WFP.** 2023. Country brief. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024]. <https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/43ae04fa42b7420a85274329d051a0a2/download/>
- ### Central African Republic
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

FEWS NET. 2023. Despite New Harvests, Staple Cereal Prices Remain High, Particularly in Conflict Zones. October 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://fews.net/west-africa/central-african-republic/remote-monitoring-report/october-2023>

FEWS NET. 2023. Central African Republic Acute Food Insecurity. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://fews.net/west-africa/central-african-republic>

IPC. 2023. République Centrafricaine: Insécurité alimentaire préoccupante mais relativement stable. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_CAR_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Sept2023_Aug2024_Report_French.pdf

IPC. 2023. Central African Republic: Acute Malnutrition Situation for September 2023 - February 2024 and Projection for March–August 2024. November 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156687/?iso3=CAF>

WFP. 2023. République Centrafricaine – Bulletin #40. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000154250/download/>

Congo

OCHA. 2024 Today's Top News: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Congo. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 05 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-syria-congo>

UN. 2024. Inondations au Congo: 350.000 personnes ont besoin d'une aide humanitaire. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 05 February 2024] <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2024/01/1142472>

UNHCR. 2021. UNHCR Data Dashboard – SENS Republic of Congo. April 2021 [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrjoiMDQ2MTMzMmUtYmRiY>

UNHCR. 2023. Southern Africa Operational Update. December 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/southern-africa-operational-update-6917>

WFP. 2022. Republic of Congo Country Brief. September 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/congo/wfp-republic-congo-country-brief-september-2022>

World Bank. Republic of Congo overview. September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 05 February 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/congo/overview>.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECHO. 2024. Democratic Republic of the Congo – floods ECHO daily flash. 12 January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-floods-media-noaa-cpc-echo-daily-flash-12-january-2024>.

FEWS NET. 2023. Acute food insecurity remains high in conflict zones during the lean season. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/republique-democratique-du-congo/perspectives-sur-la-securite-alimentaire/octobre-2023>

FEWS NET. 2023. Continuing violence is the season A harvest in the North and Central-East. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/democratic-republic-congo/food-security-outlook-update/december-2023>

IOM. 2024. Democratic Republic of the Congo Displacement Tracking Matrix. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 10 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/democratic-republic-congo>

IPC. 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Malnutrition Situation July–December 2022 and Projection for January–June 2023. October 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155974/?iso3=COD>

IPC. 2023. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Food Insecurity Situation Projection Update for January - June 2023. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156354/?iso3=COD>

IPC. 2023. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for July–December 2023 and Projection for January–June 2024. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156611/?iso3=COD>

IPC. 2024. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Acute Malnutrition Situation July–December 2023 and Projection for January–June 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156760/?iso3=COD>

Eswatini

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Country Brief on Eswatini. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SWZ>

IPC. 2023. Acute food insecurity analysis June 2023 –March 2024. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Eswatini_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jun23_Mar24_Report.pdf

Lesotho

IPC. 2023. IPC acute food insecurity analysis July 2023 – March 2024. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Lesotho_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jul2023_Mar2024_Report_.pdf

Madagascar

FEWS NET. 2023. Madagascar Food Security Outlook October 2023 –May 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 12 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/madagascar/madagascar-food-security-outlook-october-2023-may-2024>

FEWS NET. 2024. Dry Conditions Improve in parts of Southern Africa; flooding continues in parts of Central and East Africa. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://fews.net/global/global-weather-hazards/january-2024-0>

IPC. 2022. Acute food insecurity situation November–December 2021 and projections for January–April 2022 and May–August 2022. January 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155379/?iso3=MDG>

IPC. 2022. Acute food malnutrition situation June–September 2023 and projections for October–December 2023 and January–April 2023. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156531/?iso3=MDG>

IPC. 2023. Acute malnutrition analysis, June 2023–April 2023. August 2023. [Accessed on 20 November 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Madagascar_Acute_Malnutrition_Jun2023_Apr2024_Report_French.pdf

IPC. 2024. Madagascar: Acute food insecurity situation for October 2023–January 2024 and projections for February– April 2024 and May–September 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156778/?iso3=MDG>

IPC. 2024. Acute malnutrition situation for October 2023–January 2024 and Projections for February–April 2024 and May–September 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156779/?iso3=MDG>

OCHA. 2023. Southern Africa: El Niño, Positive Indian Ocean Dipole Forecast and Humanitarian Impact October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/madagascar-southern-africa-el-nino-positive-indian-ocean-dipole-forecast-and-humanitarian-impact-october-2023>

Malawi

FAO. 2023. FPMA Bulletin #9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Malawi Country Brief. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=MWI&lang=ar>

FEWS NET. 2023. Key message update – Crisis (IPC Phase 3) expected amid high food prices and insufficient assistance. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/malawi/key-message-update/september-2023#:~:text=Recommended%20Citation%3A%20FEWS%20NET,.prices%20and%20insufficient%20assistance%2C%202023.>

IPC. 2023. IPC acute food insecurity analysis July 2023–March 2024. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Malawi_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jul2023_Mar2024Report.pdf

UNHCR. 2023. Picking up the pieces in Mozambique and Malawi after Tropical Cyclone Freddy. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 December 2023] <https://www.unhcr.org/africa/news/stories/picking-pieces-mozambique-and-malawi-after-tropical-cyclone-freddy>

UNICEF. 2023. Over half a million children at risk of malnutrition in Malawi. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] [https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/over-half-million-children-risk-malnutrition-malawi#:~:text=In%202023%20alone%2C%20it%20is,SAM\)%2C%20often%20called%20wasting.](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/over-half-million-children-risk-malnutrition-malawi#:~:text=In%202023%20alone%2C%20it%20is,SAM)%2C%20often%20called%20wasting.)

WFP. 2023. WFP Malawi Country Brief. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000152515/download/?ga=2.208552402.1786647325.1700479735-1921871277.1696859448>

WHO. 2023. Weekly Regional Cholera Bulletin: 28 August 2023. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/weekly-regional-cholera-bulletin-28-august-2023-data-reported-27-august-2023>

Mozambique

FEWS NET. 2023. Key message update: below-average rainfall and high temperatures threaten planted crops in parts of southern and central Mozambique. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/mozambique/key-message-update/november-2023#:~:text=Recommended%20citation%3A%20FEWS%20NET,.southern%20and%20central%20Mozambique%2C%202023.>

- IPC.** 2021. IPC Acute malnutrition analysis, February 2021–January 2022. June 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/1_IPC_Mozambique_Acute_Malnutrition_2021Feb2022Jan_Report_Portuguese.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. IPC Acute malnutrition situation for May–September 2023 and Projection for October 2023–March 2024. November 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156718/?iso3=MOZ>
- IPC.** 2023. Mozambique: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for May 2023–September 2023 and Projection for October 2023–March 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156717/?iso3=MOZ>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Operation Data Portal Mozambique. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/moz>
- UNICEF.** 2023. UNICEF Geneva Palais briefing note: Triple impact of cyclone, cholera and flooding threatening survival and well-being of children in Mozambique. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-geneva-palais-briefing-note-triple-impact-cyclone-cholera-and-flooding#:~:text=MAPUTO%2C%2025%20April%202023%20E2%80%93%20%20%20%20at%20ever%20more%20risk.>
- UNICEF.** 2021. The State of the World's Children. October 2021 [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://data.unicef.org/resources/sowc-2021-dashboard-and-tables/>
- WFP.** 2023. Mozambique country brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 24 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/wfp-mozambique-country-brief-december-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Mozambique – Food Price Bulletin November 2023, Post-cyclone food security assessment (May – June 2023). December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/wfp-mozambique-food-price-bulletin-november-2023-post-cyclone-food-security-assessment-may-june-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Data Visualized: food inflation. Mozambique. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170
- WHO.** 2023. Weekly Regional Cholera Bulletin: 28 August 2023 (Data reported as of 27 August 2023). September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on: 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/weekly-regional-cholera-bulletin-28-august-2023-data-reported-27-august-2023>
- Namibia**
- IPC.** 2023. Namibia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for July – September 2023 and Projections for October 2023 – March 2024 and April – June 2024. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156545/?iso3=NAM>
- WFP.** 2023. Data Visualized: food inflation. Namibia. [Online] [Accessed on 5 December 2023] https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation
- United Republic of Tanzania**
- DHS.** 2023. Demographic and Health Survey and Malaria Indicator Survey (TDHS-MIS). September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 5 December 2023] <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR382/FR382.pdf>
- IPC.** 2022. Acute food insecurity situation November 2021–April 2022 and May–September 2022. February 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155426/>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute food insecurity situation October 2022–February 2023 and March–May 2023. December 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156131/?iso3=TZA>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute food insecurity situation November 2023–April 2024 and May–October 2024. December 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156759/?iso3=TZA>
- WFP.** 2023. DataViz. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation
- Zambia**
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Bulletin #9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>
- IPC.** 2023. Zambia IPC acute food insecurity analysis August 2023 – March 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on: 22 November 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Zambia_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Aug2023_Mar2024_Report.pdf
- WFP.** 2023. WFP Zambia Country Brief. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on: 22 November 2023] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153702/download/_ga=2.256770632.292899905.17006466721921871277169.6859448&_gac=1.137313971700559436.CjwKCAiAxGqBhBQEIwAIDNAZvqkGSFScBE1kQeo7C8HVLj7UGLr0df8vGiJs051JlghRO3RBgxoCvZyQAavD_BwE
- Zimbabwe**
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Bulletin #9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Zimbabwe Food Security Outlook. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/southern-africa/zimbabwe>
- FAO.** November 2023). **FAO-GIEWS.** October 2023). <https://fews.net/southern-africa/zimbabwe/key-message-update/november-2023> <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc8566en> <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ZWE>
- Zim VAC 2022
ZimVAC, 2023
- A lack of access to clean water and good sanitation drove the national cholera outbreak from February 2023, with more than 13 000 suspected cases by the end of the year (WHO, December 2023)
- EAST AFRICA**
- ACAPS.** 2024. ACAPS Briefing Note – Chad: Food security crisis. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/acaps-briefing-note-chad-food-security-crisis-04-january-2024>
- ACLED.** 2024. Sudan: Setting the Stage for a Long War. Madison, Wisconsin. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sudan/>
- CILSS.** 2023. Situation Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'ouest et au Cameroun – Fiche November 2023. Niamey, Niger. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>
- European Commission.** 2023. European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations: Uganda. Brussels. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/uganda_en
- FAO.** 2023. World Food and Agriculture – Statistical Yearbook 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en?details=cc8166en>
- FAO, IGAD & Interpeace.** 2023. Conflict, climate change, food security, and mobility in the Karamoja Cluster – A study to analyse interactions among conflict, food security, climate change, migration and displacement factors. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc7672en>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Conflict, high prices, and flooding sustain elevated humanitarian needs in much of the region. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/food-security-outlook/november-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Drought-induced crop failure leads to Emergency in conflict-affected north. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook-update/december-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2024. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected in northern Ethiopia. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 04 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/key-message-update/january-2024>
- FEWS NET.** 2024. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will expand during the post-harvest period. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/january-2024>
- FEWS NET.** 2024. Clashes in Sudan's breadbasket threaten national food availability. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 03 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/sudan/alert/february-2024>
- FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crises 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2023] <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crisis-2023>
- IFPRI.** 2023. End of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Implications for sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/end-black-sea-grain-initiative-implications-sub-saharan-africa>
- IMF.** 2024. IMF Staff Completes 2023 Article IV Mission to Djibouti. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/01/25/pr2425-djibouti-imf-staff-completes-2023-article-iv-mission>
- IMF.** 2023. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/10/16/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-october-2023>
- IOM.** 2023. DTM Sudan's Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudans-internally-displaced-persons-2023-estimates?close=true>
- IOM.** 2023. République Centrafricaine — Suivi des Flux de Populations: Am-Dafock (frontière Soudanaise) (Mai-Juin 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/republique-centrafricaine-suivi-des-flux-de-populations-am-dafock-frontiere-soudanaise-mai>
- IOM.** 2023. Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 17 (August - September 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia>

- national-displacement-report-17-august-september-2023?close=true
- IOM.** 2024. DTM Sudan's Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudans-internally-displaced-persons-2023-estimates?close=true>
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September - November 2023 and Projections for December 2023 - March 2024 and for April - July 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156667/?iso3=SSD>
- IPC.** 2023. IPC Kenya acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition analysis July 2023-January 2024. September 2023 [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_2023_Jul2024Jan_Report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for October 2023 - February 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 03 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156730/?iso3=SDN>
- IPC.** 2023. Uganda: Acute Malnutrition Situation April - September 2023 and Projection for October 2023 - March 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 03 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fr/c/1156714/?iso3=UGA>
- Joint Statement.** 2023. Seeking Safety Amidst Crisis – East Africa and the Great Lakes' multi-layered displacement crises. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/seeking-safety-amidst-crisis-east-africa-and-great-lakes-multi-layered-displacement-crises>
- OCHA.** 2023. Eastern Africa: El Niño, Positive Indian Ocean Dipole Forecast and Humanitarian Impact - September 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/eastern-africa-el-nino-positive-indian-ocean-dipole-forecast-and-humanitarian-impact-september-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Eastern Africa: El Niño Impact Snapshot - November 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/somalia/eastern-africa-el-nino-impact-snapshot-november-2023#:~:text=The%20confirmation%20of%20the%20presence,%2C%20Sudan%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20and%20Uganda>
- OCHA.** 2023. Ethiopia: Humanitarian impact of drought - Flash Update #1, 22 December 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-humanitarian-impact-drought-flash-update-1-22-december-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Horn of Africa Drought Regional Humanitarian Overview & Call to Action (Revised 26 May 2023). New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February, 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/horn-africa-drought-regional-humanitarian-overview-call-action-revised-26-may-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2024 (Revised 17 May 2023). New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-revised-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-revision-issued-17-may-2023-enar>
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023>
- OPHI.** 2020. Understanding poverty in Africa, OPHI Briefing 56. Oxford. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://ophi.org.uk/publications/B-56>
- OPHI & UNDP.** 2022. Leaving no one behind: Poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Oxford. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://ophi.org.uk/publication/OPHI%E2%80%93UNDP-brief-SSA-Leaving-2022>
- UNCTAD.** 2023. UN list of least developed countries. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://unctad.org/topic/least-developed-countries/list>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Ethiopia Situation Report. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-10-jan-2024>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Uganda Population Dashboard: Overview of Refugees and Asylum-seekers in Uganda. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/uganda-overview-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-6683>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan Situation Map Weekly Regional Update – 26 Dec 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/105668>
- UNICEF.** 2023. Humanitarian Action for Children 2024 – Sudan. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/humanitarian-action-children-2024-sudan>
- WFP.** 2022. Implications of the War in Ukraine on Food Access and Availability in the East Africa Region – Update #7. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/implications-conflict-ukraine-food-access-and-availability-east-africa-region-update-7-october-2022#:~:text=The%20conflict%20in%20Ukraine%20continues,on%20the%20most%20vulnerable%20households>
- WFP.** 2023. Drought in the Horn of Africa: Situation Update, July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/drought-in-the-horn-of-africa-situation-update-july-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #2, July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151589/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #3, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153546/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. 'Fleeing danger, finding despair': hunger emergency looms for South Sudanese fleeing conflict in Sudan, warns WFP. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/news/fleeing-danger-finding-despair-hunger-emergency-ooms-south-sudanese-fleeing-conflict-sudan#:~:text=Almost%20all%20of%20those%20who%20have%20crossed%20the,families%20are%20experiencing%20moderate%20or%20severe%20food%20insecurity>
- WFP & FAO.** 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571
- WHO.** 2024. Multi-country outbreak of cholera, External situation report #11 - 12 February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 20 February 2024] [https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/multi-country-outbreak-of-cholera-external-situation-report-11-12-february-2024#:~:text=Download%20\(1.3%20MB\)-,Overview,the%20South%2DEast%20Asia%20Region](https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/multi-country-outbreak-of-cholera-external-situation-report-11-12-february-2024#:~:text=Download%20(1.3%20MB)-,Overview,the%20South%2DEast%20Asia%20Region)
- World Bank.** 2023. The World Bank in Djibouti: Context. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/djibouti/overview#:~:text=The%20global%20economic%20impact%20of,its%20lowest%20level%20since%202000>
- World Bank.** 2023. The World Bank in South Sudan: Context. Washington, DC [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview>
- Sudan Focus**
- ACAPS.** 2024. Briefing Note. Chad: Food Security Crisis. January 2024. https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230104_ACAPS_briefing_note_Chad_food_security_crisis.pdf
- CILSS.** 2023. PREGEC Fiche de Communication November 2023. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://agrhy.net/cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>
- FAO.** 2024. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 1. March 2024. <https://www.fao.org/3/cd0022en/cd0022en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2024. Key Message Update. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will expand during the post-harvest period. January 2024. <https://fewes.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/january-2024>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Alert. Clashes in Sudan's breadbasket threaten national food availability. February 2024. <https://fewes.net/east-africa/sudan/alert/february-2024>
- FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crisis Mid-Year Update 2023. August 2023. <https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC2023-MYU.pdf>
- IOM.** 2023. Displacement Tracking Matrix Central African Republic. Suivi des Flux des population : Mise a jour #1. July 2023. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/republique-centrafricaine-suivi-des-flux-de-populations-am-dafock-frontiere-soudanaise-mai>
- IOM.** 2024. Displacement Tracking Matrix Sudan. Sudan's Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates. January 2024. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudans-internally-displaced-persons-2023-estimates?close=true>
- IPC.** 2023. Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation. August 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Jun2023_Feb2024_report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity and Nutrition Analysis. November 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sep2023_July2024_report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation. December 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Oct2023_Feb2024_Report.pdf
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 (Revision issued on 17 May 2023). May 2023. <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan. December 2023. <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan Situation: Regional Displacement Update. December 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106871>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Sudan Situation: Regional Displacement Update. February 2024. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106871>

UNICEF. 2023. Humanitarian Action for Children. December 2023. <https://www.unicef.org/media/149971/file/2024-HAC-Sudan.pdf>

Burundi

FAO. 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Burundi, November 2022. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/giews-country-brief-burundi-14-november-2022>

FAO. 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Burundi, September 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=BDI>

FEWS NET. 2023. Persistent high food and fuel prices driving Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in the north. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/burundi/food-security-outlook/october-2023>

FEWS NET. 2023. Above-average 2023 Season C harvest increases access to food in the lean season. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/burundi/key-message-update/november-2023>

FSIN. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2020>

IPC. 2017. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for April - May 2017 and Projection for June - July 2017. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1026220/?iso3=BDI>

IPC. 2022. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation June - September 2022 and Projection for October - December 2022. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155945/?iso3=BDI>

IPC. 2022. Analyse de la Malnutrition Aiguë de l'IPC, Mars 2022 – Février 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burundi_Acute_Malnutrition_2022Mar2023Feb_Report_French.pdf

IPC. 2023. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation April - May 2023 and Projection for June - September 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156379/?iso3=BDI>

IPC. 2023. Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë, Avril - Septembre 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burundi_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Apr_Sept2023_Report_French.pdf

IPC. 2023. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September 2023 and Projections for October - December 2023 and for January - March 2024. Rome. [Online]

[Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156698/?iso3=BDI>

UNICEF. 2022. SMART Survey Burundi. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://data.unicef.org/country>

WHO. 2021. Anaemia in Women and Children Data Set: Burundi. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia_in_women_and_children

Djibouti

ACAPS. 2023. Djibouti: Drought. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230310_acaps_briefing_note_drought_in_djibouti_0.pdf

FAO. 2023. GIEWS Country Briefs: Djibouti, 07 August 2023. Rome. [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=DJI&lang=fr>

IPC. 2023. Djibouti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March - June 2023 and Projection for July - December 2023. Rome. [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156388/?iso3=DJI>

IPC. 2023. Djibouti: Acute Malnutrition Situation March - July 2023 and Projection for August - December 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156389/?iso3=DJI>

IPC. 2023. Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë et de la malnutrition aiguë de l'IPC, Janvier – Décembre 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Djibouti_Acute_FoodInsec_Malnutrition_JanDec2023_Report_French.pdf

WFP. 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #3, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153546/download/>

WFP & FAO. 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 21 November 2023] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571

Eritrea

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. GIEWS Country Brief Eritrea. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ERI>

GEOGLAM. 2023. Crop Monitor Early Warning. No. 89. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 24 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/crop-monitor-early-warning-no-89-december-2023>

WFP. 2023. Food Security and Nutrition Update Eastern Africa Region: Q1 & Q2 2023. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151799/download/

Ethiopia

ACLED. 2023. Ethiopia Peace Observatory September 2023 Monthly Report: Multiple coinciding conflicts and Ethiopia's rank in the ACLED Conflict Index. Madison, Wisconsin. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/10/12/epo-september-2023-monthly-multiple-coinciding-conflicts-and-ethiopias-rank-in-the-acled-conflict-index/>

FAO. 2023. GIEWS Country Briefs: Ethiopia, 15 June 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ETH>

FAO. 2023. Third Crop Prospects and Food Situation – November 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

FEWS NET. 2023. Lasting, severe impacts of conflict and drought leave millions struggling to cope. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook/june-2023>

FEWS NET. 2023. Food security emergency persists across Ethiopia in aftermath of severe shocks. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook-update/august-2023>

FEWS NET. 2023. Food Security Assistance Outlook Brief – December 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 05 January 2024] <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-12/FAOB-December%202023.pdf>

FSC. 2023. Nutrition Cluster - Tigray Region SMART Survey pooled report – August 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fscluster.org/ethiopia/document/nutrition-cluster-tigray-region-smart>

IOM. 2023. Ethiopia — Flow Monitoring Dashboard 45 (June 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-flow-monitoring-dashboard-45-june-2023?close=true>

IOM. 2023. DTM Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 17 (August - September 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 21 December 2023] <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-national-displacement-report-17-august-september-2023?close=true>

OCHA. 2023. Ethiopia: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-february-2023?gad_source=1&gclid=EAlalQobChMlmr_b5eadgmvW2TbUAR05Wg7gEAAAYASAAEgk4rvD_BwE

OCHA. 2023. Ethiopia: Cholera Outbreak - Flash Update #8 (as of 20 June 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-cholera-outbreak-flash-update-8-20-june-2023>

OCHA. 2023. Eastern Africa: El Niño Impact Snapshot, November 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/eastern-africa-el-nino-impact-snapshot-november-2023>

OCHA. 2024. Ethiopia Situation Report – January 2024. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 28 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-10-jan-2024>

Tigray Nutrition Cluster. 2023. Urgent Resumption of Lifesaving Nutrition Interventions in Tigray Region: A top priority for the Nutrition Cluster. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 14 December 2023] https://www.nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2022-11/Urgent%20Nutrition%20Interventions%20in%20Tigray_Action%20required%5B58%5D.pdf

UNDP. 2023. From Debt to Development: What are Ethiopia's Choices? New York. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-04/UNDP%20-%20Shock%20Document%20-%20Working%20Paper%20Series%203%20-%20Final%20April%20132023.pdf>

UNICEF. 2023. Ethiopia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 10, 30 November 2023. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 05 December 2023] <https://www.unicef.org/documents/ethiopia-humanitarian-situation-report-no-10-30-november-2023>

WFP. 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #3, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153546/download/>

WFP. 2024. DataViz: Ethiopia – Inflation. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/eastern-africa/ethiopia/economic/inflation>

WFP & FAO. 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571

Kenya

ACAPS. 2023. Kenya: Flooding in eastern and northern counties. Geneva. [Accessed on 22 November 2023] https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20231116_ACAPS_Briefing_note_Kenya_flooding.pdf

IPC. 2023. Kenya: Acute Food Insecurity Situation February 2023 and Projection for March - June 2023.

- Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156210/?iso3=KEN>
- IPC.** 2023. Kenya: Acute Malnutrition Situation February 2023 and Projection for March - May 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156211/?iso3=KEN>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis, July 2023 - January 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_2023_Jul2024Jan_Report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Kenya: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for July - September 2023 and Projection for October 2023 - January 2024 (ASAL). Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156541/?iso3=KEN>
- IPC.** 2023. Kenya: IPC Food Security & Nutrition Snapshot - Acute food insecurity, July 2023 to January 2024; Acute Malnutrition April- October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Jul2023_Jan2024_snapshot.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Kenya: Acute Malnutrition Situation April - July 2023 and projection for August - October 2023 (ASAL). Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156542/?iso3=KEN>
- FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Briefs: Kenya, 12 June 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=KEN>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. 2023 Long rains expected to support gradual improvements in food security. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/kenya/food-security-outlook-update/april-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #1, April 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000148789/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #3, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 22 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153546/download/>
- South Sudan**
- IPC.** 2018. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation in January 2018 and Projections for February-April 2018 and May-July 2018. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1110688/?iso3=SSD>
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October - November 2022 and Projections for December 2022 - March 2023 and April - July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155997/?iso3=SSD>
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September - November 2023 and Projections for December 2023 - March 2024 and for April - July 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156667/?iso3=SSD>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis, September 2023 - July 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 12 December 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sep2023_July2024_report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Malnutrition Situation for July - September 2023 and Projections for October 2023 - March 2024 and April- June 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156668/?iso3=SSD>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Large-scale arrival of South Sudanese returnees driving higher food assistance needs, May 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/may-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Emergency will persist in many areas of South Sudan through the harvest, June 2023 - January 2024. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 27 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/food-security-outlook/june-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #2, July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151589/download/>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan Emergency: Six months impact update - 6 November 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/104604>
- Somalia**
- ACLEd.** 2023. Somalia: Al-Shabaab Regains Lost Territories as Tax Dispute Halts Counter-Insurgency Operation, 2 June 2023. Madison, Wisconsin. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://acleddata.com/2023/06/02/somalia-situation-update-may-2023-al-shabaab-regains-lost-territories-as-a-dispute-over-tax-halts-counter-insurgency-operation/>
- FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Briefs: Somalia, 07 April 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SOM>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Many households face difficult road to recovery despite good gu rains, April 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/somalia/food-security-outlook-update/april-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2023a. Food assistance needs remain high amid ongoing recovery from drought, June 2023 - January 2024. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://fews.net/east-africa/somalia/food-security-outlook/june-2023>
- IPC.** 2022. Somalia: Acute Malnutrition Situation July - September 2022 and Projection for October - December 2022. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155886/?iso3=SOM>
- IPC.** 2023. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March 2023 and Projection for April - June 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156310/?iso3=SOM>
- IPC.** 2023. Somalia: Acute Malnutrition Situation for August - September 2023 and Projection for October - December 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156564/?iso3=SOM>
- IPC.** 2023. Acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition analysis. August - December 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-acute-food-insecurity-and-acute-malnutrition-analysis-august-december-2023-published-18-september-2023#:~:text=The%20increase%20in%20the%20number,flooding%20and%20anticipated%20decline%20in>
- OCHA.** 2023. Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-february-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Somalia: 2023 Deyr Season Floods Situation Report No. 5 (As of 24 December 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 10 March 2024]. <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/somalia/somalia-2023-deyr-season-floods-situation-report-no-5-24-december-2023#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20people%20affected%20by%20the%20floods%20is%20estimated,in%20all%20the%20affected%20states.>
- WFP.** 2023. Eastern Africa Market and Trade Update: 2023 Quarter #2, July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 26 November 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151589/download/>
- Rwanda**
- FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Rwanda, 17 November 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=RWA>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Season B stocks and interseason crops driving Minimal (IPC Phase 1). Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/rwanda/remote-monitoring-report/october-2023>
- UNHCR.** 2024. UNHCR Operations Portal: Rwanda. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/rwa?_gl=1*7voz4w*_ga*NTMzNDA0NDI5LjE3MDU5NDAwODA.*_ga_23PSTKMF6*MTcwODI1OTA1OS4xLjEuMTcwODI2MDMzOS4wLjAuMA.*_rup_ga*NTMzNDA0NDI5LjE3MDU5NDAwODA.*_rup_ga_EVDQTJ4LMY*MTcwODI1OTA1OS43LjEuMTcwODI2MDQxMC4wLjAuMA.#ga=2.194076909.1367447130.1708259059-533404429.1705940080
- WFP.** 2024. WFP DataViz: Rwanda - Inflation. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/eastern-africa/rwanda/economic/inflation>
- Uganda**
- FAO.** 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Uganda, 17 July 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=UGA>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes projected among refugees amid assistance cuts. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/uganda/food-security-outlook/june-2023#key-messages>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Food Assistance Outlook Brief, December 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-12/FAOB-December%202023.pdf>
- IPC.** 2023. Uganda: Acute Food Insecurity Situation April - August 2023 and Projection for September 2023 - February 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156423/?iso3=UGA>
- IPC.** 2023. Uganda (Karamoja): IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis, February 2023 - January 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Uganda_Karamoja_AcuteMalnutrition_Feb2023_Jan2024_report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Uganda (Refugee Settlements and Host Districts): IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis, April 2023 - February 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Uganda_Acute_Malnutrition_April_2023_March_2024_Report.pdf

WFP. 2024. DataViz: Uganda – Inflation. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation
WFP, Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2023. Situation of Food Security and Nutrition in Karamoja 2023. Kampala, Uganda. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000155179/download/

WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL

ACLEED. 2024. ACLED Dashboard. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

CH. 2024. Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë, mars 2024. [Online] [Accessed 17 April 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/ch/FICHE_COMMUNICATION_-_MARS_2024_VF.pdf

CILSS. 2023. PREGEC Fiche de Communication March 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>
CILSS. 2023. PREGEC Fiche de Communication November 2023. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

FAO. 2023. Data in Emergencies Monitoring – DIEM – Impact Assessment. November 2023. [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://data-in-emergencies.fao.org/apps/51693d84f32c498982f128151db091c8/explore>

FEWS NET. 2023. Mauritanie. Mise à jour des messages clés. Les déficits localisés en zones agropastorale et pastorale maintiennent les populations pauvres en Stress. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://fewsn.net/node/31139>

IPC. 2022. Mali. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Mali_Acute_Malnutrition_Jun2022May2023_Report.pdf

IPC. 2022. Northeast and Northwest Nigeria. IPC Acute malnutrition analysis. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Nigeria_Acute_Malnutrition_May22_April23_Report.pdf

IPC. 2023. Tchad. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Chad_Acute_Malnutrition_Oct2022_Sept2023_Report_French.pdf

IPC. 2023. Niger. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Niger_Acute_Malnutrition_2022Aug2023July_Report_French.pdf

IPC. 2024. Burkina Faso. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burkina_Faso_Acute_Malnutrition_Aug2023_Jul2024_Report_French.pdf

UNHCR. 2023. RBWCA – Monthly Statistics. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106296>

United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States. 2024. List of LDCs. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.un.org/ohrls/content/list-ldcs>

UNHCR-WFP. 2023. Mission d'évaluation conjointe (JAM) PAM-UNHCR auprès des populations réfugiées, déplacées internes et hôtes au Niger June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://wfp-unhcr-hub.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/WFP-0000151149.pdf>

World Bank. 2023. Western and Central Africa. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/af/western-and-central-africa>
WFP. 2024. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 March 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

Benin

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

FAO. 2023. Benin Country Brief. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=BEN>

FAO. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

FAO. 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 10. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc9142en/cc9142en.pdf>

Burkina Faso

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de

l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

IPC. 2024. Burkina Faso. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burkina_Faso_Acute_Malnutrition_Aug2023_Jul2024_Report_French.pdf

FAO. 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>

FEWS NET. 2023. Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire. L'aide humanitaire reste essentielle pour sauver des vies dans le nord du Burkina Faso. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fewsn.net/node/31312>

Cameroon

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

FAO. 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>
FAO. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

FEWS NET. 2023. Key Message Update. Persistent violence in the Far North region maintaining Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes during the harvest. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fewsn.net/west-africa/cameroon/key-message-update/november-2023>

OCHA. 2023. Cameroon Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroon-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-march-2023>

WHO. 2023. Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and other Emergencies: Week 46: 13 - 19 November 2023. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/374828/OEW46-1319112023.pdf>

Chad

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Tchad: Mise à jour des résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë actuelle. July 2023. [Accessed on 10 December 2023] https://sisaaptchad.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/TCHAD_Fiche_communication_Mise_a_jour_juillet2023-.pdf

FAO. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

IPC. 2023. Tchad. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Chad_Acute_Malnutrition_Oct2022_Sept2023_Report_French.pdf

Côte d'Ivoire

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyment.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

FAO. 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>

WFP. 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

Ghana

FAO. 2023. Ghana Country Brief. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 25 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=GHA>

IOM. 2024. Displacement Tracking Matrix. Situation in central sahel, liptako gourma and coastal countries. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/LIPTAKO%20GOURMA%20-%20December%202023%20%28EN%29.pdf?iframe=true>

UNHCR. 2024. Ghana. UNHCR Operational Data Portal. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/gha>

World Bank. 2024. Food Security Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebb38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-XCVIII-January-18-24.pdf>

Guinea

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

WFP. 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

LIBERIA

CH. 2022. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2023. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

FAO. 2023. Liberia Country Brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=LBR>

Mali

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

FAO. 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>

FEWS NET. 2023. Mali. Key Message Update. Despite seasonal improvement in food consumption across the country, Gao and Menaka remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fews.net/west-africa/mali/key-message-update/november-2023>

IPC. 2022. Mali. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Mali_Acute_Malnutrition_Jun2022May2023_Report.pdf

Mauritania

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

FEWS NET. 2023. Mauritanie. Mise à jour des messages clés. Les déficits localisés en zones agropastorale et pastorale maintiennent les populations pauvres en Stress. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://fews.net/node/31139>

Niger

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë

courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

IPC. 2023. Niger. Analyse IPC de la malnutrition aiguë. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Niger_Acute_Malnutrition_2022Aug2023July_Report_French.pdf

FAO. 2024. Niger Country Brief. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 25 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=NER>

FEWS NET. 2023. Niger. Key Message Update. Acute food insecurity Crisis (IPC Phase 3) persists in conflict-affected areas. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fews.net/west-africa/niger/key-message-update/november-2023>

Nigeria

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

Focus Economics. 2024. Nigeria Inflation Data. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February] <https://www.focus-economics.com/country-indicator/nigeria/inflation/#:~:text=Nigeria%20Inflation%20Data&text=Inflation%20came%20in%20at%2029.9,rose%20at%20a%20stronger%20pace>

IPC. 2022. Northeast and Northwest Nigeria. IPC Acute malnutrition analysis. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Nigeria_Acute_Malnutrition_May22_April23_Report.pdf

IPC. 2023. Northeast and Northwest Nigeria. IPC Acute malnutrition analysis. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/>

[fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Nigeria_Acute_Malnutrition_May2023_Apr2024_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Nigeria_Acute_Malnutrition_May2023_Apr2024_Report.pdf)

Senegal

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

UNICEF-WFP. 2023. Sahel & West Africa Food Security and Nutrition Hotspot Analysis. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149826/download/>

WFP. 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

Sierra Leone

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

FAO. 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>

Togo

CH. 2022. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2023. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>

CH. 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle

- aiguë courante en octobre-novembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/fiches-de-communication-ch/>
- FAO.** 2024. Togo Country Brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=TGO>
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 10. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc9142en/cc9142en.pdf>
- ASIA**
- ACAPS.** 2023. Afghanistan: Risk Overview. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/archives/detail/afghanistan-risk-overview-1>
- ACAPS.** 2023. Bangladesh and Myanmar: Impact of Cyclone Mocha. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/cyaps-briefing-note-bangladesh-and-myanmar-impact-cyclone-mocha-23-may-2023>
- ACAPS.** 2023. Myanmar: Humanitarian impacts of recent clashes. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20231123_ACAPS_Briefing_note_Myanmar_humanitarian_impacts_of_recent_clashes.pdf
- CARE.** 2022. The Impact on the Food Crisis on Women and Girls in Afghanistan. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 4 January 2024] https://www.care.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Report-Food-crisis_Final-design_28-November-2022.pdf
- European Commission.** 2023. INFORM Risk Index 2024. September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 2 February 2024] <https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk/Results-and-data/moduleId/1782/id/469/controller/Admin/action/Results>
- FAO.** 2023. Country Gender Spotlight: Pakistan. 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 3 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc5970en/cc5970en.pdf>
- FAO.** 2023. Tropical cyclone Mocha, Myanmar. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://data-in-emergencies.fao.org/apps/a97314f4fec34a448721f320829acbbe/explore>
- IDMC.** 2023. Global Report on Internal Displacement 2023. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 2 February 2024] <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2023/>
- IFRC.** 2023. Sri Lanka Flood 2023, DREF Operation. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-flood-2023-dref-operation-mdrk018>
- IOM.** 2023. Bangladesh: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Response Monthly Situation Report. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 3 February 2024] https://bangladesh.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11006/files/documents/2024-01/iom-rohingya-crisis-response-external-sitrep_november-2023.pdf
- IOM.** 2023. DTM Pakistan: Bi-Weekly Flow Monitoring of Afghan Returnees. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] https://pakistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1121/files/documents/2024-01/fm_bi-weekly-report_31dec_final.pdf
- IPC.** 2021. Afghanistan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation September – October 2021 and Projection for November 2021 – March 2022. October 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/es/c/1155210/?iso3=AFG>
- IPC.** 2023. Afghanistan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September 2022 – October 2022 and Projection for November 2022 – March 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156270/?iso3=AFG>
- IPC.** 2023. Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis October 2023 – March 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insec_Oct2023_Mar2024_Report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Bangladesh: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis March – September 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Bangladesh_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar_Sep2023_Report.pdf
- IPC.** 2022. Bangladesh IPC Chronic Food Insecurity Report. June 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Bangladesh_Chronic_Food_Insecurity_2022_June_report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Pakistan: IPC Acute Food Security Analysis April 2023 – January 2024. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Pakistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_April_2023_January_2024_Report.pdf
- IRC.** 2023. Emergency Situation Report Pakistan. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/international-rescue-committee-emergency-situation-report-pakistan-heavy-rainfall-and-flood-alert-august-11-2023#:~:text=The%20rainfall%20recorded%20in%20month,July%20during%20past%2063%20years>
- JRP.** 2023. Joint Response Plan: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/2023-joint-response-plan-rohingya-humanitarian-crisis-january-december-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. December 2023. [Online] [17 January 2024] https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-huma-nitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023?gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAiP2tBhBXEiwACsflnlyWeHZ2UX9Vom_kVsGUJ6Y6PeTBVBS6V3SpWxMkDVTv3jTBa9t1T1RoCR3iQAvD_BwE
- OCHA.** 2023. Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitari-an-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enmy?gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAiP2tBhBXEiwACsflnlyYsN1x3dG44sxYCU7yU75PaOaZymF4ccWPWdsmyZBu8pc6plqBhcC7YVQAvD_BwE
- UN DESA.** 2024. World Economic Situation and Prospects 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 8 January 2024] https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP_2024_Web.pdf
- UNHCR.** 2023. Bangladesh: UNHCR Global Focus. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 2 February 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/bangladesh#:~:text=As%20of%20S eptember%202023%2C%20965%2C467,cent%20comprise%20women%20and%20girls>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Myanmar Emergency Update. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/myanmar-emergency-regional-update-6584>
- UNHCR.** 2023. UNHCR Data Finder. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 2 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=sH5pnE>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan Situation: Midyear Report 2023. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/regional-refugee-response-plan-afghanistan-situation-midyear-report-2023#:~:text=Over%201.4%20million%20IDPs%20have,returned%20to%20Afghanistan%20in%202022>
- UNICEF.** 2023. <https://www.unicef.org/media/150091/file/Bangladesh-Humanitarian-SitRep-Floods-Landslides-13-December-2023.pdf>
- WFP.** 2023. Cox's Bazar: Ration Cuts Alert. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/coxs-bazar-wfp-bangladesh-ration-cuts-alert-may-2023-update#:~:text=In%20March%2C%20WFP%20had%20to,%24%2010%20to%20US%24%208>
- WFP.** 2023. WFP Afghanistan: Situation Report. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/wfp-afghanistan-situation-report-25-june-2023#:~:text=Sustained%20humanitarian%20assistance%20has%20effectively,and%20hunger%20rates%20from%20increasing>
- WFP.** 2023. WFP DataViz – Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 January 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>
- WFP.** 2023. Household Food Security Survey Sri Lanka: Preliminary Findings. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000155412/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. WFP to increase food ration from US\$8 to US\$10 for all Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 27 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/wfp-increase-food-ration-us8-us10-all-rohingya-refugees-coxs-bazar>
- WFP and FAO.** 2023. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149636/download/>
- World Bank.** 2024. Food security update. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebb38f5a6b68bfc1e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-CII-March-18-2024.pdf>
- World Bank.** 2024. Global Economic Prospects: South Asia. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 8 January 2024] <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/661f109500b5f8fa36a4a46eeace6786-0050012024/related/GEP-Jan-2024-Analysis-SAR.pdf>
- World Bank.** 2023. Myanmar economic recovery falters as conflict and inflation weigh. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 January 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/12/12/economic-recovery-falters-as-conflict-and-inflation-weigh>
- World Bank.** 2023. Revenue Mobilization is Fundamental for Sri Lanka to Get on a Sustainable Fiscal Path. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 8 January 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/10/02/revenue-mobilization-is-fundamental-for-sri-lanka-to-get-on-a-sustainable-fiscal-path>
- Afghanistan**
- IPC.** 2023. Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, October 2023 – March 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Food_Insec_Oct2023_Mar2024_Report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Afghanistan Acute Malnutrition Analysis, September 2022 - April 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 2 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_Acute_Malnutrition_Oct2022_Apr2023_report.pdf
- REACH.** 2022. Mid-Year Whole of Afghanistan Assessment. April 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 2 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/mid-year-whole>

afghanistan-assessment-woaa-key-sectoral-findings-april-2022

WFP. 2023. Afghanistan Food Security Update. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 January 2024] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000154406/download/_ga=2.245301701.134873580.1704221869-1803802559.1703376351

WFP. 2023. WFP Afghanistan Situation Report. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/wfp-afghanistan-situation-report-25-june-2023>

WFP. 2023. WFP DataViz – Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 January 2024] https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation

Bangladesh

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Country Brief on Bangladesh. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=BGD&lang=ZH#:~:text=Despite%20record%20cereal%20harvests%20in,inflation%20has%20gradually%20strengthened%20since>

IFRC. 2023. Population Movement Operation (PMO) Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh: Monthly Operation Update No. 88. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/bangladesh-red-crescent-society-population-movement-operation-pmo-coxs-bazar-monthly-operation-update-july-2023>

IOM. 2023. Cyclone Mocha Response Situation Report (May 15 – 18). May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/iom-myanmar-bangladesh-cyclone-mocha-response-situation-report-may-15-18th>

IPC. 2023. Bangladesh: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis March – September 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Bangladesh_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar_Sep2023_Report.pdf

Trading Economics. 2024. Bangladesh Inflation Rate. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 6 January 2024] <https://tradingeconomics.com/bangladesh/inflation-cpi>

UN. 2023. Chattogram Division Flash Floods and Monsoon Rain HCTT Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/chattogram-division-flash-floods-and-monsoon-rain-hctt-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-august-2023-january-2024>

UNHCR. 2023. UNHCR Bangladesh 2023 Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS). January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/unhcr-bangladesh-2023-standardized-expanded-nutrition-survey-sens-final-executive-summary>

UNHCR. 2023. Afghanistan Situation Update. November 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/105137>

UNICEF. 2023. UNICEF Bangladesh Dengue Outbreak Situation Report No. 5. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/unicef-bangladesh-humanitarian-situation-report-no-5-dengue-outbreak-15-november-2023>

WFP. 2023. Bangladesh Market Monitor – May – July 2023. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/bangladesh-market-monitor-may-july-2023>

WFP. 2023. Refugee Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA-6) Report. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150568/download/>

WFP. 2023. WFP DataViz. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Government of China. 2023. Customs Statistics. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 January 2024] <http://stats.customs.gov.cn/indexEn>

WFP. 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 10 January 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/state-food-security-and-nutrition-world-sofi-report-2023>

WPK Central Committee. 2023. Rodong Sinmun (English) Report on 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee 31 December 2023.

Kyrgyzstan

ACLELD. 2023. ACELD Data Dashboard. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://acleldata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

ACLELD. 2023. South Caucasus and Central Asia: Threat of Sporadic Outbreaks of Violence Across the Region. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 21 January 2024] <https://acleldata.com/conflict-watchlist-2023/south-caucasus-and-central-asia/>

FAO. 2024. Country Brief on Kyrgyzstan. [Online] [Accessed 11 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=KGZ>

IFRC. 2023. Kyrgyzstan Flood 2023 - DREF Operation (MDRKG017). August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-flood-2023-dref-operation-mdrkg017>

IMF. 2023. IMF countries: Kyrgyz Republic. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/KGZ>

National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic and IOM. 2024. Migration of the Population of the Kyrgyz

Republic. January 2024 [Online] [Accessed 20 February 2024] https://kyrgyzstan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11321/files/documents/2024-02/stat_kniga_finish_print.pdf

WFP. 2023. Kyrgyz Republic Food Security Monitoring Update: June 2023. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyz-republic-food-security-monitoring-update-june-2023>

World Bank. 2022. Personal remittances received (% of GDP) - Kyrgyz Republic. 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=KG>

Lao People's Democratic Republic

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Country Profile: Lao People's Democratic Republic. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=LAO&lang=ar>

Trading Economics. 2024. Laos Food Inflation. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://tradingeconomics.com/laos/food-inflation>

USDA. 2024. Laos Country Summary: Corn. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/countrysummary/Default.aspx?id=LA&crop=Corn>

WFP. 2024. WFP Lao PDR: Country Brief. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/lao-peoples-democratic-republic/wfp-lao-pdr-country-brief-january-2024>

Myanmar

ACLELD. 2023. ACELD Data Dashboard. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://acleldata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

OCHA. 2023. Cyclone Mocha Flash Appeal: Myanmar. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-cyclone-mocha-flash-appeal-may-2023>

OCHA. 2023. Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enmy?gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAkp6tBhB5EiwANTCxFdkgU54BXvipj8dlhxflR4Fl_yusd2DGC-oHTmzCz3_4BKpGTxcCOuUQAvD_BwE

OCHA. 2023. Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 35. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 26 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-35-2023-year-review>

WFP. 2024. Market Monitoring Dashboard v2 Myanmar. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 26 February 2024] <https://analytics.wfp.org/#/views/MarketMonitoringDashboardv2/Basket?=&null&iid=2>

WFP. 2023. WFP DataViz – Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?iso3=MMR

Pakistan

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Country Briefs: Pakistan. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=PAK>

FAO. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation #3. November 2023. [Accessed online 10 March 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

IPC. 2023. Pakistan: IPC Acute Food Security Analysis April 2023 – January 2024. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Pakistan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_April_2023_January_2024_Report.pdf

WFP. 2023. Market Monitor Report: Pakistan. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150445/download/>

WFP. 2024. WFP DataViz – Pakistan Exchange Rate. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/asia-and-the-pacific/pakistan/economic/exchange-rates>

WFP. 2023. WFP DataViz – Pakistan Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/asia-and-the-pacific/pakistan/economic/inflation>

WFP. 2023. WFP Pakistan Floods Situation Report. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/wfp-pakistan-floods-situation-report-september-2023>

Sri Lanka

IFRC. 2023. Sri Lanka Flood 2023, DREF Operation. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-flood-2023-dref-operation-mdrk018>

OCHA. 2023. Sri Lanka Multi-Dimensional Crisis: Humanitarian Needs and Priorities (HNP), Response Overview. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-multi-dimensional-crisis-humanitarian-needs-and-priorities-hnp-response-overview-9-jun-2022-31-mar-2023#:~:text=The%20HNP%20targeted%20the%20most,million%20to%20cover%20June%2D%20September.>

UNICEF and WFP. 2023. National Nutrition and Micronutrient Survey in Sri Lanka: 2022. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.mri.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/National-Nutrition-and-Micronutrient-Survey-Sri-Lanka-2022.pdf>

WFP. 2023. WFP DataViz – Sri Lanka Inflation. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://>

- dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation?adm0=170
- WFP.** 2023. WFP Sri Lanka Country Brief. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/wfp-sri-lanka-country-brief-october-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. WFP Sri Lanka – Market Monitor. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/wfp-sri-lanka-market-monitor-september-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Household Food Security Survey. December 2023 [Online] [Accessed 11 March 2024] <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/GetUrlReputation>
- WFP and FAO.** 2022. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc1886en/cc1886en.pdf>
- WFP and FAO.** 2023. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 December 2023] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149636/download/>
- Tajikistan**
- FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Profile: Tajikistan. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=TJK&lang=ar>
- World Bank.** 2022. Tajikistan: Personal remittances received (% of GDP). December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=true
- WFP and FAO.** 2023. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Republic of Tajikistan. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en?details=CC8954EN>
- World Bank.** 2022. The World Bank in Tajikistan. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/overview>
- Vanuatu**
- Council for International Development.** 2023. End of South Pacific Cyclone Season Report 2022 – 2023. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/vanuatu/end-south-pacific-cyclone-season-report-2022-2023#:~:text=The%202022-23%20tropical%20season,at%20length%20in%20this%20report.>
- IFRC.** 2023. Cyclone Lola – Emergency Appeal: Vanuatu. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/vanuatu/vanuatu-asia-pacific-cyclone-lola-emergency-appeal-operational-strategy-mdrv0u11>
- IOM.** 2022. South Pacific Islands Crisis Response Plan 2023 – 2025. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/fiji/south-pacific-islands-crisis-response-plan-2023-2025>
- World Bank.** 2021. Climate Risk Country Profile: Vanuatu. November 2021. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/country-profiles/15825-WB_Vanuatu%20Country%20Profile-WEB.pdf
- WFP.** 2023. Vanuatu mVAM Bulletin Round 1 (May – Jun) [Accessed on 10 March 2024]. <https://www.wfp.org/publications/2023-vanuatu-mvam-bulletin-round-1-may-jun>
- EUROPE**
- Ukraine Focus**
- European Commission.** 2023. Press release: Following the expiry of the restrictive measures on Ukrainian exports of grain and other foodstuff to the EU, Ukraine agrees to introduce measures to avoid a renewed surge in EU imports. Brussels. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2023] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4497
- European Commission.** 2024. EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes. Brussels. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes_en
- FAO.** 2023. The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the War in Ukraine, July 2023 Update. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc6797en/cc6797en.pdf>
- FAO.** 2024. FAO Food Price Index, January 2024. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/>
- FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crises 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2023>
- FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crises 2023: Mid-Year Update. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2023-mid-year-update>
- IFPRI.** 2023. Eastern European farmers protest gluts of Ukraine food exports: The struggle to keep solidarity lanes open. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/eastern-european-farmers-protest-gluts-ukraine-food-exports-struggle-keep-solidarity-lanes>
- IFPRI.** 2024. Ukraine and global agricultural markets two years later, February 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/ukraine-and-global-agricultural-markets-two-years-later>
- IFPRI.** 2024. Impacts of Red Sea shipping disruptions on global food security. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/impacts-red-sea-shipping-disruptions-global-food-security>
- IFPRI.** 2024. Ukraine and global agricultural markets two years later. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/ukraine-and-global-agricultural-markets-two-years-later>
- IMF.** 2023. Fall 2023 Global Food Crisis Update—Recent Developments, Outlook, and IMF Engagement. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/IMF-Notes/2023/English/INSEA2023002-S001.ashx>
- IOM.** 2023. Ukraine internal displacement report general population survey round 14 October 2023. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. https://reliefweb.int/attachments/8e6215de-7a79-4f77-a63a-3fa226779095/IOM_Gen%20Pop%20Report_R14_Displacement_0.pdf
- NASA Harvest.** 2023. Farming Amidst a War: Satellite Data Reveals Productive Yet Challenging Season For Ukraine. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://nasaharvest.org/news/farming-amidst-war-satellite-data-reveals-productive-yet-challenging-season-ukraine#:~:text=Satellite%20imagery%20reveals%20that%20approximately,Source%3A%20NASA%20Harvest%20\(J](https://nasaharvest.org/news/farming-amidst-war-satellite-data-reveals-productive-yet-challenging-season-ukraine#:~:text=Satellite%20imagery%20reveals%20that%20approximately,Source%3A%20NASA%20Harvest%20(J)
- National Bank of Ukraine.** 2024. Inflation report. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. https://bank.gov.ua/admin_uploads/article/IR_2024-Q1_eng.pdf?v=7
- Reuters.** 2023. Ukraine says 151 ships have used Black Sea corridor. London. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-151-ships-have-used-black-sea-corridor-2023-11-17/>
- United Nations.** 2023. Decrying Escalating Attacks on Ukraine's Civilian Infrastructure, Security Council Speakers Renew Call for Russian Federation to Cease War of Aggression. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15502.doc.htm>
- United Nations.** 2023. Black Sea Grain Initiative: Data. New York. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/data>
- USDA.** 2022. Ukraine Agricultural Production and Trade, April 2022. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf>
- US EIA.** 2024. Short-term Energy Outlook, February 2024. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/Feb24.pdf>
- WFP.** 2023. Syria Country Office: Market Price Watch Bulletin, December 2023. Damascus. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156214/download/>
- WFP.** 2024. WFP DataViz: Economic Explorer – Inflation. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>
- WFP & FAO.** 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 February 2024] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000153539/download/?_ga=2.110563459.703253101.1700498571-504768152.1700498571
- World Bank.** 2024. Updated Ukraine recovery and reconstruction needs assessment. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/02/15/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released>
- World Bank.** 2024. Ukraine - Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) February 2022 – December 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099021324115085807/p1801741bea12c012189ca16d95d8c2556a>
World Bank; Government of Ukraine; European Union;
- United Nations.** 2023. Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 - February 2023. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099184503212328877/p1801740d1177f03c0ab180057556615497>
- Ukraine**
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Impacts of the war on acute food insecurity remain highest near frontlines. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] [https://fews.net/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine/targeted-analysis/september-2023#:~:text=Population%20Displacement,and%20Poland%20\(1.0%20million\).](https://fews.net/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine/targeted-analysis/september-2023#:~:text=Population%20Displacement,and%20Poland%20(1.0%20million).)
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Impacts of the war on acute food insecurity remain highest near frontlines. Washington, DC. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://fews.net/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine/targeted-analysis/september-2023>
- IOM.** 2023. Ukraine: General Population Survey - Round 14 - Snapshot Report | Population Figures and Geographic Distribution (3–25 September 2023). Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/iom-ukraine-general-population-survey-round-14-snapshot-report-population-figures-and-geographic-distribution-3-25-september-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024]

- <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enuk>
- OCHA.** 2023. Ukraine Humanitarian Response 2023: Situation Report, 11 October 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-response-2023-situation-report-11-october-2023-enuk?_gl=1*ek7k9t*_ga*NzU1MzkwODgzLjE3MDUwMDk3MDA.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwNjUzNTI0NC4xNS4xLjE3MDY1MzUyNjcuMzcuMC4w
- REACH.** 2023. Ukraine: 2023 MSNA Bulletin, November 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/35b338e0/2023-MSNA-Bulletin.pdf>
- REACH & WFP.** 2023. MSNA 2023 - Food Security Preliminary Findings, October 2023. Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2023] <https://fcluster.org/ukraine/document/reach-wfp-multi-sector-needs-assessment>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Ukraine Situation: Regional Refugee Response Plan - January-December 2024. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024]
- WFP.** 2023. Ukraine External Situation Report #44 (27 November 2023). Rome. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wfp-ukraine-external-situation-report-44-27-november-2023?_gl=1*1maxro0*_ga*NzU1MzkwODgzLjE3MDUwMDk3MDA.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwNjE4MzQ1OC4xNC4xLjE3MDYxODM1MDMuMTUuMC4w
- Moldova**
- REACH.** 2023. MSNA: Moldova 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/fae3c95f/REACH_MDA_2304_MSNA2023_Presentation_October2023.pdf
- REACH.** 2023. Moldova: MSNA Factsheet, November 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/78e4196e/REACH_Factsheet_MSNA_2023_final_version.pdf
- REACH.** 2023. Moldova: MSNA Situation Overview, December 2023. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/ddadb4a5/MDA_MSNA_SO_final_version.pdf
- UNHCR.** 2024. Ukraine Refugee Situation – Republic of Moldova. Geneva. [Online] [Accessed on 01 March 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location/10784>
- LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 10. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc9142en/cc9142en.pdf>
- FSIN.** 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC%20ONLINE%20FINAL%202020_1.pdf
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Key message Update. EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA. Excessive rainfall causes damage in Honduras, while supporting agriculture in Nicaragua. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/el-salvador-honduras-and-nicaragua/key-message-update/november-2023>
- IOM.** 2023. Haiti. Displacement Tracking Matrix. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti>
- IPC.** 2023. Haiti. Mise à jour de projection de l'analyse de Septembre 2022 Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aigüe Mars - Juin 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_ProjectionUpdate_Mar_June2023_Report_French.pdf
- IPC.** 2024. Haiti: Acute Food Security Situation Projection Update for March-June 2024. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156884/?iso3=HTI>
- IPC.** 2023. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF diciembre 2022 – agosto 2023. May 2023. [Accessed on 11 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Dec2022Aug2023_Report_Spanish.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF marzo de 2023 – febrero de 2024. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar2023Feb2024_Report_Spanish.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Haiti. Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aigüe août 2023 – juin 2024. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Aout_2023_Juin_2024_Report_Francais.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Dominican Republic IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis September 2023 - November 2023 and Projection for December 2023 - April 2024 and May 2024 - August 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on March 10 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156758/?iso3=DOM>
- OCHA.** 2024. Colombia: Plan de Respuesta a Prioridades Comunitarias 2024–2025. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-plan-de-respuesta-prioridades-comunitarias-2024-2025-marzo-2024>
- OCHA.** 2023. El Salvador: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/el-salvador/el-salvador-humanitarian-response-plan-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. Haiti. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-apercu-des-besoins-humanitaires-2023-mars-2023-fren>
- UNHCR.** 2024. Colombia. Operational Data Portal. 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024]
- WFP.** 2023. Evaluación de Seguridad Alimentaria: Migrantes y Comunidades de Acogida. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150380/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Evaluación de seguridad alimentaria: Migrantes y comunidades de acogida, Colombia. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/evaluacion-de-seguridad-alimentaria-migrantes-y-comunidades-de-acogida-colombia-mayo-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Inclusion of Venezuelan Migrants in Ecuador. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150262/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://dataviz.wfp.org/economic/inflation>
- World Bank.** 2024. Food Security Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-XCVIII-January-18-24.pdf>
- Colombia**
- ACAPS.** 2024. ACAPS Anticipatory note: Colombia - Impact of El Niño on Magdalena Medio region. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/acaps-anticipatory-note-colombia-impact-el-nino-magdalena-medio-region-24-january-2024#:~:text=Since%20August%202023%2C%20below-average,02%2F11%2F2023>
- ACLEDD.** 2024. ACLED Conflict Index. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 27 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/#:~:text=The%20world%20is%20getting%20far,both%20Afghanistan%20and%20Syria%20raged>
- ACLEDD.** 2023. Regional Overview: Latin America & the Caribbean. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] https://acleddata.com/2023/08/04/regional-overview-latin-america-the-caribbean-july-2023/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=regional-overview-latin-america-the-caribbean-july-2023
- DANE.** 2023. Encuesta nacional de arroz mecanizado (ENAM). September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/agropecuaria/encuesta-de-arroz-mecanizado>
- FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Country Briefs: Colombia. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=COL>
- Food Security Cluster and Nutrition Cluster. 2024. Colombia. Nota Metodológica: Estimación de las Personas en Necesidad - Clúster de Seguridad alimentaria y Nutrición (SAN) PiN 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/nota-metodologica-estimacion-de-las-personas-en-necesidad-cluster-de-seguridad-alimentaria-y-nutricion-san-pin-2024>
- OECD.** 2022. OECD Economic Surveys: Colombia 2022. March 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/04bf9377-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/04bf9377-en>
- R4V.** 2023. RMNA 2023 – Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.r4v.info/en/document/rmna-2023-needs-analysis>
- WFP.** 2022. Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment for Migrant Populations and Host Communities – Brief. November 2022. [Online] [Accessed 1 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/emergency-food-security-and-nutrition-assessment-migrant-populations-and-host-communities-brief>
- WFP.** 2023. Evaluación de Seguridad Alimentaria: Migrantes y Comunidades de Acogida. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150380/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://dataviz.wfp.org/economic/inflation>
- Dominican Republic**
- FAO.** 2024. Dominican Republic GIEWS Country Brief. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 10 March 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=DOM>
- IPC.** 2023. Dominican Republic: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October 2022 - February 2023 and Projection for March - June 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156125/?iso3=DOM>

- IPC.** 2023. Dominican Republic IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis September 2023 - November 2023 and Projection for December 2023 - April 2024 and May 2024 - August 2024. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156758/?iso3=DOM>
- World Bank.** 2024. Food Security Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 23 February 2023] <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-XCVIII-January-18-24.pdf>
- Ecuador**
- ACAPS.** 2023. Ecuador: Migration of Venezuelan refugees and migrants. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230919_ACAPS_briefing_note_Ecuador_Venezuelan_migrants.pdf
- ACLEDD.** 2023. The Killing of Villavicencio: A Symptom of Rising Political Violence Ahead of Ecuador's Snap Elections. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://acleddata.com/2023/08/14/the-killing-of-villavicencio-a-symptom-of-rising-political-violence-ahead-of-ecuadors-snap-elections/>
- European Commission.** 2023. ECHO Daily Flash of 07 June 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/daily-flash-archiv/4804>
- Human Rights Watch.** 2023. Ecuador: Events of 2023. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/ecuador#:~:text= Fighting%20for%20territorial%20control%2C%20the,criminal%20groups%20continues%20to%20grow>
- IFRC.** 2023. Ecuador: Floods related to the El Niño phenomenon - Early Action Protocol Activation. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ecuador/ecuador-floods-related-el-nino-phenomenon-early-action-protocol-activation-eap2020ec02-operation-no-mdrec023-23-august-2023>
- R4V.** 2023. RMNA 2023 – Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.r4v.info/en/document/rmna-2023-needs-analysis>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Ecuador: Refugee Data Finder. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=7LARHo>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Inclusion of Venezuelan Migrants in Ecuador. April 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150262/download/>
- WFP.** 2023. WFP Ecuador Country Brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 1 February 2024] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156053/download/?_ga=2.45907876.1272387923.1706741966-1803802559.1703376351
- El Salvador**
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 10 December 2023] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Key message Update. EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA. Excessive rainfall causes damage in Honduras, while supporting agriculture in Nicaragua. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/el-salvador-honduras-and-nicaragua/key-message-update/november-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. El Salvador: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/el-salvador/el-salvador-humanitarian-response-plan-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>
- Guatemala**
- FAO.** 2024. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://fpma.fao.org/giews/fpmat4/#/dashboard/tool/domestic>
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Key Message Update. Delayed harvests of staple grains keep prices high. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/guatemala/key-message-update/september-2023>
- IPC.** 2023. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF marzo de 2023 – febrero de 2024. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar2023Feb2024_Report_Spanish.pdf
- Guatemala, Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Alimentación.** 2023. Informe Situacional de Granos Básicos en Guatemala 2023. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://precios.maga.gob.gt/archivos/situacionales/Informe%20Situacional%20de%20Granos%20Ba%CC%81sicos%20en%20Guatemala%202023.pdf>
- Haiti**
- CDC.** 2023. Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report: Cholera Outbreak Haiti. September 2022-January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/72/wr/mm7202a1.htm#:~:text=Haiti%20was%20declared%20cholera-free,years%20with%20no%20>
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 9. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf>
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Mise à jour messages clés. Les impacts des intempéries accentueront les déficits de production locale, lesquels entraîneront une augmentation des prix, dans un contexte de détérioration de la stabilité sociopolitique. Novembre 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/fr/latin-america-and-caribbean/haiti/mise-jour-des-messages-clés/novembre-2023>
- IPC.** 2023. Haïti. Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë Mars - Juin 2023. March 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_ProjectionUpdate_Mar_June2023_Report_French.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Haïti. Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë Août 2023 – Juin 2024. September 2023 [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Aout_2023_Juin_2024_Report_Francais.pdf
- OCHA.** 2023. Haiti. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. March 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-aperçu-des-besoins-humanitaires-2023-mars-2023-fren>
- UNICEF.** 2023. Press Release. Nearly 3 million children need support in Haiti – highest number on record. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/nearly-3-million-children-need-support-haiti-highest-number-record>
- Honduras**
- Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S).** 2024. C3S multi-system precipitation 3-month. Seasonal spatial millimeter rain forecast [March-May 2024]. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 11 March 2024] https://climate.copernicus.eu/charts/packages/c3s_seasonal/products/c3s_seasonal_spatial_mm_rain_3m?area=area06&base_time=202403010000&type=tsum&valid_time=202404010000
- FAO.** 2023. Honduras GIEWS Country Brief. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=HND>
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Informe de Monitoreo Remoto. El Niño continuará ocasionando una baja en la disponibilidad y el acceso a alimentos en los hogares pobres. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/node/31009>
- IPC.** 2023. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF diciembre 2022 – agosto 2023. May 2023. [Accessed on 11 December 2023] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Dec2022Aug2023_Report_Spanish.pdf
- Nicaragua**
- FAO.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, Triannual Global Report No. 3. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>
- FAO.** 2024. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin No. 1. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 20 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc9657en/cc9657en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Informe de Monitoreo Remoto. Atraso en la cosecha de Primera extenderá la época de escasez de alimentos. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://fews.net/es/latin-america-and-caribbean/el-salvador-honduras-y-nicaragua/informe-de-monitoreo-remoto/junio-2023>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Key message Update. EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA. Excessive rainfall causes damage in Honduras, while supporting agriculture in Nicaragua. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 11 December 2023] <https://fews.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/el-salvador-honduras-and-nicaragua/key-message-update/november-2023>
- WFP.** 2023. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 15 December 2023] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>
- Peru**
- Connecting Business Initiative (CBI).** 2023. The historical impact of coastal El Niño in Peru and how local businesses are preparing for the global El Niño. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://www.connectingbusiness.org/news->

events/blog/Peru-dengue-El-Nino?_gl=1*1txgodf*_ga*MTMyODI4ODAzNC4xNzA0MjlyMzAz*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwNjc1NjA yNS4yOC4xLjE3MDY3NTYwNDkuMzYuMC4w

R4V. 2023. RMNA 2023 – Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://www.r4v.info/en/document/rmna-2023-needs-analysis>

UNHCR. 2023. Peru: Factsheet. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/peru-factsheet-october-2023>

UNHCR. 2023. Peru: Refugee Data Finder. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=7LARHo>

WFP. 2022. Peru: Annual Country Report 2022. December 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000148004/download/?_ga=2.243284101.1272387923.1706741966-1803802559.1703376351

WFP. 2024. Economic Explorer: Inflation. [Online] [Accessed on 22 January 2024] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic/inflation>

COUNTRIES OF CONCERN

Ecuador (residents)

ECHO. 2023. ECHO Daily Flash of 07 June 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 7 February 2024] <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/daily-flash-archive/4804>

IFRC. 2024. Ecuador: Floods related to the El Niño phenomenon - Early Action Protocol Operations Update, 22 January 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/ecuador/ecuador-floods-related-el-nino-phenomenon-early-action-protocol-operations-update-22-january-2024-eap2020ec02>

IMF. 2023. Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Developments, Outlook, and Policies. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9798400254567/CH001.xml>

IRC. 2024. Press Release. Crises in Ecuador and Haiti will shape migration in Latin America in 2024: IRC. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 15 February 2024] <https://www.rescue.org/press-release/crises-ecuador-and-haiti-will-shape-migration-latin-america-2024-irc>

US Customs and Border Protection. 2024. U.S. Border Patrol and Office of Field Operations Encounters by State. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 10 February 2024] <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters>

WFP. 2023. WFP Ecuador Country Brief. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000156053/download/>

Bolivia

IFRC. 2023. Bolivia Drought - DREF operation. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bolivia-plurinational-state/bolivia-drought-dref-operation-mdrbo015>

NASA. 2023. A Fiery October in Bolivia. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/152047/a-fiery-october-in-bolivia>

OCHA. 2023. Situation Report. Latin America & The Caribbean Weekly Situation Update (As of 11 September 2023). September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/bolivia-plurinational-state/latin-america-caribbean-weekly-situation-update-11-september-2023>

Peru (residents)

Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (BCRP). 2023. Reporte de inflación: Panorama actual y proyecciones macroeconómicas 2023-2025. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Reporte-Inflacion/2023/diciembre/report-de-inflacion-diciembre-2023.pdf>

Connecting Business Initiative (CBI). 2023. The historical impact of coastal El Niño in Peru and how local businesses are preparing for the global El Niño. July 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.connectingbusiness.org/news-events/blog/Peru-dengue-El-Nino>

IDMC. 2023. IDMC Country Profile: Peru. 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/peru/>

Save the Children. 2023. Preparación ante sequías contribuye a proteger a la niñez de comunidades altoandinas en Junín y Huancavelica. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.savethechildren.org.pe/noticias/preparacion-ante-sequias-contribuye-a-proteger-a-la-ninez-de-comunidades-altoandinas-en-junin-y-huancavelica/>

WFP. 2023. WFP Peru Country Brief, April 2023. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/wfp-peru-country-brief-april-2023#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20latest%20national,57%20percent\)%20were%20food%20insecure](https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/wfp-peru-country-brief-april-2023#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20latest%20national,57%20percent)%20were%20food%20insecure)

Bolivian Republic of Venezuela

FAO. 2024. Venezuela: GIEWS Country Briefs. February 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 11 April 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=VEN>

OCHA. 2024. Venezuela: Informe de situación, enero-febrero 2024. April 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 11 April 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/venezuela-informe-de-situacion-enero-febrero-2024>

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

3RP. 2023. Regional Strategic Overview 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 6 February 2024] www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2024RSO.pdf

CDC Global. 2024. Global Measles Outbreaks. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 20 March 2024] <https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/measles/data/global-measles-outbreaks.html>

ECHO. 2024. Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Regional Crisis. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/humanitarian-implementation-plan-hip-syria-regional-crisis-echosrbud202491000-version-1>

FAO. 2023 Agriculture and Food Security Monitoring System (AFSMS) Bulletin (July–August 2023). October 2023. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://fscluster.org/syria/document/fao-agriculture-and-food-security-9>

FAO. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation Triannual Global Report No 3 [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf>

FAO & WFP. 2023. Hunger Hotspots: Early Warnings on Acute Food Insecurity, November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/hunger-hotspots-fao-wfp-early-warnings-acute-food-insecurity-november-2023-april-2024>

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. GIEWS Country Brief: Syrian Arab Republic - 11-January-2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 7 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/giews-country-brief-syrian-arab-republic-11-january-2023>

FEWS NET. 2023. Yemen Acute Food Insecurity Classification (June 2023–January 2024) [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://lb.fews.net/yemen-acute-food-insecurity-classification-june-2023-january-2024>

FEWS NET. 2024. Yemen Acute Food Insecurity. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 17 February 2024] <https://fews.net/east-africa/yemen#:~:text=ln%20January%202024%2C%20a%20total,the%20monthly%20average%20of%202023>

IOM. 2022. Syrian Arab Republic Crisis Response Plan 2023. December 2022 [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/syrian-arab-republic-crisis-response-plan-2023>

IOM. Syrian Arab Republic Crisis Response Plan 2024. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 2 February 2024] <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/syrian-arab-republic-crisis-response-plan-2024>

IPC. 2023. Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 24 November - 7 December 2023 and Projection for 8 December 2023 - 7 February 2024 [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156749/>

IPC. 2023. Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for October 2023–March 2024 and Projection for April 2024–September 2024 [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156728/>

IPC. 2024. Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 15 February–15 March 2024 and Projection for 16 March–15 July 2024. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed 28 March 2024]. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156872/>

IPC. 2022. Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update October–December 2022 [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156028/>

IDMC. 2023. Shaken to the core in Syria. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 7 February 2024] [https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/shaken-core-syria#:~:text=Despite%20recent%20reductions%20in%20conflict,earthquake%20\(see%20below%20map](https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/shaken-core-syria#:~:text=Despite%20recent%20reductions%20in%20conflict,earthquake%20(see%20below%20map)

Middle East Council on Global Affairs. 2023. Breaking the cycle: How can the MENA region tackle food insecurity? February 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 4 February 2024] <https://mecouncil.org/publication/breaking-the-cycle-how-can-the-mena-region-tackle-food-insecurity/>

OCHA. 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact, day 108. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-day-108>

OCHA. 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | flash update #99. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <http://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-99>

OCHA. 2024. Syrian Arab Republic: 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2024-humanitarian-needs-overview-february-2024>

OCHA. 2023. Global Humanitarian Overview 2024, Middle East and North Africa [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2024/article/middle-east-and-north-africa-1>

OCHA. 2023. Syrian Arab Republic: 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview (December 2023) [Accessed: 01 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2024-humanitarian-needs-overview-december-2023>

OCHA. Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt) Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 6 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/occupied-palestinian-territory-opt-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-january-2023>

- OCHA.** Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023. December 2022. [Online] [Accessed: 4 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-december-2022-enar#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20an%20estimated%2021.6,people%20in%20need%20in%202022.>
- UNDP.** 2023. Gaza War: Preliminary Findings on the Socio-Economic and Environmental Impact on Lebanon. [Online] [Accessed: 01 February 2024] [https://www.undp.org/lebanon/publications/gaza-war-preliminary-findings-socio-economic-and-environmental-impact-lebanon.](https://www.undp.org/lebanon/publications/gaza-war-preliminary-findings-socio-economic-and-environmental-impact-lebanon)
- UNHCR.** 2023. UNHCR Algeria Fact Sheet - April 2023. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 6 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/algeria/unhcr-algeria-fact-sheet-april-2023>
- UN Women.** 2024. Gender Alert: The Gendered Impact of the Crisis in Gaza. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 20 February 2024] <https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/Gender%20Alert%20The%20Gendered%20Impact%20of%20the%20Crisis%20in%20Gaza.pdf>
- WFP.** 2024. WFP Yemen Food Security Update, January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 3 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-food-security-update-january-2024>
- WHO.** 2023. Yemen: Alarming Surge in Measles and Rubella Cases. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 3 February 2024] <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1140272>
- Gaza focus**
- FAO, European Union & CIRAD.** 2023. Food Systems Profile – Palestine. Catalysing the sustainable and inclusive transformation of food systems. Rome, Brussels and Montpellier, France. 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 24 February 2024] <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc7323en>
- FAO.** 2024. Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/geospatial/resources/detail/en/c/1676364/>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Impacts of the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip on markets in the Middle East region. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://fewsn.net/sites/default/files/202312/Middle%20East%20Regional%20Markets%20Analysis.pdf>
- Global Nutrition Cluster.** 2024. Nutrition Vulnerability and Situational Analysis. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 21 February 2024] <https://www.nutritioncluster.net/resources/nutrition-vulnerability-and-situational-analysis-gaza>
- IFPRI.** 2024. Long-lasting devastation to livelihoods from damage to agricultural lands in Gaza. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 25 February 2024] <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/long-lasting-devastation-livelihoods-damage-agricultural-lands-gaza>
- IMF.** 2023. West Bank and Gaza: Selected Issues. September 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2023/327/article-A001-en.xml>
- IPC.** 2023. IPC Famine Review Committee. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Report_Gaza.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. IPC Global Initiative: Special Brief Gaza Strip. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 8 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Nov2023_Feb2024.pdf
- IPC.** 2024. Gaza Strip: Famine is imminent as 1.1 million people, half of Gaza, experience Catastrophic food insecurity. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 20 March 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-97/en/>
- MSF.** 2023. No safe place in Gaza as people are crushed by continuous bombing. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://www.msf.org/no-safe-place-gaza-people-are-crushed-continuous-bombing>
- MSNA.** 2022. MSNA 2022 Cross-Sectoral Findings: Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 2022 conducted in the occupied Palestinian territory. July 2022. [Online] [Accessed on 7 February 2024] <https://www.ochaopt.org/msna/2022/MSNA-Cross-cutting-Report-2022.pdf>
- OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel Flash Update #100. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 31 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-100-enhe>
- OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel: Flash Update #106. January 2024. [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-106>
- OCHA.** 2023. Humanitarian Needs Overview and Humanitarian Response Plan 2023. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 29 January 2024] <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-needs-overview-and-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-dashboard>
- OCHA.** 2024. Lebanon: Flash Update #12 - Escalation of hostilities in south Lebanon. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 28 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-12-escalation-hostilities-south-lebanon-21-february-2024>
- PCBS.** 2023. Presents the Main Findings of Labour Force Survey in 2022. February 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 12 January 2024] <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&itemID=4421>
- OCHA.** 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #99 [Online] [Accessed 15 April 2023] <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-99-enarhe>
- UNCTAD.** 2024. Preliminary assessment of the economic impact of the destruction in Gaza and prospects for economic recovery. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 3 February 2024] [https://unctad.org/publication/preliminary-assessment-economic-impact-destruction-gaza-and-prospects-economic-recovery#:~:text=The%20International%20Labour%20Organization%20\(ILO-\),unemployment%20reached%2079.3%20per%20cent](https://unctad.org/publication/preliminary-assessment-economic-impact-destruction-gaza-and-prospects-economic-recovery#:~:text=The%20International%20Labour%20Organization%20(ILO-),unemployment%20reached%2079.3%20per%20cent)
- UNCTAD.** 2023. Prior to current crisis, decades-long blockade hollowed Gaza's economy, leaving 80% of population dependent on international aid. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://unctad.org/press-material/prior-current-crisis-decades-long-blockade-hollowed-gazas-economy-leaving-80>
- UNDP.** 2023. Expected socioeconomic impacts of the Gaza war on neighbouring countries in the Arab region. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-12/2302056e-policybrief-expected-socio-economic-impacts-escwa-undp-web-2.pdf>
- UNRWA.** 2024. State of Palestine: Gaza Supplies and Dispatch Tracking. March 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 4 March 2024] https://data.humdata.org/dataset/state-of-palestine-gaza-aid-truck-data?force_layout=desktop
- UNRWA.** 2024. UNRWA Situation Report #81 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 5 February 2024] <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-81-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem>
- UNRWA.** 2023. Where we work: Gaza Strip. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 30 January 2024] <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip>
- UNESCO.** 2017. Gaza ten years later. July 2017. [Online] [Accessed on 29 January 2024] https://unesco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/gaza_10_years_later_-_11_july_2017.pdf
- WFP.** 2023. Gaza - Food Security Assessment. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/gaza-food-security-assessment-december-2023>
- WHO.** 2023. Gaza food utilization. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 28 January 2024] <https://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/3160/3160358/>
- WHO.** 2024. oPt Emergency Situation Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 18 February 2024] https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/Sitrep_-_issue_22.pdf
- Algeria**
- SRRP.** 2023. Sahrawi Refugee Response Plan (SRRP). February 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 12 February 2024] <https://algeria.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/SRRP%20-%20English.pdf>
- Armenia**
- ACAPS.** 2023. Armenia-Azerbaijan Briefing note 06 October 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh: Humanitarian impact of the military offensive. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20231006_ACAPS_briefing_note_Armenia_Azerbaijan_Nagorno-Karabakh_Humanitarian_impact_of_the_military_offensive.pdf
- UNHCR.** 2023. Armenia Refugee Response Plan. October 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 18 January 2024] https://reporting.unhcr.org/libraries/pdf.js/web/viewer.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Freporting.unhcr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2023-10%2FArmenia%2520Emergency%2520RRP%2520-%2520Inter-Agency%2520Appeal%2520-9%2520October%25202023_PDF.pdf
- WFP.** 2023. Market Price Monitoring Bulletin (Issue No. 21: November 2023). [Online] [Accessed on 20 January 2024] <https://www.wfp.org/publications/market-price-monitoring-bulletin-issue-no-21-november-2023>
- Egypt**
- UNHCR.** UNHCR: New Population Movement from Sudan - Egypt (As of 11 January 2024). [Online] [Accessed: 9 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/egypt/unhcr-new-population-movement-sudan-egypt-11-january-2024>
- Iraq**
- 3RP.** Regional Strategic Overview 2024 (advanced version). January 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 10 February 2024] https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2024RSO_advanced_version.pdf
- The Islamic Republic of Iran (Afghan refugees)
- UNHCR.** Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan Situation. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://reporting.unhcr.org/afghanistan-regional-refugee-response-plan-summary>
- Trading Economics.** Iran indicators. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/indicators>
- Jordan (Syrian refugees)**
- 3RP.** Regional Strategic Overview 2024 (advanced version). January 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 10 February 2024] https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2024RSO_advanced_version.pdf

Lebanon

IPC. 2023. Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for October 2023 - March 2024 and Projection for April 2024 - September 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 10 February 2024] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156728/?iso3=LBN>

IPC. 2023. Lebanon's food insecurity persists as economic crisis continues. August 2023. [Online] [Accessed: 4 February 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Lebanon_Acute_Food_Insecurity_May2023_Oct2023_Report.pdf

OCHA. Lebanon: At a Glance - Escalation of hostilities in South Lebanon, as of 16 January 2024. [Online] [Accessed: 5 February 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-glance-escalation-hostilities-south-lebanon-16-january-2024>

UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF. 2022. Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. [Online] [Accessed: 7 February 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149219/download/>

WFP. WFP Lebanon Country Brief, September 2022. [Online] [Accessed: 10 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/wfp-lebanon-country-brief-september-2022>

Libya

IFRC. 2023. November 2023. Revised Emergency Appeal. Libya- Flood Storm Daniel. [Online] [Accessed on 12 February 2024] <https://www.ifrc.org/emergency/libya-storm-daniel>

OCHA. 2023. Libya Humanitarian Overview 2023 (December 2022). January 2023. [Accessed on 10 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-humanitarian-overview-2023-december-2022>

OCHA. 2023. Libya Flood Response Flash Appeal September to December 2023. September 2023. [Accessed on 11 February 2024] https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-flood-response-flash-appeal-sept-2023-dec-2023-issued-september-2023-enar?_gl=1*ojud2*_ga*MTY0NjQ4NDAwOC4xNzAwMTQyNDgy*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwNzgzNTg4NS43Ny4wLjE3MDC4MzU4ODUuNjAuMC4w

UNHCR. 2024. Libya Registration Dashboard. 1 January 2024. January 2024. [Accessed on 8 February 2024] <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/lby>

World Bank. 2024. Libya Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment. January 2024. [Accessed on 13 February 2024] <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099353101242428521/pdf/IDU153d4e1711e33e145321b8881cf996ea3acf7.pdf>

Palestine (Gaza)

Global Nutrition Cluster. 2024. Nutrition Vulnerability and Situational Analysis. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed

on 21 February 2024] <https://www.nutritioncluster.net/resources/nutrition-vulnerability-and-situation-analysis-gaza>

IPC. 2023. IPC Global Initiative: Special Brief Gaza Strip. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Nov2023_Feb2024.pdf

IPC. 2023. IPC Famine Review Committee. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Report_Gaza.pdf

UNICEF. 2024. Intensifying conflict, malnutrition and disease in the Gaza Strip creates a deadly cycle that threatens over 1.1 million children. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/intensifying-conflict-malnutrition-and-disease-gaza-strip-creates-deadly-cycle>

UNRWA. 2024. UNRWA Situation Report #81 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 14 January 2024] <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-81-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem>

WFP. 2024. WFP Gaza Market Monitor Flash Update #5. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 13 January 2024] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000155435/download/>

UNICEF. December 2023. <https://www.unicef.org/stories/winter-weather-heightens-dangers-gazas-children> (TO BE CONFIRMED)

Palestine (West Bank)

ACLED. 2023. The Resurgence of Armed Groups in the West Bank and Their Connections to Gaza. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/2023/12/14/the-resurgence-of-armed-groups-in-the-west-bank-and-their-connections-to-gaza/Food-Security-Cluster>. 2023. West Bank Situation Overview #2. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://fscluster.org/state-of-palestine/document/west-bank-situation-overview-2-20231214>

ILO. 2023. Palestinian unemployment rate year-on-year is set to nearly double as a result of escalation of hostilities in Gaza. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 13 January 2024] https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_907149/lang-en/index.htm

OCHA. 2024. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel Flash Update #87. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 15 January 2024] <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-87>

UNDP. November 2023. General Assembly Informal Briefing On The Humanitarian Situation in Gaza. Accessed March 10 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 17 January 2024] <https://www.undp.org/speeches/general-assembly-informal-briefing-humanitarian-situation-gaza>

Syrian Arab Republic

ACAPS. 2024. Syria country analysis. February 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 8 February 2024] <https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/syria>

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Syrian Arab Republic Country Brief. January 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 9 February 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SYR&lang=es#:~:text=Despite%20the%20below%E2%80%91average%20production,the%20country's%20ability%20to%20finance>

Insecurity Insight. 2023. Syria: Humanitarian Operations and Conflict-related Sensitivity (October 2023). [Online] [Accessed on 8 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-humanitarian-operations-and-conflict-related-sensitivity-october-2023>

OCHA. 2023. Syria: Facing the dual challenge of climate change and conflict. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 8 February 2024] <https://unocha.exposure.co/syria-facing-the-dual-challenge-of-climate-change-and-conflict>

OCHA. 2023. Syrian Arab Republic: Cross-Border Humanitarian Reach and Activities from Türkiye (July 2023). November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 6 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-cross-border-humanitarian-reach-and-activities-turkiye-july-2023>

REACH. 2023. Three Years into the Water Crisis in Northeast Syria: Main Gaps and Adaptation Efforts Going Ahead. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 7 February 2024] https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/reach/30e49387/REACH-SYR_Brief_Water-Crisis-in-NES_November2023.pdf

World Bank. 2023. Syria Economic Monitor, Summer 2023 : The Economic Aftershocks of Large Earthquakes (English). [Online] [Accessed on 4 February 2024] <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099540309012311026/idu0a8823acd034ac04efd0abc20842c479023f4>

Turkiye

UNHCR. Inter-Agency Protection Needs Assessment, Round 7 – August 2023. November 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 3 February 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/inter-agency-protection-needs-assessment-round-7-august-2023>

DGMM. 2024. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Management. February 2024 [Online] [Accessed on 4 March 2024] <https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27>

Yemen

ACLED. 2024. Yemen and the Red Sea: Rising Tensions Threaten Peace Process and International Security. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/yemen/>

European Commission. 2023. Echo Daily Flash – 13 June 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/daily-flash-archive/4808>

FAO. 2023. Yemen Quarterly Food Security Update. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-quarterly-food-security-update-december-2023>

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Country Profile: Yemen. May 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=YEM&lang=zh>

IEP. 2023. Global Peace Index 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf>

IOM. 2023. Yemen – Rapid Displacement Tracking Update (10 – 16 December 2023). December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] [https://dtm.iom.int/reports/yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-update-10-16-december-2023#:~:text=From%201%20January%20to%2016,individuals\)%20displaced%20at%20least%20once](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-update-10-16-december-2023#:~:text=From%201%20January%20to%2016,individuals)%20displaced%20at%20least%20once)

IPC. 2023. Yemen IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis January – December 2023. June 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_JanDec2023_Report_English.pdf

UNDP. 2023. The Impact of Climate Change on Human Development in Yemen. December 2023. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://www.undp.org/arab-states/publications/impact-climate-change-human-development-yemen>

WFP. 2024. WFP Yemen Food Security Update. January 2024. [Online] [Accessed on 16 January 2024] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-yemen-food-security-update-january-2024>



Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP in 2016, the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors committed to addressing the root causes of food crises and finding lasting solutions to them, through shared analysis and knowledge, strengthened coordination in evidence-based responses and collective efforts across the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) nexus.



The Food Security Information Network (FSIN) is a technical global platform for the exchange of expertise, knowledge and best practices on food security and nutrition analysis. Its purpose is to promote timely, independent and consensus-based information about food crises, while also highlighting and addressing critical data gaps. As a key partner of the GNAFC, FSIN coordinates the publication of the *Global Report on Food Crises*.